India - Pakistan War of 1971

Discuss 71,65,kargil,I mean anything but not women.this is off topic and I received my final warning.i can't discuss women here.
i was not talking about women, i was talking about the false history that you guys are taught since day one, sure we lost to china in 1962 it was a complete defeat that showed our weakness , and sure we shot down our own helicopter in an unfortunate incident and no sane indian will be hesistant to admit that , but we never surrendered to china and we never will.

you see in india we dont have DUAL CITIZENSHIP all indians and there fate is joined with the fate of india this is the only country we have , all our gods, monuments everything is here only so make no mistake even if china gives you unilateral military support to think that we will surrender it will be a bloody war till the end.
 
The War That Made India a 'Great Power' (And Hurt Pakistan to This Day)
This is what happens when you chop a nation in half.

Before December 3, 1971, Pakistan was a country suffering from a split personality disorder. When British India became independent in 1947, the country was divided into Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan. The problem was that East Pakistan and West Pakistan were almost a thousand miles apart, and wedged in between them was archenemy India. Imagine if the United States only consisted of the East Coast and West Coast, and Russia controlled all of North America in between.

Thirteen days later, Pakistan had been amputated. Indian troops had conquered East Pakistan, which became the new nation of Bangladesh. More than ninety thousand Pakistani soldiers were taken prisoner, half the Pakistani Navy had been sunk and the Indian Air Force came out on top. It was total humiliation, and not just for Pakistan. The United States and Britain sent aircraft carriers in a futile attempt to intimidate India, and ended up facing off against Soviet warships. Pakistan’s defeat also spurred its rulers to begin the development of nuclear weapons.

The 1971 India-Pakistan War, the third major conflict between the two nations in twenty-five years, was sparked by unrest in East Pakistan. The Bengalis of East Pakistan, who constituted 54 percent of Pakistan’s population at the time, chafed under the rule of West Pakistan. The two Pakistans belonged to different ethnic groups and spoke different languages.


Do You Know What Happened On This Day?

Bengali demands for autonomy were rebuffed. By mid-1971, an East Pakistan guerrilla movement had emerged, supported by India. Pakistan’s military-controlled government cracked down hard, killing up to three million Bengalis in what has been described as a genocide. By November, both India and Pakistan were preparing for war.

On December 3, Pakistan launched a preemptive air strike against Indian airfields, ironically trying to emulate how the Israeli Air Force had destroyed Egyptian airpower in 1967. The difference was that the Israelis committed two hundred aircraft and wiped out nearly five hundred Egyptian aircraft in a few hours; Pakistan committed fifty aircraft and inflicted little damage. The air war featured the full panoply of Cold War jets, pitting Pakistani F-104 Starfighters, F-86 Sabres, MiG-19s and B-57 Canberras against Indian MiG-21s, Sukhoi-7s, Hawker Hunters and Folland Gnats, as well as Hawker Sea Hawks flying from the Indian carrier Vikrant.


Both sides claimed victory in the air war. Chuck Yeager, who was in Pakistan advising their air force, claimed the Pakistanis “whipped their asses.” The Indians claim Yeager was crazy. However, it does appear that India had the upper hand in the air, controlling the skies over East Pakistan and losing about forty-five aircraft to Pakistan’s seventy-five. The maneuverable little Indian Gnat, a British-made lightweight fighter (its predecessor was called the Midge), proved so successful against Pakistani F-86s that the Indians dubbed it the “Sabre Slayer.”

At sea, there is no question that India won. The Indian Navy dispatched missile boats, armed with Soviet-made Styx missiles, to strike the western port of Karachi, sinking or badly damaging two Pakistani destroyers and three merchant ships, as well as fuel tanks. Indian ships blockaded East Pakistan from reinforcements and supplies. Notable was India’s use of the carrier Vikrant to conduct air strikes on coastal targets, as well as conducting an amphibious landing on Pakistani territory.

Pakistan retaliated by dispatching the submarine Ghazi to mine Indian ports. While stalked by an Indian destroyer, the Ghazi mysteriously blew up. However, the submarine Hangor did sink the Indian frigate Khukri.

As for the ground war, the best that can be said is that if Napoleon himself had faced Pakistan’s strategic dilemma, he would have sulked off to St. Helena. Isolated by land and blockaded by sea, no army could have defended East Pakistan against even a moderately competent foe, let alone the nine Indian divisions that quickly captured the East Pakistan capital of Dhaka. East Pakistani forces surrendered on December 16.

To add insult to the defeat of Pakistan and its proudly Muslim rulers, the Indian campaign was planned by Maj. Gen. J. F. R. Jacob—an Indian Jew descended from a family that fled Baghdad in the eighteenth century.

One issue that hampered Pakistan’s war effort would soon become familiar in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and other ethnically divided nations. In 1971, Bengalis comprised a significant part of the Pakistani military, especially in technical jobs.

Meanwhile, the superpowers were flexing their muscles. Despite its cruelty toward the Bengalis, and the opposition of U.S. diplomats, President Richard Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger backed Pakistan against pro-Soviet India (see the Nixon-Kissinger transcripts here). Task Force 74, centered on the aircraft carrier Enterprise, steamed into the Bay of Bengal, as did the British carrier Eagle. Why India would have been intimidated into a cease-fire, even as its tanks were rolling into Dhaka, is a mystery. America’s attempt to deter India from defeating Pakistan became a case study of the limitations of relying on the threat of force to compel other nations to change their behavior.

In fact, what the U.S. Navy accomplished was to chill U.S.-Indian relations for years. Even more disturbing were the Soviet cruisers, destroyers and submarines shadowing Task Force 74. A war between two Southwest Asian nations could have triggered a superpower showdown at sea, and perhaps World War III.

