India's Foreign Policy : News, Views and Discussion
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How India can act as a global bridge
Earlier this year, United States (US) President Donald Trump used his prerogative as G-7 host to suggest inviting the leaders of India, Australia, and South Korea to the annual conclave. “I don’t feel that as a G-7 it properly represents what’s going on in the world. It’s a very outdated group of countries,” Trump said in May. While he later considered adding Brazil, Trump’s proposal was overshadowed by his suggestion that Russia be included, a move opposed by many of his advisers. Meanwhile, questions persist about whether this year’s G-7 summit — already postponed — will be held at all in person amid the coronavirus pandemic.
This is not the first hint that the G-7 format will expand. Last year, France extended a similar invitation to India (along with Australia, Spain, Chile, and five African countries) when it was the host. More recently, the British government floated the prospect of a D-10 partnership of democracies (comprising the G-7-plus India, Australia, and South Korea) to cooperate on 5G telecommunications technology.
These proposals come at a time when cooperation among democracies appears to be back in vogue, amid growing concerns about China’s assertiveness, the global economic battering at the hands of Covid-19, and greater technological competition. Two new mechanisms for coordinating policies related to the pandemic reflect a similar sentiment. The first, consisting of the US, India, Japan, Australia, South Korea, New Zealand, and Vietnam (as chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), involves the countries’ foreign secretaries or their equivalents. Another initiated by the US secretary of state consists of discussions with his counterparts from Japan, India, Australia, Brazil, South Korea and Israel.
While these have, so far, been one-off initiatives or issue-specific mechanisms, permanently expanding G-7 could represent a logical and natural progression. The G-7 evolved as an annual summit between heads of government after the economic shocks of the early 1970s. It was initially intended to be an informal forum for economic and political coordination involving the largest democratic economies. Starting with the five leaders of the US, Japan, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom (UK), it soon expanded to seven with the additions of Italy and Canada. Additionally, the leadership of the European Union (EU) was also included by convention.
The G-7 evolved as an annual summit between heads of government after the economic shocks of the early 1970s.
In the 1990s, as part of a bid to incorporate Russia into a post-Cold War order, G-7 evolved into G-8. For a while, in the early 2000s, a G8+5 format attempted to engage the leaders of the largest developing economies, including China, India, Brazil, South Africa, and Mexico, before the elevation of G-20 after the 2008 global financial crisis made this redundant. In 2014, Russia was dropped after its annexation of Crimea and G-8 reverted to G-7.
The recent signals from Washington, Paris, and London suggest an opportunity to permanently amend G-7 in a manner that better reflects today’s international order and priorities. In 1980, the economies of India, Australia, Brazil, and South Korea ranked 14th, 16th, 17th, and 29th in the world, respectively. Prior to the 2020 pandemic, they were 5th, 14th, 9th, and 12th. Given their relative strengths — large populations, important geographies, technological advantages, and capable militaries — not to mention their systems of governance, the inclusion of some of these countries would undoubtedly strengthen the democratic world’s ability to address today’s most pressing global challenges.
Despite the US’s invitation this year, an expanded G-7 is by no means a foregone conclusion. For now, US entreaties and India’s openness to participating in such formats are driven by tactical considerations, including both countries’ immediate problems with China. A more permanent shift would depend upon whether future leaders perceive value. While the presumptive Democratic nominee for US president Joe Biden has stressed the need to renew multilateral coalitions, he may be reluctant to so obviously exclude China, the world’s second-largest economy.
Despite the US’s invitation this year, an expanded G-7 is by no means a foregone conclusion. For now, US entreaties and India’s openness to participating in such formats are driven by tactical considerations, including both countries’ immediate problems with China
For its part, India has an unusual opportunity. Over the next two years, it will have a leadership role at three important organisations: Chair of the executive board of the World Health Organization (WHO), non-permanent membership on the United National Security Council (UNSC), and chair of G-20. This affords a good opportunity to achieve favourable multilateral outcomes at these and other bodies.
And, yet, India confronts other challenges. One is learning how to effectively utilise such a forum. Indian officials have become so accustomed to working within the framework of the G-77 — the large bloc of developing countries at the United Nations — that working with the G-7 will require a very different mindset. In fact, India could be a natural bridge between the two international groupings, one of which represents the global South, the other the global West.
Indian officials have become so accustomed to working within the framework of the G-77 — the large bloc of developing countries at the United Nations — that working with the G-7 will require a very different mindset. In fact, India could be a natural bridge between the two international groupings, one of which represents the global South, the other the global West
Finally, there will be the inevitable concerns about whether India’s entry into any such grouping would undermine its strategic autonomy. In fact, it does quite the opposite. India is already a member of groupings such as BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), East Asia Summit (EAS), Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and G-20, all of which meet regularly at the leadership level. Associating with other major economies, all of them democracies, ought to be a worthy aspiration.
Earlier this year, United States (US) President Donald Trump used his prerogative as G-7 host to suggest inviting the leaders of India, Australia, and South Korea to the annual conclave. “I don’t feel that as a G-7 it properly represents what’s going on in the world. It’s a very outdated group of countries,” Trump said in May. While he later considered adding Brazil, Trump’s proposal was overshadowed by his suggestion that Russia be included, a move opposed by many of his advisers. Meanwhile, questions persist about whether this year’s G-7 summit — already postponed — will be held at all in person amid the coronavirus pandemic.
