Point de situation des opérations en Ukraine 18 juin 2022- Combats
Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)
Update on operations in Ukraine 18 June 2022 - Fighting
In the 28 May update it was explained that the Russian capture of Popasna on 7 May and the rapid advance in all directions had formed a pocket that threatened all Ukrainian forces in the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk (S-L) sector. This delicate situation, with rarely a happy ending for the defenders, presented the Ukrainian forces with three options: counter-attack, resist or withdraw.
Wisdom would probably have chosen the third option, but politics and the desire not to give up a metre made them choose the first. The zone was thus reinforced with new units with the mission of loosening the stranglehold from Severodonetsk to Horlivka (in the LNR zone). Including the 4th (armoured) police rapid reaction brigade, there are now 12 Ukrainian manoeuvre brigades and six militia or territorial army units in this small pocket. That's between 1/4 and 1/3 of the Ukrainian army in a 50 x 50 km square. If the Russians take the small town of Soledar - they are only a few kilometres away - the whole T1302 road linking S-L to the rest of Ukraine will be cut off. There will remain the much less convenient route through Siversk in the north of the pocket. Of course, if Siversk also fell, all Ukrainian forces in the pocket would be seriously threatened with destruction, if only by logistical drain. The area from Siversk to Lyzychansk, protected by two reinforced manoeuvre brigades, is not threatened for the moment after several Russian attempts, sometimes disastrous, to cross the Donets River. A new bridge set up by the Russians at Bilohorivka was detected and destroyed on 16 June, proof that the Russians had not given up on attacking from this side.
Reinforcements and counter-attacks, but without really pushing the enemy back. The Ukrainian units deployed on S-L were able to push the Russians back for a while in Severodonetsk, but they did not prevent them from regaining ground, while the destruction of the three bridges linking the town to Lysychansk isolated them. At present, the Ukrainians hold only 20% of the city, i.e. the Metolkine district and especially the Azot chemical complex, where, as in Azovstal in Marioupol, hundreds of civilians are also refugees. They must have committed in the area of the order of three or four battalions from the three brigades placed in Lysychansk, which are facing a "Severodonetsk division" of 7 to 9 Chechen infantry battalions, Wagner, LNR and a tank battalion. By holding firm, the Ukrainian battalions can hold the city for several weeks, but whether this has any military value remains to be seen. Lysychansk on high ground and across a river that can no longer be crossed by bridges is much easier to defend.
It is likely, however, that the Russian forces did not seek to approach Lysysychansk head-on, but to bypass it via the localities of Tochkivka, Hirske and Komyshuvakha between 6 and 10 km south of the town and north of the Russian pocket of Popasna. As in S-L, this sector was defended by two Ukrainian manoeuvre brigades and one territorial brigade. The western side of Popasna was also defended by three manoeuvre brigades and one Ukrainian territorial brigade, which were at best trying to regain ground and at worst to defend Soledar and the Bakhmut-Lysysyshansk axis. The southern side is lighter with an armoured brigade and several infantry battalions defending the approaches to the key town of Bakhmut, which is also held by a territorial brigade.
On the other side, the Russians abandoned any organic linkage and formed three ad hoc divisions on each side of Popasna from a pool of 20-25 LNR battalions, Russian armoured-mechanised regulars and mostly elite infantry with a division and an air assault brigade as well as three naval infantry brigades combined in the area.
The last axis of Russian effort around the S-L pocket and even the S-L/S-K complex was in the Horlivka area of the DNR, where a small Russian Wagner-Naval Infantry assault group supported by I Corps (DNR) units tried to push back the 46th Air Assault Brigade towards Kostiantynivka, without much success.
As in Severodonetsk, the Ukrainians slowed down the Russian advance considerably in this area, but their attacks were hardly successful and did not allow them to retake or even threaten the Popasna pocket, the only objective whose capture could change the course of operations.
