You're still using the 'hypocrisy' slander after the last 4 months?
They shouldn't buy oil and gas from a country that likely to invade their neighbours.
Same one?
An IL-76 military plane crashed in Russia
Last edited:
Ukraine - Russia Conflict
- Thread starter randomradio
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They shouldn't buy oil and gas from a country that likely to invade their neighbours.
Same one?
An IL-76 military plane crashed in Russia
Well, it's about time they started given their losses. Russia isn't like a NATO country, they have to maintain government, order and contested borders elsewhere.
No, we should listen to Russian state-controlled media instead.
It won't matter, Russia's economy is ultimate going down the toilet.
No, you are just being ridiculous and blaming them for everything, rather than blaming a leader who went against the will of his people and his own election promises.
You underestimate our security services. And like I said, Russia has far more potential for aggro than the EU. It has Chechens fighting on the Ukrainian side FFS. This really is pathetic, you threatening Europe with terrorism because Russian can't win.
The few separatists will simply be killed or locked up. The Russian system has nothing attractive to offer people.
That's not how NATO works, not even slightly. UK, France, Spain have all had disputed regions.
You are deluded. The Russian system has nothing to offer except martial style law these days and a crap economy. It's more likely that people in Kaliningrad will turn against them and they will lose Kaliningrad.
The only active contested border for Russia is Ukraine today. I think only India has the biggest contested border right now.
No, we should look at proof via social media, not mainstream media.
Your security apparatus, especially in the Baltics, is practically non-existent. Only the French have something, set up after ISIS attacks.
Disputed by NATO's enemy, nope.
The Russian system is crap, even they know that, but that's not how some people value their freedom. Politics doesn't care about comfort.
It's the risk of it. Chechnya, Dagestan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Belarus looks shaky, Transnistria, Kaliningrad. Overseas deployment in Syria, Libya, Mali, CAR. They could be attacked anywhere.
I've seen all the proof I need on just that.
Creating a disputed region in a country that's already a member doesn't work, it just brings the whole of NATO down on that region if need be, especially if it's being disputed by NATO's enemy or proxies thereof. It only works before they join, that's why Russia started a war in the Donbass.
People do though. If all you have to offer is crap, people either leave or rebel.
Even more HIMARS for Ukraine.
edition.cnn.com
Biden administration announces $450 million in additional military assistance for Ukraine | CNN Politics
The Biden administration on Thursday announced an additional $450 million in military aid for Ukraine, with the US giving the war-stricken country four more multiple launch rocket systems and artillery ammunition for other systems.
Nope, NATO won't interfere in a disputed region.
Actually the early June bit can still happen.
In any case, the Russians are concentrating on killing or forcing retreat rather than taking more land.
It will if they ask for help, which they absolutely can as a NATO member. The fact they are being attacked by separatists is neither here nor there. You have no clue.
Yeah, by next year maybe. After Russian dead + wounded figure is near half a million.
The Russians are being killed in equal measure if not more so. You are unable to adjust to the reality that Russia has not won this war as fast as conventional thinking in February would have said they could, and you continue making garbage excuses.
The Ukrainians' hope is that the Russians will eventually wear themselves out as they did around Kiev.
The battle of Severodonesk seen by Michel Goya:
To put everything in perspective, read again what Michel Goya has been saying for the last 3 months.
We are talking about a territory with 4 large cities of 100,000 inhabitants that the Russians have only conquered at 25% despite considerable efforts over the last 12 weeks. The Russians have some clear advantages, but they haven't even tackled the biggest piece yet (Sloviansk-Kramatorsk).
27 March: Even if Severodonetsk fell to the 8th A and the 2nd LNR Corps, the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk-Druzhkivka-Kostiantynivka-Toretsk line was a real urban front, 70 km long and with 450,000 inhabitants, very difficult to take. The announcement for once of a clear objective - the conquest of the Donbass - perhaps means that it is considered attainable. It is possible, but it will still be difficult, especially if Ukrainian forces can be reinforced in the region.
5 April: The battle of Donbass is now arguably the decisive battle of the war. It is unlikely that the Russian side will consider a ceasefire before the end of April and see the outcome of the battle. If the two Donbass provinces, including Mariupol, are conquered, the Russians will be able to declare themselves victorious by 9 May, even if this will undoubtedly be a much smaller victory than envisaged. If not, i.e. if they find it impossible to take the Donbass, perhaps they will consider a 'tactical ceasefire' to freeze the situation while rebuilding their forces for a subsequent large-scale offensive.
