MMRCA 2.0 - Updates and Discussions

[Hydra]

Good summary

@Sathya here he mention about kargil war & mmrca relationship, not direct.

 

[marich01]

I really can't believe somebody of your calibre typed this. Believe me I checked multiple times if I was actually engaging you in conversation or Hydrocele.

It does not have to be explicitly said or written out. There are a lot of subtle ways to hint that if the adversary choose to escalate past certain boundaries to cause us trouble then the same trouble will find him also and this would not depend on the adversary logic, rather the interpretation of us which allow every possible course of action. There is a reason we still have multiple Prithvi regiments mated with nuke warheads pointed at Pak because Pak has use first doctrine. I am 100% certain in this regard that our doctrine allow us to use every single measure under our capability, there is no grey zone in it.

As a country we have the capability to repel any decapitation attack/attempt and this provision is there with the Govt led high security committee that if such a situation arise be it conventional or nuclear level, our interpretation will not consider the latter use case only. It will be all encompassing response. I am certain about this part based on the very few little interaction I have ever managed to get, natsec study, papers, discussions & there is not much ambiguity about it. Yes various theories, interpretation, but overall action point there is certain alignment about the response part.

Major reason why for all the talk, the tomahawks did not yet land en masse inside Russia. Everyone respects a certain threshold.

 

[marich01]

Unlike our 2 neighbors, India has a NFU policy without any strategic ambiguity. Unless our N doctrine changes, we will never be the 1st to escalate.

Our policy makers were bold in embracing an NFU posture as early as 2001. Our N triad became fully operational only in 2018 when Arihant conducted her first deterrent patrol.

What did we see in the last event? a missile aimed at Delhi shot down but no equal response (ie launching a nuke capable BM minus nuke payload) was given. rather we hit back in pure conventional term. This was because the attack was not considered as a decapitation attempt. Pak will not try that, I think post the Op in one seminar the person when talking about nuke threat from Pak side said we wargamed and this threat is minimal.

As triggers go, first trigger need not be a nuke response. In any warlike event, first trigger is via diplomatic channel, ie what Russia did acting as mediator sort. 2nd trigger is a military response in equal measure. Then another further action be it mil level or diplomatic leadership level. each of these are at different escalatory level. Usually both sides be reasonable and agree on certain point of action and its reflected across the board. What I proposed above is our Govt willing to have all options on hand because how do you know the other side would hit you once you turn back or not? Therefore all option remain valid until everything is back to normal.

At any point of time, would you call our stance wrt Pak has gone back to normal over the past 2 decades since Kargil? not much. We had to push different triggers time to time. The same will happen wrt a bigger adversary. It will not start in one day and won't end in one.

 

[Speedster1]

What did we see in the last event? a missile aimed at Delhi shot down but no equal response (ie launching a nuke capable BM minus nuke payload) was given. rather we hit back in pure conventional term. This was because the attack was not considered as a decapitation attempt.

This has been officially refuted by the IA.

Army’s Western Command removes video showing Pakistan’s Shaheen missile

Speculation of Pakistani missile shot down by S-400, Indian Army's response, and Operation Sindoor updates.

www.thehindu.com

What I proposed above is our Govt willing to have all options on hand because how do you know the other side would hit you once you turn back or not? Therefore all option remain valid until everything is back to normal.

There is no indication we are moving away from our policy of keeping missiles demated from their warheads.

(we have started missile cannisterization from the A5 onwards which would suggest a deployed capability. But this has not been officially declared atleast)

In this situation, it will certainly take X days/weeks for the forces to deploy strategic missiles after receiving the go-ahead from the NCA.

In my view, India has widened the range of conventional options by setting up the IRF, for example. Once operational India gains the ability to strike targets without raising the N threshold.

This move also negates Pak propoganda that any incoming Indian missile could be a carrying a nuclear whd, forcing Pak to respond.

So, escalation management is now much easier for India.

 

[_Anonymous_]

It does not have to be explicitly said or written out. There are a lot of subtle ways to hint that if the adversary choose to escalate past certain boundaries to cause us trouble then the same trouble will find him also and this would not depend on the adversary logic, rather the interpretation of us which allow every possible course of action. There is a reason we still have multiple Prithvi regiments mated with nuke warheads pointed at Pak because Pak has use first doctrine. I am 100% certain in this regard that our doctrine allow us to use every single measure under our capability, there is no grey zone in it.

