Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict 2020

Lolwa

Senior member
Feb 6, 2020
1,770
1,090
Delhi
Moreover it shows the incompetence of Russia as an ally. That too after signing NATO like agreement with them. And now after Biden taking over power in the US, they are even more nervous. Thank God our leadership knew this beforehand.
Russia is nobody's ally. The biggest winner of this war is Russia. It has gained even more influence in the Caucasus. Russia lost two airmen and pretty much annexed all of Armenia...
On top of that the amount of isreali and Turkish tech electronic signature and information they have learnt has value in gold. This war will lead to a huge jump in Russian drone and ew capabilities in the upcoming decade.
 

Lolwa

Senior member
Feb 6, 2020
1,770
1,090
Delhi
And if I were Armenia I would best cancel bel WLR order , no point buying weapons from a country which has no capability to provide help geopolitical or otherwise.
Why do we get unnecessarily possessive and make everything happening in the world about ourselves? China has been selling weapons to lot of countries for the last 40 years. A lot of them have won and lost. There was no emotional undercurrents when it came to whom they sold. Armenia and India never had any relations to talk about. Plus the Caucasus are Russian and Iranian backyard. The results wouldn't have changed whether we had a better a geopolitical situation or MIC. We have no strategic depth in the Caucasus we don't owe them anything. The Armenians could have very well bought Chinese drones if they were that desperate but they didnt because there economic situation doesn't allow it and also because of the failure of the Armenian ruling class.
The simple fact remains that Azerbaijan offers a lot more opportunities to the world while armenia doesn't have anything of value..
 
  • Like
  • Agree
Reactions: jetray and Volcano

AbRaj

Senior member
Dec 6, 2017
2,490
1,833
Republic of Wadiya
I don't feel like commenting because it is a waste of time but for what's it worth I will say India has no or very little advantage vis a vis por..... in a conventional war .

War is not solely about equipment's . Equipment's solely matter when qualitative advantage is greater than 40% or so . Quantitative advantage in modern day armoured warfare is rather limited because of widespread availability of countermeasures . Eg one can field 10 ATGMs per enemy tank without breaking sweat. Additionally superior tactics has the potential to blunt both quantitative and qualitative advantage in armour.

I will advise to look at por.... defensive measures along their vulnerable areas. One will get the idea . Unless one is interested in " quantitative " increase in bodybags proportional to so called " quantitative " advantage , one can try the same.

Indian has very limited offensive capability in the vertical envelope , the one which can actually provide an advantage and break the certain stalemate in the horizontal envelope. As of now India literally doesn't have any mass deployed offensive system even at standoff range which can force the hand of enemy. Same reason why china has a upper hand vis a vis India. Ie winning the war even before it is fought .

Anyways smart people might come up with smart excuses , but nevertheless if IAF had the qualitative advantage of even 20% , paf ambush even with its natural advantage of surprise would have been bloodied successfully. At the end of the day what matters is what you put on the table , not rhetoric. IAF is still locked in WW2 mentality. IAF ( India ) is 9th pass compared to IAF ( Israel ) PhD.

As of so called EW exposure by paf , its stupid to expect pak not to factor it or equally stupid not to expect paf to remedy it , if true. And it seems people are yet to realise that similar EW exposure is equally prevalent during peacetime ops etc. So nothing out of the ordinary more or less . Systems can be tweaked more or less to change EW characteristics if it's a overriding necessity due to suspected compromise etc. It's a car and mouse game and importantly it is foolish to assume that the opponent is equally foolish
Agar Rafale hota to...............:unsure:
 

randomradio

Senior Member
Nov 30, 2017
15,516
11,307
India
Trusting Israel is a terrible idea. They won’t think twice before dumping us if their interest doesn’t align with us. Indian economy will reach 10 trillion dollar sooner or later. But we can’t be considered a powerful country unless domestic MIC is developed on war footing basis. Modi highly disappointed on that front.

Indigenisation is a 15-20 year effort, there's nothing much a govt in a single term can do. It will take at least 10 years to show up on the ground. And this is something the scientific community has to achieve.
 
  • Like
Reactions: hellbent

hellbent

Senior member
Dec 4, 2017
673
1,464
Lol

I was speaking from Armenian perspective and what they are likely to do post the debacle. I will bet ₹10 that they will cancel the deal.

And who said that India has got anything to with Armenia etc. Not me. India has no reach nor interest in that region. India best try to manage her own backyard and try to do it convincingly for a start.

