It seems the French are aware India will not buy 114 Rafales
Le retard de 8 ans sur les radars GaN des Rafale indiens inquiète New Delhi, face aux J-20 chinois. Dassault et Thales sont sous pression.
www.avion-chasse.fr
A worrying technological gap in a high-intensity environment
The
RBE2-AESA GaN radar, intended for the F4.2 and F5 evolutions of the
Rafale, offers significant advantages over the current GaAs version. Using
gallium nitride transistors, it doubles the power emitted in equal dimensions, while increasing the density of pulses per surface. This improvement results in an
estimated gain of effective range of 20-30%, an increased ability to treat several simultaneous tracks, and better immunity to blurging and active decoys.
By comparison,
the Chinese J-20 would now be equipped, according to several Western sources, with an AESA radar based on the
Type 1475 radar in GaN, with a range greater than
300 kilometers, capable of tracking about twenty targets simultaneously. At this stage, the Indian Rafale can effectively engage an aircraft such as the J-20 in an optimized environment (acler cooperation, pre-identification, etc.). In BVR (Beyond Visual Range) fought, the advantage is clearly in Beijing’s favor.
The J-20 also features advanced on-board electronic warfare systems, offset jamming pods, and optimised frontal stealth. The superiority of the Rafale, hitherto ensured by
manoeuvrability, the Meteor missiles and the
SPECTRA suite, became partial without a radar capable of fully exploiting the long-range environment.
Testing of the RBE2-GaN, however, started as early as 2014. But
Thales, faced with industrial limits, prioritized the modernization of French appliances, and did not deliver a GaN module operational to export until 2024. This choice, dictated by production rates, certification requirements, and budgetary constraints, has penalised India despite its initial investment in the Rafale programme to the tune of
EUR 7.8 billion.
An industrial dependence that undermines India’s air sovereignty
This delay illustrates the limitations of a
turnkey purchasing model, where critical systems remain under the control of home suppliers. India, which was demanding further technology transfer, failed to obtain the rights to manufacture or integrate the GaN radar. The contract signed in 2016 provides for the delivery of Rafale in an
F3R version, without binding commitment to future modernizations.
This generates a strategic dependence on French industrial calendars. The Indian Rafale programme does not have a
local retrofit line, and upgrades are to pass through Mérignac and Limours, where Thales assembles radar modules. This logistics pattern slows down maintenance cycles and prevents rapid upturn, as required by tensions with China or Pakistan.
The local alternative via
Bharat Electronics Ltd. or
DRDO is not yet mature in the AESA-GaN segment. India has invested in the
Uttam AESA radar for the
Tejas Mk2, but it does not yet reach the performance thresholds for Rafale-class fighter aircraft. The French delay therefore has a full impact on India’s airspace control strategy.
Faced with this situation, voices are being raised in the IAF command to redirect certain future commands to platforms with native GaN radars. The
Su-57, proposed by Russia with a N036 Byelka radar, or
the American F-15EX, are mentioned as alternatives to complement, although no agreement has been formalized at this stage.
Crisis management that is difficult for French industrialists
On the French side, the situation is followed with caution.
Dassault Aviation, which pilots the Rafale platform, remains dependent on
Thales for radar equipment. The latter, engaged in the Rafale F5 programme, has already delivered the first GaN modules for French aircraft, but the export extension remains marginal. By 2025, only
4 to 6 GaN radars would have been delivered outside France, all intended for test programmes or pilot units.
The problem is therefore both
industrial and political. The production capacity of GaN transistors in Europe remains limited. The only certified manufacturing line for the military aeronautical field is located in Limoges. It can only produce
a few dozen modules per year, far short of the global backfit needs of the Rafale fleet.
India’s pressure highlights a
strategic friction point: the gap between modernization announcements and the ability to deliver them. For New Delhi, this delay is more than a technical incident. It calls into question the confidence in the technological promise of the Rafale as a
fighter aircraft of regional superiority.
The French Ministry of the Armed Forces has not officially commented on the situation, but discussions would take place behind the scenes to propose an
acceleration plan. This would include the provision of GaN radars from
the end of
2026, with first operational integrations in 2027. This is a delay that is considered too late by part of the Indian General Staff, which anticipates a
peak in Sino-Indian tension in the next two to three years.
Rafale is out of running 
