The Quad (US, Japan, India, Australia Security Dialogue) : Updates and Discussions

Ginvincible

Well-Known member
Dec 5, 2017
416
437
Ohio

RESOLVED: Japan Is Ready to Become a Formal Member of Five Eyes​

By: Jagannath Panda & Ankit Panda | December 08, 2020​


From the Editor


In an August 2020 interview, former Defense Minister Kono Taro stated Japan’s interest in joining “Five Eyes,” an intelligence-sharing relationship between Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Though Japan enjoys high levels of cooperation with Five Eyes countries, the argument for Japan to formally become the “sixth eye” has strengthened in the face of China’s growing military and cyber capabilities.

In the nineteenth issue of the Debating Japan newsletter series, the CSIS Japan Chair invited Dr. Jagannath Panda, Research Fellow and Centre Coordinator for East Asia at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, and Mr. Ankit Panda, Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, to share their perspectives on whether Japan is truly ready to become a formal member of Five Eyes.

Prime Minister Suga assumed leadership during a period of extraordinary international vulnerability and geopolitical tensions. Heralded as a "continuity" leader, Suga’s focus on defense posturing—one of former prime minister Shinzo Abe's defining legacies—has only increased. Under Suga, Japan’s addition as the “Sixth Eye” in “Five Eyes”—an intelligence-sharing alliance including the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—has gained further traction. With intelligence sharing being centrally dependent upon mutual trust and strategic understanding, Tokyo’s inclusion in the Five Eyes boils down to six main considerations.

First, Japan’s inclusion in the alliance creates a consensus to embrace security multilateralism alongside its active economic multilateralism efforts. Under Abe, Japan’s restricted multilateral security endeavors underwent an enormous transformation with a heightened focus on “collective self-defense” and “Proactive contribution to peace.” Japan’s leadership in multilateral trading platforms like the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the establishment of the Expanded Partnership of Quality Infrastructure (EPQI), and engagement in trilateral and quadrilateral groupings with India, Australia, and the United States, are evidence of its emerging multilateral security and economic nexus.

Second, Japan as a “Sixth Eye” is a logical progression, considering the already existing intelligence-sharing apparatus that Japan has with Australia, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Japan’s increasing security concerns vis-à-vis China and its threat perception from North Korea have made the political class more attuned to the global alliance structure in search of security. In this, Tokyo’s strategic perceptions are aligned (if not converging entirely) with those of the Five Eyes countries. Moreover, the recent Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) with Australia has further strengthened the Japan-Australia security and military partnership that is very much China-centric. Tokyo’s formal inclusion would enable a much-needed geo-intelligence network in the Indo-Pacific.

Third, although Japan’s current intelligence mechanisms are relatively new, it is quickly incorporating stronger domestic security measures. Tokyo recently implemented a state secrecy law in 2013, which was widely protested amidst an unfavorable public opinion of secretive intelligence activities. Despite this Act, access to most information in Japan is easy, with the process of classifying information based on sensitivity levels still being largely lax. Should Tokyo decide to actively push for a Five Eyes inclusion, it must assure the Five Eyes members that its addition will not expand risks by implementing a tougher legal framework with stricter protections and a robust counter-intelligence setup.

Nevertheless, Tokyo has displayed a remarkable shift in its national security strategy, as seen in its 2020 defense white paper that projects it as a proactive regional leader ready to defend its national interests. Not only has Japan revamped its intelligence capabilities, but it also shows a willingness (amidst debates) to acquire first-strike capabilities, with the question of security enhancement becoming an increasingly accepted part of public discourse. Tokyo has also broadened the scope of its state secrets act, demonstrating its interest in expanding its security partnerships to include intelligence sharing beyond the United States.