Collecting electronic signature of aerial assets leads to " big jump " in drone and EW capabilities 🤔

That's possible only if one assumes that the aerial assets are transmitting / radiating blueprints and that too unencrypted.

Electronic signature collection is mostly related to characterisation of the EW wave being transmitted

1. Signal discrimination and signal isolation of the information carrying signal

2. Measure the frequency

3. Measure the power level

4. Measure the pulse width

5. Measure the amplitude

6. Measure time of arrival / phase

7. Intra / inter pulse analysis

8. Frequency hopping pattern

Etc

And importantly the information is encrypted especially those being transmitted by UAVs / aircrafts and if one finally manages to break the same one will generally end up with generic flight control command codes and sensor generated imagery . None of these will translate into information which can help one jump technology.


Collection of electronic signatures allows one to generate a threat library and calibrate ( or develop ) own countermeasures for the same and importantly generate the electronic order of battle of the hostile party.
 
  • Like
Reactions: Killbot

hellbent

Senior member
Dec 4, 2017
673
1,464
Agar Rafale hota to...............:unsure:

I pity this country

Because if someone tries to do something good , then 1000 people try to prevent it.

Rafale acquisition was met with lot of opposition so IAF has to justify it at every opportunity.

Rafale is a capable aircraft but problem is it is few in numbers , expensive and foreign.

Rafale is simply a pawn in the chessboard , see the bigger picture . Post balakot situation will not repeat . Maybe next one will be something which even rafale can't handle because the IAF can't handle it properly , similar to post balakot. It's not the machines / equipments , it's the men in charge of IAF. The organisation has to be competent and prepared.

IAF is backwards when it comes to technology across the entire spectrum. Flying around aircrafts doesn't make for an effective airforce , formulating , developing , enabling technologies and related tactics to the aircrafts makes for an effective airforce.

Eg IAF stock of PGMs / Smart weapons is almost totally foreign and that too very limited , only saving grace is DRDO ran after then and we will have some local equivalents within next 5 years. In a peer to peer conflict , PGMs etc will be needed in huge numbers to seize the upper hand first . Dumb bombs will come in later after main threats are removed. IAF is mostly saddled with dumb bombs.

And forget about distruptive technologies , only two or three years ago IAF got their *censored* kicked into cooperating with drdo etc to study and develop systems which are sorely needed to fight modern wars.

IAF like IA is a reflection of the sorry state of India . But silver lining is that since last 3 years or so a effort is being made to change that. I won't hold my breath though.

IN is more competent technologically etc than the other 2 services. Eg DRDO sonar development would not have been possible without the huge contribution of IN. Can you believe it they have people who actually contributed to core R&D. IAF & IA will faint .

If I remember correctly one of the retd IN officers became one of the top SONAR related scientist in US.
 
Last edited:

A Person

Senior member
Dec 1, 2017
1,319
1,279
A Place
Eg IAF stock of PGMs / Smart weapons is almost totally foreign and that too very limited , only saving grace is DRDO ran after then and we will have some local equivalents within next 5 years. In a peer to peer conflict , PGMs etc will be needed in huge numbers to seize the upper hand first . Dumb bombs will come in later after main threats are removed. IAF is mostly saddled with dumb bombs.
Most PGMs are just kits that you fit on a dumb bomb. Paveway, AASM, SPICE, etc. So having a lot of dumb bombs is not a problem, it's the raw resource on which you'll graft whichever PGM kit is most relevant for the mission.
 

zapper

Well-Known member
Oct 10, 2019
448
350
US
Russian peacekeepers stationed in Nagorno-Karabakh

1605401315302.png
 

Volcano

Senior member
Mar 11, 2018
2,229
1,966
India, Kerala

LESSONS LEARNED FROM SECOND NAGORNO-KARABAKH WAR


Lessons Learned From Second Nagorno-Karabakh War


Prepared by Thurisaz Solutions exclusively for SouthFront

On November 10th, 2020 the Republic of Armenia signed a ceasefire with Azerbaijan, agreeing to hand over nearly a fifth of the territory within its sphere of influence prior to the signing. While maintaining the Lachin corridor, as well as a passageway to Stepanakart, the former capital of the self proclaimed Artsakh Republic; the Armenian Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan, was forced to accept a peace agreement returning all surrounding territories to Azeribaijani control, as well as permitting Russian Peacekeepers to set up observation posts throughout the Lachin corridor and the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Leading up to this historic agreement was a bloody, and largely one-sided conflict in which Azerbaijan proved once and for all that a new generation of warfare has arrived.



Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Nagorno-Karabakh as well as the surrounding territories have been fiercely contested between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Initially the undisputed territory of Azerbaijan, the regions surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh have been under the de-facto control of the Artsakh Republic, an autonomous region within the Armenian sphere of influence, since the brutal First Nagorno-Karabakh War ended in 1994. During this war more than 700,000 Azerbaijani civilians were displaced from the region, causing enormous friction in the years following the OSCE brokered ceasefire, as they were not permitted to return to their homes after the territorial handover took place.

While the territory surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh has remained de-jure Azerbaijani, internationally recognized to be so, the negotiations regarding their return remained fruitless for the 26 years they had been underway. Baku, growing increasingly dissatisfied with this lack of progress, began to consider military options during the mid-2010s. Border skirmishes became a common occurrence, with hundreds of Azerbaijani and Armenian troops being killed and wounded in the years before the 2020 conflict.
In 2016, a large scale flare-up in the fighting brought tensions to a fever-pitch, with more than 100 combatants being killed. This also served as confirmation for the Azeri military that they were truly a match for Armenia. While undesirably large casualties were suffered, the advance had been extremely rapid; in some cases with Armenian positions being overrun in a matter of hours from the beginning of operations. Taking note of these results, Azerbaijan’s government began to remedy them in the form of further military modernization and expansion.
Large deals between Israel and Turkey provided Baku with loitering munitions such as the IAI Harop, developed by Israel, and the Bayraktar 2 reconnaissance drone, built by Turkey. The Azerbaijani military also began a general restructuring of their tactics, aiming for a truly multi domain capability rather than the two-dimensional operational thinking common amongst second-rate powers. In order to make this happen, Baku increased their defense budget by more than 60% between 2016 and 2020.
Following further skirmishes in 2017 and 2018, the gloves finally came off on September 27th, 2020. Initial skirmishes along the line of contact led to the declaration of martial law in both Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the beginning stages of mobilization by the Armenian Military. The following day, Azerbaijan began its own mobilization efforts. Much to the consternation of the United Nations and the International Community at large, Azerbaijan did not relent and continued it’s offensive actions past the first skirmishes. Following initial moderately successful counterattacks by Armenia in an effort to retake lost positions, the lines became relatively static for the following days despite intense clashes between the two forces.
As early as the beginning of October, the Armenian lines began to crack. Intense usage of long range artillery with observation drones in a forward observer role started to take their effect on Armenian manpower and morale. Azerbaijani forces were able to advance in both the Northern and Southern sectors of fighting throughout the beginning of the month; and following incremental Azerbaijani advances, on October 10th Russia brokered an initial Ceasefire between the two sides. However, within a matter of hours this ceasefire fell apart and hostilities resumed across the entire front.
Lessons Learned From Second Nagorno-Karabakh War
Click to see the full-size image
Throughout mid-October the advantage shifted further and further towards Azerbaijan. The Republic of Artsakh began losing more and more territory, and the Armenian aligned military forces continued losing more and more men and equipment. It was at this point where Azerbaijan began exerting more operational dominance on the battlefield. By October 19th, Azerbaijani forces had occupied a significant portion of southern Artsakh, and were successfully holding their gains in the north as well. Hundreds, if not thousands of Armenians had been killed by this point, and hundreds of trucks, tanks, and other pieces of military equipment had been destroyed by Azerbaijani drones and artillery.
Following yet another unsuccessful Russia brokered ceasefire, Azerbaijani offensives resumed in the South. Armenian and Artsakh forces were forced into a total retreat, being continuously targeted by unseen drones, loitering munitions, and shelling. At this point the air defenses within Nagorno-Karabakh had been utterly dismantled by effective Azerbaijani use of air assets, such as the IAI Harop that Baku had previously acquired. A notable image encapsulates the conflict by showing the moment before a Harop impacts into an S-300PS Transporter Erector Launcher.
By the beginning of November, the entire Artsakh-Iranian border had been occupied by Azerbaijani forces, and the Armenian aligned forces were on a distinct strategic backfoot. With morale at an all time high for Azerbaijan, their forces pivoted to the Northwest to begin an offensive targeting Stepanakart, the capital of The Republic of Artsakh. Within a matter of days, large scale breakthroughs had been made, as the shattered remnants of the Armenian aligned forces hastily attempted to halt the Azerbaijani advance. However, the Armenian forces were no longer capable of any significant impact on the battlefield, and the Armenian Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan, was forced to the negotiating table after the fall of Shusha, the second largest city in Nagorno Karabakh, and the last stronghold before Stepanakart.
This war is essential to take lessons from due to a number of key properties it displayed. The usage of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs) is impossible for any nation not to take note of. Unlike in prior conflicts, aerial capabilities are no longer exclusive to large powers, and can be employed to enormous effect by any military regardless of size or funding. There is no longer an ability to fight a nation state without considering the aerial dimension of the conflict, and air defense capabilities must be high up on the priority list of any military planner. Had the Armenian air defenses been competent and extensive, the war may have turned out significantly differently.
The employment of standoff loitering munitions also holds with it enormous consequences for future conflicts. Relatively inexpensive precision guided munitions are proliferating massively, and as a result any concentrated military formation or emplacement is vulnerable from the air. While in the past it may have sufficed to entrench military hardware to protect it, modern warfare now dictates that such two-dimensional thinking is a recipe for disaster. Even small, lightly funded militaries are now capable of precision standoff strikes without putting their forces at risk.
The most important effect of these two new factors is that wars are likely to be more relegated to standoff engagements, rather than troop-on-troop kinetic fights. If it is possible to dismantle a military without ever putting a soldier in harm’s way, a commander will undoubtedly choose that option. It is likely there will be a shift from typical “troop” movements towards an initial battle for aerial dominance, and an attempt to attrit enemy air defenses and destroy enemy formations as quickly as possible with cheap standoff munitions, followed by what is most aptly characterized as “mopping up” by ground formations.
Lessons Learned From Second Nagorno-Karabakh War
Click to see the full-size image
While ground formations are by no means useless, their role has undergone a total change. In a conventional conflict, they no longer are most effective in their offensive capability and ability to destroy the enemy, but rather are now most useful solely to hold off an enemy ground force from being able to deny the use of a military’s aerial assets, and to secure territory following the dismantling of a nation’s military from the air. It is blindingly clear that as soon as Azerbaijani forces were capable of effectively utilizing the air to project power and destroy Armenian aligned formations, the war was as good as won.
Nikol Pashinyan had in fact been warned of this eventuality by the fourth day of the conflict, however he had failed to react accordingly. Instead of ensuring a successful and timely mobilization of the nation, he instead issued orders to halt replacements to the front, and opted to send only volunteers to the front lines. Acquisition of new, effective Short Range Air Defense (SHORAD) systems such as the Tor-M2KM were also neglected, and instead older 9K33 “Osa” Short Range Air Defense systems were procured. While simple procurement and mobilization policies would likely not alone have resulted in a victory for Armenia, it would undoubtedly have made the conflict much more difficult for the Azerbaijani military, and a more favorable peace agreement could have been achieved.
Lessons Learned From Second Nagorno-Karabakh War
Click to see the full-size image
When one opts to ignore the reality of the modern battlefield in favor of political fantasy as Pashinyan has done, good men die. The Armenian military was not equipped with the necessary tools to wage a modern war, and the result was a crushing defeat, with thousands of unnecessary casualties. If any military seeks to win conflicts in the modern age, it must take these lessons from Nagorno-Karabkh, lest they suffer the same fate.
Lessons Learned From Second Nagorno-Karabakh War
 

