The Rafale and what you know about it.

SPECTRA

At first, this was an ordinary system used for self-protection of the Rafale, quite classic all in all, but nonetheless with remarkable performance, so that it was increasingly used for purposes other than self-protection. What's unusual, at first, is that it has a built-in jammer that can be used in a wide range of frequencies in conjunction with a DRFM. It also detects using interferometric techniques. The combination of the two means that it can locate threats and therefore jam them in a directive manner, which is more discreet than a Growler, just as effective if not more so, and requires less energy. But the SPECTRA system was sanctified on 5 April 2010 at 10.30am, the day Bill Sweetman published his article "A Stealthier Rafale? In this article he talked about "active cancellation", i.e. the possibility of SPECTRA being capable of analysing incoming radar signals and duplicating them by shifting them by half a phase so as to electronically cancel out the signal returning to the enemy radar.

SPECTRA and CARBONE

Carbone is a demonstrator of a jamming escort system that replaces dedicated platforms and crews with a combination of integrated systems comprising a jammer with very high transmitted power and real-time control of multiple beams. This is mounted in an automatic pod carried by a multi-role fighter for the jamming mission.

Carbone is significantly more powerful than existing or upgraded offensive pods. Carbone uses a DRFM receiver and real-time geolocation algorithms, such as those implemented in Spectra.

Operational trials have demonstrated the effectiveness of Carbone (NATO MACE X field trials in August 2000).


1701190190295.png


The philosophy behind Carbone was to analyse the incoming signal using interferometry, locate the transmitter, reproduce the signal using DRFM, and send it back to the transmitter several times. So it's not just white noise like other offensive jammers.

But you have to remember that Carbone was just a demonstrator, perhaps the aim was just to demonstrate a real-time ability to reproduce the signal. Because if you're able to do that in real time, there's no doubt that you'll be able to modify the replica slightly to make more intelligent jamming.

Finally, the technologies are the same as for SPECTRA: DRFM, localisation, but the power is greater and the jamming approach is less intelligent. The corresponding operational system is perhaps SPECTRA.

How does SPECTRA work?

First you need to know your own aircraft's 'signature' perfectly. Because of the complexity of SPECTRA processing, the Rafale is starting to simplify its signature: the aircraft is designed so that its unprocessed radar signature is concentrated in a few strong 'peaks' which are then 'attenuated' by the selective use of RAM. The collection of these few strong peaks is the Rafale 'model'.

Secondly, it would be nice to cancel out the reflected radar signal. The original incoming radar signal will be reflected by the spikes. Each spike will produce an individual reflection with its own, often unique, amplitude and phase. The return signal, picked up by the radar, would be somewhat chaotic, consisting of background noise and "spikes". By removing these 'spikes' from the radar screen, the aircraft can blend into the background noise, which is normally ignored by radar operators.

If you look at where SPECTRA's active antennas are, surprisingly they are close to areas that can generate spikes.

To suppress these spikes, the aircraft, when painted by a radar, transmits a signal that mimics the echo that the radar will receive from the spikes, but half a wavelength out of phase, so that the radar sees no return. The advantage of this technique is that it uses very low power compared with conventional EW and provides no indication of the presence of the aircraft; the challenge is that it requires very fast processing. This rapid processing has been demonstrated by Carbone.
 
Spectra and location


If a radar transmits a pulse, it will generally arrive at slightly different times on two spatially separated receiving antennas, the TDOA (Time Difference Of Arrival) being due to the different distances of each antenna from the radar. In fact, for a pair of antennas, there is a set that is the location of the transmitters that would give the same TDOA measurement. In 2D this is a hyperbola, in 3D a hyperboloid.


1701192340946.png


Note that the receivers don't need to know the absolute time at which the pulse was transmitted - only the time difference.

Now consider a third receiver at a third location. This would provide a second TDOA measurement and therefore locate the radar on a second hyperboloid. The intersection of these two hyperboloids describes a curve on which the radar is located.

If a fourth receiver is now introduced, a third TDOA measurement is available and the intersection of the resulting third hyperboloid with the curve already found defines a single point in space. The location of the radar is therefore determined entirely in 3D.

Interferometry

Measuring a phase is a distance measurement: you have to imagine the wave as a helix where you advance by the wavelength when you have made a complete turn, so 2ft radiating corresponds to the wavelength, or about 3 cm in the X band. The problem is that this is a precise distance measurement modulo wavelength. The same phase difference can correspond to a distance of 10 cm or 13 cm or 37 cm etc ... if the wavelength is 3 cm. In practice, all we do is refine the accuracy of a measurement by measuring the phase. With the previous measurement and a rough measurement at 21.5 cm, we will know from the phase measurement that the measurement is 22 cm with a high degree of accuracy. We then convert this distance into time, taking into account the speed of light.

We have seen that the position of a radar can be calculated by measuring the time difference between the arrival of the signal on two antennas separated by a known distance. To measure a delay, correlations can be made between the signals received by one antenna and those received by the other. The signals from one antenna are shifted in time relative to those from the other until a correlation is obtained. The time used for this correlation is the time difference between the arrival of the signals from the two antennas. This is the DTOA processing described in more detail in the first paragraph.

Depending on the number of antennae receiving the signal and their location, it will be possible to locate the Radar or just obtain its direction. The antennae have known positions by design, but they must not move in relation to each other, so interferometry is NOT recommended if the antennae are on the wingtips; they must be on a rigid part of the aircraft if you do not want to lose the advantage of the accuracy of the measured delay.

Interferometry is not magic, but it is what allows Spectra to make precise measurements of direction and sometimes even location, and we shall see that it is this ability that gives magical results.
 
