I don't think that's what happened, but you're free to have your own opinion. Let's keep the discussion on topic.You seems to be correct, and so the Pakistani assessment, because to save one pilot India had to stop the retaliatory air strike because he was son of an air marshal. Pakistanis seems to have taken this into account and surely have formulated new conventional strike policy. So talking about nuclear exchange their assessment got the stamp.
I'm not sure, so far the deployment has been observed against Pakistan only.Isn't the new TNWs also for Chinese to make their second strike capability coming beyond 2000km from sea where IBG are present , like Andamans or Gwadar?
Not a bad contingency strategy at all.To my understanding a good manoevure would be to let them use TNW on their cities and retaliate with massive TNW strike. And call for de-escalation. It's just that we need to avoid taking any hit. They might shift to shaheens and which Indian BMD can tackle some how.
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The Pakistanis will be reading all this. And getting the ideas haha!
You know, sometimes its better to use common sense first, instead of directly jumping to numerical calculations.You don't have truckload of nukes either. Take any airfield. The distance between 2 hangars if 150-200m. At best, 1 nuke can take out 4 or 5 hardened hangars out of a possible 20 or 30 or more such hangars. You need the ability to hit all hangars, which can either be done with a lot of nukes or obviously with enough conventional weapons. And Pakistan doesn't have a lot of nukes.
The Indian SFC does not thinks that it is a meaningless point at all. You're welcome to ask them why.India's primary response to any type of nuclear attack will be massive. So this is a meaningless point to bring up.
If you are assuming India will use TNWs in retaliation to Pak using TNWs, I don't think that's how it's going to work.
Lost in translation...Dunno what you mean in the context. A decision has to made rather quickly considering we now have SSBNs, so launches can happen within a short window.
I think you and @Saaho can debate amongst yourselves on how to "win" a nuclear war, despite losing 5~10% of the population.That's the point. The small number of nukes cannot bring the region down with it either. So all PA can do with nukes is put a small dent in India, and the result is the top brass will be globally hunted and any damage caused will be fixed within 10 years or so. The richer India becomes, the more resilient will India become in a nuclear confrontation.
What does escalation dominance during a stand-off have to do with border skirmishes?Who are you referring to? PA? Sadly for them, no. We have created no-man's land in many places along the LoC. In a lot of areas, the PA has not seen the LoC in a year.
Actually its my fault, I keep forgetting that you take a healthy hourly dose of optimism and have a version of the world that exists on paper.The only point I'm making is PA is not in the game of defeating India in a war, whether conventional or nuclear.
My personal opinion is, the current PA exists only to buy time until certain people can leave Pakistan during all-out war. And if PA goes nuclear at this time, even these certain people will be hunted down, that's why PA won't use nukes at all.
Pakistani PM literally stated that we will not think about retaliation, we will be compelled to retaliate. If Pakistan did not expect anything, and had not prepared contingency SOPs, the response wouldn't have come within 30 hours.Pak's reaction to Balakot was expected and overestimated. Rather you can say that Pakistan's reaction was either to be nothing or more than what happened. And there were people very much counting on Pakistan to do much more than just the post-Balakot skirmish. According to Rawat, our escalation point went up to war.
Army was ready for conventional war with Pakistan after Balakot: Sources
Rather, it was Pakistan that did not expect India to retaliate the way we did after Pulwama.
I suggest you acknowledge the uniformed officers of your own country.
Fortunately, I live in the real world, and I trust Indian military personnel and what they develop on the ground more than I trust your word for it. So please, I suggest you sing these lullabies to someone else.Have you considered you are the one making wrong assumptions?
India is not bluffing after all.
One would assume India will want to deal with Pakistan long before China actually becomes a major military threat to India, possibly post 2035.
Make only short term investments in Pakistan. Mid term and long term... that's a huge risk. Do you want to risk a permanent demonetisation of Pakistan's currency?
PA's historic control of the power center has nothing to do with its deterrence strategies and doctrines. These two domains have almost never overlapped. Unfortunately I can't convince you with evidence about how or why, but I can tell you that you're putting the wrong 2 and 2 together. Of course you are entitled to your opinion.The Belief stems from the most simple observation. Pakistani Military has never been on the losing side in a conflict. Every time it has had an altercation with whichever state, it's a stranglehold on the administration of Pakistan just has grown stronger. No matter what happens on the battlefield, Pakistani Military always wins in Islamabad.
The day it uses Nuclear Weapons it will lose, and a loss of such magnitude will be unacceptable to Pakistan Military.
And that is reinforced with what you dub as Blunder of 99, which consolidated power for a Military general for the next decade instead of court-martial. This is not new or unique we saw the same with General Tikka Khan, General Rao Farman Ali, FM Ayub, etc.
Unfortunately I can't share the evidence, and even if I did it wouldn't be worth it. But ask the people on your side, maybe they'll help you out.Where is the evidence of that? Actually, the evidence is quite contrary to that.
Read this :
Pruthvik Shankar asked: Does India have tactical nuclear weapons? | Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
Don't bother about the seems and coulds, thats conjecture based on previous Indian doctrine(s).
Let me first point out what his earlier points are (from what you quoted):Which ex-SFC? BS Nagal?
His position is actually different :
India's nuclear doctrine: The fog lifts
He fears that political leadership may not show resolve but he favours FULL implementation of massive retaliation. In absence of any tactical nuclear weapons, political leadership will be left with no other option and that a good thing. BTW, this was his position in 2014 and before. India was ruled by morons who would have not chosen to commit. If the war happens right now, India will commit fully because political leadership has no political crisis at hand to mitigate.
Isn't that exactly what I've been saying?"commitment to 'massive' retaliation is problematic"
"India's 'response to a few or one (Pakistani) tactical nuclear weapons should not be disproportionate"
"escalation control should be practiced in conventional and nuclear war on moral and humanitarian considerations"
"The strategy is not rational, (and) our political leadership may not show resolve during crisis or at the time of decision".
Now coming to where he doubles down, he argues what India SHOULD do to uphold deterrence, but in spite of that he fears that it MIGHT NOT happen. So you can see the inherent incredibility of a disproportionate response.
Nagal is not the only one. And even if there were zero public statements regarding this, the developments on the ground would suggest the same shift in India's doctrine.