As a country we have the capability to repel any decapitation attack/attempt and this provision is there with the Govt led high security committee that if such a situation arise be it conventional or nuclear level, our interpretation will not consider the latter use case only. It will be all encompassing response. I am certain about this part based on the very few little interaction I have ever managed to get, natsec study, papers, discussions & there is not much ambiguity about it. Yes various theories, interpretation, but overall action point there is certain alignment about the response part.

Major reason why for all the talk, the tomahawks did not yet land en masse inside Russia. Everyone respects a certain threshold.

I'd suggest you read up more about deterrence for this isn't your area of expertise & it shows.

Deterrence means you refuse to act or react against known provocations like India was successfully deterred by Paxtan for all the terrorist activities they undertook in India right from the 1980s till we executed a surgical strike for what they did in Uri.

The reason being as simple as Paxtan threatened usage of N Weapons in case India undertook military action for terrorist incidents sponsored or executed by Paxtan in India. That right there is clasical deterrence at work.

Deterrence means the US will not react to Chinese invasion of Taiwan. That's clearly not the case as the US hasn't declared what they'd do in case China takes Taiwan. That's strategic ambiguity. However on the ground they're doing everything possible to match Chinese abilities where they're found lacking & enhance capabilities where they're already ahead.

So to sum up , the US isn't deterred by China , China isn't deterred by India & in the recent past India hasn't been deterred by Paxtan.

In fact the Indo Pak N dynamic vis a vis deterrence threw up a surprise for the strategic community who were predicting that once both these nations became declared N powers in 1998 , tensions would die down as MAD became the norm .

However Paxtan created a new doctrine by indulging in terrorist activities in India & threatening N Weapon retaliation if India undertook military action as a retaliatory measure.

This was a brand new paradigm as until that moment those strategic planners & think tankers never encountered a phenomenon wherein one N power directly perpetrated terrorist activities in another N power's territory & then threatened N retaliation for military action the latter would undertake as retribution for those terrorist activities the former undertook.

To further illustrate the point in Vietnam , the Chinese & Russians armed & trained the Vietnamese to take on the Americans . The US didn't do anything to the former two because deterrence. The US repaid Russia in the same coin in Afghanistan & threatened a N war if Russia took action against Paxtan.

Earlier that's exactly what Russia did when they sent N submarines to hunt the US 7th fleet in the BoB in 1971 when the US decided to deter India from partitioning Paxtan . It worked & the US backed off.

However when India wanted to undertake the same in what was then West Paxtan which is what the original plan prepared by IG , Maneckshaw & others was , the USSR refused to support us as the Americans threatened to enter the war . Result we had the Shimla Pact.

That's how deterrence works.

 

[Speedster1]

I'd suggest you read up more about deterrence for this isn't your area of expertise & it shows.

Deterrence means you refuse to act or react against known provocations like India was successfully deterred by Paxtan for all the terrorist activities they undertook in India right from the 1980s till we executed a surgical strike for what they did in Uri.

The reason being as simple as Paxtan threatened usage of N Weapons in case India undertook military action for terrorist incidents sponsored or executed by Paxtan in India. That right there is clasical deterrence at work.

Deterrence means the US will not react to Chinese invasion of Taiwan. That's clearly not the case as the US hasn't declared what they'd do in case China takes Taiwan. That's strategic ambiguity. However on the ground they're doing everything possible to match Chinese abilities where they're found lacking & enhance capabilities where they're already ahead.

So to sum up , the US isn't deterred by China , China isn't deterred by India & in the recent past India hasn't been deterred by Paxtan.

In fact the Indo Pak N dynamic vis a vis deterrence threw up a surprise for the strategic community who were predicting that once both these nations became declared N powers in 1998 , tensions would die down as MAD became the norm .

However Paxtan created a new doctrine by indulging in terrorist activities in India & threatening N Weapon retaliation if India undertook military action as a retaliatory measure.