In signal processing, cross-correlation is a measure of the similarity of two waveforms as a function of a time shift applied to one of them. For continuous functions f and g, cross-correlation is defined as:

1701192855506.png


where f * is the complex conjugate of f and t is time.

For example, if we consider two real functions differing only by an unknown offset in x. We can use cross-correlation to find out by how much we need to shift the x's to superimpose them. The formula involves calculating for each point x the integral of the product of the two functions. When the functions overlap, the value of the product is maximised. In fact, if the extreme values are superimposed, they contribute strongly to the integral, whether the value is positive or negative, because the product of two negative numbers is positive.

If the functions have complex values, taking the conjugate guarantees that the extremes with imaginary components will contribute positively to the integral.

The convolution product of two real or complex functions f and g is another function, usually written as "
1701192927200.png
" and defined as :

1701192985237.png


So

1701193036786.png


This equality is used in signal processing to reduce processing times. The Fourier transform of a convolution product is obtained by multiplying the Fourier transforms of the functions, so if f and g have integrable squares then:

1701193133810.png


The main advantage of calculating the convolution product using Fourier transforms is that these operations are less time-consuming for a computer than calculating the integral directly. The latter formula can be used to efficiently calculate the cross-correlation of two signals or the self-correlation of the same signal received at different times.

This specialised calculation was first carried out by general-purpose computers, but it is now possible to make massively parallel components dedicated to this function alone. For use in GPS receivers, Global Locate produced a component with 16,000 correlators before 2010; today we must have exceeded 100,000!

I intend to show some possible applications of this approach and technology.
 
The first application that springs to mind concerning the use of the correlators I mentioned in the previous post is that relating to RWRs. Since we know nothing about the threat, we need to monitor all the frequencies and delays within the limit of the light propagation time between the antenna doublet we're using. The frequency/time plane is divided into elementary cells in which the correlation will be tested.

The finer the slice, the more sensitive the detection: the superposition is never perfect because time is discretised and the frequency is subject to a different Doppler effect for each antenna. The finer the cut, the better the superposition and the stronger the correlation.

If we had a single correlator (or a general-purpose computer), we would have to perform the calculation successively for all the times and frequencies, which could take longer than the acquisition, and we would therefore be obliged to enlarge the mesh and therefore reduce sensitivity. So we can see the advantage of having a chip with 100,000 correlators. And there's nothing to stop you using several of them.

There are two techniques for achieving good precision in direction measurement: you can increase the distance between the antennas, but then you have to increase the size of the element in the time/frequency plane to be measured. You can also measure the phase of the signal, which will give a precise delay and therefore a precise direction.

But it's not just RWR. Radar can also use this technique. Radar knows very well what pulse it has sent out, so it is well placed to test the return using the technique described above. Since what it is looking for is precise, it will be able to devote a lot of time (making a fine cut) to detection.

For example, if the radar has used a long pulse to spread the energy over time and increase its stealth, detecting the return with correlators amounts to compressing the pulse as if it were short and with the same energy.
 
So what makes Spectra special?

We must put on record that there is consistent evidence that Spectra is capable of automatically processing waveforms in real time, a technology that the US does not yet have, as the director of DARPA has admitted. They are only now starting to work on this technology, which we have been using for over a decade. By combining it with SPECTRA's extraordinary localisation capabilities, it makes it possible to create jammers that are far more intelligent than those used by the Growlers. And it is likely to enable "active cancellation".

Indeed:

  • For radar to have good range performance, it has to be able to recognise its signal, so there's no need to cancel it out completely, just alter it a little so that the return signal no longer correlates with the replica of the transmitted signal.
  • You don't need to modify the first pulse for it to work, but you do need a series of pulses that exceeds a few units to produce a signal that can be distinguished from the others and from the noise.
  • The technique that seems to be used is to make a sort of adaptive mirror (this is of course an image to show how we can manage with such fast phenomena), a mirror that can amplify or attenuate the signal received according to the known signature of the Rafale and the geometry of the threat in relation to the aircraft. This adaptation is in real time but it doesn't evolve by the microsecond, it's the 'reflection' on this mirror that implements these extremely short times.
  • In the X-band, the wavelength is of the order of 3 cm, and we only have the time taken for the light to travel 1.5 cm to make the 'reflection' if we want to process the first pulse... But the difficulty for stealth aircraft is to counter the longer wavelengths: if we use an absorbent material whose thickness is the same as the wavelength, we can locally add 3 cm, but we couldn't add 1 m! On the other hand, 1 m makes active cancellation easier...
So that's an advantage that allows the Rafale to surprise many people.

Now to the question of localisation

I have shown that the accuracy of the direction measured by SPECTRA is greatly underestimated in official communications.

There are three antennae, which gives us the direction of the threat in 3D and therefore enables us to locate threats on the ground (this is the intersection of the direction with the ground). With 4 antennae, we could even locate airborne threats. The reason why this has not been done is probably because it would be too imprecise, and the antennae would have to be spread out over greater distances than the Rafale for it to work properly.

In addition to direction measurement, Doppler measurement on the enemy radar, when possible, enables SPECTRA to continue to track an air track only passively. By integrating the radial speed, it is possible to calculate distance differences which, when added to the old distance, give the new distance.

Locating enemy radars allows the general situation to be updated thanks to data fusion, and enables jammers to focus their processing on areas where it is useful, which is more discreet and saves energy.

Multistatic radar


I'm going to explain how these techniques could be used for on-board multistatic radar. There is still some preparation to be done. I'm going to give some explanations based on examples taken from navigation satellites.