7 April: In the east, the Russian intention is clearly to seize the Severdonetsk salient as quickly as possible and, above all, in the west to push from Yzium towards Bervinkove, a small town of 8,000 inhabitants 30 km west of Sloviansk held by the 85th brigade. For the time being, the aim is not to capture the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk urban stronghold but to bypass it.
10 April: A form of combat based on massive in-depth fire followed by concentrated attacks by ad hoc divisions, which were revealed as they wore out, was thus taking shape. (...) With the remaining forces, there is hardly any other possibility than to attempt a Yzium-Donetsk or Yzium-Zaporajjia junction (...) In the end, it is hard to see how the Russian battle groups, even with the superiority of supporting fire, could exceed in tactical range on the points of contact the Ukrainian battalions in the Donbass, worn out, but in a solid defensive posture, undoubtedly with better morale, and possibly reinforced. And even if the Russians do manage to be superior, it is not clear how they could create enough victorious points of contact to prevail in this spring offensive.
21 April: The major Russian offensive in the Donbass is primarily a fire offensive with a crushing of Ukrainian positions in all seven combat zones, with about 2,400 various artillery pieces, and several hundred daily air sorties with strikes in the entire depth of the theatre. (...) The aim is to neutralise as much as possible the Ukrainian forces in the Russian attack zones, to fix them in the defensive zones and to hinder movements in the depth.
28 April: Winning the battle of Donbass is equivalent to taking a rectangle 100 km long and 70 km deep, the size of a French department, in which there are three major cities. (...) All other things being equal, it would take the Russian forces between two and three months at the current rate to take this rectangle.
8 May: Supported by large masses of artillery, the Russian forces are still pursuing their three converging attacks (...). It is the same plan that has been implemented since mid-March, but fuelled since the beginning of April by forces coming first from the Kharkiv sector and then from Kiev, with an increase in intensity since 18 April. (...) The Russians will therefore have to wait at best until the beginning of June to envisage the siege of the town of Severodonetsk, which is almost as difficult to take as Marioupol, and the investment, which is probably incomplete, of the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk area, which is as difficult as Marioupol.
15 May: The possibility of a large "pincer" encircling Donetsk oblast is no longer credible at present. (...) In summary, the Russian offensive is increasingly focused on the conquest of Sloviansk and Severdonetsk-Lysychansk, with limited attacks and many strikes along the rest of the Donbass arc and a defensive posture in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions. The Russians are advancing very slowly, at the cost of significant losses, and when you lose a lot of men and equipment to gain little ground, the battle of manoeuvre tends to become a battle of attrition. (...) The dislocation of the Ukrainian forces north of Sloviansk is unlikely, at best the Russians will see them retreat to the city. The Russians may therefore be on the northern outskirts of Sloviansk at the end of this month or early June, with exhausted forces. Their prospects are more favourable for Severodonetsk where they are already on the outskirts of the city. They can hope at best to have the city surrounded by the end of the month. They will then have to fight inside the urban bastions
21 May: The battle of the quadrilateral of four cities of 100,000 inhabitants (SK and SL) to be conquered is the "major effect" of "Operation Donbass". Once the conquest of these four towns is secured, with perhaps the easier conquest of Propovsk - a road junction in the centre-west of Donetsk oblast, population 65,000 - it will be possible to say that the Russian mission is accomplished, at least in this phase of the war. The most spectacular Russian advance took place in Popasna (22,000 inhabitants), 50 km south of Sverodonetsk, taken on 7 May after six weeks of fighting. Popasna is clearly the new axis of effort after the failure at Izium. (...) The capture of the town, a high point, made it possible to observe and therefore strike with artillery all Ukrainian movements, particularly between the road junction of Bakhmut (77,000 inhabitants) and Lysytchansk-Severodonetsk. (...) The progression towards the north, a threat to the security of the town, was also a priority. ) The advance to the north already threatens to encircle Ukrainian forces in the small towns of Zolote and Hirske along the front line, before reaching Lysychansk-Severodonetsk (LS) and in the west the main LS supply route in the Soledar region, or even Bakhmut.
