PAK-FA / Sukhoi Su-57 - Updates and Discussions

[Hyperactive ADD]

.....sure mate. The su57 has its own advantages but it was designed to fight under friendly AD protection hence the relatively poor IR stealth from the back. It might get better if the flat nozzles are introduced but even the Its basic RCS shape is not as optimal. the J20 idk but the F22 and F35 are vastly better in terms of pure stealth via airframe.

I've said it in other threads — I consider all fifth-generation fighters to be failures. The Su-57 is merely the best among a bad lot. Ever since the Cold War ended, this whole Western-liberal school of design thinking has been one fundamental logical fallacy after another.

Let's start with "first-detect, first-engage." If that's the idea, then you're definitely switching on your radar to search for targets. And switching on your radar to search for a target is like turning on a flashlight in the dark to find a cat — the first thing that lights up is you.

Then there's the issue of downward stealth. Downward stealth matters when you're deep behind enemy lines, in an environment where the adversary holds the advantage in air defense. The entire air defense system of Europe, combined, is less dense than the organic air defense assets of a single Russian combined-arms army. If your aircraft design is purpose-built to take on the Russian military, giving extra weight to this aspect does make sense — and the same goes for Taiwan, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, which are among the rare pockets of high-density air defense networks anywhere on the planet. But when it comes to other countries, whose air defense systems are barely worth mentioning, what's the point of optimizing in that direction? And in an age of 100-plus-kilometer glide missiles — especially considering the Su-57's massive internal bays designed to carry four cruise missiles — what exactly is the value of penetrating an enemy's air defense envelope in the first place?

Finally, there's the rear-aspect stealth you mentioned. Rear-aspect stealth has always been about the infrared spectrum — things like serrated nozzles, designed to dissipate heat. But engines are getting more and more powerful, with temperatures climbing from around 1,300 degrees in the previous generation to 1,800 degrees in the latest engines. No matter how you tweak the back end, the infrared signature is only going to get more and more pronounced. So just how much absolute value does any of that really have?
even when it comes to radar-band stealth, the return echoes generated by the tail section are positively modest compared to the returns bouncing off the nose cone and the cockpit — and for radar waves, that nose radome might as well be a pane of clear glass. When you're already crawling with lice, you stop caring about a few more. That marginal sliver of stealth improvement at the rear is nothing but a psychological comfort blanket, barely worth the bother.

 

[Hyperactive ADD]

Appreciate the raw, no-BS take on European suppliers and the hard truths about tech transfers. That "fangs at the weak, knees at the strong" line is sharp, it really captures how political reliability often overrides specs in this game. And yeah, pointing to the USSR-to-China model as the rare genuine full-chain precedent makes sense historically. It wasn't just crates of hardware; it was experts on the ground, training, standards, and systemic know-how through those "156 Projects" in the 1950s. Studies (like Giorcelli & Li) show the plants that got both machinery and deep training saw productivity gains compounding for decades, up to 50% cumulative after 40 years, with real spillovers. Hardware alone faded fast after the split. That's the absorption + iteration playbook China rode into broader industrial muscle, including aviation lineages from Su-27s onward.

Your advice for India to lean into Sukhois/MiGs with serious reverse-engineering tracks with patterns that worked before. Russia's Su-57 offers to India have moved into pretty advanced technical talks, joint production at HAL lines (building on Su-30MKI), significant localization, source code access, engines, avionics, stealth elements, and integration of Indian stuff like BrahMos/Astra. Putin himself pitched co-development recently. It's not the full 1950s blank-check model, but it's closer to meaningful transfer than most Western deals come with.

On India's side, Atmanirbhar isn't just talk. Defense production hit a record ₹1.54 lakh crore in FY 2024-25, with indigenous output around ₹1.27 lakh crore (huge jump from 2014 levels). Exports are climbing fast too (tens of thousands of crore, to 100+ countries). Tejas indigenous content is rising, DRDO/private sector ecosystem is expanding, and policies are pushing private/MSME involvement. Full fighter self-reliance (engines, materials, timelines) is still a grind, AMCA and Tejas Mk2 are progressing but not there yet. So the hybrid bridge via Russian platforms + domestic R&D makes pragmatic sense, exactly as the Chinese experience showed.

