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@Falcon @DivineHeretic What do you guys think Pak reaction would be as, if and when violence erupts in the valley, militarily?
Also to Divine, your answers are quite informative were you also associated with the Armed forces like vstol and Falcon?
 
@Falcon @DivineHeretic What do you guys think Pak reaction would be as, if and when violence erupts in the valley, militarily?
Also to Divine, your answers are quite informative were you also associated with the Armed forces like vstol and Falcon?
I read the statement of Gokhale after Modi-Xi meeting which mentioned about the talks Xi had with Imran Khan. It appears to me that the whole delegation of PA with Imran which went and met Xi in China was to convey a message to India to cool off and for that Pak was willing to make lots of concessions. Including maybe a stoppage of terrorism and let J&K stabilise.
 
Hi,

With the onset of integrated battle groups for the IA, with each being a smaller mix of Mechanized Infantry along with its own armor and anti-air support, and even possible Arty support, how does that change the classical definition of heavy vs light formations?

Given IBG's are diluted in terms of volume of firepower compared to a Tier1 formation but is more agile and versatile, will a PA light defense be able to hold off against it. How would you compare the for the sake of discussion ability of a first strike IBG formation vs a traditional formation? Also, the effect of multiple IBG's strikes, say 8 of them across IB, vs a traditional 3 formation strike derived from the Corp.

Lastly, Air interdiction and Forward Air support, the effect of both Vis-a-vis IBG's and traditional formations.


Separate from the above discussion, would you like to shed some light on the shortfalls of SPH and Towed Arty and how that hinders potential deployment and progress of the panned IBGs's.

Regards
Milspec

A detailed reply to your questions will require an essay I'm afraid. However I will try to present my opinions in brief. Regret the delay, been busy with research.

To answer the second question first, I assert that the new IBGs in th envisoned configuration are far superior in concentration and balance of firepower as compared to the erstwhile heavy tier 1 formations referred to (1 armored div of 2000s for example). Sure on paper the IBGs are short on firepower vs the tier 1 formations. However as history will prove, none of the elements of tier 1 formations of IA of equivalent size have been able to operate cohesively in wars. As such, even though the held a higher theoretical volume of firepower, they never could amass and contentrate that firepower effectively. they were also lumbering giants, operating very carefully, defensive in mindset even on offensive operations, refusing to take targets of opportunity. A brief reading of 1 Armored Div's actions in 1965 would confirm my statements. In contrast, the new IBGs are designed for high intensity, concentrated firepower, designed to overwhelm and storm positions. Recent wargames have also confirmed that being able to punch through enemy positions is more dependent on absolute ferocity and rate of accurate firepower, a sharp thrust of the dagger vs the heavy blows of the sledgehammer. Further, the mindset is completely different. The commanders from company level onwards here are expected to assault and strike deep. Its the mindet change that's been tested over the past 2 decades of war games.

Now, PA's doctrine of using smaller, ATGM battalions to hold superior Armored brigades is informed from past experiences of conventional conflict with IA and internal exercises/simulations of such asymmetric combat. There are certain major flaws with taking the past PA's experiences as is without setting the context. It is true that PA light formations in the past have managed to stem superior IA forces on several occassions in 1965 & 1971 wars. An example would be the disappointing performance of 1 Armored division in 1965. But as I stated earlier, the 1965 & 1971 IA heavy formations were severely lacking in cohesion. The most they managed was to get one brigade attacking at any moment of time. further, they were stymied by cautious, slow reacting commanders who frankly had no business commanding armored forces. Given such a scenario, it wasn't surprising that PA inferior formations could hold them off, or delay them. In fact, when some of the IA formations actually stalled in 1965, they had suffered less than 300 casualties across a corps level front, with no major loss of combat effectiveness, a clear indication that the offensive lacked the weight and intensity required of a strike formation. Compare that with the Wehrmacht's panzer divisions: attacks would be carried out with a ferocity that formations several times larger would recoil and be pushed back. This happened right up until the end of 1944.

Finally as far as attacking PA positions held by light ATGM units (Light AT Battalions) are concerned, I imagine the strategy will be similar to that of Army Group South's in the Battle of Kursk vs the strongpoint based defensive doctrine of Stavka. The wehrmacht battlegroups would identify areas for ingress and concentrate very fire on defending strongpoints, panzers grenadiers supported by Panzers supported by artillery supported by air support attacking to shatter the strongpoints. Breaches would immediately be taken advantage of with fast moving formations which would storm the positions and advance as rapidly as possible until the next strongpoint at which they'd again concentrate. The IA IBGs are particularly suited for such an assault style, given the force structure. If done right, light formations cannot hold out against such firepower supremacy for long. The question i can they break through the first line before reinforcements arrive to relieve the shattered forces.