It's important to realise that from a detection point of view, the performance of satellite navigation receivers is extraordinary. The satellites are 20,000 km away, the transmission power is just a few watts, the receivers don't have fancy antennas, and yet they work.

The detection method is the one I've described, but for it to be effective the signal has to be coded with what we call "gold" codes because they give a high degree of auto-correlation and a low degree of cross-correlation. This is how coding works:

1701207265521.png

A pure frequency would not allow this principle of searching by correlation. In addition to coding, the signal can include data:

1701207300809.png

And this can be useful, as we shall see.

Why explain all this? The first thing to understand is that radars, transmissions, jammers and navigation satellites use electromagnetic techniques that can converge; and the military signal from navigation satellites has some very interesting characteristics.

First of all, we know how to restrict its use to allies: we know how to 'encrypt' the signal so that it cannot be used by those who do not have the key. You'll understand if I say no more. We also know how to protect it against jamming, spoofing and all the techniques of electronic warfare. Which is amazing, because it's an extremely weak signal.

Secondly, the collaboration of several platforms to form an extended sensor comes up against the problem of precise timing, which is at the heart of the navigation system's ability to solve the problem of localisation.

If 4 satellites are needed to obtain coordinates, this is because the unknowns in the problem to be solved are the three spatial coordinates and the time coordinate. Users of a navigation system therefore have at their disposal a shared time base that has the quality and precision of an atomic clock.
 
  • Love
Reactions: Herciv
The aim of the TRAGEDAC upstream study, notified in 2010, is to create a networked passive 3D location system for the Rafale and future combat UAVs, to make it easier to establish a tactical situation, and to improve the responsiveness and coordination of fire control during patrols. The solution must be able to operate in real time using information from the sensors on the networked aircraft.

The idea is to be able to increase the accuracy of locating an enemy by using non-emissive methods (Spectra and optronic frontal sector) and by sharing the information gathered within a patrol, for example via link 16. In particular, to determine the distance to the target, which is the most difficult data to estimate using only passive means. This is a purely software modification which, according to the DGA, would be particularly complex to implement from the point of view of data synchronisation between aircraft. The first test flights are due to start at the end of the year to collect data.

What possible solution could there be? The simplest solution seems to be to use Link 16. But on link 16 we transmit tracks, and an ESM bearing is a track, but if we do nothing more we'll lose a lot of measurements because the track has to be maintained by the participating unit with the best track quality.

That's not what we want. We want measurements from different aircraft to enable triangulations, and we want to be able to feed all this into a Kalman filter so that it can give us a speed-route position of the target. Above all, we don't want to lose any measurements.

If there were only one track, this would be relatively easy, but as there are several, we need to be able to allocate the ESM readings to each of the targets we want to track without making a mistake. For the Kalman filter to work properly, the measurements will have to be dated using a common and precise time base, and I explained how this is possible in a previous post. To attribute the correct measurements to the target, we'll have to rely on the technical analysis of the signal made by each of the aircraft.

Is Link 16 suitable for this? There is a problem of insufficient throughput and latency. And Link 16 is not passive! The proof is that the aircraft in the patrol are supposed to receive it.

So SPECTRA offers the possibility of directional jamming with AESA antennas, and these antennas are positioned so that they cover 360°. We have the hardware to create a dedicated link that will be discreet because it is directional.

But we can go even further, we can want to do auto-correlation between an antenna on one aircraft and one on another aircraft. Having a dedicated link will make this easier, because we won't be constrained by the link 16 protocol.

Considerably increasing the distance between the antennae will improve accuracy, even beyond that which is possible with interferometry, as the position error (of the order of 5 m) will be small compared with the distance between the antennae. On the other hand, the processing must take into account a wider range of delays, which increases the computing power required to remain in real time.

The fact that the antennae are further apart also makes the difference in Doppler significant and further increases the volume of processing required. On the other hand, the Doppler is a measure of radial velocity which can greatly facilitate the convergence of the Kalman filter.
 
  • Love
Reactions: Herciv
Once Tragedac has been built, 80% of a multistatic radar has been completed. It is assumed that AESAs are used as transmitters and PESAs (which have reduced performance compared with AESAs, but only in transmission, so priority is given to using them in reception) or AESAs as passive receivers. The AESA emits and transmits on the dedicated link the data enabling the PESA to build a replica of its signal. The PESA will then be able to detect the direct signal (Spectra for example) and the reflected signal (with its PESA antenna) by correlation with the replica it has built. As we have seen, the signal is coded and can contain data. The signal can therefore contain the position of the transmitter (x,y,z,t) and the orientation of the antenna.

The delay of the reflected signal relative to the date of transmission defines a locus of the target positions, which is an ellipse, and the orientation of the antenna defines a straight line whose intersection with the ellipse gives the position of the target. Of course, the common time base is still that of the satellite navigation system.

If we are detecting, all we need to do is measure the delays without worrying about the direction: each delay produces an ellipse, which is larger or smaller depending on the delay, and which determines the distance. For the direction, it's not the reception that counts but the direction in which the signal was sent, i.e. the orientation of the transmitting AESA antenna (which is data included in the signal).
 
  • Love
Reactions: Herciv
I'm going to try to explain why France has not opted for the 'all stealth' approach when it comes to aeronautical weapons.

In fact, in many respects, the French (industry and research) have been and are forerunners in the field of stealth. The first class of stealth combat ships in the world was the Lafayette class. Even today, French ships are among the most stealthy in the world, if not THE most stealthy in the world (sometimes to the detriment of pure offensive and defensive capabilities, but this is a conscious choice). The Apache missile, which gave rise to the Scalp family, was also highly innovative in terms of stealth, and confirmed France's position as European leader in aeronautical stealth technologies.