Hydra

Banned
May 19, 2020
3,300
1,602
Mumbai

LESSONS LEARNED FROM SECOND NAGORNO-KARABAKH WAR


Lessons Learned From Second Nagorno-Karabakh War


Prepared by Thurisaz Solutions exclusively for SouthFront

On November 10th, 2020 the Republic of Armenia signed a ceasefire with Azerbaijan, agreeing to hand over nearly a fifth of the territory within its sphere of influence prior to the signing. While maintaining the Lachin corridor, as well as a passageway to Stepanakart, the former capital of the self proclaimed Artsakh Republic; the Armenian Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan, was forced to accept a peace agreement returning all surrounding territories to Azeribaijani control, as well as permitting Russian Peacekeepers to set up observation posts throughout the Lachin corridor and the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Leading up to this historic agreement was a bloody, and largely one-sided conflict in which Azerbaijan proved once and for all that a new generation of warfare has arrived.



Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Nagorno-Karabakh as well as the surrounding territories have been fiercely contested between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Initially the undisputed territory of Azerbaijan, the regions surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh have been under the de-facto control of the Artsakh Republic, an autonomous region within the Armenian sphere of influence, since the brutal First Nagorno-Karabakh War ended in 1994. During this war more than 700,000 Azerbaijani civilians were displaced from the region, causing enormous friction in the years following the OSCE brokered ceasefire, as they were not permitted to return to their homes after the territorial handover took place.

While the territory surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh has remained de-jure Azerbaijani, internationally recognized to be so, the negotiations regarding their return remained fruitless for the 26 years they had been underway. Baku, growing increasingly dissatisfied with this lack of progress, began to consider military options during the mid-2010s. Border skirmishes became a common occurrence, with hundreds of Azerbaijani and Armenian troops being killed and wounded in the years before the 2020 conflict.
In 2016, a large scale flare-up in the fighting brought tensions to a fever-pitch, with more than 100 combatants being killed. This also served as confirmation for the Azeri military that they were truly a match for Armenia. While undesirably large casualties were suffered, the advance had been extremely rapid; in some cases with Armenian positions being overrun in a matter of hours from the beginning of operations. Taking note of these results, Azerbaijan’s government began to remedy them in the form of further military modernization and expansion.
Large deals between Israel and Turkey provided Baku with loitering munitions such as the IAI Harop, developed by Israel, and the Bayraktar 2 reconnaissance drone, built by Turkey. The Azerbaijani military also began a general restructuring of their tactics, aiming for a truly multi domain capability rather than the two-dimensional operational thinking common amongst second-rate powers. In order to make this happen, Baku increased their defense budget by more than 60% between 2016 and 2020.
Following further skirmishes in 2017 and 2018, the gloves finally came off on September 27th, 2020. Initial skirmishes along the line of contact led to the declaration of martial law in both Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the beginning stages of mobilization by the Armenian Military. The following day, Azerbaijan began its own mobilization efforts. Much to the consternation of the United Nations and the International Community at large, Azerbaijan did not relent and continued it’s offensive actions past the first skirmishes. Following initial moderately successful counterattacks by Armenia in an effort to retake lost positions, the lines became relatively static for the following days despite intense clashes between the two forces.
As early as the beginning of October, the Armenian lines began to crack. Intense usage of long range artillery with observation drones in a forward observer role started to take their effect on Armenian manpower and morale. Azerbaijani forces were able to advance in both the Northern and Southern sectors of fighting throughout the beginning of the month; and following incremental Azerbaijani advances, on October 10th Russia brokered an initial Ceasefire between the two sides. However, within a matter of hours this ceasefire fell apart and hostilities resumed across the entire front.
Lessons Learned From Second Nagorno-Karabakh War
Click to see the full-size image
Throughout mid-October the advantage shifted further and further towards Azerbaijan. The Republic of Artsakh began losing more and more territory, and the Armenian aligned military forces continued losing more and more men and equipment. It was at this point where Azerbaijan began exerting more operational dominance on the battlefield. By October 19th, Azerbaijani forces had occupied a significant portion of southern Artsakh, and were successfully holding their gains in the north as well. Hundreds, if not thousands of Armenians had been killed by this point, and hundreds of trucks, tanks, and other pieces of military equipment had been destroyed by Azerbaijani drones and artillery.
