The Quad (US, Japan, India, Australia Security Dialogue) : Updates and Discussions

Quad nations to announce financing to boost India's vaccine output: US official​

A first ever leaders' meeting of the Quad group of countries on Friday plans to announce financing agreements to support an increase in manufacturing capacity for coronavirus vaccines in India, a senior U.S administration official told Reuters.

The financing agreements will be between the United States, Japan and others and focus particularly on companies and institutions in India manufacturing vaccines for American drugmakers Novavax Inc and Johnson & Johnson, the official, who did not want to be identified by name, said.

The aim of the initiative by the Quad, which groups the United States, India, Japan and Australia, would be to reduce manufacturing backlogs, speed vaccination, and defeat some coronavirus mutations, the official said.

"The idea is that the quicker you can vaccinate, the more that you can defeat some of these mutations. So this is a capacity that will come online later this year, and it will substantially increase our capacity, collectively," he said.

Some of the additional vaccine capacity created in India would be used in vaccination efforts in Southeast Asian countries, the official added.

The White House announced earlier on Tuesday that President Joe Biden will participate in an online Quad meeting on Friday, the first leader-level meeting of a group seen as part of efforts to balance China's growing military and economic power.

White House spokeswoman Jen Psaki said she expected a range of issues facing the global community to be discussed "from the threat of COVID, to economic cooperation and ... the climate crisis."

India has urged the other Quad members to invest in its vaccine production capacity in an attempt to counter China's widening vaccine diplomacy.
 
I agree with what has been tweeted by @Falcon but we need to wait for now to see what happens in depsang. For China, it had become very dangerous once we occupied the main ridgeline from which these fingers emerge. We had them by their balls and also throat. We could have squeezed their balls and not let them even cough. That was the situation we had created. We had divided the entire Aksai Hind in two killing fields for China. One in P Tso area and another in the north in depasang with both PLA garrisons unable to provide mutual support. We could have done a pincer to take out the PLA Gogra/Hot springs garrison thru depsang and North bank of P tso while completely destroying the Moldo garrison. We should have insisted on withdrawal first from depsang and withdrawal from P tso should have been the last. We were dominating the area right upto Khurnak Fort on the north bank and the southern bank domination gave us a direct line of sight upto Rutog which is the main staging base for PLA in south Aksai Hind.
What if Chinese now refuse to discuss Depsang and Gogra/Hot springs area? Are we ready in that scenario to rapidly reoccupy the dominating heights after having placed our cards on table? Given the superior infra on Chinese side, Can we again outwit them? PLA showed its ability to rapidly mobilise by the speed with which it demobilised. Does this not send some message to our babus? IMHO, this withdrawal from P Tso area is our 1972 Shimla moment. We lost on the table what we had won in battle on ground. We have learnt nothing from our past and we are now more like Pakistanis who too have learnt nothing from the past.
 
I agree with what has been tweeted by @Falcon but we need to wait for now to see what happens in depsang. For China, it had become very dangerous once we occupied the main ridgeline from which these fingers emerge. We had them by their balls and also throat. We could have squeezed their balls and not let them even cough. That was the situation we had created. We had divided the entire Aksai Hind in two killing fields for China. One in P Tso area and another in the north in depasang with both PLA garrisons unable to provide mutual support. We could have done a pincer to take out the PLA Gogra/Hot springs garrison thru depsang and North bank of P tso while completely destroying the Moldo garrison. We should have insisted on withdrawal first from depsang and withdrawal from P tso should have been the last. We were dominating the area right upto Khurnak Fort on the north bank and the southern bank domination gave us a direct line of sight upto Rutog which is the main staging base for PLA in south Aksai Hind.
What if Chinese now refuse to discuss Depsang and Gogra/Hot springs area? Are we ready in that scenario to rapidly reoccupy the dominating heights after having placed our cards on table? Given the superior infra on Chinese side, Can we again outwit them? PLA showed its ability to rapidly mobilise by the speed with which it demobilised. Does this not send some message to our babus? IMHO, this withdrawal from P Tso area is our 1972 Shimla moment. We lost on the table what we had won in battle on ground. We have learnt nothing from our past and we are now more like Pakistanis who too have learnt nothing from the past.
We should have never agreed to vacate all those heights as during war anyone who dominates heights win the war. Chinese were a worried lot after this Indian coup.

We should have been adamant about Chinese army respecting status quo all across the border and Lac along with doklam. We should have made them vaccate first from all the violated areas along with Indian army matching all the de-escalation steps except those heights which should have been the last step. And even after that ample warning should have been given that we will reoccupy those heights in the event of any misadventure from their side...😞
 
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Opinion: Our four nations are committed to a free, open, secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific region​

Opinion by Joe Biden, Narendra Modi, Scott Morrison and Yoshihide Suga
Joe Biden is president of the United States. Narendra Modi is prime minister of India. Scott Morrison is prime minister of Australia. Yoshihide Suga is prime minister of Japan.