But mastering the theory and the industrial tools is one thing. Developing a combat tool is quite another.

Here, cost comes into play, but not exclusively.

When it was decided to integrate stealth technologies into the Rafale, the objective was clearly stated as being to maintain a good balance between aerodynamic capabilities and all-round stealth.

In other words, stealth is a plus, but not the Holy Grail, and it is out of the question to sacrifice the aircraft's performance and ease/cost of maintenance simply to equip it with a stealth capability that will only be useful in less than 5% of cases.

And this logic has prevailed throughout France's major aeronautical programmes. There's no point in spending a huge amount of money to develop machines that are a pain to maintain in the field (particularly OPEX in Africa, which is hardly a problem for the USAF, which almost never sends its fighters there) when full stealth will only be needed occasionally in any case.

Especially when France is at the cutting edge in certain tactical areas that can accomplish the same things as stealth, with a different method.

Let me give you some examples:

  • For the nuclear mission, at the time of the development of the ASMP, then the ASMP-A, and still today its successor, the question has always been whether it was better to favour stealth over speed (the American choice) or hypervelocity over stealth (particularly IR, obviously). The studies carried out so far have shown that it would be better to develop an ultra-fast missile, especially as France has extremely good expertise in ramjet technology.

  • As far as combat helicopters are concerned, the Tiger incorporates a huge amount of stealth technology, and is currently the stealthiest modern combat helicopter on the market (if we exclude certain models dedicated mainly to reconnaissance). It could have been MORE stealthy, as the RAH-66 tried to be. Technically, this was possible, but it would have entailed operational compromises that were not acceptable: a fenestron required a lighter and therefore less autonomous airframe, a payload armament required a larger and therefore less visually stealthy airframe (and, apart from human observers, let's not forget that some short-range flak/SAM systems are still guided by visual signatures), etc etc.

Given that the main threats to a close combat helicopter are small arms and heat-guided missiles, it would have been stupid to reduce the helicopter's manoeuvrability and defensive performance in order to increase its stealth.

The Americans thought that their stealth technology would make sense on a combat helicopter, but they were soon disillusioned and returned to a more conventional vision of things in this area.

  • On the Rafale, the presence of internal jamming systems on each aircraft (rather than the use of specialised aircraft to accompany raids) and the tactical penetration capability maintained by France meant that the Rafales were able to operate over Libya from the first day of the fighting without any special support.

The US procedure, on the other hand, would have required the use of stealth aircraft or, alternatively, a joint heavy strike using Tomahawk cruise missiles prior to the deployment of non-stealth aircraft. Two different concepts, two different methods.

  • As far as the FREMM frigates are concerned, the French version is much less armed than the Italian version (the same applies to the Horizons) in terms of close-in defence, but the absence of an aft gun, a radar positioned on high mast, close-in firing lines, etc. means that the French FREMMs are much stealthier. This is a logical choice, given that French ships are much more often called upon to carry out special operations requiring a high degree of stealth (commando drop-off/recovery, electronic eavesdropping, etc.) than their Italian counterparts.

To this I would add that the French university system, although it has its faults, also has the unique capacity in the world (other countries also do this in qualitative terms, but not necessarily in quantitative terms) to produce engineers/experts capable of managing complex, large-scale problems. In fact, this has historically been France's greatest competitive advantage (and I'm speaking in the broadest sense, since this applies to the hard sciences as much as to engineering and the social sciences).

It's not being chauvinistic to say that the shit that went down with the F-35 programme would never have happened in France, not with such cost and schedule overruns.

So yes, the French can sometimes do 'the same' for 10 times less. Except that, in fact, they don't do 'the same'. They can meet the same specifications for less money. A fleet of 2000 Rafales would no doubt have cost 3 times less than an equivalent fleet of F-35s IF the USA had been France!

But they are not France! They don't have the French university system, they don't charge the same for their weapons programmes!

If Dassault manages to make excellent aircraft at a "low price", it's because they hire people excellently trained in French public universities, because they re-use technologies developed by university centres and advanced research institutes (such as ONERA), and because they have a project management structure capable of getting the best out of all these elements at the lowest price.

In many respects, the American system is very different. In the US, the defence budget is used to fund applied research and the development of much broader technologies for a specific programme, which are then used by the industry as a whole. They finance through defence (at a high price, since it is billed by private companies) what other countries finance differently.

If the B-2 Spirit costs more than its weight in gold, it's not because it contains alien technology. It's because the programme was used to develop, perfect and test cutting-edge computer design, cutting and ultra-precise assembly technologies that are now used on all the production lines that make Boeing 777s, 737s and 787s.

It's a different mentality, a different way of doing things. Comparing the two requires a systemic approach, not a simple comparison of figures in a table.
 
Stealth is used in most (American) scenarios because it exists on their aircraft. But even in their scenarios, stealth is only really necessary in a very small percentage of real missions.

If we take the Rafale as an example, over 90% of its missions consist of OP, CAP with 4 to 6 bombs and CAS. Even the Americans have no specific plans to use their F-35s in stealth configurations for such operations. For the remaining 10% (roughly speaking), we end up with conventional penetration and reconnaissance missions, mainly. And even then, the percentage is quite high because of the Rafale's versatility (and on the Rafale M, you have to add nanny flights and sea assaults).

For reconnaissance and penetration, the USA relies heavily on stealth. This enables them to fly higher with a low probability of detection. And for deep strikes, the USA relies heavily on massive MDC fire to saturate enemy defences and allow raids to penetrate the enemy's system.

