There are many others besides Saifuddin Soz. Here are the facts:
Let's now see how facts are stacked up on Modi's claim about Patel and Kashmir. Patel undoubtedly played a stellar role in the integration of over 560 princely states into the Indian Union after India won freedom. Nehru himself has praised him as the "builder and consolidator of New India". However, three princely states - Hyderabad, Junagadh and Jammu & Kashmir - remained major sources of contention between India and Pakistan. Patel's steely resolve ensured the merger of Junagadh (through plebiscite) and Hyderabad (through police action) with India. Kashmir, however, continues to bleed both India and Pakistan - morally, financially and in terms of tens of thousands of lives - with no solution in sight.
All available facts of history disprove Modi's claim that Patel could have secured a lasting and fully satisfactory solution to the Kashmir problem in 1947-48 itself. Indeed, far from wanting to get all of Kashmir for India, Patel was, initially, prepared to give away all of Kashmir to Pakistan. To know how, it is useful to listen to the unanimous voices of multiple historians. Rajmohan Gandhi in his biography "Patel: A Life", tells us that Patel was thinking of making an ideal bargain: if Jinnah let India have Junagadh and Hyderabad, Patel would not object to Kashmir acceding to Pakistan. He cites a speech by Patel at Bahauddin College in Junagadh, following the latter's merger with India, in which he said: "We would agree to Kashmir if they agreed to Hyderabad." (pages 407-8, 438)
Patel's other authoritative biographer Balraj Krishna writes in his book "Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel" - "But for Nehru, he could settle the Kashmir issue in no time by arranging that the Kashmir Valley go to Pakistan and East Pakistan to India. Both countries would benefit from such an arrangement." Why did he want such an arrangement? Citing a conversation on this matter between Dr Rajendra Prasad and Jayaprakash Narayan, he writes: "(According to the Sardar), when we had given away Punjab, Sind and NWFP, of what value could the small valley of Kashmir have for us?" (pages 163-4)
Let us turn to a third biographer, Dr Dinkar Joshi, a renowned Gujarati historian who is well known to Modi. On page 220 of his book "Sardar: The Sovereign Saint", Dr Joshi writes: "Sardar knew the reasons behind Maharaja Hari Singh's indecisiveness - the geographical and demographic conditions of Kashmir (it being a Muslim-majority state neighbouring West Pakistan). If Hari Singh decided to join Pakistan, Sardar had planned his own strategies - he would ask for Jammu and Ladakh for India and hand over Kashmir Valley to Pakistan."
This is corroborated by another acclaimed book "The Shadow of the Great Game - The Untold History of India's Partition" by Narendra Singh Sarila. The author writes (pages 343-4) that Mountbatten, the last viceroy, "told me many years later" - "I explained to HH (Hari Singh) that his choice was between acceding to India or Pakistan and made it clear that I had assurances from the Indian leaders that if he acceded to Pakistan, they would not take it amiss."
Who had given those assurances? Sarila writes: "According to VP Menon (an important civil servant, and Patel's right-hand man who played a critical role during India's partition and the integration of princely states) 'These assurances had been given by Sardar Patel, the Home Minister, himself.'"
The authenticity of this has been has been certified by none other than HV Seshadri, a former Number 2 in the RSS leadership hierarchy. In his book "The Tragic Story of Partition", Seshadri, quoting Menon, states that Patel had no objection to Kashmir going to Pakistan. (page 215)
If all this does not convince Modi and his followers, they would do well to turn to pages 186-7 of "The Biography of Bharat Kesri Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee - With Modern Implications" by SC Das. Founder of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, Mookerjee is, after all, a BJP icon. Das tells us that Patel was keen on giving Kashmir Valley to Pakistan in exchange for East Pakistan. More significantly, he writes: "There was consensus between Dr Mookerjee and India's Iron Man Sardar Patel on this grave issue."
Why did India's Loh Purush favour Kashmir's accession to Pakistan? Most historians attribute it to Patel's pragmatism. Unlike Nehru, he was not emotionally attached to Kashmir. He probably thought that a Muslim-majority state bordering Pakistan could become a source of trouble for India. At the same time, historians also record that after Pakistan tried to forcibly seize Jammu & Kashmir by sending armed invaders, Patel became an indefatigable crusader against Pakistan.
As is well known, India's first war with Pakistan in 1947-48 ended in a stalemate, a UN-enforced ceasefire, and effective partition of J&K. It was a war in which Britain connived with Pakistan's adventure in Kashmir. In this, the erstwhile colonial masters were helped by a fact we would find hard to believe today - even after India and Pakistan had become independent, their opposing armies were still led by British nationals! The moot question here is: Did Patel take a stand that the Indian army must continue the fight until all of J&K came under Indian control?
Let us put the question in another way. "Most Indian political parties, BJP being the most vociferous among them, assert that Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir is an atoot ang(inseparable part) of Bharat. This is as much an agony as it is an assertion, since no party and no leader can present a credible strategy to get PoK back. Did Patel have one? Again, the answer would disappoint Modi and his supporters.
On this, we should listen to the views of two eminent and erudite Indian ambassadors. In his 2002 book "War and Diplomacy in Kashmir: 1947-48", Chandrashekhar Dasgupta tells us (pages 79-80) that - (a) "Sardar Patel at one stage declared that he would reject any proposal concerning a plebiscite in Kashmir unless Pakistan accepted the principle of plebiscite in Hyderabad also." In other words, Patel was not in principle opposed to a plebiscite in Kashmir. (b) At one stage, Patel offered a complete withdrawal (of Indian troops) from the Poonch area (to facilitate the holding of a plebiscite). In other words, Patel was ready to halt the Indian army's operations mid-way through the war in favour of a diplomatic-democratic solution.
All of us know no such solution emerged. But very few know that Patel, the realist, did not press for a military solution. Dasgupta's narration on this is supported by TCS Raghavan, who retired as India's ambassador in Islamabad in 2015. In his widely praised recent book "The People Next Door - The Curious History of India's Relations with Pakistan", Raghavan writes (page 9): "By the end of 1948, the war had run its course. While the tribal levies and the Pakistan military personnel were evicted from many areas in Poonch, Ladakh and Kargil, a narrow stretch bordering Pakistan and including Muzaffarabad and Mirpur and in the large area of Gilgit and Skardu further to the north remained in Pakistani control. Evicting Pakistan forces from these would require a larger offensive, a move which Prime Minister Nehru and his government, including Deputy Prime Minister Vallabhbhai Patel, had little enthusiasm for."
These, in essence, are the irrefutable facts about Patel, partition and Kashmir.