This was a brand new paradigm as until that moment those strategic planners & think tankers never encountered a phenomenon wherein one N power directly perpetrated terrorist activities in another N power's territory & then threatened N retaliation for military action the latter would undertake as retribution for those terrorist activities the former undertook.

To further illustrate the point in Vietnam , the Chinese & Russians armed & trained the Vietnamese to take on the Americans . The US didn't do anything to the former two because deterrence. The US repaid Russia in the same coin in Afghanistan & threatened a N war if Russia took action against Paxtan.

Earlier that's exactly what Russia did when they sent N submarines to hunt the US 7th fleet in the BoB in 1971 when the US decided to deter India from partitioning Paxtan . It worked & the US backed off.

However when India wanted to undertake the same in what was then West Paxtan which is what the original plan prepared by IG , Maneckshaw & others was , the USSR refused to support us as the Americans threatened to enter the war . Result we had the Shimla Pact.

That's how deterrence works.

For true deterrence, esp against China, India needs to implement launch on warning capability of the kind the US and Russia have. That will tell the world we mean business.

In any case, we have a relatively modest number of warheads (based on public figures) and they are likely kept in de-targeted mode (assuming they even have warheads mated.)

In the event of a (hypothetical) N strike, our missiles should be off before enemy warheads make impact.

We now have a sea-based leg but we don't know if our Arihant SSBNs sail with N-tipped missiles onboard when out on patrol.

It may sound like the obvious thing to do but cannot be assumed to be true. I'd say some updates from GoI on our strategic posture are long overdue.

 

[_Anonymous_]

For true deterrence, esp against China, India needs to implement launch on warning capability of the kind the US and Russia have. That will tell the world we mean business.

In any case, we have a relatively modest number of warheads (based on public figures) and they are likely kept in de-targeted mode (assuming they even have warheads mated.)

In the event of a (hypothetical) N strike, our missiles should be off before enemy warheads make impact.

We now have a sea-based leg but we don't know if our Arihant SSBNs sail with N-tipped missiles onboard when out on patrol.

It may sound like the obvious thing to do but cannot be assumed to be true. I'd say some updates from GoI on our strategic posture are long overdue.

Technicalities , capabilities & capacities apart , do you actually think our dhotis have the balls to threaten China with a N strike assuming things go south in our war with them ? And even if these dhotis find it in themselves to issue such a warning do you think that'd deter the Chinese ?

I posed a simple question earlier which I've done since 2022 when I created the thread on war gaming an Indo China war - what happens once there's a stalemate across the LAC & China starts aggressively targeting the hinterland destroying our infrastructure , industrial bases ports power plants defence mfg hubs oil refineries et al apart from population centers like how Russia is doing to Ukraine ?

Say we launch a nuke or 2 on China , then what ?

 

[Speedster1]

Technicalities , capabilities & capacities apart , do you actually think our dhotis have the balls to threaten China with a N strike assuming things go south in our war with them ? And even if these dhotis find it in themselves to issue such a warning do you think that'd deter the Chinese ?

I posed a simple question earlier which I've done since 2022 when I created the thread on war gaming an Indo China war - what happens once there's a stalemate across the LAC & China starts aggressively targeting the hinterland destroying our infrastructure , industrial bases ports power plants defence mfg hubs oil refineries et al apart from population centers like how Russia is doing to Ukraine ?

Say we launch a nuke or 2 on China , then what ?

That's precisely why LOW is a neccessity. It delegates launch authority to military commanders rather than politicians who may hesitate at the last minute.

Through a series of intentional leaks, we must let it be known that are missiles are armed and targeted at major population and industrial centers across China.

That's what deterrence is all about, isn't it? Having the capability and demonstrating the intent to deliver a punishing blow to the adversary.

LoW will make our NFU policy credible decades into the future. Otherwise, we stand to lose our N triad in a first strike and our fate would be sealed.