This is not the first hint that the G-7 format will expand. Last year, France extended a similar invitation to India (along with Australia, Spain, Chile, and five African countries) when it was the host. More recently, the British government floated the prospect of a D-10 partnership of democracies (comprising the G-7-plus India, Australia, and South Korea) to cooperate on 5G telecommunications technology.
These proposals come at a time when cooperation among democracies appears to be back in vogue, amid growing concerns about China’s assertiveness, the global economic battering at the hands of Covid-19, and greater technological competition. Two new mechanisms for coordinating policies related to the pandemic reflect a similar sentiment. The first, consisting of the US, India, Japan, Australia, South Korea, New Zealand, and Vietnam (as chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), involves the countries’ foreign secretaries or their equivalents. Another initiated by the US secretary of state consists of discussions with his counterparts from Japan, India, Australia, Brazil, South Korea and Israel.
While these have, so far, been one-off initiatives or issue-specific mechanisms, permanently expanding G-7 could represent a logical and natural progression. The G-7 evolved as an annual summit between heads of government after the economic shocks of the early 1970s. It was initially intended to be an informal forum for economic and political coordination involving the largest democratic economies. Starting with the five leaders of the US, Japan, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom (UK), it soon expanded to seven with the additions of Italy and Canada. Additionally, the leadership of the European Union (EU) was also included by convention.
The G-7 evolved as an annual summit between heads of government after the economic shocks of the early 1970s.
In the 1990s, as part of a bid to incorporate Russia into a post-Cold War order, G-7 evolved into G-8. For a while, in the early 2000s, a G8+5 format attempted to engage the leaders of the largest developing economies, including China, India, Brazil, South Africa, and Mexico, before the elevation of G-20 after the 2008 global financial crisis made this redundant. In 2014, Russia was dropped after its annexation of Crimea and G-8 reverted to G-7.
The recent signals from Washington, Paris, and London suggest an opportunity to permanently amend G-7 in a manner that better reflects today’s international order and priorities. In 1980, the economies of India, Australia, Brazil, and South Korea ranked 14th, 16th, 17th, and 29th in the world, respectively. Prior to the 2020 pandemic, they were 5th, 14th, 9th, and 12th. Given their relative strengths — large populations, important geographies, technological advantages, and capable militaries — not to mention their systems of governance, the inclusion of some of these countries would undoubtedly strengthen the democratic world’s ability to address today’s most pressing global challenges.
Despite the US’s invitation this year, an expanded G-7 is by no means a foregone conclusion. For now, US entreaties and India’s openness to participating in such formats are driven by tactical considerations, including both countries’ immediate problems with China. A more permanent shift would depend upon whether future leaders perceive value. While the presumptive Democratic nominee for US president Joe Biden has stressed the need to renew multilateral coalitions, he may be reluctant to so obviously exclude China, the world’s second-largest economy.
Despite the US’s invitation this year, an expanded G-7 is by no means a foregone conclusion. For now, US entreaties and India’s openness to participating in such formats are driven by tactical considerations, including both countries’ immediate problems with China
For its part, India has an unusual opportunity. Over the next two years, it will have a leadership role at three important organisations: Chair of the executive board of the World Health Organization (WHO), non-permanent membership on the United National Security Council (UNSC), and chair of G-20. This affords a good opportunity to achieve favourable multilateral outcomes at these and other bodies.
And, yet, India confronts other challenges. One is learning how to effectively utilise such a forum. Indian officials have become so accustomed to working within the framework of the G-77 — the large bloc of developing countries at the United Nations — that working with the G-7 will require a very different mindset. In fact, India could be a natural bridge between the two international groupings, one of which represents the global South, the other the global West.
Indian officials have become so accustomed to working within the framework of the G-77 — the large bloc of developing countries at the United Nations — that working with the G-7 will require a very different mindset. In fact, India could be a natural bridge between the two international groupings, one of which represents the global South, the other the global West
Finally, there will be the inevitable concerns about whether India’s entry into any such grouping would undermine its strategic autonomy. In fact, it does quite the opposite. India is already a member of groupings such as BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), East Asia Summit (EAS), Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and G-20, all of which meet regularly at the leadership level. Associating with other major economies, all of them democracies, ought to be a worthy aspiration.
UNSC: A diplomatic ‘two-front’ war
Stoking diplomatic deadwood in the hope that the embers may catch fire is a parlour game at the United Nations. One of our neighbours — Pakistan — has indulged in this for years. “The India-Pakistan Question”, inscribed on the United Nations Security Council (SC)’s agenda on January 6, 1948, was last considered by SC on November 5, 1965. Yet, on the annual requests of Pakistan, the item has remained an inert part of the Council’s formal agenda. These requests are followed by sundry communications, in a bid to stir the pot. They are circulated and filed. No one is bothered. Then, in August 2019, following changes to Jammu and Kashmir (J&K)’s special status provided in the Indian Constitution, China weighed in favour of its “iron brother” and initiated what was akin to a diplomatic “two-front war”.
Using its perch on the Council, China took over the driver’s seat of this venture. Since China did not have the requisite majority to call for a formal meeting, it requested an informal consultation. China proposed a draft outcome statement and lobbied for support. The tussle was transformed into one between a Permanent Member of the Council — China; and a non-member of the Council — India. Pakistan was the cat’s paw in the equation.