The French method also consists of avoiding detection, but relying instead on a combination of tactical TBA flight and the staggered use of electronic countermeasures (a method also preferred by the Israeli forces, incidentally).

Of course, in some of these flights, increased stealth would prove useful, allowing fewer detours to be made, or higher flights and greater autonomy. But these flights represent only a tiny fraction of the missions assigned to a multi-role combat aircraft, and the choice has been made not to sacrifice the overall performance of the aircraft (manoeuvrability, acceleration, operating costs, etc.) simply to gain a tactical advantage over a tiny percentage of actual operations.

After that, if France has never invested heavily in airborne stealth, it's also because it is very well placed in the development and use of anti-stealth radar systems (but not only), and that it understood very early on that stealth was, in the long term, only a secondary capability of aircraft, and not a primary quality.

Incidentally, I wouldn't be surprised if some of the systems developed by the US Navy were also very well suited to detecting stealthy aircraft, and that would explain the scepticism and historical pragmatism of American sailors towards this range of technology.

To illustrate this point, here's how a trio of Rafales neutralise a battery of S-400s in a real environment (simulated attack on Latakia air base in Syria). TBA flight (approach at 200 feet above ground level following terrain, speed 450 knots, masked by real terrain after avoiding the local SA-6 batteries). The result: 18 AASMs launched in less than thirty seconds, spotted by the Russians not even 20 km away at low altitude. A battery of eight launchers means 32 missiles. So what happens? The AASMs are effectively all shot down, but at the cost of all the S-400 missiles and the Pantsir shooting down the leakers. As for the Rafales, they set off again calmly, with just the Su-30s trying to chase them down and missing all their shots at maximum range.

Without the slightest super-furtivity, the French SEAD has just neutralised an S-400 for good, which will need a hell of a long time to rearm, with just three aircraft, for a purchase budget of one Raptor or, if we're being generous, two JSFs. I wish you luck in achieving the same result with either of the US configurations.
 
  • Like
Reactions: Rajput Lion

SINGAPORE—Safran Aircraft Engines says it will double Leap engine blade production in China as it officially opens a new factory at its Guiyang facility.
The French manufacturer says CFM International, Safran's joint venture with GE Aerospace, is preparing for a global manufacturing ramp-up of the high-bypass turbofan engines. Safran welcomed the new capabilities into operation at a ceremony on Sept. 1 at the Shawen Park facility.
Safran says in a statement that it has invested $30 million into the new facility, which features "machineries dedicated to the manufacturing (lost-wax casting) of the low-pressure turbine blades, vanes and seals for CFM56 and Leap engines."

Even though the manufacturing unit is built to produce lost wax casting for Low pressure turbine what is the probability that Chinese getting the know how of Snecma M88?

The successor of CFM56 which is M123 is a derivative of M88 by adding a sixth stage high pressure compressor unit to M88.
 
To illustrate this point, here's how a trio of Rafales neutralise a battery of S-400s in a real environment (simulated attack on Latakia air base in Syria). TBA flight (approach at 200 feet above ground level following terrain, speed 450 knots, masked by real terrain after avoiding the local SA-6 batteries). The result: 18 AASMs launched in less than thirty seconds, spotted by the Russians not even 20 km away at low altitude. A battery of eight launchers means 32 missiles. So what happens? The AASMs are effectively all shot down, but at the cost of all the S-400 missiles and the Pantsir shooting down the leakers. As for the Rafales, they set off again calmly, with just the Su-30s trying to chase them down and missing all their shots at maximum range.

Without the slightest super-furtivity, the French SEAD has just neutralised an S-400 for good, which will need a hell of a long time to rearm, with just three aircraft, for a purchase budget of one Raptor or, if we're being generous, two JSFs. I wish you luck in achieving the same result with either of the US configurations.

Arguments can be made against this. Rafale can only use low altitude, but the F-35 can use low and medium, perhaps even high. Enough to get to within the range of its weapon. 'Cause all the Russians have to do is position their Su-35s 30 km ahead of an S-400 battery and the Rafales will now have to fight their way out. This could force the French into attrition warfare.

Furthermore, an S-400 unit with 8 launchers, assuming 3-4 launchers are packed with SR/MR SAMs, they will have as many as 48-64 missiles, increasing the size of the Rafale formation to 6. And if the Russians increase the sophistication of the missile to the same extent the DRDO has demonstrated with Akash, it will be possible to launch 1 missile per target, with any stragglers being taken out by Pantsir. Which means Rafale needs as many as 64 Hammers or risk leaving operational missiles in the unit.

If this tactic is effective, then the MKI with powered SAAW can do more. 32 can be carried on 1 jet, so a flight of 2 will carry 72, which is more than enough to not just empty the S-400's magazine, but also destroy the entire SAM system.

And if we assume it's the weapon that gives the advantage, not the aircraft, then with the same weapon Rafale can carry only 16 with a centerline tank, so half that of an MKI. So we will need 4 Rafales to do the job of 2 MKIs. And we can buy 2.5 MKIs for the cost of 1 Rafale.

The F-35 can carry 24 in Beast Mode. So 3 F-35s against 4 Rafales.

In any case, the Russians are prepared to deal with such a threat. An S-400 SAM site typically has 2 regiments with 16-24 launchers each. And it's protected by not just Buk and Pantsirs but also a new SAM called S-350, which is basically the SR/MR component of the S-400. It's a SAM the Russians helped SoKo develop and this is the Russian version.


Each S-350 battalion is expected to be 12-launcher strong, ie, 2 batteries of 6 each. So that's 144 additional missiles protecting an S-400 regiment.

12 such battalions will be delivered by 2027.

