- Dec 3, 2017
In his diplomatic career of 39 years, Gokhale, who is proficient in Mandarin, has spent more than 20 years in China, seven years on the China desk in MEA and seven years in East Asia.
US begin to contest the influence of india in Indo-Pacific :
U.S. policymakers should not assume U.S.-India convergence on liberal aims, including India’s commitment to the liberal international order.www.nbr.org
The author, Daniel Markey, a Senior Adviser on South Asia at the United States of Peace, wrote this paper for the National Bureau of Asian Research, which is a non-profit think-tank based in Seattle and Washington DC.
The author believes that the evolving character of India’s domestic politics “is likely to influence its foreign policy aims and decision-making processes, hard-power capabilities, and the way India relates to other states, including the US”.
Mr Markey points out that the Balakot airstrike, subsequent skirmishes and India’s “debunked claims of a destroyed terrorist camp inside Pakistan and downing of a Pakistani F-16 jet, have already raised questions in the United States about New Delhi’s credibility and communications strategy during an exceptionally dangerous regional context”.
Although India still refuses to accept its failure in intimidating Pakistan, US scholars and defence experts only confirm the downing of an Indian aircraft whose pilot was captured and later returned to India at Wagah border.
The paper urges US policymakers to recognise that if India’s leaders “feel less constrained by a free press and domestic audience costs, they may be more willing to run risks for tactical and political advantage”.
The paper also reviews India’s anti-Muslim policies, noting that when India’s policies disadvantage Muslims or other minority groups, perceptions of India suffer and India’s neighbours stop viewing the country as a pluralistic democracy.
This, the author warns, will reduce India’s ability to contest for regional influence while China can continue to increase its influence, “afforded by sheer financial heft”, in South Asia.
The Admiral & his co author are talking thru their hats if they think that India & China are going back to discuss some territory swap as per Zhou en lai's deal of 1960 . Frankly I don't know which world is he inhabiting ?The IndianExpress, 02/14
Pragmatism, not jingoism will help India deal with China
India must shed naive optimism and halt China’s covert but steady haemorrhaging of Indian territoryBy Arun Prakash and Ashok Hukku
(i don’t paste the full paper, only the last part/conclusion of it):
While jingoism has its place in politics, we must be realistic enough to understand that neither conquest nor re-conquest of territory is possible in a nuclearised South Asia. India’s Parliament and government should now accord utmost priority to establishing settled, viable and peaceful international boundaries all around. Only then will India be able to focus on nation-building and socio-economic development without interruption. A few pragmatic options offer themselves for resolving the Sino-Indian imbroglio.
First, India could exhume and revive the offer reportedly made by PM Zhou in 1960. Seeking strategic depth for Highway 219 that links Xinjiang with Tibet across Aksai Chin, Zhou had suggested negotiating a “quid pro quo” wherein China would recognise the McMahon Line in exchange for India making certain adjustments in the west. This would call for considerable political boldness and diplomatic adroitness.
A second option would be for India to bring sustained pressure to bear on China on the diplomatic, trade and psychological fronts and await results. At the same time, Indian forces must remain poised for swift direct action; seizing unoccupied territory and holding on to it as a bargaining chip. The surprise capture of tactical heights on the Kailash Range by our Special Forces brought severe psychological pressure on Beijing and must serve as a template. While skirmishes and physical confrontations may take place, it is considered most unlikely — for several reasons — that China would take on India in a major or even a limited conflict (@STEPHEN COHEN ).
A third option lies in the maritime domain where opportunities exist, both for power-balancing via partnerships, as well as direct naval action. China’s economy and industry are overwhelmingly dependent on uninterrupted seaborne trade and energy. Thus, China’s Indian Ocean sea lanes constitute a “jugular vein” that India could threaten via trade warfare. In this context, the Andaman & Nicobar Islands, suitably fortified and militarised, could become maritime bastions, dominating the Malacca Straits. Far more strategic advantage could accrue if India were to shed its political coyness and offer Port Blair as a logistic “watering hole” to selected friendly navies.
The last option would, obviously, be to maintain the status quo — with 50,000-60,000 troops deployed at high altitudes — and engage in sustained military/diplomatic parleys hoping for useful outcomes — with an unpredictable Chinese threat hanging over our heads like a sword of Damocles.
[of course, it’s clear that the fourth option is, for the authors, only rhetorical]
No, they don’t think so (that’s my understanding, reading their last sentence in #First).The Admiral & his co author are talking thru their hats if they think that India & China are going back to discuss some territory (…)