In December 2004, the continental shelf off the coast of Indonesia shifted two meters, creating one of the largest tidal waves in modern history and a nearly unprecedented humanitarian crisis around the Indian Ocean. With millions displaced and hundreds of thousands killed, the Indo-Pacific region sounded a clarion call for help. Together, our four countries answered it.

Australia, India, Japan and the United States — a group of democratic nations dedicated to delivering results through practical cooperation — coordinated rapid humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to people in need. Our cooperation, known as “the Quad,” was born in crisis. It became a diplomatic dialogue in 2007 and was reborn in 2017.

Now, in this new age of interconnection and opportunity throughout the Indo-Pacific, we are again summoned to act together in support of a region in need.

Since the tsunami, climate change has grown more perilous, new technologies have revolutionized our daily lives, geopolitics have become ever more complex, and a pandemic has devastated the world. Against this backdrop, we are recommitting to a shared vision for an Indo-Pacific region that is free, open, resilient and inclusive. We are striving to ensure that the Indo-Pacific is accessible and dynamic, governed by international law and bedrock principles such as freedom of navigation and peaceful resolution of disputes, and that all countries are able to make their own political choices, free from coercion. In recent years, that vision has increasingly been tested. Those trials have only strengthened our resolve to reckon with the most urgent of global challenges together.

Our governments have worked closely for years, and Friday, for the first time in “Quad” history, we convened as leaders to advance meaningful cooperation at the highest level. To strengthen our quest for a region that is open and free, we have agreed to partner to address the challenges presented by new technologies and collaborate to set the norms and standards that govern the innovations of the future. It is clear that climate change is both a strategic priority and an urgent global challenge, including for the Indo-Pacific region. That’s why we will work together and with others to strengthen the Paris agreement, and enhance the climate actions of all nations. And with an unwavering commitment to the health and safety of our people, we are determined to end the covid-19 pandemic because no country will be safe so long as the pandemic continues.

The pandemic is among the greatest risks to health and economic stability in recent history, and we must work in partnership to stop it in its tracks. Now, we are launching an ambitious effort to help end covid-19. Together, we pledge to expand and accelerate production in India of safe, accessible and effective vaccines. We will partner at each stage to ensure that vaccines are administered throughout the Indo-Pacific region into 2022. We will combine our scientific ingenuity, financing, formidable productive capacity and long history of global-health partnership to surge the supply of life-saving vaccines, in close collaboration with multilateral organizations including the World Health Organization and Covax Facility. Our vaccine initiative will be guided by a Quad Vaccine Experts Working Group that brings together the sharpest scientific leaders from Australia, India, Japan and the United States to meet the region’s pressing needs. And though the pandemic prevents us from meeting in person, we will do so before the end of 2021. The promises we make today must translate into a healthier and more prosperous Indo-Pacific tomorrow.

We are proud to announce these bold steps — and eager to begin the work our countries must undertake to achieve them. Ending and recovering from the pandemic, standing up to climate change, and advancing our shared regional vision will not be easy. We know we cannot and will not succeed without coordination and cooperation.

We will renew and strengthen our partnerships in Southeast Asia, starting with the Association for Southeast Asian Nations, work with the Pacific Islands, and engage the Indian Ocean region to meet this moment. The Quad is a flexible group of like-minded partners dedicated to advancing a common vision and to ensuring peace and prosperity. We welcome and will seek opportunities to work with all of those who share in those goals.

Over the course of these past months, each of us has grieved the suffering that our people and the world have endured. But in this dark hour, our partnership offers a spark of hope to light the path ahead. Our foundations of democracy and a commitment to engagement unite us. We know we can provide for the safety and prosperity of our people at home by confronting global crises together, with purpose and resolve. We summon from tragedy the strength and resilience to unify and overcome. And we recommit ourselves, once again, to an Indo-Pacific region that is free, open, secure and prosperous.
 
Getting the Quad Right Is Biden’s Most Important Job
The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue is the best hope for standing up to China.
By James Mattis, Michael Auslin, Joseph Felter

Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga, Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne, and U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo pose for photographs before a Quad Indo-Pacific meeting. Nicolas Datiche/AFP/Getty Images

On March 12, U.S. President Joe Biden will lead the first Quadrilateral Security Dialogue talks with the leaders of Australia, India, and Japan. Making the Quad work could be Biden’s most important task in Asia but doing so requires a specific agenda that builds on shared goals. And it’s not just about China—it’s about getting Asia right.

Biden faces a resurgent China, more confident than it was before the COVID-19 pandemic. That will make it harder to deal with a host of challenges in Asia, from maritime security to North Korea. In the face of such risks, the Biden administration is right to continue former U.S. President Donald Trump’s move to reinvigorate the group.

The Quad can play an important role in countering Beijing’s “might makes right” foreign policy, but it has a bigger role than that. Never envisioned as a formal alliance, the group is more an aspiration that is grounded in common interests among the most important democracies in Asia. And it offers the best opportunity to lead a robust values-based partnership in the Indo-Pacific for those democracies and other like-minded nations.