The duo threw everything into the fray. They argued along the following three axes. Contrary to previous Council decisions, India changed the status quo, violating international law. The change resulted in large-scale human rights violations, leading to a serious humanitarian situation. This, along with India’s military assertiveness along the Line of Control constituted a threat to international peace and security. The Council, which is responsible for maintenance of international peace and security, needed to respond.
The same talk that we hear now on India-China issues was voiced then. Can India take on an economy five times its size? Can actions evoking criticism domestically be shielded from global scrutiny? Will a global power, which had sewn up vast swathes with its Belt and Road Initiative, not get broad support against a mid-sized delegation with limited resources?
A blow-by-blow account is left for another time. Suffice it to say that then, as now, hubris of global overreach was on display. Then, as now, quiet diplomacy was in play. Then, as now, despite the disparity in the power equation, some stay silent. Then, as now, key partners weigh in our favour. The closed-door outcome was better than expected. The public diplomacy victory was the icing on the cake.
More efforts — including one earlier this week — have been made. These follow a slightly different tack. Pakistan writes a letter to the president of the Council. China follows up to raise the matter during closed, informal consultations under “Any Other Business”. The “pinprick” doesn’t yield anything, as overwhelmingly, others aren’t interested. The rubric “Any Other Business” can be used by anyone, to raise anything. Some have used it to prick China about Hong Kong, and in course of discussions also referred to the treatment of Uighurs. Others target Russia by raising matters not on the active agenda. In short, failed “pinpricks” are par for the course. Our overcoming such efforts provides useful “lessons learnt”.
First, in August 2019, the People’s Republic of China took the unprecedented step of trying to extricate an agenda item that it had historically never engaged with. When the item was last considered in 1965, it was the Republic of China whose representative sat on the Council. China invalidated the oft-repeated shibboleth that it will handle “differences through peaceful discussion” bearing in mind “sensitivities and concerns”. Despite not succeeding, China keeps trying in other ways. Try, try and try again seems their theme song; never letting our guard down needs to be ours.
Second, China, an authoritarian autocracy averse to invoking human rights concerns in Council discussions, opportunistically masqueraded as a champion of human rights in J&K in August 2019. China used a double-edged weapon against us. When those who partner us in thwarting Chinese efforts accuse China of violating human rights, we need to consider whether to continue the approach of keeping our distance or work with them on such issues.
Third, when China initially pushed for a discussion on J&K, it cloaked itself as a “concerned” member of the international community. China’s interests in owning a suitable piece of real estate in the region were not obvious to all. China’s actions this summer are increasingly viewed as of a full-fledged party to a dispute. Should it keep treading this path, someone or the other can raise concerns about China’s role, which can lead to China attracting UN provisions that apply to parties to a dispute.
Fourth, when confronting “wolf warriors”, we need to better understand the “wolf totem” too. China’s manoeuvres on one front tend to presage, at times, other interventions and may possibly be a precursor to developments on other fronts. We, therefore, require greater coherence in our approach to China, across the board.
Fifth, the broader takeaway is that in a fast-evolving multipolar order, bilateral differences among the poles are best addressed appropriately, rather than taken to multilateral platforms and nurtured as disputes. If a pole still persists, then, at best, it would be a “pinprick”, nothing more. No pole, irrespective of its weight relative to the others, can easily sway the rest to the detriment of another pole. The “de facto” realities of a multipolar world are resetting the “de jure” world of multilateralism.
www.hindustantimes.com
Stoking diplomatic deadwood in the hope that the embers may catch fire is a parlour game at the United Nations. One of our neighbours — Pakistan — has indulged in this for years. “The India-Pakistan Question”, inscribed on the United Nations Security Council (SC)’s agenda on January 6, 1948, was last considered by SC on November 5, 1965. Yet, on the annual requests of Pakistan, the item has remained an inert part of the Council’s formal agenda. These requests are followed by sundry communications, in a bid to stir the pot. They are circulated and filed. No one is bothered. Then, in August 2019, following changes to Jammu and Kashmir (J&K)’s special status provided in the Indian Constitution, China weighed in favour of its “iron brother” and initiated what was akin to a diplomatic “two-front war”.
Using its perch on the Council, China took over the driver’s seat of this venture. Since China did not have the requisite majority to call for a formal meeting, it requested an informal consultation. China proposed a draft outcome statement and lobbied for support. The tussle was transformed into one between a Permanent Member of the Council — China; and a non-member of the Council — India. Pakistan was the cat’s paw in the equation.
The duo threw everything into the fray. They argued along the following three axes. Contrary to previous Council decisions, India changed the status quo, violating international law. The change resulted in large-scale human rights violations, leading to a serious humanitarian situation. This, along with India’s military assertiveness along the Line of Control constituted a threat to international peace and security. The Council, which is responsible for maintenance of international peace and security, needed to respond.
The same talk that we hear now on India-China issues was voiced then. Can India take on an economy five times its size? Can actions evoking criticism domestically be shielded from global scrutiny? Will a global power, which had sewn up vast swathes with its Belt and Road Initiative, not get broad support against a mid-sized delegation with limited resources?
A blow-by-blow account is left for another time. Suffice it to say that then, as now, hubris of global overreach was on display. Then, as now, quiet diplomacy was in play. Then, as now, despite the disparity in the power equation, some stay silent. Then, as now, key partners weigh in our favour. The closed-door outcome was better than expected. The public diplomacy victory was the icing on the cake.
