Raw radar data (I/Q) is considered highly sensitive because it can indirectly be used to reconstitute or bypass processing and exploitation algorithms. French doctrine is generally more open than that of the United States, but it remains cautious when it comes to allowing a partner to use this data to feed a C4ISR system not controlled by France (in particular to avoid capture by other powers, including Russia or the United States). In theory, it is possible to define an interface for exporting sensor data to a combat cloud, but this requires a level of trust, encryption and compartmentalisation that goes well beyond simple access to the Rafale's internal buses.
What is being asked for is part of a vision of an advanced combat cloud, which France understands perfectly, since it is also developing similar concepts on its side with the SCAF and the joint tactical cloud.
On the Rafale F4/F5, access to so-called ‘pre-processed’ data is not designed natively, as much of the processing is directly integrated into the sensor bricks themselves, for reasons of efficiency and security. This is not to say that nothing is possible - but it would imply, in order to move in this direction, a co-engineering approach further upstream, within a precise bilateral framework.
For example, it might be judicious to study together how to interface certain data flows (from Rafale sensors) with Indian modules - whether internal to the aircraft or remote - within a controlled, secure and jointly validated framework. This would involve identifying what types of data would be useful (level, format, frequency), at what granularity, and within what latency or cybersecurity constraints. This is an area that it would be interesting to explore with the technical teams at Dassault and Thales.
It is precisely this type of strategic discussion that would be made possible by a structuring G-to-G agreement, or an in-depth technological section within the MRFA framework.