The four Quad countries first acted collectively in response to the devastating 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean, providing disaster response aid in Indonesia in particular. The Japanese prime minister proposed a more formal Quad plan during his first term as premier in 2006. Yet the shortness of Abe’s first stint in office as well as concern by Canberra and New Delhi over alienating China led to little action beyond a 2007 meeting on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum (ASEAN) and a naval exercise in September that year.

What a difference a decade makes. In October 2017, with Abe back in power in Tokyo, then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and then-Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono proposed resuming the dialogue. A second formal Quad meeting took place in November that year, again at an annual ASEAN summit. Since then, the foreign ministers of the Quad countries have met three times, in 2019, 2020, and just last month with Secretary of State Antony Blinken in attendance. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has also stated the Quad is “fundamental” to the United States’ position in the Indo-Pacific.

All this is welcome news, yet the real test of the Quad will be how it actually helps uphold the rule of law and stabilize Asia. There are four areas in particular where Australia, India, Japan, and the United States can work cooperatively in ways that advance their common interests and strengthen peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific.

The first is maritime security. China’s growing maritime claims have been stoking instability in the South and East China Seas for years. From building and militarizing island garrisons in the South China Sea in flagrant violation of international law to repeated incursions into waters around the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands, China has been raising tensions in the region. A new law allowing the Chinese Coast Guard to use weapons to enforce Chinese maritime claims only raises the risk of an armed encounter.

Given the naval strength of the Quad nations, they should take the lead in enhancing regional maritime security cooperation; capacity building of smaller navies; increased information sharing; and regular, joint maritime patrols that maintain freedom of navigation in international waters and deny Beijing the ability to intimidate and coerce smaller nations.

A second area of Quad cooperation should be on supply-chain security. The Quad nations are among the world’s largest economies and most important traders. China’s delays in shipping personal protective equipment made by U.S. companies in Chinese factories and its threats to deny the United States access to its pharmaceuticals as the coronavirus pandemic spread was a stark reminder of the vulnerabilities of the world’s global supply chain. It underscores the urgent imperative to reduce dependency on China for a range of materials and goods like rare earth elements that are critical to U.S. national security.

Trusted allies and partners broadly in the region need to coordinate efforts to develop secure supply chains among them and deny China the leverage and coercive tools it currently enjoys.

Technology cooperation should be a third area of focus for the Quad. Ensuring that nations with a shared commitment to the rules-based international order maintain a technological edge in emerging technologies, as well as in new domains of conflict and competition like information technology and space, is crucial. Doing so will ensure economic and military competitiveness in the coming generation.

Although all nations have fallen behind China in the race for 5G, the Quad countries should concentrate on developing shared next-generation telecommunications technologies and expanding viable options beyond China, given the demonstrated downside risks of its technologies.

Finally, the Quad can draw on the diversity of its members to enhance diplomacy between leading democracies and other nations in Asia in ways not possible for Washington alone. Japan, for example, traditionally has maintained ties with authoritarian regimes and can engage with countries like Cambodia, Myanmar, and others, while both India and Australia have deep ties to many nations in Asia and Oceania where the United States is less present.

The Quad should complement the United States’ current hub-and-spoke alliance system, as well as multilateral organizations like the East Asia Summit, ASEAN, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. The grouping will gain the most support if presented as an alignment based on shared interests and values. Linking together the largest democracies in the region to promote cooperative action among all nations sharing a similar vision for a free, open, and prosperous Indo-Pacific may offer the best chance to channel China’s increasing power and more positively influence Asia, as well as strengthen democracy and liberalism in the world’s most dynamic region.

James Mattis was the 26th U.S. secretary of defense and is a fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution.

Michael Auslin is the author of Asia’s New Geopolitics: Essays on Reshaping the Indo-Pacific and is a fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution.
Joseph Felter served as deputy assistant secretary of defense from 2017 to 2019 and is a fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution.
 
Key points: the recent Quad virtual summit was important for at least three reasons: 1. Underscored priority accorded to Quad by 4 countries 2. Set out a positive, affirmative vision and agenda 3. Unveiled implementation (3 working groups, including COVID19 vaccine effort)

Another theme concerned what the Quad is and is not: IS NOT: - a mutual commitment to defense - effort to undermine ASEAN centrality/unity IS: - mechanism for burden-sharing - effort at reinforcing rules and norms, building resilience, giving partner countries more options

The Quad has demonstrated an openness to partners: - Military exercises with Singapore ('07), Canada, France - 'Quad plus' dialogues with RoK/NZ/VN (and another with RoK/Brazil/Israel) - Current and potential multilateral caucusing (e.g. D-10, G20, GPAI)

Future agenda, beyond working groups: - Widening: supply chain resilience, infrastructure financing, cyber security, counter terrorism - Deepening security cooperation: defence R&D, development and use of hard assets

Final point: Quad has taken a long time to develop, in part, because there needed to be sufficient trust that participants would not use it as a bargaining chip (and will be downgraded or undermined for tactical gains). Summit meeting suggests that trust has been achieved.