Serbia's hedging is a live case study for your point: Rafale buy came with restrictions (MICA instead of full Meteor due to Western sensitivities), while they've integrated Chinese CM-400 supersonic missiles on upgraded MiG-29s. Diversification in action.

Russian systems have held up in Ukraine's grind, mass fires, EW, glide bombs, adaptations without full general mobilization, validating resilience in protracted attrition. But it's come at steep costs (high losses, slow gains), and both sides have innovated hard with cheap drones/FPVs. PLA analysts have pored over this: pushing attritable swarms, EW cat-and-mouse, resilient logistics, info dominance, and accepting long fights over quick wins. It builds on that Soviet foundation into today's J-20, Type 055, hypersonics, and mass output. The "East Wind" shift feels real in multipolarity, but it depends on execution speed in the drone/EW/artillery age.

European examples (Mistral cancellation, AUKUS killing the French sub deal, Rafale strings) do expose the dependency risks you called out. Secondary-tier options often stay stopgaps unless you extract full lines/tech.

With Russia's Su-57 pitch offering decent absorption potential for India, and China evolving that old Soviet base while digesting Ukraine realities, what do you see as the real game-changers today for climbing tiers, depth of initial transfer, scaling domestic R&D + ecosystem (India's DRDO + private talent pool + diaspora), mass/asymmetric doctrines, or something else? India's manufacturing base and innovation push might tweak the classic Chinese script in interesting ways in the 2020s.

This kind of straight comparative analysis is gold for the forum. Keeps things grounded instead of the usual echo chambers. Drop the next one whenever, always good to chew on.

Ah, alright — thank you so much for your support, and for taking the time to write so much in reply. I've taken note of everything. But it's already quite late now, and I have to head over to my mother-in-law's place tomorrow. So I'll come back and respond tomorrow.

 

[lmaoxd]

I've said it in other threads — I consider all fifth-generation fighters to be failures. The Su-57 is merely the best among a bad lot. Ever since the Cold War ended, this whole Western-liberal school of design thinking has been one fundamental logical fallacy after another.

Let's start with "first-detect, first-engage." If that's the idea, then you're definitely switching on your radar to search for targets. And switching on your radar to search for a target is like turning on a flashlight in the dark to find a cat — the first thing that lights up is you.

Then there's the issue of downward stealth. Downward stealth matters when you're deep behind enemy lines, in an environment where the adversary holds the advantage in air defense. The entire air defense system of Europe, combined, is less dense than the organic air defense assets of a single Russian combined-arms army. If your aircraft design is purpose-built to take on the Russian military, giving extra weight to this aspect does make sense — and the same goes for Taiwan, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, which are among the rare pockets of high-density air defense networks anywhere on the planet. But when it comes to other countries, whose air defense systems are barely worth mentioning, what's the point of optimizing in that direction? And in an age of 100-plus-kilometer glide missiles — especially considering the Su-57's massive internal bays designed to carry four cruise missiles — what exactly is the value of penetrating an enemy's air defense envelope in the first place?

Finally, there's the rear-aspect stealth you mentioned. Rear-aspect stealth has always been about the infrared spectrum — things like serrated nozzles, designed to dissipate heat. But engines are getting more and more powerful, with temperatures climbing from around 1,300 degrees in the previous generation to 1,800 degrees in the latest engines. No matter how you tweak the back end, the infrared signature is only going to get more and more pronounced. So just how much absolute value does any of that really have?
even when it comes to radar-band stealth, the return echoes generated by the tail section are positively modest compared to the returns bouncing off the nose cone and the cockpit — and for radar waves, that nose radome might as well be a pane of clear glass. When you're already crawling with lice, you stop caring about a few more. That marginal sliver of stealth improvement at the rear is nothing but a psychological comfort blanket, barely worth the bother.