Prospects: One month after the official announcement of the main phase of the Donbass battle, and in reality already two months of attacks, the Russians are still far from an operational victory. After having envisaged a total envelopment, they have reduced their ambition to the encirclement of Lysychansk-Severodonetsk and the capture of Lyman before tackling Sloviansk, which they also hope to encircle and take. (...) Assuming that the encirclement of Lysychansk-Severodonetsk has been achieved, it will then be necessary to take these two localities, which have been preparing for a siege for the past two months and have forces superior to those defending Marioupol. It is difficult to see how, with a lot of effort and unless there is a Ukrainian collapse, the Russians could take the two cities before the end of July. Will they be able to sustain a parallel fight to encircle Sloviansk-Kramatorsk, which will probably not happen before the end of June at this rate, and then an investment of the two cities that is even more difficult than Lysysychansk-Severodonetsk, because they are even better defended and especially close to Ukrainian forces?
19 June: The material balance of forces, especially in terms of firepower, will be to the advantage of the Russian forces for the next three months. It is even likely that this advantage will be even greater from mid-July to mid-August. It remains to be seen whether this material advantage of the summer can be combined with an assault infantry still sufficient in volume to obtain decisive results. Everything depends on the intelligence of the Ukrainian defence in the Donbass and in the immediate Severodonetsk-Lysychansk pocket. If the Ukrainian army is surrounded in this pocket, the Russians will undoubtedly achieve their major effect. If it manages to hold out for two months there, or if it manages to withdraw in good order and without great material loss to a solid Sloviansk - Kramatorsk - Druzhkivka - Kostiantynivka line, it may succeed in preventing the Russians from achieving their strategic objective.
To put everything in perspective, read again what Michel Goya has been saying for the last 3 months.
We are talking about a territory with 4 large cities of 100,000 inhabitants that the Russians have only conquered at 25% despite considerable efforts over the last 12 weeks. The Russians have some clear advantages, but they haven't even tackled the biggest piece yet (Sloviansk-Kramatorsk).
27 March: Even if Severodonetsk fell to the 8th A and the 2nd LNR Corps, the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk-Druzhkivka-Kostiantynivka-Toretsk line was a real urban front, 70 km long and with 450,000 inhabitants, very difficult to take. The announcement for once of a clear objective - the conquest of the Donbass - perhaps means that it is considered attainable. It is possible, but it will still be difficult, especially if Ukrainian forces can be reinforced in the region.
5 April: The battle of Donbass is now arguably the decisive battle of the war. It is unlikely that the Russian side will consider a ceasefire before the end of April and see the outcome of the battle. If the two Donbass provinces, including Mariupol, are conquered, the Russians will be able to declare themselves victorious by 9 May, even if this will undoubtedly be a much smaller victory than envisaged. If not, i.e. if they find it impossible to take the Donbass, perhaps they will consider a 'tactical ceasefire' to freeze the situation while rebuilding their forces for a subsequent large-scale offensive.
7 April: In the east, the Russian intention is clearly to seize the Severdonetsk salient as quickly as possible and, above all, in the west to push from Yzium towards Bervinkove, a small town of 8,000 inhabitants 30 km west of Sloviansk held by the 85th brigade. For the time being, the aim is not to capture the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk urban stronghold but to bypass it.
10 April: A form of combat based on massive in-depth fire followed by concentrated attacks by ad hoc divisions, which were revealed as they wore out, was thus taking shape. (...) With the remaining forces, there is hardly any other possibility than to attempt a Yzium-Donetsk or Yzium-Zaporajjia junction (...) In the end, it is hard to see how the Russian battle groups, even with the superiority of supporting fire, could exceed in tactical range on the points of contact the Ukrainian battalions in the Donbass, worn out, but in a solid defensive posture, undoubtedly with better morale, and possibly reinforced. And even if the Russians do manage to be superior, it is not clear how they could create enough victorious points of contact to prevail in this spring offensive.
21 April: The major Russian offensive in the Donbass is primarily a fire offensive with a crushing of Ukrainian positions in all seven combat zones, with about 2,400 various artillery pieces, and several hundred daily air sorties with strikes in the entire depth of the theatre. (...) The aim is to neutralise as much as possible the Ukrainian forces in the Russian attack zones, to fix them in the defensive zones and to hinder movements in the depth.
28 April: Winning the battle of Donbass is equivalent to taking a rectangle 100 km long and 70 km deep, the size of a French department, in which there are three major cities. (...) All other things being equal, it would take the Russian forces between two and three months at the current rate to take this rectangle.
8 May: Supported by large masses of artillery, the Russian forces are still pursuing their three converging attacks (...). It is the same plan that has been implemented since mid-March, but fuelled since the beginning of April by forces coming first from the Kharkiv sector and then from Kiev, with an increase in intensity since 18 April. (...) The Russians will therefore have to wait at best until the beginning of June to envisage the siege of the town of Severodonetsk, which is almost as difficult to take as Marioupol, and the investment, which is probably incomplete, of the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk area, which is as difficult as Marioupol.
