The total looks like this:
- 8 Tu-95MS (all 8 FMC, at least 6 loaded with Kh-101; this was between 70% and 100% of the ‘most often flown’ part of the Russian Tu-95MS-fleet, and thus the ‘best part’, ‘biggest success’ of this operation);
- 7 (perhaps 10) Tu-22M-3 (‘nice’, but not as important as knocking out Tu-95MS’);
- 2 A-50s (‘wasted effort’; both were non-operational for years and useless even as sources of spares)
- 1 An-12 (‘just a transport’)
Together: 8 Tu-95MS, 7-10 Tu-22M-3, 2 A-50s, 1 An-12.
In a war of attrition - which is what this conflict meanwhile is - crucial is to knock out items the enemy cannot replace, or has major problems with replacing. The Russians can’t replace any of these aircraft: they are not in production for 25 years (or longer). In the case of A-50s, they cannot even overhaul and repair, while in the case of Tu-95MS this costs them lots of time and lots of money. The Russian aviation industry was struggling with the lack of skilled workforce already before the invasion on Ukraine: ever since, it is experiencing constantly increasing problems with importing Western high-tech necessary for their avionics and weapons (so much so: the A-100 - the project for an upgrade of A-50s - was cancelled for the lack of the same, while the Su-57 is ‘heading nowhere’).
From that point of view, the strikes on Tu-22M-3s were ‘nice’ (about 30% of bombers known as ‘operated as of 2022-2023’ were knocked out, but they’ve been largely inactive for over a year), and those on the two A-50s were ‘entirely pointless’ (both were non-operational ‘for decades’).
However, the strikes on Tu-95MS have mauled the Russian strategic bomber fleet. They not only destroyed about 50% of ‘regularly operational’- but also between 70% and 100% of ‘fully mission capable’ aircraft. They also destroyed approximately ‘monthly production worth’ in Kh-101 missiles. Means: this kind of threat for Ukraine is out of commission for at least a month, probably longer. The rest now depends on how much of ‘his’ money is Pudding ready to invest into repairs of the fleet…and then how long is it going to take to manufacture new Kh-101s.
Except for the way in which the UAVs were smuggled into Russia to then launch near-simultaneous attacks at air bases so far away from each other (is a lesson certain to be learned by numerous countries, but non-state actors, too), precisely this point is what, yes, made this attack both ‘very important’ and ‘highly effective’.