Fourth, the growing diplomatic and political strife between China and the Indo-Pacific countries have left China “alert” toward the potential consequences of an expanded Five Eyes network. Here, the Five Eyes must aim at capitalizing on its unique intelligence-sharing apparatus. Edward Snowden’s 2013 intelligence spill uncovered that the alliance had additional intelligence-sharing levels: Nine Eyes and 14 Eyes. Israel, Singapore, Japan, and South Korea have all been informal partners within these frameworks. Japan’s elevation to the Five Eyes level has major potential for the region’s security outlook.

Fifth, Japan’s addition to the Five Eyes as the first East Asian, non-English speaking country—and possibly in a Five Eyes+1 trial format—would not only add to the network’s capabilities but also boost former prime minister Abe’s "collective self-defense" outlook. It would pave the way for deeper engagement in multilateral frameworks such as the United Kingdom’s Democratic-10 (D-10), the Quad 2.0, and the emerging “Quad Plus” narrative. As security becomes a priority for Japan amid heightened tensions in the East China Sea, Suga must focus on improving Japan’s ability to protect its intelligence and classified data.

Sixth, Japan has plenty to offer to the Five Eyes. It is skilled in specialized intelligence gathering and sharing, particularly signals intelligence (SIGINT) obtained from radio stations and data shared electronically. Japan also has one of the world’s most vast intelligence-gathering frameworks, built in the post-war period to stay alert, keeping in view of its insignificant military presence. Its historical focus on China and North Korea—which have been further enhanced in recent times with the recognition of China and North Korea as Tokyo’s biggest security threats—only makes Japan’s bid stronger.

The intelligence advantages that Tokyo can bring to the table are clear. However, for being accepted to the rather elite alliance, Japan must convince the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada that its domestic counter-intelligence measures and new legislations can sufficiently protect state secrets while adding substance to the Five Eyes grouping. This will require not only a bolstering of its domestic laws and technological apparatus but also a sophisticated diplomatic approach.

The Five Eyes intelligence-sharing partnership is the oldest in the world, tracing its origins back to an Anglo-American accord from 1943. Apart from the addition of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand shortly thereafter, the group’s membership has remained static.

During the Cold War, the propensity of these states to share intelligence—far more liberally than Moscow did with its Warsaw Pact partners—yielded significant dividends. Gathering, analysis, and even counterintelligence benefited.

Today, as competition intensifies in the Indo-Pacific, Japan seeks to join the group. Former Japanese defense minister Taro Kono boldly alluded to the notion of “Six Eyes,” suggesting in no uncertain terms that Tokyo ought to ascend as a formal member of the decades-old group.

It isn’t clear that the time is right for “Six Eyes” to manifest, even as the apparent benefits of Japanese participation—including geographic proximity to China—are clear. Tokyo’s bona fides as an ally and partner to the Five Eyes states, responsible international stakeholder, and positive force in global affairs are not in question. Rather, the time is not right for Japan’s formal membership.

Even as the Five Eyes grouping has found sustained relevance in the post-Cold War era and certainly in the information age, there are growing concerns about counterintelligence and information security within the five extant members. New Zealand, by some measures the weakest link, faces a stark counterintelligence challenge from China, raising uncomfortable questions about its continuing Five Eyes status.

Intelligence-sharing networks can only be as effective as their most vulnerable nodes. While Tokyo has made sustained efforts to improve its own counterintelligence and information security practices in recent decades, work is ongoing. Recent efforts to expand counterintelligence practices should be welcomed in this regard. By contrast, more must be done to advance security for sensitive information in the private sector in Japan.

The principles of information sharing that have undergirded the Five Eyes grouping for decades are remarkable. The 1955 UKUSA Agreement, for instance, underscores that signals intelligence—“raw” and “end product”—is to be shared “continuously, currently and without request.” This effective firehose of sensitive intelligence has been viable and sustainable in part due to decades of cultural and bureaucratic synergies between the five constituent states.

By setting up formal membership as the most meaningful benchmark of Tokyo’s integration with Five Eyes, Japan may find itself disappointed. Instead, there is tremendous scope for Tokyo continuing to partner with its ally the United States and the four remaining non-ally Five Eyes states on intelligence-sharing and coordination.