Add to that the 256 missiles per S-400 target area. So, if we are talking about 400 missiles per target area, we need a pretty massive operation to accomplish SEAD. Just saturating 1 site alone will require nearly 70 Rafales with 6 Hammers each. Or 25 Rafales with powered SAAW. Hence the need for vast quantities of drones and GLCMs, alongside weapons that specifically target the radar systems.

And some sites are even bigger, with more batteries per regiment. And some large targets like Moscow have multiple regiments, which will require the entire AAE just to shut down the air space for an hour. And all of this does not even consider reserve radars and launchers with ready-to-fire missiles brought out of their underground pens.

Look at India, 200 Rafales are not enough if the goal is to saturate Russian defenses, and the AAE needs volumes if there is a need to take independent action against the Russians. Another reason why I say the USAF is the most critical force in NATO, to the point where all other air forces are almost irrelevant outside of providing mass.
 
Arguments can be made against this. Rafale can only use low altitude, but the F-35 can use low and medium, perhaps even high. Enough to get to within the range of its weapon. 'Cause all the Russians have to do is position their Su-35s 30 km ahead of an S-400 battery and the Rafales will now have to fight their way out. This could force the French into attrition warfare.

Furthermore, an S-400 unit with 8 launchers, assuming 3-4 launchers are packed with SR/MR SAMs, they will have as many as 48-64 missiles, increasing the size of the Rafale formation to 6. And if the Russians increase the sophistication of the missile to the same extent the DRDO has demonstrated with Akash, it will be possible to launch 1 missile per target, with any stragglers being taken out by Pantsir. Which means Rafale needs as many as 64 Hammers or risk leaving operational missiles in the unit.

If this tactic is effective, then the MKI with powered SAAW can do more. 32 can be carried on 1 jet, so a flight of 2 will carry 72, which is more than enough to not just empty the S-400's magazine, but also destroy the entire SAM system.

And if we assume it's the weapon that gives the advantage, not the aircraft, then with the same weapon Rafale can carry only 16 with a centerline tank, so half that of an MKI. So we will need 4 Rafales to do the job of 2 MKIs. And we can buy 2.5 MKIs for the cost of 1 Rafale.

The F-35 can carry 24 in Beast Mode. So 3 F-35s against 4 Rafales.

In any case, the Russians are prepared to deal with such a threat. An S-400 SAM site typically has 2 regiments with 16-24 launchers each. And it's protected by not just Buk and Pantsirs but also a new SAM called S-350, which is basically the SR/MR component of the S-400. It's a SAM the Russians helped SoKo develop and this is the Russian version.


Each S-350 battalion is expected to be 12-launcher strong, ie, 2 batteries of 6 each. So that's 144 additional missiles protecting an S-400 regiment.

12 such battalions will be delivered by 2027.

Add to that the 256 missiles per S-400 target area. So, if we are talking about 400 missiles per target area, we need a pretty massive operation to accomplish SEAD. Just saturating 1 site alone will require nearly 70 Rafales with 6 Hammers each. Or 25 Rafales with powered SAAW. Hence the need for vast quantities of drones and GLCMs, alongside weapons that specifically target the radar systems.

And some sites are even bigger, with more batteries per regiment. And some large targets like Moscow have multiple regiments, which will require the entire AAE just to shut down the air space for an hour. And all of this does not even consider reserve radars and launchers with ready-to-fire missiles brought out of their underground pens.

Look at India, 200 Rafales are not enough if the goal is to saturate Russian defenses, and the AAE needs volumes if there is a need to take independent action against the Russians. Another reason why I say the USAF is the most critical force in NATO, to the point where all other air forces are almost irrelevant outside of providing mass.
MKI isn't designed to fly low and fast like Rafale, so don't think it will/can employ the same tactics against S-400 to saturate it like Rafale. So @Picdelamirand-oil does have a point.
 
MKI isn't designed to fly low and fast like Rafale, so don't think it will/can employ the same tactics against S-400 to saturate it like Rafale. So @Picdelamirand-oil does have a point.

Of course it does.

You are confused between Rafale's unsupervised capabilities versus the MKI pilot still needing to keep an eye out, although after 20 years that may have changed.
 
  • Like
Reactions: Rajput Lion
MKI isn't designed to fly low and fast like Rafale, so don't think it will/can employ the same tactics against S-400 to saturate it like Rafale. So @Picdelamirand-oil does have a point.
Above all, the Rafale will use SPECTRA to create a multitude of false tracks, aircraft and weapons, which will be difficult to distinguish from the real ones for the S-400, leading to excessive missile consumption.
 
  • Like
Reactions: Rajput Lion
Rafale F5: A technological jewel in the making

The Rafale F5, the fruit of Dassault Aviation's expertise, promises to be a revolutionary fighter aircraft, combining power, versatility and cutting-edge technology. Its manufacture is based on close collaboration between the design offices in Saint-Cloud and the assembly lines in Mérignac, with the support of "Team Rafale" partners such as Safran and Thales.

Design and technology

At the heart of the Rafale F5 is the new-generation RBE2-XG* radar, a true technological jewel. This disruptive radar uses a combination of gallium nitride** and artificial intelligence to deliver unrivalled capabilities. It is designed to detect all types of aircraft, including 5th generation fighters in stealth mode, as well as the smallest targets such as microdrones, which have previously been hard for traditional combat aircraft to spot.

Technical performance

1. Interconnection with UAVs: The Rafale F5 will be able to fly in company with a swarm of UAVs, offering unprecedented operational flexibility. This capability will enable coordinated and effective action in high-intensity scenarios, reinforcing air superiority.