More efforts — including one earlier this week — have been made. These follow a slightly different tack. Pakistan writes a letter to the president of the Council. China follows up to raise the matter during closed, informal consultations under “Any Other Business”. The “pinprick” doesn’t yield anything, as overwhelmingly, others aren’t interested. The rubric “Any Other Business” can be used by anyone, to raise anything. Some have used it to prick China about Hong Kong, and in course of discussions also referred to the treatment of Uighurs. Others target Russia by raising matters not on the active agenda. In short, failed “pinpricks” are par for the course. Our overcoming such efforts provides useful “lessons learnt”.
First, in August 2019, the People’s Republic of China took the unprecedented step of trying to extricate an agenda item that it had historically never engaged with. When the item was last considered in 1965, it was the Republic of China whose representative sat on the Council. China invalidated the oft-repeated shibboleth that it will handle “differences through peaceful discussion” bearing in mind “sensitivities and concerns”. Despite not succeeding, China keeps trying in other ways. Try, try and try again seems their theme song; never letting our guard down needs to be ours.
Second, China, an authoritarian autocracy averse to invoking human rights concerns in Council discussions, opportunistically masqueraded as a champion of human rights in J&K in August 2019. China used a double-edged weapon against us. When those who partner us in thwarting Chinese efforts accuse China of violating human rights, we need to consider whether to continue the approach of keeping our distance or work with them on such issues.
Third, when China initially pushed for a discussion on J&K, it cloaked itself as a “concerned” member of the international community. China’s interests in owning a suitable piece of real estate in the region were not obvious to all. China’s actions this summer are increasingly viewed as of a full-fledged party to a dispute. Should it keep treading this path, someone or the other can raise concerns about China’s role, which can lead to China attracting UN provisions that apply to parties to a dispute.
Fourth, when confronting “wolf warriors”, we need to better understand the “wolf totem” too. China’s manoeuvres on one front tend to presage, at times, other interventions and may possibly be a precursor to developments on other fronts. We, therefore, require greater coherence in our approach to China, across the board.
Fifth, the broader takeaway is that in a fast-evolving multipolar order, bilateral differences among the poles are best addressed appropriately, rather than taken to multilateral platforms and nurtured as disputes. If a pole still persists, then, at best, it would be a “pinprick”, nothing more. No pole, irrespective of its weight relative to the others, can easily sway the rest to the detriment of another pole. The “de facto” realities of a multipolar world are resetting the “de jure” world of multilateralism.
UNSC: A diplomatic ‘two-front’ war
India warded off the China-Pakistan game on Kashmir. But don’t let the guard down
Jaishankar talks of RCEP, says it is important not to get into false choice on FTAs
Advising against overhyping decisions not to join Free Trade agreements (FTAs), External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar on Saturday said it is important not to get into false choices and that there was a need to have detailed honest debates.
Speaking at a discussion in India@75 Summit organised by CII, the minister said proponents of Free Trade Agreements make out as if that is the only vehicle to engage the world.
He also referred to India’s decision not to join the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) last year and said apprehensions that it reflected protectionist tendencies were not correct.
“It’s important not to get into false choices. The choice is not today between will India engage or not engage the world. Proponents of FTAs make out as if that is the only vehicle to engage the world and if you missed out of RCEP, you are missing something very big in the world,” he said.
“I am not sure that it’s an accurate assessment of RCEP or FTAs... We need to drill down, get to basics, have detailed honest debates and not make these mantras ‘oh my God, we’re retreating and becoming protectionists’. A lot of our problems arise when we start overhyping it,” he
In November last year, India decided not to join the RCEP agreement as its key concerns were not addressed. The key issues behind New Delhi’s decision not to be part of RCEP included inadequate protection against import surge, insufficient differential with China, possible circumvention of rules of origin, keeping the base year as 2014 and no credible assurances on market access and non-tariff barriers.
In May, China said it will welcome India back to negotiations on the RCEP at an appropriate time.
www.hindustantimes.com
Advising against overhyping decisions not to join Free Trade agreements (FTAs), External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar on Saturday said it is important not to get into false choices and that there was a need to have detailed honest debates.
Speaking at a discussion in India@75 Summit organised by CII, the minister said proponents of Free Trade Agreements make out as if that is the only vehicle to engage the world.
He also referred to India’s decision not to join the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) last year and said apprehensions that it reflected protectionist tendencies were not correct.
“It’s important not to get into false choices. The choice is not today between will India engage or not engage the world. Proponents of FTAs make out as if that is the only vehicle to engage the world and if you missed out of RCEP, you are missing something very big in the world,” he said.
“I am not sure that it’s an accurate assessment of RCEP or FTAs... We need to drill down, get to basics, have detailed honest debates and not make these mantras ‘oh my God, we’re retreating and becoming protectionists’. A lot of our problems arise when we start overhyping it,” he
In November last year, India decided not to join the RCEP agreement as its key concerns were not addressed. The key issues behind New Delhi’s decision not to be part of RCEP included inadequate protection against import surge, insufficient differential with China, possible circumvention of rules of origin, keeping the base year as 2014 and no credible assurances on market access and non-tariff barriers.
In May, China said it will welcome India back to negotiations on the RCEP at an appropriate time.
Jaishankar talks of RCEP, says it is important not to get into false choice on FTAs
Speaking at a discussion in India@75 Summit organised by CII, the minister said proponents of Free Trade Agreements make out as if that is the only vehicle to engage the world.
India is a constructive, dependable actor globally, writes Harsh Vardhan Shringla
Covid-19 continues to exact a heavy toll worldwide. In India too, positive cases are rising. However, our effective domestic response has led to a significant improvement in our recovery rate, which is now 68.78%. The case fatality rate at 2.01% remains one of the lowest in the world.