Tokyo may not find itself as the sixth “Eye” soon, but that does not mean it cannot enjoy status akin to “Five Eyes-plus.” In practice, this would not manifest in a meaningful designation that would allow for seamless intelligence sharing as is expected within Five Eyes; but it would set Tokyo on a path to greater intelligence-sharing with these states, enhancing Japanese security in the process.

A model for this sort of cooperation may be the relationship that exists between the Five Eyes and certain European states, most of whom are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). For instance, in the area of signals and electronic intelligence, Five Eyes states have close cooperative relationships with intelligence agencies in the Netherlands, Norway, France, and Denmark. Another rung of cooperation exists with states including Belgium, Italy, Germany, Spain, and Sweden.

From the perspective of the Five Eyes states, Tokyo’s formal accession as a sixth “eye” would open an uncomfortable can of worms with other allies and partners. For instance, other states may find cause to seek formal membership as well, presenting diplomatic dilemmas that may manifest in splits within the Five Eyes states themselves. Tokyo, instead, could become the first peg of an Indo-Pacific-oriented informal cooperative network led by Five Eyes—a status that it already de facto enjoys.

The status quo best protects the interests of the Five Eyes states and, while it may not be the ideal outcome for Tokyo, it is optimal under the current environment and effectively mitigates the risks that may come with formal expansion. On China and North Korea, Japan has intelligence competencies that would be immensely valuable; in turn, the Five Eyes can plan for controlled, but fluid intelligence sharing with Tokyo where suitable.

The good news is that Tokyo’s energetic diplomacy has yielded results in recent years—with partial assistance from China, which has done much to heighten threat perceptions among the Five Eyes states. In the United Kingdom, perspectives on intelligence sharing with Japan have quickly accelerated. Japan-Australia cooperation, too, is rapidly growing.

The most important principle that should guide intelligence sharing is pragmatism and solidarity. Japan’s legitimate security concerns and position as a democratic bulwark in Northeast Asia should motivate intelligence sharing where and when it makes sense. Fixating on Tokyo’s formal status privileges symbolic matters over a gradual process of convergence that best suits current realities.

===========================================================================================

About the Authors

JAGANNATH PANDA is a research fellow and centre coordinator for East Asia at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. He is also the series editor for “Routledge Studies on Think Asia.” Dr. Panda is an expert on East Asian affairs focusing on China, Japan, and the Korean Peninsula. Most recently, he was a Japan Foundation fellow and Korea Foundation fellow for the year 2018-19. Dr. Panda is in charge of East Asia Centre’s academic and administrative activities, including the Track-II and Track 1.5 dialogues with the Chinese, Japanese, and Korean think tanks/institutes. He is a recipient of V. K. Krishna Menon Memorial Gold Medal (2000) from the Indian Society of International Law & Diplomacy in New Delhi. Dr. Panda’s most recent publications include India and China in Asia: Between Equilibrium and Equations (Routledge, 2019); and Scaling India-Japan Cooperation in Indo-Pacific and Beyond 2025: Corridors, Connectivity and Contours (KW Publisher, 2020). He is also the author of India-China Relations: Politics of Resources, Identity and Authority in a Multipolar World (Routledge, 2017) and China’s Path to Power: Party, Military and the Politics of State Transition (Pentagon Security International, 2010).