1. A stealth aircraft engaging hostile aircraft will not be alone, it will use other assets like 4th gen fighters with massive radars or AWACS or Ground based radars and AD to cue missiles. Its not going to be a solo 1v1. Stealth helps here because it makes sure YOU are not detectable while your allies who are are far enough for it to barely matter.

2. Downward stealth is important if your going to fly over a country but the vast majority of the time while facing an actual airforce your going to stay in friendly lines. This allows you a first look and first shoot advantage that doesnt require downward stealth.

3. Rear aspect is important here because you need to shoot and egress and rear aspect stealth increases your chances by a significant amount vs Dual mode seeker missiles. any small increase in stealth drastically increases survival chances. We also have to take into account IRSTs and theyre increasing effectiveness and range.

It looks like you and I have fundamental disagreements about this topic. lets just agree to disagree and move on.

 

[Rajput Lion]

1. A stealth aircraft engaging hostile aircraft will not be alone, it will use other assets like 4th gen fighters with massive radars or AWACS or Ground based radars and AD to cue missiles. Its not going to be a solo 1v1. Stealth helps here because it makes sure YOU are not detectable while your allies who are are far enough for it to barely matter.

2. Downward stealth is important if your going to fly over a country but the vast majority of the time while facing an actual airforce your going to stay in friendly lines. This allows you a first look and first shoot advantage that doesnt require downward stealth.

3. Rear aspect is important here because you need to shoot and egress and rear aspect stealth increases your chances by a significant amount vs Dual mode seeker missiles. any small increase in stealth drastically increases survival chances. We also have to take into account IRSTs and theyre increasing effectiveness and range.

It looks like you and I have fundamental disagreements about this topic. lets just agree to disagree and move on.

Our Su-57/60MKI variant would be far better in-terms of stealth from all-aspects, especially rear than current Su-57S/E. Rest assured about that.

 

[Speedster1]

OMG, this thread expanded so fast.

DoD/security plans & deals're supposed to appear tricky, so that enemies can't adapt prematurely.
> IM In short,

- Looking at USA's arm twisting, no F-35 or any future jet &/or engine. After 80% F414 ToT also be mentally prepared for 20% arm twisting.​

- Few squads of Su-57 50-50 chance. Although Su-57 has many cool stuff but we should not see Su-57 as true 5gen but 4.5-5gen gap filler better than any 4.5gen jet. Hence getting it or not, i'm neutral.​

- We can take 1 of the new Russian engines & inflate AMCA like LCA to MWF, similar to Kaan. Ultimately our own domestic/JV engines matter.​

.
.
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Expanding the short lines -

- USA makes good quality products but in return expects world submission/domination.
- Jets remain for 40-60 years but Regimes can change every few years, so to avoid further arm-twisting & delays, we should limit our purchases from them to auxilliary systems & products like helicopters, cargo planes, equipments, etc for which alternatives are there globally & locally. That would be enough for international trade & diplomacy. So we shouldn't even dream of F-35 or even export variant of NGAD, F/A-XX, their CCAs.

> Action speak more than words, for US & us too. World is already pointing to most populous nation's bureaucratic management & delays.

- Indians succeed abroad but struggle locally & with AI/ML there'll be global impact & forcing priority on local employment, so many NRIs will have to return to India.​

- Expanded DoD employement & PPP need to absorb the talent. It's not good to keep going to shopping abroad even to friendliest nations like Russia, France, israel, etc.​

​

- AMCA plan A with F414 along with inflated plan-B. Citizens are already in shock after 15 years thinking earlier that the prototype is half way under construction until this PPP news disclosed the real state of progress.​

​

- Bcoz new airframe & engine design take 10-15 years at least hence just like GTRE's effort & JV engine, we also need our own heavy class 5+gen airframe along with appropriate engine to be officially started immediately, later upgraded to 6gen when DRDO making RAM, RAS, DEW, TVC, etc. We don't need a complete capitalistic GCAP, FCAS system, just some of their components & technology which EU'll agree or not is tentative. If ADA can't design new airframe then PPP should do it.​

> We've to be carefull with products of EU & Russia too bcoz friendly politicians can't remain in power indeinitely & every nation's defence products' export variant is supposed to be inferior to its domestic variant, to maintain a leading strategic & industrial advantage & business continuity.