High recovery and low-fatality outcomes can be attributed to proactive measures taken to deal with the outbreak from its early stages. We started screening Covid-19 cases a full 13 days before the first case was detected in India. We implemented full lockdown on the 55th day of the outbreak when we had only around 600 cases. Our public health response has been appreciated by the World Health Organization (WHO). The government took rapid steps to augment health infrastructure. As Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi noted, India now has over 11,000 Covid-19 facilities and 1.1 million isolation beds. We have ramped up testing to over half-a-million tests a day, to be scaled up to a million.
India’s response has not been confined to meeting our domestic requirements. We have been significantly engaged with the international community in providing the leadership that the global situation demanded. As a responsible stakeholder in global health supply chains, we ensured timely access to essential drugs and medical items for over 150 countries, while meeting our own domestic requirements. We reaffirmed our position as the first responder to humanitarian crises in the region by deploying medical teams to help Maldives, Mauritius, Comoros and Kuwait deal with the pandemic. India also dispatched naval assets to the Maldives, Mauritius, Madagascar, Comoros and Seychelles to deliver assistance. This demonstrated our strong commitment to the PM’s vision of Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR).
From being a net importer of Covid-19-related medical items, we have emerged as a net exporter. Today, we are manufacturing over 500,000 personal protective equipment (PPE) kits and over 300,000 N-95 masks every day. Our system has shown the necessary adaptability and agility to significantly ramp up production to go beyond our domestic requirements.
The repatriation of Indian nationals stranded abroad and the evacuation of foreigners from India to their home countries have been among the most successful aspects of our response. In the initial days, the ministry of external affairs had promptly set up a Covid cell and a 24x7 control room to assist Indian citizens abroad. The PM had also personally directed our heads of missions to extend all possible assistance to our nationals stranded abroad. Subsequently, the Vande Bharat mission, launched to repatriate our nationals stranded overseas, has been the largest exercise of its kind ever undertaken by the government and has demonstrated our capacity to effectively carry out complex humanitarian missions. Over one million Indians have returned under the Vande Bharat mission so far through flights, across land borders and on naval ships. We have been able to bring home Indian nationals from distant locations, and also facilitated the return of Bhutanese and Nepalese nationals stranded in third countries to their homes on Vande Bharat flights.
Rigorous screening of returnees by our diplomatic missions has ensured that the proportion of positive cases remains extremely small (less than 0.2%). Testing on arrival by the health ministry and state governments has helped detect these cases. The mission just doesn’t end with the arrival of our nationals. We are also mapping their skills on arrival to link them with companies for job opportunities.
There has also been no let-up in our diplomatic outreach during the pandemic. We have initiated and been part of several important conversations globally. Our Neighborhood First policy was on full display when the PM hosted a video conference of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (Saarc) leaders early in the crisis — our first such engagement on Covid-19. He announced a series of measures to deal with the pandemic, including the creation of a Covid-19 emergency fund with a commitment of $10 million from India. We have also called for a better multilateral response to global crises in the future. The PM has, on several occasions, including in the G-20 and Non-aligned Movement virtual summits, proposed the reform of multilateral cooperation by bringing people to the centre of our efforts. Our own initiatives such as the International Solar Alliance and the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure are prime examples of this approach. The decision of the G-20 on debt service suspension for developing countries, which India fully supported, reflects this people-centric approach. At the virtual Global Vaccine Summit, the PM highlighted how India’s contribution to the global response in terms of sharing medicines was guided by our philosophy of Vasudhaiva Kutumbkum. The PM also hosted the first virtual bilateral summit with Australia, which was followed by the India-European Union summit. In addition, the PM has spoken to his counterparts from 61 countries during this period. The external affairs minister has spoken to foreign ministers from 77 countries. We have kept open channels of virtual communication to strengthen partnerships and deal with situations that require diplomatic engagement.
We have been constantly adjusting, adapting and innovating to deal with the changed reality, particularly in our engagement with the world. And in the process, we have been successful in elevating India’s profile as a constructive and dependable actor on the global stage.
m.hindustantimes.com
Covid-19 continues to exact a heavy toll worldwide. In India too, positive cases are rising. However, our effective domestic response has led to a significant improvement in our recovery rate, which is now 68.78%. The case fatality rate at 2.01% remains one of the lowest in the world.
High recovery and low-fatality outcomes can be attributed to proactive measures taken to deal with the outbreak from its early stages. We started screening Covid-19 cases a full 13 days before the first case was detected in India. We implemented full lockdown on the 55th day of the outbreak when we had only around 600 cases. Our public health response has been appreciated by the World Health Organization (WHO). The government took rapid steps to augment health infrastructure. As Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi noted, India now has over 11,000 Covid-19 facilities and 1.1 million isolation beds. We have ramped up testing to over half-a-million tests a day, to be scaled up to a million.
India’s response has not been confined to meeting our domestic requirements. We have been significantly engaged with the international community in providing the leadership that the global situation demanded. As a responsible stakeholder in global health supply chains, we ensured timely access to essential drugs and medical items for over 150 countries, while meeting our own domestic requirements. We reaffirmed our position as the first responder to humanitarian crises in the region by deploying medical teams to help Maldives, Mauritius, Comoros and Kuwait deal with the pandemic. India also dispatched naval assets to the Maldives, Mauritius, Madagascar, Comoros and Seychelles to deliver assistance. This demonstrated our strong commitment to the PM’s vision of Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR).