15 May: The possibility of a large "pincer" encircling Donetsk oblast is no longer credible at present. (...) In summary, the Russian offensive is increasingly focused on the conquest of Sloviansk and Severdonetsk-Lysychansk, with limited attacks and many strikes along the rest of the Donbass arc and a defensive posture in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions. The Russians are advancing very slowly, at the cost of significant losses, and when you lose a lot of men and equipment to gain little ground, the battle of manoeuvre tends to become a battle of attrition. (...) The dislocation of the Ukrainian forces north of Sloviansk is unlikely, at best the Russians will see them retreat to the city. The Russians may therefore be on the northern outskirts of Sloviansk at the end of this month or early June, with exhausted forces. Their prospects are more favourable for Severodonetsk where they are already on the outskirts of the city. They can hope at best to have the city surrounded by the end of the month. They will then have to fight inside the urban bastions
21 May: The battle of the quadrilateral of four cities of 100,000 inhabitants (SK and SL) to be conquered is the "major effect" of "Operation Donbass". Once the conquest of these four towns is secured, with perhaps the easier conquest of Propovsk - a road junction in the centre-west of Donetsk oblast, population 65,000 - it will be possible to say that the Russian mission is accomplished, at least in this phase of the war. The most spectacular Russian advance took place in Popasna (22,000 inhabitants), 50 km south of Sverodonetsk, taken on 7 May after six weeks of fighting. Popasna is clearly the new axis of effort after the failure at Izium. (...) The capture of the town, a high point, made it possible to observe and therefore strike with artillery all Ukrainian movements, particularly between the road junction of Bakhmut (77,000 inhabitants) and Lysytchansk-Severodonetsk. (...) The progression towards the north, a threat to the security of the town, was also a priority. ) The advance to the north already threatens to encircle Ukrainian forces in the small towns of Zolote and Hirske along the front line, before reaching Lysychansk-Severodonetsk (LS) and in the west the main LS supply route in the Soledar region, or even Bakhmut.
Prospects: One month after the official announcement of the main phase of the Donbass battle, and in reality already two months of attacks, the Russians are still far from an operational victory. After having envisaged a total envelopment, they have reduced their ambition to the encirclement of Lysychansk-Severodonetsk and the capture of Lyman before tackling Sloviansk, which they also hope to encircle and take. (...) Assuming that the encirclement of Lysychansk-Severodonetsk has been achieved, it will then be necessary to take these two localities, which have been preparing for a siege for the past two months and have forces superior to those defending Marioupol. It is difficult to see how, with a lot of effort and unless there is a Ukrainian collapse, the Russians could take the two cities before the end of July. Will they be able to sustain a parallel fight to encircle Sloviansk-Kramatorsk, which will probably not happen before the end of June at this rate, and then an investment of the two cities that is even more difficult than Lysysychansk-Severodonetsk, because they are even better defended and especially close to Ukrainian forces?
19 June: The material balance of forces, especially in terms of firepower, will be to the advantage of the Russian forces for the next three months. It is even likely that this advantage will be even greater from mid-July to mid-August. It remains to be seen whether this material advantage of the summer can be combined with an assault infantry still sufficient in volume to obtain decisive results. Everything depends on the intelligence of the Ukrainian defence in the Donbass and in the immediate Severodonetsk-Lysychansk pocket. If the Ukrainian army is surrounded in this pocket, the Russians will undoubtedly achieve their major effect. If it manages to hold out for two months there, or if it manages to withdraw in good order and without great material loss to a solid Sloviansk - Kramatorsk - Druzhkivka - Kostiantynivka line, it may succeed in preventing the Russians from achieving their strategic objective.
Decade-long Russian sabotage scheme. Nazis had nothing to do with it.
www.yahoo.com
Putin’s Decade-Long Secret Sabotage Scheme Revealed
MARIUS BOSCH / ReutersRussia’s recent gains on the battlefield can be attributed in part to a quiet, nearly decade-long sabotage campaign to block Ukraine from vital ammunition supplies, according to several reports.The tactics include bullying ammunition sellers not to deliver to Ukraine and...
At least 12 people has a really bad day then.
The more area they take, the more area they have to control with less forces by the day.
Opinion: Uncrewed Airpower Is Ukraine’s Path To Long-Term Security | Aviation Week Network
MQ-1 Gray Eagles can be transferred to Ukrainian forces to help defeat Russia’s Black Sea blockade.
aviationweek.com