2. Stealth and neutralisation of anti-aircraft systems: The nEUROn combat drone, as an extension of the Rafale F5, will be able to operate stealthily to neutralise modern enemy anti-aircraft systems. This combination of aircraft and UAVs offers an innovative strategic approach to complex missions.

3. Connectivity and data processing: The Rafale F5 will be able to process huge quantities of data in real time, enabling it to carry out varied and complex missions. Its connectivity with a range of UAVs acting as wingmen enhances its ability to adapt to the changing demands of the battlefield.

Future prospects

The Rafale F5 is part of a long-term vision for combat aviation, with major strategic implications. Competing with renowned fighter aircraft such as the F-35A Lightning II, the Rafale F5 is set to redefine the standards of the aviation industry. Its planned delivery to the DGA from 2035 will mark a crucial stage in the development of France's defence capabilities.

In conclusion, the Rafale F5 embodies the excellence of French aeronautical engineering and promises to raise military aviation standards for decades to come. Its ongoing development and cutting-edge technical performance make it an invaluable asset for French and international armed forces.

*The RBE2-XG is a new-generation radar developed by Dassault Aviation to equip the Rafale F5.

Advanced features : The RBE2-XG is an Active Electronically Scanned Antenna (AESA) radar, which means it uses individual transceiver modules to generate electronically controlled radar beams. This technology allows great flexibility in radar beam management and offers advanced target detection and tracking capabilities.

Disruption technology: The term "disruption" refers to the radar's ability to disrupt enemy detection and jamming systems. Using a combination of gallium nitride and artificial intelligence, the RBE2-XG is designed to identify and track various types of aircraft, including 5th generation fighters operating in stealth mode, as well as small targets such as micro-UAVs.

High performance: The RBE2-XG radar offers increased sensitivity, improved resolution and extended detection capability compared with traditional radars. It is capable of identifying the most unobtrusive targets and tracking multiple targets simultaneously, making it an essential asset for complex and demanding air operations.

Integration with the aircraft: The RBE2-XG is designed to be fully integrated with the Rafale F5 weapon system, enabling real-time communication with other systems on board the aircraft. This connectivity enhances the Rafale F5's ability to operate collaboratively with UAVs and other platforms, improving its versatility and effectiveness on the battlefield.

In summary, the RBE2-XG radar represents a significant advance in the Rafale F5's detection and tracking capabilities, offering state-of-the-art performance and cutting-edge technology to meet the challenges of modern air operations.

**Gallium nitride is a semiconductor material composed of gallium and nitrogen, known as GaN. It is widely used in various high-tech fields because of its unique properties. Here are some key points to explain gallium nitride:

Electrical properties: Gallium nitride has superior electrical properties to other semiconductors such as silicon. In particular, it is valued for its ability to operate at high temperatures and high radio frequencies.

Applications: Gallium nitride is widely used in the manufacture of electronic components such as light-emitting diodes (LEDs), high-frequency transistors, lasers and power devices. It is also used in radar, wireless communication systems and defence equipment.

Benefits: Devices made from gallium nitride offer high energy efficiency, better durability and greater reliability than other materials. This makes them a preferred choice for applications requiring high performance.

In the context of the Rafale F5's RBE2-XG radar, the use of gallium nitride in disruption radar technology improves the aircraft's sensitivity, resolution and detection capability. This technological advance helps to enhance target detection and tracking capabilities, offering a strategic advantage on the battlefield. Gallium nitride is an essential high-tech material, offering superior electronic performance and a wide range of applications in key sectors such as aerospace, defence and telecommunications.
 
Rafale F5: A technological jewel in the making

The Rafale F5, the fruit of Dassault Aviation's expertise, promises to be a revolutionary fighter aircraft, combining power, versatility and cutting-edge technology. Its manufacture is based on close collaboration between the design offices in Saint-Cloud and the assembly lines in Mérignac, with the support of "Team Rafale" partners such as Safran and Thales.

Design and technology

At the heart of the Rafale F5 is the new-generation RBE2-XG* radar, a true technological jewel. This disruptive radar uses a combination of gallium nitride** and artificial intelligence to deliver unrivalled capabilities. It is designed to detect all types of aircraft, including 5th generation fighters in stealth mode, as well as the smallest targets such as microdrones, which have previously been hard for traditional combat aircraft to spot.

Technical performance

1. Interconnection with UAVs: The Rafale F5 will be able to fly in company with a swarm of UAVs, offering unprecedented operational flexibility. This capability will enable coordinated and effective action in high-intensity scenarios, reinforcing air superiority.

2. Stealth and neutralisation of anti-aircraft systems: The nEUROn combat drone, as an extension of the Rafale F5, will be able to operate stealthily to neutralise modern enemy anti-aircraft systems. This combination of aircraft and UAVs offers an innovative strategic approach to complex missions.

3. Connectivity and data processing: The Rafale F5 will be able to process huge quantities of data in real time, enabling it to carry out varied and complex missions. Its connectivity with a range of UAVs acting as wingmen enhances its ability to adapt to the changing demands of the battlefield.

Future prospects

The Rafale F5 is part of a long-term vision for combat aviation, with major strategic implications. Competing with renowned fighter aircraft such as the F-35A Lightning II, the Rafale F5 is set to redefine the standards of the aviation industry. Its planned delivery to the DGA from 2035 will mark a crucial stage in the development of France's defence capabilities.

In conclusion, the Rafale F5 embodies the excellence of French aeronautical engineering and promises to raise military aviation standards for decades to come. Its ongoing development and cutting-edge technical performance make it an invaluable asset for French and international armed forces.

*The RBE2-XG is a new-generation radar developed by Dassault Aviation to equip the Rafale F5.