The successful implementation of such intense assaults will depend heavily on IA's ability to quickly concentrate accurate, overwhelming firepower against positions. That requires a degree of air superiority and the availablity of intense CAS aircrafts. A well placed strike by 4 ACs dropping 2000 pounders guided by ground CAS controllers can demolish strongpoints in a single blow, and render denfenders incapable of combat.
 
I read the statement of Gokhale after Modi-Xi meeting which mentioned about the talks Xi had with Imran Khan. It appears to me that the whole delegation of PA with Imran which went and met Xi in China was to convey a message to India to cool off and for that Pak was willing to make lots of concessions. Including maybe a stoppage of terrorism and let J&K stabilise.

I think they wanted XI to Warn INDIA
Or Give them Money to Fight INDIA

This Stand off is getting Costly for them
 
A detailed reply to your questions will require an essay I'm afraid. However I will try to present my opinions in brief. Regret the delay, been busy with research.

To answer the second question first, I assert that the new IBGs in th envisoned configuration are far superior in concentration and balance of firepower as compared to the erstwhile heavy tier 1 formations referred to (1 armored div of 2000s for example). Sure on paper the IBGs are short on firepower vs the tier 1 formations. However as history will prove, none of the elements of tier 1 formations of IA of equivalent size have been able to operate cohesively in wars. As such, even though the held a higher theoretical volume of firepower, they never could amass and contentrate that firepower effectively. they were also lumbering giants, operating very carefully, defensive in mindset even on offensive operations, refusing to take targets of opportunity. A brief reading of 1 Armored Div's actions in 1965 would confirm my statements. In contrast, the new IBGs are designed for high intensity, concentrated firepower, designed to overwhelm and storm positions. Recent wargames have also confirmed that being able to punch through enemy positions is more dependent on absolute ferocity and rate of accurate firepower, a sharp thrust of the dagger vs the heavy blows of the sledgehammer. Further, the mindset is completely different. The commanders from company level onwards here are expected to assault and strike deep. Its the mindet change that's been tested over the past 2 decades of war games.

Now, PA's doctrine of using smaller, ATGM battalions to hold superior Armored brigades is informed from past experiences of conventional conflict with IA and internal exercises/simulations of such asymmetric combat. There are certain major flaws with taking the past PA's experiences as is without setting the context. It is true that PA light formations in the past have managed to stem superior IA forces on several occassions in 1965 & 1971 wars. An example would be the disappointing performance of 1 Armored division in 1965. But as I stated earlier, the 1965 & 1971 IA heavy formations were severely lacking in cohesion. The most they managed was to get one brigade attacking at any moment of time. further, they were stymied by cautious, slow reacting commanders who frankly had no business commanding armored forces. Given such a scenario, it wasn't surprising that PA inferior formations could hold them off, or delay them. In fact, when some of the IA formations actually stalled in 1965, they had suffered less than 300 casualties across a corps level front, with no major loss of combat effectiveness, a clear indication that the offensive lacked the weight and intensity required of a strike formation. Compare that with the Wehrmacht's panzer divisions: attacks would be carried out with a ferocity that formations several times larger would recoil and be pushed back. This happened right up until the end of 1944.

Finally as far as attacking PA positions held by light ATGM units (Light AT Battalions) are concerned, I imagine the strategy will be similar to that of Army Group South's in the Battle of Kursk vs the strongpoint based defensive doctrine of Stavka. The wehrmacht battlegroups would identify areas for ingress and concentrate very fire on defending strongpoints, panzers grenadiers supported by Panzers supported by artillery supported by air support attacking to shatter the strongpoints. Breaches would immediately be taken advantage of with fast moving formations which would storm the positions and advance as rapidly as possible until the next strongpoint at which they'd again concentrate. The IA IBGs are particularly suited for such an assault style, given the force structure. If done right, light formations cannot hold out against such firepower supremacy for long. The question i can they break through the first line before reinforcements arrive to relieve the shattered forces.