- Although Su-57 has many +ve points like flatter fuselage, DIRCM, levcons, TVC, IRST, multi-band DAS-MAWS, side & rear looking radars, multi-band RF antennas, new HMDS, glass cockpit, etc, but its RCS is not satisfactory from 5gen PoV, contributed by many aspects like round engine bays, round IRST, IFRP, canopy arc, etc.​

​

- Regular citizens/enthusiasts are not historians, journalists, so as per internet search & chatter on other foreign forums, Russians don't seem to claim Su-57 front RCS lower than 0.1m2, that's just 1 decimal place lower than the Western MLUed 4.5gen jets with 1m2 RCS in clean config.​

- So for public understanding -​

F-22 - 0.0001m2​

Domestic F-35 - 0.001m2 or b/w 0.001 & 0.0001 m2.​

Exported F-35 - <=0.001m2​

Domestic Su-57 - <=0.1m2​

Exported Su-57 - ??​

MLUed 4.5gen clean config - 1-5m2​

Initial 4gen - 5-25m2​

​

- So <=0.1m2 RCS Su-57 can kill 1+m2 RCS 4.5gen jets, but even if world's best avionics is put inside a fuselage which's still visible 1st could be vulnerable to enemy 5gen jet & SAM, then the incoming BVR-AAM/SAM has to be decisively jammed to survive. Some missiles have HoJ (Home on Jam) capability so that has to be countered by ECCM.​

​

- In next few years when AMCA full scale RAM+RAS+EW model will be tested in anechoic chamber & RCS range, then DoD'll know its RCS which'll be desired to be at most 0.001m2 like F-35.
- If we intend to use networked fusion then enemy can also use it.
- LR-AAMs/SAMs R&D or import also seen on both sides.

> Some points on engine performance -

- It does vary as per weather, geography, giving 5-10% more dry thrust in cold/dense sea level areas & 5-20% less dry thrust in hot/thin air sea level areas. There'll be some trade-offs.​

- Russia is cold region, Europe is also very cool. USA has diversified geography & climate. Their jets & engines have been used globally,​

- Engines thrust're quoted as per testing in chamber with conditions of sea level STP, also tested in heated & cold air to simulate real world, keeping a cap or flat-rating limit to avoid damage.​

- In hot areas bcoz the air is pushed up, as altitude rises the performance differences decrease. Hence the hurdle is the initial takeoff at higher runway &/or hot climate.​

- Important IAF bases like Gwalior, Ambala, Bikaner, etc used in Op-Sindoor for example, in summer can have 10-20% loss of air density, dry thrust & lift compared to STP.​

​

- In lower air density, by rule of conservation of mass, the velocity(volume) needs to increase to compensate for lower air density, means higher T/o & flight speeds, means longer runways.​

​

- And lift also needs sufficient air density.​

​

- So when enough runway, Afterburner can be lit when jet is stationary bcoz it's direct fuel injection & fuel's calorific value is very high giving big KE to air molecules compensating for dry thrust loss, provided the engine thermal materials are good & a jet can still t/o with full MTOW.​

​

- But if runway is limited then any jet can t/o with 80% of MTOW, more payload, less fuel then do mid-air-refuelling.​

​

- But if airfield is higher like in Tibet then it's bigger problem bcoz air density drops by 35-40%, dry thrust drop by 40%, T/o speed increases by 30%, the runway length to like 5 Kms.​

- IDK exactly how much AB's wet thrust can compensate this loss of dry thrust but internet search shows J-20 or any jet can still t/o with around 70-80% of MTOW with AB, 46% empty, remaining 24-34% weapons+internal fuel.​

​

- So if 18.4 tons empty Su-30MKI carrying Brahmos & many AAMs with AL-31FP engine is manageable with longer T/o distance, then 18.5 tons empty Su-57 with any higher thrust engine'll also be manageable.
- If Russia allows airframe modification then we can use it for 6gen TD.