 

[redpanda]

To be honest, if dhotis or whatever label we may choose to give our policy makers were truly as visionless as they’re sometimes made out to be, there wouldn’t have been sustained efforts to counter Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal since the Vajpayee era. Like the whole BMD programme. We have to admit that, at times, we enthusiasts tend to caricature them a bit too much. While there have certainly been shortcomings in our policymaking, it’s hardly the kind of andher nagari that some portray it to be. I wouldn’t make a definitive comment about what could or couldn’t happen between India and China. The outcome would depend heavily on the timing and the specific circumstances under which any conflict occurs. Under certain conditions, things could work in our favor; under others, they could turn out much worse. And how our policy makers will behave, time will tell.

 

[_Anonymous_]

That's precisely why LOW is a neccessity. It delegates launch authority to military commanders rather than politicians who may hesitate at the last minute.

In a nation where foreign ministry bureaucrats & of late IPS personnel are in charge of National Security policy making till date, where military personnel are still not part of the policy making process & there's a great deal of reluctance to admit them even moves to restrict them , you're actually expecting mid level commanders to be empowered with the ability to launch nukes?

Through a series of intentional leaks, we must let it be known that are missiles are armed and targeted at major population and industrial centers across China.

I've taken it one step ahead & asked you what happens after we've launched a nuke or 2 at the Chinese?

That's what deterrence is all about, isn't it? Having the capability and demonstrating the intent to deliver a punishing blow to the adversary.

Please refer to the above scenario .

LoW will make our NFU policy credible decades into the future. Otherwise, we stand to lose our N triad in a first strike and our fate would be sealed.

Answered this above . To elaborate the Chinese don't see this escalating into a N exchange & unfortunately neither do we which is alright if we have the ability to strike their industrial & population centers all the way on the Eastern & Southern coasts in huge nos.

Unfortunately for us while the capabilities exist & capacities can be ramped up where is the intent or more specifically where's the IRF I've been hearing about since 2019-20 ? We're going about it in our own sweet time.

There are plenty of other elements of the entire matrix where we're either shown marked apathy or we're going about it as if we'd be facing the Chinese somewhere in 2050 viz the IAF, ISR abilities, IRF as mentioned above, Refuellers, Cyber & Anti Cyber Warfare, artillery for the IA, body protection suits, small arms, NVD for the IA etc . The list is a long one.

 

[_Anonymous_]

To be honest, if dhotis or whatever label we may choose to give our policy makers were truly as visionless as they’re sometimes made out to be, there wouldn’t have been sustained efforts to counter Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal since the Vajpayee era. Like the whole BMD programme.

Right , so how did we get into this situation? IG wanted to nip Pak NWP in the bud. She was assassinated before she could act on it . Enter her useless son who chickened out on more than one occasion where Zia Kana ran circles around him.

USSR repeatedly egged on India to take on Paxtan since they couldn't but Rajiv refused to budge. Result his successors from ABV onwards till MMS kept absorbing losses.

For perspective observe the way the Israelis were & are relentless about destroying Iran's NWP. That's the difference between strategic & tactical thinking.

We have to admit that, at times, we enthusiasts tend to caricature them a bit too much. While there have certainly been shortcomings in our policymaking, it’s hardly the kind of andher nagari that some portray it to be.

It's not andher nagari, just a few notches above it & this is a nation which had its butt kicked in 1962. It seems every few decades we need a reminder to gird up our loins.

I wouldn’t make a definitive comment about what could or couldn’t happen between India and China. The outcome would depend heavily on the timing and the specific circumstances under which any conflict occurs. Under certain conditions, things could work in our favor; under others, they could turn out much worse. And how our policy makers will behave, time will tell.

I've broadly outlined the scenario the way I see it in my previous post . You're welcome to respond to it

 

[screambowl]

They thought that when Su30 was imported they can create an ecosystem and infrastructure for aircraft production then some miscalculations happened. And then until now major test facilities and critical component manufacturing is still lacking. Not very positive or hopeful but with fingers crossed this new 114 Rafale procurement can remove that road block.

The basic issue is the engine and test facilities. Avionics part India can handle itself.

If you have a working engine as per requirements you can get an AMCA in 10 years. Otherwise not before 2045. I am not very hopeful with this project due to the engine part.

 

[Speedster1]

In a nation where foreign ministry bureaucrats & of late IPS personnel are in charge of National Security policy making till date, where military personnel are still not part of the policy making process & there's a great deal of reluctance to admit them even moves to restrict them , you're actually expecting mid level commanders to be empowered with the ability to launch nukes?