ANKIT PANDA is the Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. An expert on the Asia-Pacific region, his research interests range from nuclear strategy, arms control, missile defense, nonproliferation, emerging technologies, and U.S. extended deterrence. He is the author of Kim Jong Un and the Bomb: Survival and Deterrence in North Korea (Hurst Publishers/Oxford University Press, 2020).
Panda was previously an adjunct senior fellow in the Defense Posture Project at the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) and a member of the 2019 FAS International Study Group on North Korea Policy. He has consulted for the United Nations in New York and Geneva on nonproliferation and disarmament matters, and has testified on security topics related to South Korea and Japan before the congressionally chartered U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.
Panda was a Korea Society Kim Koo Fellow, a German Marshall Fund Young Strategist, an International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Shangri-La Dialogue Young Leader, and a Carnegie Council on Ethics in International Affairs New Leader. He has worked at the Council on Foreign Relations and the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs.
A widely published writer, Panda’s work has appeared in the New York Times, the Washington Post, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the Diplomat, the Atlantic, the New Republic, the South China Morning Post, War on the Rocks, Politico, and the National Interest. Panda has also published in scholarly journals, including Survival, the Washington Quarterly, and India Review, and has contributed to the IISS Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment and Strategic Survey. He is editor-at-large at the Diplomat, where he hosts the Asia Geopolitics podcast, and a contributing editor at War on the Rocks.

About the Editor

Hannah Fodale is a research assistant with the Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where she focuses on projects involving U.S.-Japan relations and security in the Indo-Pacific region.

RELATED RESOURCES:

CSIS RESOURCES

Japan’s Leadership Role in a Multipolar Indo-Pacific,” Hiroyuki Suzuki (2020)
Mt. Fuji DC Event: The U.S.-Japan Alliance at 60,” September 9, 2020
How Japan Can Forge Resiliency and Defense Capacity Building in the Indo-Pacific in the Era of Covid-19,” Mitsuko Hayashi (2020)

RECENT DEBATING JAPAN ISSUES

RESOLVED: Joe Biden Would be Good for Japan” (October 2020)
RESOLVED: Japan Has Not Done Enough to Bolster Immigration” (August 2020)
RESOLVED: Japan Is Well-positioned to Counterbalance China in Southeast Asia” (July 2020)

=============================================================================
Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

Download the PDF
 

RISING SUN

Senior member
Dec 3, 2017
7,271
4,127

Britain could join 'Asian Nato' under proposal to expand its membership to counter China​

Britain could join the military coalition known as the "Asian Nato" following a US proposal to expand the group’s membership as a counterweight to China.

President Biden’s new policy chief on Asia this month sketched out a proposition of drafting additional countries into the informal alliance, which is also dubbed the “Quad”, in order to deter adventurism by Beijing.

The UK is poised to join the grouping, according to the Spectator, and Government insiders have not denied the idea.

Although it is understood no firm proposals have yet been tabled for Boris Johnson to review, he has highlighted the similarities between the UK’s foreign policy and the principles set out by President Biden.

Kurt Campbell, appointed to the newly-created role of “Asia tsar” in the fresh US administration, is a China hawk and former State Department official who was credited as the architect of the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia” strategy in 2012.

Kurt Campbell, the new Asia coordinator, is a trusted hand among the US' Asian allies  - SAEED KHAN/AFP

Kurt Campbell, the new Asia coordinator, is a trusted hand among the US' Asian allies - SAEED KHAN/AFP
In an essay for Foreign Affairs magazine this month entitled “How America Can Shore Up Asian Order”, he endorsed the UK’s proposal to expand the G7 into a bigger group of democracies that will be known as the “D10”.

Mr Johnson has invited Australia, India and South Korea to join the G7 summit in Cornwall in June, where their permanent membership of the expanded alliance is expected to be formalised.

Such a coalition “will be most urgent for questions of trade, technology, supply chains, and standards,” Mr Campbell wrote.

He added: “Other coalitions, though, might focus on military deterrence by expanding the so-called Quad currently composed of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, infrastructure investment through cooperation with Japan and India, and human rights through the two-dozen states that criticized Beijing’s internment camps in Xinjiang and its assault on Hong Kong’s autonomy.”

These alliances are needed to “create balance in some cases, bolster consensus on important facets of the regional order in others, and send a message that there are risks to China’s present course,” he said.

It is understood there is appetite in the UK Government to join a new human rights coalition, as well as the “Quad”, although no decision is imminent on either. Britain is one of 24 nations that has called out China over abuses against the Uighur minority and in Hong Kong.