The successful implementation of such intense assaults will depend heavily on IA's ability to quickly concentrate accurate, overwhelming firepower against positions. That requires a degree of air superiority and the availablity of intense CAS aircrafts. A well placed strike by 4 ACs dropping 2000 pounders guided by ground CAS controllers can demolish strongpoints in a single blow, and render denfenders incapable of combat.

In Any Conflict in the Plains , we will Require
MBRL attacks on the target followed by IAF strikes or Missile Strikes on the Radar and SAM sites

Thereafter we will see An Artillery assault on the Dug in Positions , Bunkers and Pill Boxes close to the Borders , which will be used for stopping our Armoured forces

The Armour - Infantry Joint attack will follow at the end

Everything Depends on Fire power And Airpower
 
Damn, he gives so many details out.
  • Feb 18, NSA Ajit Doval called us and shared Jaish-e-Mohammed balakot camp details including videos which were obtained by RAW. Only 3 of us knew in the force.
  • Mirages were transferred to the western command from central.
  • Crystal maze and Spice were used. 12 Mirages as groups of six each. 4 more as back up.
  • IAF send an officer to Delhi airport to make sure they ignore the movement of the strike package.
  • All northern airbases were put on high alert without giving away more info.
  • After Mirages took off from Gwalior to our surprise we saw F-16s and AWACS were circling Rawalpindi area!. Their detection of the strike package would have led to cancelling of the strike. Thus to distract them I ordered Su-30 MKIs and Jaguars to take off to the direction of Bahawalpur, Pakistani Panjab. Six aircraft flew till the border and returned as PAF planes got distracted.
  • MIrages used hill terrains to enter Pakistan at low altitude then gained altitude to strike.
  • Mirages were inside Pakistan airspace for12 minutes.
  • The first bomb was fired at 3:28 AM. By 4 all planes were landed safely in two different airbases.
  • 'Bander' was the code name used to inform mission success to the air chief.
@Falcon @randomradio @vstol Jockey @DivineHeretic @Milspec @_Anonymous_ @Arvind @Gautam @lcafanboy @Ashutosh
 
Damn, he gives so many details out.
  • Feb 18, NSA Ajit Doval called us and shared Jaish-e-Mohammed balakot camp details including videos which were obtained by RAW. Only 3 of us knew in the force.
  • Mirages were transferred to the western command from central.
  • Crystal maze and Spice were used. 12 Mirages as groups of six each. 4 more as back up.
  • IAF send an officer to Delhi airport to make sure they ignore the movement of the strike package.
  • All northern airbases were put on high alert without giving away more info.
  • After Mirages took off from Gwalior to our surprise we saw F-16s and AWACS were circling Rawalpindi area!. Their detection of the strike package would have led to cancelling of the strike. Thus to distract them I ordered Su-30 MKIs and Jaguars to take off to the direction of Bahawalpur, Pakistani Panjab. Six aircraft flew till the border and returned as PAF planes got distracted.
  • MIrages used hill terrains to enter Pakistan at low altitude then gained altitude to strike.
  • Mirages were inside Pakistan airspace for12 minutes.
  • The first bomb was fired at 3:28 AM. By 4 all planes were landed safely in two different airbases.
  • 'Bander' was the code name used to inform mission success to the air chief.
@Falcon @randomradio @vstol Jockey @DivineHeretic @Milspec @_Anonymous_ @Arvind @Gautam @lcafanboy @Ashutosh


FEBRUARY 26 was GREAT
FEBRUARY. 27 could have been Much better
 
A detailed reply to your questions will require an essay I'm afraid. However I will try to present my opinions in brief. Regret the delay, been busy with research.

To answer the second question first, I assert that the new IBGs in th envisoned configuration are far superior in concentration and balance of firepower as compared to the erstwhile heavy tier 1 formations referred to (1 armored div of 2000s for example). Sure on paper the IBGs are short on firepower vs the tier 1 formations. However as history will prove, none of the elements of tier 1 formations of IA of equivalent size have been able to operate cohesively in wars. As such, even though the held a higher theoretical volume of firepower, they never could amass and contentrate that firepower effectively. they were also lumbering giants, operating very carefully, defensive in mindset even on offensive operations, refusing to take targets of opportunity. A brief reading of 1 Armored Div's actions in 1965 would confirm my statements. In contrast, the new IBGs are designed for high intensity, concentrated firepower, designed to overwhelm and storm positions. Recent wargames have also confirmed that being able to punch through enemy positions is more dependent on absolute ferocity and rate of accurate firepower, a sharp thrust of the dagger vs the heavy blows of the sledgehammer. Further, the mindset is completely different. The commanders from company level onwards here are expected to assault and strike deep. Its the mindet change that's been tested over the past 2 decades of war games.