Following yet another unsuccessful Russia brokered ceasefire, Azerbaijani offensives resumed in the South. Armenian and Artsakh forces were forced into a total retreat, being continuously targeted by unseen drones, loitering munitions, and shelling. At this point the air defenses within Nagorno-Karabakh had been utterly dismantled by effective Azerbaijani use of air assets, such as the IAI Harop that Baku had previously acquired. A notable image encapsulates the conflict by showing the moment before a Harop impacts into an S-300PS Transporter Erector Launcher.
By the beginning of November, the entire Artsakh-Iranian border had been occupied by Azerbaijani forces, and the Armenian aligned forces were on a distinct strategic backfoot. With morale at an all time high for Azerbaijan, their forces pivoted to the Northwest to begin an offensive targeting Stepanakart, the capital of The Republic of Artsakh. Within a matter of days, large scale breakthroughs had been made, as the shattered remnants of the Armenian aligned forces hastily attempted to halt the Azerbaijani advance. However, the Armenian forces were no longer capable of any significant impact on the battlefield, and the Armenian Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan, was forced to the negotiating table after the fall of Shusha, the second largest city in Nagorno Karabakh, and the last stronghold before Stepanakart.
This war is essential to take lessons from due to a number of key properties it displayed. The usage of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs) is impossible for any nation not to take note of. Unlike in prior conflicts, aerial capabilities are no longer exclusive to large powers, and can be employed to enormous effect by any military regardless of size or funding. There is no longer an ability to fight a nation state without considering the aerial dimension of the conflict, and air defense capabilities must be high up on the priority list of any military planner. Had the Armenian air defenses been competent and extensive, the war may have turned out significantly differently.
The employment of standoff loitering munitions also holds with it enormous consequences for future conflicts. Relatively inexpensive precision guided munitions are proliferating massively, and as a result any concentrated military formation or emplacement is vulnerable from the air. While in the past it may have sufficed to entrench military hardware to protect it, modern warfare now dictates that such two-dimensional thinking is a recipe for disaster. Even small, lightly funded militaries are now capable of precision standoff strikes without putting their forces at risk.
The most important effect of these two new factors is that wars are likely to be more relegated to standoff engagements, rather than troop-on-troop kinetic fights. If it is possible to dismantle a military without ever putting a soldier in harm’s way, a commander will undoubtedly choose that option. It is likely there will be a shift from typical “troop” movements towards an initial battle for aerial dominance, and an attempt to attrit enemy air defenses and destroy enemy formations as quickly as possible with cheap standoff munitions, followed by what is most aptly characterized as “mopping up” by ground formations.
Lessons Learned From Second Nagorno-Karabakh War
Click to see the full-size image
While ground formations are by no means useless, their role has undergone a total change. In a conventional conflict, they no longer are most effective in their offensive capability and ability to destroy the enemy, but rather are now most useful solely to hold off an enemy ground force from being able to deny the use of a military’s aerial assets, and to secure territory following the dismantling of a nation’s military from the air. It is blindingly clear that as soon as Azerbaijani forces were capable of effectively utilizing the air to project power and destroy Armenian aligned formations, the war was as good as won.
Nikol Pashinyan had in fact been warned of this eventuality by the fourth day of the conflict, however he had failed to react accordingly. Instead of ensuring a successful and timely mobilization of the nation, he instead issued orders to halt replacements to the front, and opted to send only volunteers to the front lines. Acquisition of new, effective Short Range Air Defense (SHORAD) systems such as the Tor-M2KM were also neglected, and instead older 9K33 “Osa” Short Range Air Defense systems were procured. While simple procurement and mobilization policies would likely not alone have resulted in a victory for Armenia, it would undoubtedly have made the conflict much more difficult for the Azerbaijani military, and a more favorable peace agreement could have been achieved.
Lessons Learned From Second Nagorno-Karabakh War
Click to see the full-size image
When one opts to ignore the reality of the modern battlefield in favor of political fantasy as Pashinyan has done, good men die. The Armenian military was not equipped with the necessary tools to wage a modern war, and the result was a crushing defeat, with thousands of unnecessary casualties. If any military seeks to win conflicts in the modern age, it must take these lessons from Nagorno-Karabkh, lest they suffer the same fate.
Lessons Learned From Second Nagorno-Karabakh War
Armenians paid the price for not modernising their military. The lesson we should also learn, Chinese are up grading their military and we are sleeping like an idiot.
 