President Biden’s swivel back to a multilateralist approach to foreign policy after Donald Trump’s isolationist inclinations and unpredictable manoeuvres has prompted sighs of relief among British diplomats based at King Charles Street.


On Wednesday, Dominic Raab, the Foreign Secretary, held a call with his US equivalent Antony Blinken, who was sworn in as Secretary of State on Tuesday.

A Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office spokesperson said Mr Raab offered his congratulations and the pair “discussed the opportunities to work together on a shared agenda, to reinforce democratic values across the world and to strengthen the two countries’ global alliance.

“They spoke about the upcoming UK’s presidencies of the G7 and COP26, the need to tackle Iranian destabilising behaviour and cooperation to hold China to its international commitments.”

The spokesperson added: “The Foreign Secretary welcomed President Biden’s commitment to tackling climate change, including by re-joining the Paris Agreement, as well as the US re-engaging with the World Health Organisation.” The pair agreed to speak again soon.

Mr Blinken said the relationship with China was "arguably the most important" the US had in the world.

In his first press briefing in the role, he emphasised areas in which Washington and Beijing could collaborate, saying "it's in our mutual interest to try to work together" on issues such as climate change. However, he said he believed China had committed "genocide" against Uighur Muslims.

"Increasingly, [the US-China] relationship has some adversarial aspects to it," Mr Blinken added.
 

jetray

Well-Known member
Mar 15, 2018
1,103
795
India

Britain could join 'Asian Nato' under proposal to expand its membership to counter China​

Britain could join the military coalition known as the "Asian Nato" following a US proposal to expand the group’s membership as a counterweight to China.

President Biden’s new policy chief on Asia this month sketched out a proposition of drafting additional countries into the informal alliance, which is also dubbed the “Quad”, in order to deter adventurism by Beijing.

The UK is poised to join the grouping, according to the Spectator, and Government insiders have not denied the idea.

Although it is understood no firm proposals have yet been tabled for Boris Johnson to review, he has highlighted the similarities between the UK’s foreign policy and the principles set out by President Biden.

Kurt Campbell, appointed to the newly-created role of “Asia tsar” in the fresh US administration, is a China hawk and former State Department official who was credited as the architect of the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia” strategy in 2012.

Kurt Campbell, the new Asia coordinator, is a trusted hand among the US' Asian allies  - SAEED KHAN/AFP

Kurt Campbell, the new Asia coordinator, is a trusted hand among the US' Asian allies - SAEED KHAN/AFP
In an essay for Foreign Affairs magazine this month entitled “How America Can Shore Up Asian Order”, he endorsed the UK’s proposal to expand the G7 into a bigger group of democracies that will be known as the “D10”.

Mr Johnson has invited Australia, India and South Korea to join the G7 summit in Cornwall in June, where their permanent membership of the expanded alliance is expected to be formalised.

Such a coalition “will be most urgent for questions of trade, technology, supply chains, and standards,” Mr Campbell wrote.

He added: “Other coalitions, though, might focus on military deterrence by expanding the so-called Quad currently composed of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, infrastructure investment through cooperation with Japan and India, and human rights through the two-dozen states that criticized Beijing’s internment camps in Xinjiang and its assault on Hong Kong’s autonomy.”

These alliances are needed to “create balance in some cases, bolster consensus on important facets of the regional order in others, and send a message that there are risks to China’s present course,” he said.

It is understood there is appetite in the UK Government to join a new human rights coalition, as well as the “Quad”, although no decision is imminent on either. Britain is one of 24 nations that has called out China over abuses against the Uighur minority and in Hong Kong.

President Biden’s swivel back to a multilateralist approach to foreign policy after Donald Trump’s isolationist inclinations and unpredictable manoeuvres has prompted sighs of relief among British diplomats based at King Charles Street.


On Wednesday, Dominic Raab, the Foreign Secretary, held a call with his US equivalent Antony Blinken, who was sworn in as Secretary of State on Tuesday.

A Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office spokesperson said Mr Raab offered his congratulations and the pair “discussed the opportunities to work together on a shared agenda, to reinforce democratic values across the world and to strengthen the two countries’ global alliance.

“They spoke about the upcoming UK’s presidencies of the G7 and COP26, the need to tackle Iranian destabilising behaviour and cooperation to hold China to its international commitments.”

The spokesperson added: “The Foreign Secretary welcomed President Biden’s commitment to tackling climate change, including by re-joining the Paris Agreement, as well as the US re-engaging with the World Health Organisation.” The pair agreed to speak again soon.

Mr Blinken said the relationship with China was "arguably the most important" the US had in the world.

In his first press briefing in the role, he emphasised areas in which Washington and Beijing could collaborate, saying "it's in our mutual interest to try to work together" on issues such as climate change. However, he said he believed China had committed "genocide" against Uighur Muslims.

"Increasingly, [the US-China] relationship has some adversarial aspects to it," Mr Blinken added.
:giggle: send them to hong kong.

Quad is the most overrated nonsense , chinese dont even care about this piddly group. Once in a year like a obese fat person they conduct an exercise and exchange some info on china. Then they start claiming that they contained china.

Instead of Quad why not create an ASEAN NATO and take control of all the islands occupied by china in south china sea? None of the countries want to take any concrete action but keep doing dumb patrols while china races to build military outposts.
 

RISING SUN

Senior member
Dec 3, 2017
7,271
4,127

'Quad' a foundation for American policy in Indo-Pacific: Sullivan​

WASHINGTON, Jan. 29 (Yonhap) -- The U.S.-led regional forum in the Indo-Pacific, known as the Quad, may serve as the foundation of U.S. foreign policy in the region, the top U.S. security adviser said Friday.

National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan also said the Joe Biden administration will continue to build on the Quad.

"I think we really want to carry forward and build on that format, that mechanism which we see as a foundation upon which to build substantial American policy in the Indo-Pacific region," Sullivan said at a virtual event, also attended by his immediate predecessor, Robert O'Brien.

The captured image from the website of U.S. Institute of Peace shows National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan speaking at an online event hosted by the U.S. Institute of Peace on Jan. 29, 2021. (Yonhap)

The event, named "Passing the Baton," was hosted by the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP), which said it has hosted similar events involving top national security officials from new and former administrations at each change of administration over the past 20 years.

O'Brien said the new administration will have to work with "all means of national power" and "certainly allies and friends" in dealing with challenges posed by China.

"I am glad to see that, I think, as we work together with our allies, especially with the quad -- Japan, Australia, India and the United States, which may be the most important relationship we have established since NATO at a high level -- I think we are gonna be able to confront that challenge," said O'Brien.

Sullivan said the new administration will continue to work with the multilateral forum in the Indo-Pacific and also reinforce it.

"I think you will see continuity and an effort to reinforce...carry forward steps that had been taken by the previous administration," he told the online event.

The Trump administration had sought to expand the regional forum into a "Quad Plus," arguing it could be a NATO-like alliance to counter what it called growing aggression from China's communist party.

The tension between the U.S. and China had placed much pressure on U.S. allies in Asia, where, for many, including South Korea, China's economic presence easily overwhelms that of any others.

Sullivan stressed the need to work with allies, partly to impose costs on China for its actions.

"We represent well more than half of the world's economy, and that provides us, not just the kind of leverage we need to be able to produce outcomes, but it provides us a chorus of voices that can drive the argument that says, 'We are going to stand up for a certain set of principles in the face of aggression and the kinds of steps that China has taken'," he said.

"The last piece is speaking with clarity and consistency on these issues and being prepared to act, as well to impose costs for what China is doing in Xinjiang, what it's doing in Hong Kong, for the bellicosity and threats that it is projecting towards Taiwan," added the White House official.
 