The larger point was about whether Su-57 could be ordered without a formal RfI/RfP process. Lately, the IAF has been doing market surveys via RfIs for items like AWACS (2 so far) for which we already have a proven local tech base.

To give you an example, nobody had any doubt that the IN would choose Rafale overSH B3 for MRCBF. Yet, MoD went the whole 9 yards. I suspect that was done, atleast partly, to deflect US pressure.

In case of Su-57, the Russians could also sucker us on upfront acquisition and lifecycle costs without a proper competition. Gorshov/Vikram redux?

 

[Picdelamirand-oil]

It bares its fangs at weak nations, forcing them to buy second-hand, low-spec junk, still acting as if it were a colonial overlord.

When it meets a slightly stronger country, it says, "Don't you worry. We don't care what the Americans think, and we don't care what the Russians think. Go ahead and use it with confidence — whatever happens, we'll take the blame."

But when it actually runs into the Americans, it instantly snaps to attention and hollers, "Daddy, we'll do exactly as you say！"

And at the sight of Jews, its legs start trembling so hard it looks ready to drop to its knees.

--------------------------That's European goods.

picture this — it's M1A2s, Leclercs, Rafales, Marders, and a whole rainbow brigade of LGBT infantry rolling into the Donetsk four oblasts. By now, they'd probably be defending Moscow itself.
I mean, come on — Europe tagged along with America messing around in Afghanistan for over a decade, and in the end, didn't they all get politely, ever-so-dignifiedly escorted out by the Taliban right at Kabul Airport?



What is the "best" choice for the Indian government?
—Self-reliance, independent production — there is simply no other way. Security cannot be bought, and core technologies are things others will never sell to you. Historically speaking, the only truly wholehearted, full-chain technology transfers since World War II have been from the Soviet Union to China, and, in a few specific fields, from the United States to Japan. In other words, if you're talking about a "credit score" in this game, only those two countries have any real credibility. No other nation has set such a precedent. You'd be lucky if they didn't fleece you dry and strip you bare — and you're hoping to dig up blueprints from Europe's shallow little bookshelf?

Play it straight — just buy the Sukhois and MiGs. If push comes to shove, reverse-engineer the damn things, bolt for bolt. That's how you shave decades off the detour.
— That's the Chinese experience,
Of course, you can pay to negotiate; it can be sold to Chinese people, but it's impossible that it won't be sold to Indians.

Specifically regarding India, they could simply replicate the F-15 or F-16.
plain and simple.You want to politely ask others to sit tight and wait obediently while you overtake them — that's about as real as dreaming with your eyes open.Especially Americans

I think there is one point where I agree with you completely: security cannot simply be bought.

A serious country cannot remain forever dependent on foreign suppliers for its critical defence capabilities. India must develop its own industrial base, its own weapons, its own software interfaces, its own maintenance ecosystem, and ultimately its own design capabilities. On that point, I think there is no disagreement.

But I do not think your conclusion follows from that premise.

You seem to suggest that India should simply buy Sukhois and MiGs, reverse-engineer them, and follow the Chinese path. But the problem is that your own previous description of the Chinese aerospace experience actually proves the opposite.

You explained at length how China absorbed Soviet and Russian technologies, bought blueprints, recruited engineers, reverse-engineered engines and aircraft, and built its own programmes from that base. But you also described the consequences: long delays in engines, persistent dependence on foreign design inputs, difficulties with WS-10 and WS-15, compromised aircraft designs, factional struggles between Chengdu and Shenyang, corruption issues, and platforms whose real performance may be far below propaganda claims.