Advanced features : The RBE2-XG is an Active Electronically Scanned Antenna (AESA) radar, which means it uses individual transceiver modules to generate electronically controlled radar beams. This technology allows great flexibility in radar beam management and offers advanced target detection and tracking capabilities.

Disruption technology: The term "disruption" refers to the radar's ability to disrupt enemy detection and jamming systems. Using a combination of gallium nitride and artificial intelligence, the RBE2-XG is designed to identify and track various types of aircraft, including 5th generation fighters operating in stealth mode, as well as small targets such as micro-UAVs.

High performance: The RBE2-XG radar offers increased sensitivity, improved resolution and extended detection capability compared with traditional radars. It is capable of identifying the most unobtrusive targets and tracking multiple targets simultaneously, making it an essential asset for complex and demanding air operations.

Integration with the aircraft: The RBE2-XG is designed to be fully integrated with the Rafale F5 weapon system, enabling real-time communication with other systems on board the aircraft. This connectivity enhances the Rafale F5's ability to operate collaboratively with UAVs and other platforms, improving its versatility and effectiveness on the battlefield.

In summary, the RBE2-XG radar represents a significant advance in the Rafale F5's detection and tracking capabilities, offering state-of-the-art performance and cutting-edge technology to meet the challenges of modern air operations.

**Gallium nitride is a semiconductor material composed of gallium and nitrogen, known as GaN. It is widely used in various high-tech fields because of its unique properties. Here are some key points to explain gallium nitride:

Electrical properties: Gallium nitride has superior electrical properties to other semiconductors such as silicon. In particular, it is valued for its ability to operate at high temperatures and high radio frequencies.

Applications: Gallium nitride is widely used in the manufacture of electronic components such as light-emitting diodes (LEDs), high-frequency transistors, lasers and power devices. It is also used in radar, wireless communication systems and defence equipment.

Benefits: Devices made from gallium nitride offer high energy efficiency, better durability and greater reliability than other materials. This makes them a preferred choice for applications requiring high performance.

In the context of the Rafale F5's RBE2-XG radar, the use of gallium nitride in disruption radar technology improves the aircraft's sensitivity, resolution and detection capability. This technological advance helps to enhance target detection and tracking capabilities, offering a strategic advantage on the battlefield. Gallium nitride is an essential high-tech material, offering superior electronic performance and a wide range of applications in key sectors such as aerospace, defence and telecommunications.

As expected, a 2030 date was quite optimistic. And that 2035 delivery date is really late for the IAF, it will enter AMCA territory. So MRFA will be for the F4.
 
  • Agree
Reactions: Rajput Lion
Above all, the Rafale will use SPECTRA to create a multitude of false tracks, aircraft and weapons, which will be difficult to distinguish from the real ones for the S-400, leading to excessive missile consumption.

How? Those 3 Rafales are below horizon and running away. A supporting Rafale at high altitude 200 km away is not gonna provide false targets to a bunch of Hammers 20 km away.

And if you end up using false targets, then there is no stealth, it's just 4th gen technique all over again. The S-400 crews will know beforehand they are under attack. The entire point of the attack is for it to be detected merely 1 minute before the Hammers hit their targets from 20 km away.

The Russians have designed the S-400 and other supporting SAMs to be safe from saturation attacks. As of 2021, they had inducted 576 launchers in 57 battalions. And they have been building at least 6-8 battalions every year since then. So saturation isn't the answer.
 
As expected, a 2030 date was quite optimistic. And that 2035 delivery date is really late for the IAF, it will enter AMCA territory. So MRFA will be for the F4.
This is correct. In comparison, MKI will have this "disruptive" AI enabled GaN radar within couple of years. Just imagine how much our GaN radar would evolve during 2030s in AMCA MK2?

Anyways, Rafale F4.2 won't be that bad for MRFA, me thinks. Just sign the deal post elections for local assembly of 114 Rafale F4.2 along with 26+26(repeat order) of Rafale-M for Indian Navy and voila we'll have that fabled 200 Rafale force that we've dreamt/thought about for years.
 
  • Like
Reactions: YoungWolf
This is correct. In comparison, MKI will have this "disruptive" AI enabled GaN radar within couple of years. Just imagine how much our GaN radar would evolve during 2030s in AMCA MK2?

Anyways, Rafale F4.2 won't be that bad for MRFA, me thinks. Just sign the deal post elections for local assembly of 114 Rafale F4.2 along with 26+26(repeat order) of Rafale-M for Indian Navy and voila we'll have that fabled 200 Rafale force that we've dreamt/thought about for years.

Rafale without GaN is almost useless to India. The Chinese have been operating GaN radars on their fighters since 2016.

And we need the F5's MUMT as well. But if it's coming after 2035, it won't be part of MRFA.

A better option is to just buy Rafales in batches for a split between F4 and F5. I doubt that's possible with MRFA though.
 
  • Like
Reactions: Rajput Lion
Rafale without GaN is almost useless to India. The Chinese have been operating GaN radars on their fighters since 2016.

And we need the F5's MUMT as well. But if it's coming after 2035, it won't be part of MRFA.

A better option is to just buy Rafales in batches for a split between F4 and F5. I doubt that's possible with MRFA though.
We would get F5 capabilities during Rafale-I MLU. And Chinese operating GaN radar from 2016 onwards in their fighters maybe just their propaganda, IMO.

A force of 200 strong Rafale 4.2 would kick a** of most Chinese fighters and would give us a platform to destroy their A2/AD bubble. Thanks to its size and kinematics, a plane of Rafale's size is perfect to play hide and seek over the Himalayas where bulky Chinese Flankers and J-20 would have plenty of issues.