RISING SUN

Senior member
Dec 3, 2017
7,271
4,127

'Quad' countries arranging first meeting of leaders​

Washington – The United States, Japan, Australia and India are working to arrange the first meeting of their leaders under the so-called Quad framework amid China’s growing clout in the region, a source from one of the countries involved said.

The move comes as the new administration of U.S. President Joe Biden appears eager to build on renewed attention to the grouping of the four major Indo-Pacific democracies, with national security adviser Jake Sullivan calling it “a foundation upon which to build substantial American policy in the Indo-Pacific.”

According to the source, the United States has already proposed to other countries the idea of holding an online meeting of the Quad leaders.

Whether the talks will materialize soon is up to India, which is known for its relatively cautious stance on the framework. It is the only Quad member that shares a land border with China and operates outside of U.S.-led security alliances.

During the envisioned meeting, the participants are expected to discuss cooperation for the realization of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” amid concerns over China’s maritime assertiveness in the region.

China may react with displeasure, as it sees the framework as an attempt to contain it.

Officially known as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, the Quad originally arose in 2004 in response to the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami.

Yoshihide Suga | POOL / VIA REUTERS Yoshihide Suga | POOL / VIA REUTERS
After a period of hiatus, it was revived in 2017 and has since grown beyond humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, most recently focusing on efforts to advance “a free, open and inclusive” Indo-Pacific region, according to the U.S. State Department.

For the first time under the framework, the foreign ministers of the four countries met in New York in 2019. The second meeting was held in Tokyo last October in the midst of the coronavirus pandemic.

After the talks in October, then-U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that his government hopes to “institutionalize” the Quad grouping, saying it has the capacity to “push back against the Chinese Communist Party.”

Biden, who took office on Jan. 20, and Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga agreed during recent telephone talks that they would promote the Quad grouping, according to the Japanese Foreign Ministry.

Biden has also vowed to counter China’s economic abuses and aggressive behavior by rebuilding alliances, though it is unclear how the Quad framework may evolve under his administration.
 

RISING SUN

Senior member
Dec 3, 2017
7,271
4,127

How US plans for first Quad summit with leaders of Japan, Australia and India could be first steps towards ‘mini-Nato’ to counter Chinese influence​

The US has proposed the first summit between the leaders of the “Quad” group, media reports said on Sunday, as the new administration looks to strengthen a framework that some observers believe could develop into a “mini-Nato” designed to counter China’s growing power in the Asia-Pacific.

Washington has already proposed an online meeting with the leaders of Australia, India and Japan, the Japanese news agency Kyodo reported on Sunday.
Joe Biden’s administration has already said it will build on the previous administration’s work in setting up the group, one of the few Donald Trump policies it has decided to continue.

National security adviser Jake Sullivan said last week that the White House sees the Quad as “fundamental, a foundation upon which to build substantial American policy in the Indo-Pacific region”.


The proposed summit would be the first at the highest level since the Trump administration decided to transform the “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue” into a mechanism to counter China’s growing influence in the Asia-Pacific region in 2017.


Kyodo reported that the agenda was expected to include talks on ensuring a “free and open Indo-Pacific” amid concerns over China’s activities in the region, such as its building of military infrastructure in disputed areas in the South China Sea.


Chinese diplomatic observers said there were still a number of obstacles to the grouping becoming a full-blown military alliance.

“A Quad summit should not be a surprise – since an Indo-Pacific security alliance against China has been an unchangeable strategy and basic US policy on China,” said Shi Yinhong, an international relations specialist from Renmin University in Beijing,

Shi added that the Quad could well grow into a “mini-Nato” after Britain also expressed interest in getting involved.

But it is not certain how far it will develop, especially since India, the only member to share a land border with China, has reservations about the framework and has long maintained a non-aligned stance in diplomacy.


India’s military, which relies heavily on Russian weapons and equipment, will find it harder to integrate smoothly into a US-led defensive pact than Japan or Australia would.


“At the moment India is only a partner to the US, not yet an ally,” said Shi. But New Delhi’s willingness to side with the US and join the Quad increased greatly after last June’s deadly clash with Chinese troops on their disputed border, he said.