From being a net importer of Covid-19-related medical items, we have emerged as a net exporter. Today, we are manufacturing over 500,000 personal protective equipment (PPE) kits and over 300,000 N-95 masks every day. Our system has shown the necessary adaptability and agility to significantly ramp up production to go beyond our domestic requirements.
The repatriation of Indian nationals stranded abroad and the evacuation of foreigners from India to their home countries have been among the most successful aspects of our response. In the initial days, the ministry of external affairs had promptly set up a Covid cell and a 24x7 control room to assist Indian citizens abroad. The PM had also personally directed our heads of missions to extend all possible assistance to our nationals stranded abroad. Subsequently, the Vande Bharat mission, launched to repatriate our nationals stranded overseas, has been the largest exercise of its kind ever undertaken by the government and has demonstrated our capacity to effectively carry out complex humanitarian missions. Over one million Indians have returned under the Vande Bharat mission so far through flights, across land borders and on naval ships. We have been able to bring home Indian nationals from distant locations, and also facilitated the return of Bhutanese and Nepalese nationals stranded in third countries to their homes on Vande Bharat flights.
Rigorous screening of returnees by our diplomatic missions has ensured that the proportion of positive cases remains extremely small (less than 0.2%). Testing on arrival by the health ministry and state governments has helped detect these cases. The mission just doesn’t end with the arrival of our nationals. We are also mapping their skills on arrival to link them with companies for job opportunities.
There has also been no let-up in our diplomatic outreach during the pandemic. We have initiated and been part of several important conversations globally. Our Neighborhood First policy was on full display when the PM hosted a video conference of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (Saarc) leaders early in the crisis — our first such engagement on Covid-19. He announced a series of measures to deal with the pandemic, including the creation of a Covid-19 emergency fund with a commitment of $10 million from India. We have also called for a better multilateral response to global crises in the future. The PM has, on several occasions, including in the G-20 and Non-aligned Movement virtual summits, proposed the reform of multilateral cooperation by bringing people to the centre of our efforts. Our own initiatives such as the International Solar Alliance and the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure are prime examples of this approach. The decision of the G-20 on debt service suspension for developing countries, which India fully supported, reflects this people-centric approach. At the virtual Global Vaccine Summit, the PM highlighted how India’s contribution to the global response in terms of sharing medicines was guided by our philosophy of Vasudhaiva Kutumbkum. The PM also hosted the first virtual bilateral summit with Australia, which was followed by the India-European Union summit. In addition, the PM has spoken to his counterparts from 61 countries during this period. The external affairs minister has spoken to foreign ministers from 77 countries. We have kept open channels of virtual communication to strengthen partnerships and deal with situations that require diplomatic engagement.
We have been constantly adjusting, adapting and innovating to deal with the changed reality, particularly in our engagement with the world. And in the process, we have been successful in elevating India’s profile as a constructive and dependable actor on the global stage.
India is a constructive, dependable actor globally, writes Harsh Vardhan Shringla
Through the pandemic, it has not only met its domestic requirements but taken a range of steps for global good
'All border situations were resolved through diplomacy'
External Affairs Minister Dr Subrahmanyam Jaishankar's book The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World is scheduled for release on September 7.
On August 25, he presented the first copy of the book to Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and tweeted, 'Privileged to present the first copy of my book 'The India Way' to PM @narendramodi. Thank him for his inspiration and encouragement.'
In an earlier tweet in July, the minister had said, 'A two-year project finally concluded. Thank all those who made it possible. Should hit the stands in early September.'
Dr Jaishankar, who joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1977, is uniquely placed to write the book, having served in embassies in Moscow, Washington, DC, Colombo, Budapest and Tokyo. He served as ambassador to the United States from 2013 to 2015, and to China from 2009 to 2013, before becoming foreign secretary in 2015.
After his retirement from the Indian Foreign Service in 2018, he was appointed external affairs minister by Prime Minister Modi in the government that took office in 2019.
In an exclusive interview to Senior Rediff.com Contributor Sheela Bhatt, Dr Jaishankar spells out his outline of a changing world, and India's place in it.
How will you narrate 'The India Way'? What is the broad framework of Indian thinking of the 21st century that would help India achieve its strategic goals?
Look, we are a billion-plus civilisational society that is poised to occupy a much more prominent place in the world. That puts us in a pretty unique position. Only China can claim something similar. And we do so at a time of unprecedented change, when the 1945 architecture is facing challenges. Our own capabilities and aspirations have steadily increased, as also the expectations of us. The democratic world looks to India, as do the developing countries. The global order is simultaneously undergoing greater rebalancing and more multi-polarity. My point is that the world is different, we are also different, and the future obviously will be different. In this situation, we need to optimise our relationships and maximise our convergences. You can say it is a 'Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas, Sabka Vishwas' approach to foreign policy. That is the essence of the India Way.
You have said in your book that India has three major burdens from the past. One, the Partition of 1947; two, the delayed economic reforms; and three, the prolonged exercise of the nuclear option. Can you elaborate, please?
Actually, I have explained this in some detail in the book. Whatever the causes, the result of Partition was a reduction in India's geo-political significance and global standing. As for the economic reforms, I would compare our moment of change with that of China. There is a 15-year gap, which has huge implications. As for stretching the nuclear option -- that we finally concluded in 1998 -- it unnecessarily prolonged the hyphenation with Pakistan. People may debate the compulsions and merits of each of these factors. But no one can deny that they had a serious impact on our strategic prospects.