Unlike prev govts who feared too much autonomy could result in a coup by the military, the present GoI has been much more pragmatic.

We now have a CDS equal in rank to a Cabinet Secy. Tri-service integration initiatives are underway. So, a devolution of authority with adequate safeguards is not out of the realm of possibility, imo.

I've taken it one step ahead & asked you what happens after we've launched a nuke or 2 at the Chinese?

If deterrence fails, it'd be use it or lose it anyway.

Answered this above . To elaborate the Chinese don't see this escalating into a N exchange & unfortunately neither do we which is alright if we have the ability to strike their industrial & population centers all the way on the Eastern & Southern coasts in huge nos.

Our nukes may be the only thing China respects. Mere saber rattling or even missile tests won't work.

As the US moves to resume underground N-testing, we must drop our self-imposed moratorium on testing, prove our TNW capability - 'credible minimum N deterrent' et all.

 

[redpanda]

I'd suggest you read up more about deterrence for this isn't your area of expertise & it shows.

Deterrence means you refuse to act or react against known provocations like India was successfully deterred by Paxtan for all the terrorist activities they undertook in India right from the 1980s till we executed a surgical strike for what they did in Uri.

The reason being as simple as Paxtan threatened usage of N Weapons in case India undertook military action for terrorist incidents sponsored or executed by Paxtan in India. That right there is clasical deterrence at work.

Deterrence means the US will not react to Chinese invasion of Taiwan. That's clearly not the case as the US hasn't declared what they'd do in case China takes Taiwan. That's strategic ambiguity. However on the ground they're doing everything possible to match Chinese abilities where they're found lacking & enhance capabilities where they're already ahead.

So to sum up , the US isn't deterred by China , China isn't deterred by India & in the recent past India hasn't been deterred by Paxtan.

In fact the Indo Pak N dynamic vis a vis deterrence threw up a surprise for the strategic community who were predicting that once both these nations became declared N powers in 1998 , tensions would die down as MAD became the norm .

However Paxtan created a new doctrine by indulging in terrorist activities in India & threatening N Weapon retaliation if India undertook military action as a retaliatory measure.

This was a brand new paradigm as until that moment those strategic planners & think tankers never encountered a phenomenon wherein one N power directly perpetrated terrorist activities in another N power's territory & then threatened N retaliation for military action the latter would undertake as retribution for those terrorist activities the former undertook.

To further illustrate the point in Vietnam , the Chinese & Russians armed & trained the Vietnamese to take on the Americans . The US didn't do anything to the former two because deterrence. The US repaid Russia in the same coin in Afghanistan & threatened a N war if Russia took action against Paxtan.

Earlier that's exactly what Russia did when they sent N submarines to hunt the US 7th fleet in the BoB in 1971 when the US decided to deter India from partitioning Paxtan . It worked & the US backed off.

However when India wanted to undertake the same in what was then West Paxtan which is what the original plan prepared by IG , Maneckshaw & others was , the USSR refused to support us as the Americans threatened to enter the war . Result we had the Shimla Pact.

That's how deterrence works.

I don't really agree with your premise because you are assuming deterrence is absolute based on a few isolated events. Here is my perspective: What you are calling the 'fall of deterrence' is just a state finding the headroom for small-scale unconventional (and some conventional) action under the nuclear umbrella. That's it.

This isn't a new thing; both the US and Russia tried to check each other's thresholds back in the 'good old Cold War days' just like this. This doesn't mean X isn't deterred by Y. It simply means they found ways to operate within that limited headroom without bringing the big nukes into play.

So to sum up , the US isn't deterred by China , China isn't deterred by India & in the recent past India hasn't been deterred by Paxtan

If China wasn't deterred by our nukes, they would have launched a full-scale or limited-scale special operation at us long time ago instead of doing what they did in Galwan.

One could also say that, these countries are just trying to do test the limits of N deterrence that's it. China hasn't done anything yet that should make India nuke them and vice versa. In case Indo-Pak even with Nukes there was always room for some conventional and unconventional action. It is just that India never bothered exploiting that headroom until recently while Pakistan did. That's it.