The Quad group had its first foreign ministers’ meeting in New York in 2019, and a second in Tokyo in October last year.

The Japanese foreign ministry has said that Biden and Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga agreed during a phone call late last month that they would promote the grouping.
 

jetray

Well-Known member
Mar 15, 2018
1,103
795
India

It's unfortunate that we will never get a proper analysis of the Chinese view from inside China due to their state-controlled opinions. This relegates all these Chinese "analysts" straight into a dustbin.
forgot about chinese, do we have enough Indians who can read the chinese well from inside china?
I am not talking about our foreign office mandarins or reporters but academics, professionals who are or have spent time in china.
 

randomradio

Senior Member
Nov 30, 2017
9,751
7,387
India
forgot about chinese, do we have enough Indians who can read the chinese well from inside china?
I am not talking about our foreign office mandarins or reporters but academics, professionals who are or have spent time in china.

I have no way say in that since I don't know much about China and the Chinese myself.
 

RISING SUN

Senior member
Dec 3, 2017
7,271
4,127

Quad leaders looking ‘to muscle up to Beijing’​

Scott Morrison hopes to attend the first leaders’ meeting of Quadrilateral Security Dialogue partners in coming months, as Australia, the US, Japan and India look to work together to counter growing Chinese assertiveness in the region.
The Australian has learned the Morrison government is working behind the scenes with Quad partners to arrange the leaders’ meeting, at the urging of new US President Joe Biden.

Foreign Minister Marise Payne said Australia was keen on increasing Quad engagement “including at leaders’ level”.

“I last met my Quad foreign minister counterparts in October 2020 in Tokyo and we agreed to continue meeting on a regular basis, following our first ministerial meeting in New York in September 2019,” she told The Australian.

“The Quad’s positive agenda complements Australia’s other bilateral, regional and multilateral engagement, including with ASEAN, to strengthen the Indo-Pacific’s economic recovery, security, sovereignty and resilience.”

The proposed online leaders’ meeting would be a first for the security grouping, which US national security adviser Jake Sullivan has branded “a foundation upon which to build substantial American policy in the Indo-Pacific”.

China is fervently opposed to the Quad, while India has until recently avoided antagonising Beijing through only low-key support for the grouping.

China’s incursions into Indian territory in the Himalayas have led New Delhi to take a much harder line, bringing the country more firmly into the Indo-Pacific security partnership.

Opposition foreign affairs spokeswoman Penny Wong said a meeting of all Quad leaders — Mr Biden, Mr Morrison, Japan’s Yoshihide Suga and India’s Narendra Modi — “would be a positive step”.

“Australia should be seeking to maximise the Quad’s effectiveness to support our shared pandemic recoveries and shape the region to be stable, prosperous and respectful of sovereignty,” Senator Wong said. “This will require more than meetings — the Morrison government needs to work with allied and aligned nations and commit the resources to deliver our interests.”

The Quad’s potential as a security grouping was demonstrated last year when Australia was invited by India to attend its November Malabar naval exercises with the US and Japan.

Australia has also strengthened its defence partnership, with a new joint logistics agreement, and a pledge by Japan’s Self-Defence Forces to “protect Australian Defence Force assets” if they come under threat.

Australia is also focused on working with Quad partners to deliver COVID-19 vaccines, improve maritime security, deliver regional infrastructure, improve supply chain resilience, provide disaster relief, and counter cyber attacks and disinformation.

Lowy Institute executive director Michael Fullilove said the Biden administration wanted to compete, not co-operate, with China.

“All the early signals from the Biden administration — including President Biden’s remarks at the State Department, NSA Jake Sullivan’s call for a ‘chorus of voices’ to respond to Beijing, Secretary of State Tony Blinken’s forward-leaning phone call with Yang Jiechi, and the reported move on a Quad leaders’ meeting — indicate that Washington intends to muscle up to Beijing,” he said.