How relevant is Jawaharlal Nehru's non-alignment today?
Like many other approaches, non-alignment too had its context. And that was the Cold War, which saw pulls and pressures from the Western and Soviet blocs. I have brought out how India responded to these. When it suited us, such as after the 1962 or in 1971, we were quite prepared to lean in one direction. But the current world is very different. Bloc politics is much weaker. China is not the USSR. The top 20 countries are less Western than before. Our own weight in global politics is much more. My point is that if the architecture is so different, then so too must its navigation. But don't get me wrong. India is and will always be an extremely independent polity. The manner in which it pursues its interests will reflect that basic character.
As a former diplomat, do you think that increasingly, most relationships between nations are now more transactional than principled?
To some extent, perhaps. It leads to convergences and where that is deeper, so is the relationship. But, values and principles also have a place in the calculation. Clearly, they have to be in sync with interests. Bear in mind that principles define our branding, aspirations, sometimes our very character. Strengthening the global commons and contributing to global good has great value. So, as a country, we should be proud of responding to a Nepal earthquake or a Mozambique cyclone. Our Africa partnership in fact represents a solidarity that goes well beyond self-interest. So does our medical consignments to 150 countries during COVID-19. In fact, at a time when the world is more cynical, this distinguishes us from many others. And I believe it is also intrinsic to the India Way.
Your book focusses significantly on our ties with China. You will agree that we are looking at the most serious crisis since 1962. The current government has invested in leadership diplomacy with China as well. How do you see the way out?
Well, you are right on that one thing. This is surely the most serious situation after 1962. In fact, after 45 years, we have had military casualties on this border. The quantum of forces currently deployed by both sides at the LAC (Line of Actual Control) is also unprecedented. If you look back over the last decade, there have been a number of border situations -- Depsang, Chumar and Doklam. In a sense, each one was different. This one surely is. But what is also common is that all borders situations were resolved through diplomacy. I am not minimising either the seriousness or the complex nature of the current situation. Naturally, we have to do what it takes to secure our borders. As you know, we are talking to the Chinese both through military channels and diplomatic ones. In fact, they work in tandem. But when it comes to finding a solution, this must be predicated on honouring all agreements and understandings. And not attempting to alter the status quo unilaterally.
But while the talks are going on, its impact on the rest of the relationship seems to be serious. Common people are really angry at what happened.
You have a point there. That is why we tell the Chinese side clearly that peace and tranquility in the border areas are the basis for the relationship. If we look back at the last three decades, this is quite self-evident.
You obviously wrote the book before the current problems with China. So how have you envisaged the future of the ties in your book?
What I have said is that the ability of India and China to work together could determine the Asian century. But their difficulties in doing so may well undermine it. So, this is an extremely consequential relationship for both. It has its fair share of problems and I have been forthright in acknowledging them. We need honest conversations on this, among Indians and between India and China. That is why this relationship requires both a strategy and a vision.
What are the factors that have kept India-Russia relations sturdy? In your first decade of service, India was largely banking on the India-Russia strategic partnership as the fulcrum of its policy.
I am so glad you asked. India-Russia ties have been remarkably consistent even though the world has seen dramatic changes over the last three decades. The convergences are very strong in many areas. But popular sentiment and leadership efforts have also given these ties an exceptional character. Its growing economic content and cooperation in Russia's Far East are new facets that have strengthened it recently.
America has led the world since 1945. Now, it is looking inward with its America First policy. As someone long associated with this relationship, how do you assess its impact on India?
To start with, we must analyse why America has changed. And thereafter, what it means for India and the world. Much of my book is devoted to this subject. Some of it is domestic to the US; some a reflection of their situation vis-à-vis others, especially China. On our part, we should take clinical view of our own interests and not get entangled in the debates of others. We have a broad spectrum of support in the US. These relations have progressed through multiple administrations. And that tells us that the convergences are getting deeper and broader by the day. Like everybody else, both India and the US are coming to terms with the changing world and are obviously discovering the merits of doing more together.
According to you, in the last 43 years, which were those historic international events that heavily influenced India's diplomacy?
Obviously, you picked 43 since I joined the Foreign Service in 1977.
Looking back, I would say starting with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. Then the break-up of the USSR in 1992, the 9/11 events in 2001, the global financial crisis in 2008 and now the corona pandemic in 2020. The epilogue of the book is called 'After the Virus', and makes the case that it will lead to radical shifts in the global order.
www.rediff.com
External Affairs Minister Dr Subrahmanyam Jaishankar's book The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World is scheduled for release on September 7.
On August 25, he presented the first copy of the book to Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and tweeted, 'Privileged to present the first copy of my book 'The India Way' to PM @narendramodi. Thank him for his inspiration and encouragement.'
In an earlier tweet in July, the minister had said, 'A two-year project finally concluded. Thank all those who made it possible. Should hit the stands in early September.'
Dr Jaishankar, who joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1977, is uniquely placed to write the book, having served in embassies in Moscow, Washington, DC, Colombo, Budapest and Tokyo. He served as ambassador to the United States from 2013 to 2015, and to China from 2009 to 2013, before becoming foreign secretary in 2015.
After his retirement from the Indian Foreign Service in 2018, he was appointed external affairs minister by Prime Minister Modi in the government that took office in 2019.