This leaves the Ukrainian forces with the choice of either withdrawing in good order or holding on. They could withdraw to the Sloviansk - Kramatorsk - Druzhkivka - Kostiantynivka conurbation, which could constitute a solid line of defence if the previous three months had been devoted to preparing the defence and, for example, setting up numerous depots. This would also have the advantage of shortening the front line and thus making it possible to densify its defence. They could choose to hold in place in the hope of Russian attrition, but in this game they risked cracking before they did, not for lack of courage but simply for lack of ammunition, and this could turn into a disaster.
The reinforcement of the S-L pocket had the inevitable effect of clearing the other sectors. In the Sloviansk area, on a wide front from the Russian Izium pocket to the Lyman pocket, one can distinguish the western side of the Izium pocket, once an axis of Russian effort and now rather defensive, where the 106th Airborne Division and three independent Russian brigades were fighting the area against four Ukrainian brigades, without much effect on either side. At the other end, after the capture of Lyman, two to three Russian brigades are trying to take control of the forest up to the Donetsk River and perhaps make contact with the Ukrainian 95th Air Assault Brigade at Raihorodok, 2km north-east of Sloviansk.
The Russian effort in the region is clearly in the area between these two extremes, concentrating a motorised infantry division and the 90th armoured division, reinforced with several independent armoured-mechanised brigades and two infiltration brigades (45th Special Brigade and 3rd Spetsnaz Brigade) against the 81st Air Assault Brigade (and possibly also a motorised brigade) reinforced with several independent infantry battalions holding the Dovenhke-Krasnopillya forest region and the M03 road from Izium to Sloviansk. The fighting is difficult and Russian progress very slow, but it is hard to see how the Ukrainian forces could not be forced to retreat to Sloviansk. Sloviansk is still far from being threatened, however.
In the peripheral sectors of the front, north of Kharkiv, there is a series of Russian counter-attacks to push the Ukrainian forces as far away from the border as possible and probably back within artillery range of Kharkiv. Perhaps the Russians want to protect the reconstitution area of their forces in the Belgorod base region and the logistical axis to Izium via Vovchansk from Ukrainian incursions or strikes.
With two complete divisions and several brigades at rest, the Belgorod base also constitutes a pool of forces from which the Russians can draw to reinforce the 6th Army in charge of the Kharkiv sector. There is thus a permanent presence of DNR/LNR units, which feel they are overused (the two DNR/LNR corps are approaching the destruction threshold) instead of the Russians, and occasional reinforcements of armoured-mechanised brigades or artillery, which allow the 6th Army to push back Ukrainian units weakened by the reinforcement of the Donbass in terms of men and reduced logistics. After having raised many hopes, the Ukrainian successes in the Kharkiv sector were not decisive.
At the other end of the front, the Kherson region constitutes a bridgehead across the Dnieper that the Russians want to keep at all costs, but without having for the moment the means to use it as an offensive base. The 80km long and 30km wide area was defended by the 49th Army, which had the 20th Motorised Infantry Division in Kherson, the 7th Division and the 11th Air Assault Brigade in the centre and three independent brigades in the north. With the addition of three reconnaissance brigades, one of which was a spetsnaz, the whole ensemble represented perhaps 10 battalions, of rather good tactical quality even if very worn, entrenched for almost two months and supported by at least three artillery brigades and, as everywhere else, significant close air support. In these conditions, it is difficult for the Ukrainians, despite having six manoeuvre brigades and as many territorial units or militias, to obtain significant results. The area between Kherson and Mykolaev was locked and it was impossible for either side to break through. At the beginning of June, Ukrainian forces managed to cross the Inhulet River in the centre of the area, but after advancing a few kilometres, Russian firepower and counter-attack blocked the advance. Since then the fighting has been very static.
For the sake of completeness, we should also mention the area from the Dnieper to the city of Donetsk, which is the least densely occupied on either side and where both sides are simultaneously in a more defensive posture. For months, the DNR I Corps has been trying to push the Ukrainian forces back beyond the city of Donetsk, but without much success. The 1st Corps is exhausted and the Ukrainian forces, although reduced, are not in a good defensive position. As for the rest, there were numerous small-scale battles all along the line, with no effect other than to fix and wear down the enemy forces a little. The capture of Orikhiv could be of interest to the Russians by threatening Zaporajjia but they lacked the forces in the sector to be able to consider it.