 

[_Anonymous_]

Unlike prev govts who feared too much autonomy could result in a coup by the military, the present GoI has been much more pragmatic.We now have a CDS equal in rank to a Cabinet Secy. Tri-service integration initiatives are underway.

A full general was always the equivalent of a cabinet secretary in the GoI whereas a Lt General is the equivalent of a secretary in the GoI. Fun fact a full general outranks the Defence Secretary in the GoI yet reports to the latter.

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Nowhere in a major democracy are things as lopsided as in India & the military excluded from policy making as far as National Security goes.

Things are changing no doubt but it's not keeping pace with the rapid changes in the world or even our neighborhood.

So, a devolution of authority with adequate safeguards is not out of the realm of possibility, imo.

I'd believe that when it happens. Let's stick to what the situation is for the purpose of this discussion.

Just for clarification I don't see it happening at all. Launch on warning is too risky to be entrusted to a mid level commander & our establishment is extremely risk averse & a lover of bureaucratic procedures.

If deterrence fails, it'd be use it or lose it anyway.

Deterrence has already failed when China keeps poking you is my humble submission . Ditto for Paxtan. It's only off late have we broken our own self imposed shackles vis a vis Paxtan.

Traditional deterrence the way it is understood doesn't apply to the Sino Indo Pak dynamic. We require a different paradigm to deal with them & we haven't displayed any propensity whatsoever to think out of the box to come up with such a solution.

So far we've only managed to retaliate against Paxtan not even deter it .

Our nukes may be the only thing China respects. Mere saber rattling or even missile tests won't work.

Yet unlike Paxtan we've shown no inkling of making known to China our stand that this would be the hill we'd die on.

All we've displayed since 1962 is we won't give in without a fight & that stand too isn't unambiguous. It hasn't deterred China a wee bit.

As the US moves to resume underground N-testing, we must drop our self-imposed moratorium on testing, prove our TNW capability - 'credible minimum N deterrent' et all.

Sure we must. No 2 opinions about it . Look I'm not even arguing in favour of a N strike . If you've gotten so far you're already playing Russian Roulette.

All I'm saying is do the little things right. Like raise the IRF pronto , build up a huge force along with mfg capacities (as opposed to the ~ 300 odd Pralay missiles you're inducting all the way upto 2030-32. Is this a joke in the current scenario ? It appears to be so & it's a very sick one ) & you're safe .

This way you compensate for the lack of numbers of the IAF to take on PLAAF , you insulate your industrial & population centers along with important infrastructure from Chinese aggression .

You don't do it & you're then grasping at straws. It's really as simple as that.

 

[_Anonymous_]

I don't really agree with your premise because you are assuming deterrence is absolute based on a few isolated events. Here is my perspective: What you are calling the 'fall of deterrence' is just a state finding the headroom for small-scale unconventional (and some conventional) action under the nuclear umbrella. That's it.

You're actually describing a failure of deterrence.

This isn't a new thing; both the US and Russia tried to check each other's thresholds back in the 'good old Cold War days' just like this. This doesn't mean X isn't deterred by Y. It simply means they found ways to operate within that limited headroom without bringing the big nukes into play.

USSR & the US always indulged in proxy wars. They never directly perpetrated acts of war or terror on each other's soil or citizens. That's what classical deterrence is all about.

If China wasn't deterred by our nukes, they would have launched a full-scale or limited-scale special operation at us long time ago instead of doing what they did in Galwan.

Galwan was a probing mission in case you're unaware. The intention was never a war but to seize territory sit on it & eventually vacate that part which you don't want thru tedious negotiations but hold on to the ones you want .

How do we know it ? For they didn't deploy more than 50,000 troops for the mission . For a full scale invasion they'd deploy more like 7-8 divisions . Plus given their emphasis on non contact warfare , they'd initiate thru a massive artillery & rocket barrage which'd be preceded by a massive cyber attack on all our assets - civilian & military .

I'd ask @Jaymax to add details to the overview I've provided since he's much more informed than myself about these matters as well as much more articulate than I am.

Needless to say , the Chinese succeeded in their mission partially .