So if China’s experience shows anything, it is not that reverse engineering is a magic shortcut. It shows that reverse engineering can help a country start faster, but it does not automatically give maturity.

Reverse engineering can copy shapes, dimensions, components and sometimes manufacturing methods. It does not automatically copy metallurgy, engine hot-section mastery, software architecture, electronic warfare libraries, sensor fusion, certification discipline, maintenance philosophy, sortie generation, pilot training standards, or decades of operational refinement.

That is precisely why India should not simply repeat the Chinese path.

India already has Russian-origin platforms. It has Su-30MKI, MiG-29, and decades of experience with Soviet/Russian systems. These aircraft remain useful and should be upgraded. Nobody is saying otherwise. But the question is not whether Russian systems can still be dangerous. Of course they can. The question is whether they provide India with the best future ecosystem.

The Ukraine war is instructive here. Russia entered the war with the largest stockpile of Soviet and Russian legacy systems in the world. If that alone guaranteed operational superiority, Russia should have achieved a decisive victory very quickly. It did not. Russia has shown resilience, adaptation and mass. It has not shown decisive superiority. After years of war, it has still not achieved its initial objectives, its aviation has been heavily constrained, its Black Sea Fleet has suffered severe losses, and its rear-area infrastructure is increasingly vulnerable.

So the lesson of Ukraine is not “old Soviet systems are useless.” That would be wrong. The lesson is that stockpiles and rugged legacy designs are not enough. Modern combat power depends on ISR, EW, logistics, maintenance, precision weapons, secure communications, software, training, industrial replacement capacity and operational doctrine.

That is exactly where the Rafale becomes important for India.

The Rafale is not merely an aircraft purchase. If India were simply buying 114 Rafales off the shelf, your criticism would be stronger. But that is not what is happening. India is demanding local production, deep MRO, Indian weapons integration, ICDs, industrial workshare, and a long-term domestic support ecosystem. That is not dependency. That is controlled appropriation.

India is not buying the Rafale in order to remain French-dependent forever. India is buying the Rafale because it offers a mature combat system that can be progressively Indianised.

There is a major difference between passive import and strategic absorption.

Passive import means buying aircraft, spare parts and weapons forever from abroad.

Strategic absorption means using a mature foreign platform to build domestic skills: precision manufacturing, systems integration, quality control, maintenance, avionics support, weapons integration, software interfaces, engine MRO, and eventually design competence for future Indian programmes.

That is what the Rafale programme can do if managed properly.

It gives India immediate combat capability against Pakistan and China, while also building the industrial base needed for future Indian systems such as AMCA, TEDBF, Ghatak and indigenous weapons. It is not a substitute for Indian self-reliance. It is a bridge toward it.

The “just copy the F-15 or F-16” argument is also not realistic. A modern fighter is not only an airframe. Copying an external shape is the easiest part. The hard part is the engine, radar, EW suite, mission computer, sensor fusion, data links, weapons integration, software validation, maintainability, production quality and operational doctrine. If this were easy, every major country would already have a world-class fighter industry.

India should learn from China, but not blindly imitate it.

China’s path produced impressive achievements, but also long delays, hidden dependencies, engine problems and uncertain real-world maturity. India has the opportunity to take a different path: combine selective foreign partnerships with domestic integration and production, rather than relying only on reverse engineering.

That is why the Rafale makes sense.

Not because France is perfect. Not because Europe is fully autonomous. Not because India should trust any foreign supplier blindly.

It makes sense because, compared with the alternatives, it gives India a strong combination of combat capability, availability, survivability, upgrade path, political flexibility, weapons integration, and industrial learning.

The Su-30MKI should be upgraded. The Tejas should continue. AMCA should continue. Indigenous missiles should be integrated. But the Rafale fills the high-end gap now and creates an industrial ecosystem that India can use later.

In short: India does not need to choose between “buying foreign” and “being self-reliant.” The real strategy is to buy selectively, absorb deeply, integrate nationally, and then build independently.

That is exactly why the Rafale deal is important.