In an exclusive interview to Senior Rediff.com Contributor Sheela Bhatt, Dr Jaishankar spells out his outline of a changing world, and India's place in it.
How will you narrate 'The India Way'? What is the broad framework of Indian thinking of the 21st century that would help India achieve its strategic goals?
Look, we are a billion-plus civilisational society that is poised to occupy a much more prominent place in the world. That puts us in a pretty unique position. Only China can claim something similar. And we do so at a time of unprecedented change, when the 1945 architecture is facing challenges. Our own capabilities and aspirations have steadily increased, as also the expectations of us. The democratic world looks to India, as do the developing countries. The global order is simultaneously undergoing greater rebalancing and more multi-polarity. My point is that the world is different, we are also different, and the future obviously will be different. In this situation, we need to optimise our relationships and maximise our convergences. You can say it is a 'Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas, Sabka Vishwas' approach to foreign policy. That is the essence of the India Way.
You have said in your book that India has three major burdens from the past. One, the Partition of 1947; two, the delayed economic reforms; and three, the prolonged exercise of the nuclear option. Can you elaborate, please?
Actually, I have explained this in some detail in the book. Whatever the causes, the result of Partition was a reduction in India's geo-political significance and global standing. As for the economic reforms, I would compare our moment of change with that of China. There is a 15-year gap, which has huge implications. As for stretching the nuclear option -- that we finally concluded in 1998 -- it unnecessarily prolonged the hyphenation with Pakistan. People may debate the compulsions and merits of each of these factors. But no one can deny that they had a serious impact on our strategic prospects.
How relevant is Jawaharlal Nehru's non-alignment today?
As a former diplomat, do you think that increasingly, most relationships between nations are now more transactional than principled?
To some extent, perhaps. It leads to convergences and where that is deeper, so is the relationship. But, values and principles also have a place in the calculation. Clearly, they have to be in sync with interests. Bear in mind that principles define our branding, aspirations, sometimes our very character. Strengthening the global commons and contributing to global good has great value. So, as a country, we should be proud of responding to a Nepal earthquake or a Mozambique cyclone. Our Africa partnership in fact represents a solidarity that goes well beyond self-interest. So does our medical consignments to 150 countries during COVID-19. In fact, at a time when the world is more cynical, this distinguishes us from many others. And I believe it is also intrinsic to the India Way.
Your book focusses significantly on our ties with China. You will agree that we are looking at the most serious crisis since 1962. The current government has invested in leadership diplomacy with China as well. How do you see the way out?
Well, you are right on that one thing. This is surely the most serious situation after 1962. In fact, after 45 years, we have had military casualties on this border. The quantum of forces currently deployed by both sides at the LAC (Line of Actual Control) is also unprecedented. If you look back over the last decade, there have been a number of border situations -- Depsang, Chumar and Doklam. In a sense, each one was different. This one surely is. But what is also common is that all borders situations were resolved through diplomacy. I am not minimising either the seriousness or the complex nature of the current situation. Naturally, we have to do what it takes to secure our borders. As you know, we are talking to the Chinese both through military channels and diplomatic ones. In fact, they work in tandem. But when it comes to finding a solution, this must be predicated on honouring all agreements and understandings. And not attempting to alter the status quo unilaterally.
But while the talks are going on, its impact on the rest of the relationship seems to be serious. Common people are really angry at what happened.
You have a point there. That is why we tell the Chinese side clearly that peace and tranquility in the border areas are the basis for the relationship. If we look back at the last three decades, this is quite self-evident.
You obviously wrote the book before the current problems with China. So how have you envisaged the future of the ties in your book?
What I have said is that the ability of India and China to work together could determine the Asian century. But their difficulties in doing so may well undermine it. So, this is an extremely consequential relationship for both. It has its fair share of problems and I have been forthright in acknowledging them. We need honest conversations on this, among Indians and between India and China. That is why this relationship requires both a strategy and a vision.
What are the factors that have kept India-Russia relations sturdy? In your first decade of service, India was largely banking on the India-Russia strategic partnership as the fulcrum of its policy.
I am so glad you asked. India-Russia ties have been remarkably consistent even though the world has seen dramatic changes over the last three decades. The convergences are very strong in many areas. But popular sentiment and leadership efforts have also given these ties an exceptional character. Its growing economic content and cooperation in Russia's Far East are new facets that have strengthened it recently.
America has led the world since 1945. Now, it is looking inward with its America First policy. As someone long associated with this relationship, how do you assess its impact on India?
To start with, we must analyse why America has changed. And thereafter, what it means for India and the world. Much of my book is devoted to this subject. Some of it is domestic to the US; some a reflection of their situation vis-à-vis others, especially China. On our part, we should take clinical view of our own interests and not get entangled in the debates of others. We have a broad spectrum of support in the US. These relations have progressed through multiple administrations. And that tells us that the convergences are getting deeper and broader by the day. Like everybody else, both India and the US are coming to terms with the changing world and are obviously discovering the merits of doing more together.
According to you, in the last 43 years, which were those historic international events that heavily influenced India's diplomacy?
Obviously, you picked 43 since I joined the Foreign Service in 1977.
'All border situations were resolved through diplomacy'
'I am not minimising either the seriousness or the complex nature of the current situation.' 'Naturally, we have to do what it takes to secure our borders.' 'We are talking to the Chinese, both through military channels and diplomatic ones.'<br>'In fact, they work in tandem.' 'When it comes to...