One could also say that, these countries are just trying to do test the limits of N deterrence that's it. China hasn't done anything yet that should make India nuke them and vice versa.

Depends on where we draw our red lines. Paxtani red lines were known. Since 2016 we've been calling their bluff in an incremental manner. Operation Sindoor literally blew away their N blackmail.

This begs the question - What are our red lines vis a vis China ? Does loss of territory constitute a red line ? Is it subject to quantifiability ? What're our other red lines ? Does a massive attack on our infrastructure invite a N strike ?

To begin with how do we define an attack ? Is it a physical attack or a cyber attack which'd disable all our systems either temporarily or permanently .

Further I'd assume this also applies to a massive attack on our population centers. This once again raises the question - is this subject to the test of quantifiability ? which is to say how many civilian casualties are we willing to suffer before we exercise the N option ?

Plenty of other areas we need to sit & think about , wargame , draft , redraft plans , review , revise & review them again before we either convey these directly to the Chinese or thru a via media or make them public.

In case Indo-Pak even with Nukes there was always room for some conventional and unconventional action.

Same paradigm with the Indo Chinese dynamic.

It is just that India never bothered exploiting that headroom until recently while Pakistan did. That's it.

Ditto for India vis a vis China. Doklam & Galwan were exceptions . Look up on material of how we've lost territory between the Sumdurong Chu incident way back in 1987-88 till Modi assumed power.

 

[Speedster1]

A full general was always the equivalent of a cabinet secretary in the GoI whereas a Lt General is the equivalent of a secretary in the GoI. Fun fact a full general outranks the Defence Secretary in the GoI yet reports to the latter.

Pretty sure that's not the case. The CS is the govt's top bureaucrat after all.

Deterrence has already failed when China keeps poking you is my humble submission . Ditto for Paxtan. It's only off late have we broken our own self imposed shackles vis a vis Paxtan

That's precisely why we need to upgrade our deterrence posture. Earlier we didn't have a functional triad. Today we do.

As you correctly pointed out earlier, Pak continued to impose costs on us for years via jihadi attacks using its nukes as a shield.

Now that we've discovered their actual N threshold is much higher than we thought, we'll exploit this more often.

Why do you think Munir got himself crowned as CDS in Pak? To raise the stakes for India if ever there is an Op Sindoor 2.0. He now directly controls Pak nukes.

Yet unlike Paxtan we've shown no inkling of making known to China our stand that this would be the hill we'd die on.

All we've displayed since 1962 is we won't give in without a fight & that stand too isn't unambiguous. It hasn't deterred China a wee bit.

I think a lot of it has to do with n scientist Santhanam's allegations after Pokhran 2 that our nuke was a dud. The man should've been slapped with OSA and locked away for eternity.

 

[redpanda]

Ditto for India vis a vis China. Doklam & Galwan were exceptions . Look up on material of how we've lost territory between the Sumdurong Chu incident way back in 1987-88 till Modi assumed power.

Agreed. But this raises the question of what the solution actually is. This is just an educated guess. But it seems unlikely that, as a nation, we would want to drift into even a limited or localized conflict with China at this stage. In many ways, we appear to be in a phase of strategic contemplation similar to where we were with Pakistan between roughly 2000 and 2014. Perhaps the policy makers too are not sure about the thresholds. Maybe it is all WIP in South Block. This is also because, in the end, the India–China relationship extends well beyond a purely bilateral frame. It is deeply embedded in wider regional and global alignments, supply chains, and great-power competition. As a result, geopolitical headwinds could flow in either direction, making escalation not just a two-party calculation but one with second- and third-order consequences well beyond the immediate theatre. Afterall we are still dependent on Russia for weapons to a large extent, even though we are trying to localise and diversify. Unless, India grows to a certain stature I don't expect anything brave from our policy makers with respect to China. Afterall the current Bravado towards Pakistan is a result of growth in our stature..

 

[Shan]

Some SM channels are doing pretty good work. Found this a few days ago:

Good stuff.

 

[STEPHEN COHEN]

French Media Reporting Integration of Indian Weapons on 114 Rafales

https://twitter.com/x/status/2014247508868735347