Now, PA's doctrine of using smaller, ATGM battalions to hold superior Armored brigades is informed from past experiences of conventional conflict with IA and internal exercises/simulations of such asymmetric combat. There are certain major flaws with taking the past PA's experiences as is without setting the context. It is true that PA light formations in the past have managed to stem superior IA forces on several occassions in 1965 & 1971 wars. An example would be the disappointing performance of 1 Armored division in 1965. But as I stated earlier, the 1965 & 1971 IA heavy formations were severely lacking in cohesion. The most they managed was to get one brigade attacking at any moment of time. further, they were stymied by cautious, slow reacting commanders who frankly had no business commanding armored forces. Given such a scenario, it wasn't surprising that PA inferior formations could hold them off, or delay them. In fact, when some of the IA formations actually stalled in 1965, they had suffered less than 300 casualties across a corps level front, with no major loss of combat effectiveness, a clear indication that the offensive lacked the weight and intensity required of a strike formation. Compare that with the Wehrmacht's panzer divisions: attacks would be carried out with a ferocity that formations several times larger would recoil and be pushed back. This happened right up until the end of 1944.

Finally as far as attacking PA positions held by light ATGM units (Light AT Battalions) are concerned, I imagine the strategy will be similar to that of Army Group South's in the Battle of Kursk vs the strongpoint based defensive doctrine of Stavka. The wehrmacht battlegroups would identify areas for ingress and concentrate very fire on defending strongpoints, panzers grenadiers supported by Panzers supported by artillery supported by air support attacking to shatter the strongpoints. Breaches would immediately be taken advantage of with fast moving formations which would storm the positions and advance as rapidly as possible until the next strongpoint at which they'd again concentrate. The IA IBGs are particularly suited for such an assault style, given the force structure. If done right, light formations cannot hold out against such firepower supremacy for long. The question i can they break through the first line before reinforcements arrive to relieve the shattered forces.

The successful implementation of such intense assaults will depend heavily on IA's ability to quickly concentrate accurate, overwhelming firepower against positions. That requires a degree of air superiority and the availablity of intense CAS aircrafts. A well placed strike by 4 ACs dropping 2000 pounders guided by ground CAS controllers can demolish strongpoints in a single blow, and render denfenders incapable of combat.
From rohitvats BR
Quick thoughts on state of Pakistan Army (PA) Armored Corps basis a recent report -

Government report reveals Pakistan’s progress on military acquisitions amid financial woes


(1) PA Armored Corps is not exactly in top shape and there's not modernization happening. Pakistan simply lacks the money for undertaking the much required upgrades.

(2) T-80UD tanks were inducted in mid-90s. Even latest T-80UD would be reaching 20 years of service life. And it forms the core of their vaunted 1st Armored Division under Multan based 2 Corps (Army Reserve South). While Pakistan does a good job at their rebuild factories there is a limit to which you can upgrade & extend the service life. And if cutting edge of your main strike force is a 20+ years old tank, it tells you about the lack of resources to get new technology.

(3) Al-Khalid - For all the hoopla around Al-Khalid, the production rate has been low; not even an armored regiment per year. Tells you that PA again lacks resources to replace older tanks with Al-Khalid. For a tank whose pilot batch was inducted in 2001, my estimate is that over 18 years, the number of Al-Khalid-1s produced stand at ~350 tanks.

(4) Al-Zarrar - Pakistan Army continues to modernize the legacy Chinese Type-59 tanks. And while Heavy Industries Taxila (HIT) has done a commendable upgrade job, the fact that a Al-Zarrar forms the single largest tank type in Pakistan Armored Corps, tells you about the state of affairs.\

(5) Type-85IIAP - Pakistan Army's interim import from China which was modified as per its expectation. PA went the T-80UD and Al-Khalid route after this as it had sub-optimal performance.

- Pakistan continues to focus on upgrading older tanks. And using rebuild to to extend the life of its legacy platforms. There is no new induction of a technologically superior product. Trials of Chinese tanks and rumours of T-90 have not come to fructification. And it has to face a modern, upgraded and expanded Indian Army Armored Corps!