  • Agree
Reactions: jetray and Volcano

RISING SUN

Senior member
Dec 3, 2017
14,402
6,409
Lol

I was speaking from Armenian perspective and what they are likely to do post the debacle. I will bet ₹10 that they will cancel the deal.

And who said that India has got anything to with Armenia etc. Not me. India has no reach nor interest in that region. India best try to manage her own backyard and try to do it convincingly for a start.

Collecting electronic signature of aerial assets leads to " big jump " in drone and EW capabilities 🤔

That's possible only if one assumes that the aerial assets are transmitting / radiating blueprints and that too unencrypted.

Electronic signature collection is mostly related to characterisation of the EW wave being transmitted

1. Signal discrimination and signal isolation of the information carrying signal

2. Measure the frequency

3. Measure the power level

4. Measure the pulse width

5. Measure the amplitude

6. Measure time of arrival / phase

7. Intra / inter pulse analysis

8. Frequency hopping pattern

Etc

And importantly the information is encrypted especially those being transmitted by UAVs / aircrafts and if one finally manages to break the same one will generally end up with generic flight control command codes and sensor generated imagery . None of these will translate into information which can help one jump technology.


Collection of electronic signatures allows one to generate a threat library and calibrate ( or develop ) own countermeasures for the same and importantly generate the electronic order of battle of the hostile party.