- Al-Khalid is a competent tank design and Al-Khalid-2 will build on it. But the issue is with production and not quality. It seems HIT has been facing production issues. And engine has been their Achilles heel. In an ideal scenario, it AK-1 would've replaced older tanks but it has not. And the fact that PA ran trials of Chinese tanks shows PA feels the need for a modern 'heavy' tank and that AK-1 by itself is not a complete solution. While PA tries to optimize its resources, the gap between Indian and Pakistan Armored Corps is increasing.

- To counter this gap and even the odds, Pakistan Army will continue to reply on its Heavy and Light Anti-Tank battalions. Also, my research shows that Pakistan Army has created new armored brigades - it is possible to do this by not retiring older tanks even as new ones enter service. Of course, Pakistan Armored Divisions and Independent Armored Brigades are smaller in size compared to Indian Army. Pakistan hopes that time & space factor, along with the fact that India does not have disproportionate disparity, will allow it to hold fort.
 
  • Informative
Reactions: Ironhide and Ashwin
Damn, he gives so many details out.
  • Feb 18, NSA Ajit Doval called us and shared Jaish-e-Mohammed balakot camp details including videos which were obtained by RAW. Only 3 of us knew in the force.
  • Mirages were transferred to the western command from central.
  • Crystal maze and Spice were used. 12 Mirages as groups of six each. 4 more as back up.
  • IAF send an officer to Delhi airport to make sure they ignore the movement of the strike package.
  • All northern airbases were put on high alert without giving away more info.
  • After Mirages took off from Gwalior to our surprise we saw F-16s and AWACS were circling Rawalpindi area!. Their detection of the strike package would have led to cancelling of the strike. Thus to distract them I ordered Su-30 MKIs and Jaguars to take off to the direction of Bahawalpur, Pakistani Panjab. Six aircraft flew till the border and returned as PAF planes got distracted.
  • MIrages used hill terrains to enter Pakistan at low altitude then gained altitude to strike.
  • Mirages were inside Pakistan airspace for12 minutes.
  • The first bomb was fired at 3:28 AM. By 4 all planes were landed safely in two different airbases.
  • 'Bander' was the code name used to inform mission success to the air chief.
@Falcon @randomradio @vstol Jockey @DivineHeretic @Milspec @_Anonymous_ @Arvind @Gautam @lcafanboy @Ashutosh
The best part and outcome of Balakot Air strikes is we crossed our psychological mindset to go to any length to punish perpetrators wherever they are whether on our side of LoC/IB or across the IB/LoC without any 2 thoughts. And let the world know about our intentions by actually announcing it. This has put Pakistan on backfoot for the first time since independence....🙂🙂
 
Damn, he gives so many details out.
  • Feb 18, NSA Ajit Doval called us and shared Jaish-e-Mohammed balakot camp details including videos which were obtained by RAW. Only 3 of us knew in the force.
  • Mirages were transferred to the western command from central.
  • Crystal maze and Spice were used. 12 Mirages as groups of six each. 4 more as back up.
  • IAF send an officer to Delhi airport to make sure they ignore the movement of the strike package.
  • All northern airbases were put on high alert without giving away more info.
  • After Mirages took off from Gwalior to our surprise we saw F-16s and AWACS were circling Rawalpindi area!. Their detection of the strike package would have led to cancelling of the strike. Thus to distract them I ordered Su-30 MKIs and Jaguars to take off to the direction of Bahawalpur, Pakistani Panjab. Six aircraft flew till the border and returned as PAF planes got distracted.
  • MIrages used hill terrains to enter Pakistan at low altitude then gained altitude to strike.
  • Mirages were inside Pakistan airspace for12 minutes.
  • The first bomb was fired at 3:28 AM. By 4 all planes were landed safely in two different airbases.
  • 'Bander' was the code name used to inform mission success to the air chief.
@Falcon @randomradio @vstol Jockey @DivineHeretic @Milspec @_Anonymous_ @Arvind @Gautam @lcafanboy @Ashutosh

This is good enough for the trailer of bollywood. Movie would require more masala to be added. :)
 
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These Pakistani idiots cant manage their own country. It has split into two in less than 25 years of its existence and now are on the brink of multiple splits.

They carry this 1400 year old mentality to focus on why others are happy, peaceful and prosperous, causing envy, hatred and racism in their minds.

They could move ahead with their agenda in India for the 60 years with the help of Indian traitors when ruled by Congress et al.

With Modi and Doval at the helm to deny their evil designs, it will now become the cause of their downfall.
 
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