In the end, India had demonstrated its military superiority. Pakistan lost half its territory and population. Perhaps more important, Pakistani illusions that an Islamic army could rout the “weak” Hindus had been disproved. Following the 1947 and 1965 wars, the 1971 war was the third major conflict between India and Pakistan. It was also the last. Despite some hostilities in Kargil and other spots on the border, India and Pakistan have not fought a major war in forty-five years.

Unfortunately, Pakistan’s humiliation in 1971 spurred it into developing an atomic bomb. With India also armed with atomic weapons, South Asia now lives under the shadow of nuclear war. The next major India-Pakistan clash could be the last.
The War That Made India a 'Great Power' (And Hurt Pakistan to This Day)
 
bishwa (@bishwa55900127) Tweeted:
This day in 1971, 9 #PakistanAirForce pilots fled Dhaka for Burma in a Twin Otter.

#PAF had kept 2 Twin Otters hidden near Tezgaon Airfield. One was totaled by the #IAF . The other was used for the getaway.

The ceasefire happened on 16th Dec, 8 days after they fled. bishwa on Twitter ( )

I'm betting all of them went to occupy senior positions in the PAF. In fact I'm betting one of them went on to be the ACM.

@Arsalan123 ; @safriz
 
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He was a Kashmiri Pandit. He gave his own life jacket to a sailor to help him escape. He did not make any effort to save himself and was last seen sitting on his chair-The CO's chair when the ship went down. In the finest traditions of old yore of Navies around the world.

A question:
Since he obviously would have been adapt at swimming. Couldn't a person in such a situation, get out of the ship, try to swim and catch hold of a person with a life jacket to rest in between until help comes?
 
A question:
Since he obviously would have been adapt at swimming. Couldn't a person in such a situation, get out of the ship, try to swim and catch hold of a person with a life jacket to rest in between until help comes?
He could have easily saved himself but chose to go down with the ship.
 
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A question:
Since he obviously would have been adapt at swimming. Couldn't a person in such a situation, get out of the ship, try to swim and catch hold of a person with a life jacket to rest in between until help comes?
Its a maritime tradition a true captain never abandons the ship. Captain is responsible for everyone and that includes the ship as well.

The captain goes down with the ship - Wikipedia
 
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Rarely told story of avoidable loss of INS Khukri in 1971: A general’s honest account

India’s 14 squadron was tasked to hunt Pakistan submarine PNS Hangor spotted near Diu. The 3-frigate squadron was one short as INS Kuthar broke down.

INS Khukri was one of the Blackwood anti-submarine frigates built by Britain in the 1950s and inducted into the Indian Navy towards the end of 1959. The Khukri, the Kirpan and the Kuthar were designated as ‘second class anti-submarine frigates’.

According to Rear Admiral Raja Menon, the Indian Navy was unhappy with the short-range sonars being given with the Blackwood class of anti-submarine frigates and requested Britain for the better medium-range sonars. The reply given, according to the Admiral, was that the better sonars were to be given only to NATO countries.

During the 1971 war these three anti-submarine frigates were pitted against Pakistan’s Daphne class submarines. These submarines were built in France in the late 1960s and were the best conventional submarines of that time. Pakistan had three of them – the Hangor, the Mangro and the Shushuk. The range of the sonars aboard the F-14 Squadron, that is, on the Khukri, Kirpan and Kuthar was approximately 2,500 m whereas the detection capability of the Daphne submarines was approximately 25,000 m, that is, ten times more.

1920px-Yoddhasthal_Permanent_Exhibition_Southern_command_Indian_Army_Bhopal_45-e1544952372651.jpg
A scale model of INS Khukri | CommonsKhukri attacks enemy submarine
From 22 November 1971, PNS Mangro a Daphne class submarine was on patrol outside Bombay harbour, lying in wait for ships of the Indian Navy. Another Pakistani submarine PNS Hangor was on patrol in the vicinity of Okha. On 1 December, Hangor received orders to replace Mangro as she had completed her tour of duty outside Bombay.

The F-14 Squadron (Indian Navy) was at sea with the Eastern Fleet when the Kuthar suffered a burst boiler and had to be moved back to Bombay. Unable to move under its own steam, Kuthar had to be towed back by INS Kirpan and both ships were escorted by INS Khukri. On their way back, the squadron was very vulnerable as it had one ship being towed, another towing and the third providing escort. En route there were many alarms of submarines. Some were no doubt false alarms and the Khukri, aware of its task to get the squadron safely back to Bombay, attacked these various threats on its own. One of these targets, the crew felt, was definitely an enemy submarine and also that the submarine suffered a hit. The entire attack, including the explosion, was recorded on tape. Aware of the responsibility to get the squadron back to Bombay, the Khukri could not wait for the signs of a hit in the form of oil slicks or flotsam and returned to Bombay on 6 December where she made a claim that she had made contact with an enemy submarine and had damaged or destroyed it but could not produce concrete proof. This particular incident occurred on 5 December 1971. The three ships reached Bombay on 6 December.

Being aware of the less than adequate performance of the existing sonars with the F-14 Squadron and some other ships, the Indian Navy had instituted a research project with the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) to find ways and means by which the performance of existing sonars could be improved. Lieutenant VK Jain, a bright, young naval officer was working on this project at the BARC. Certain positive outcomes had emerged from the research. These research projects, however, were incomplete. Headquarters Western Naval Command decided it would be a good idea to incorporate the version of the sonar that was still in the experimental stage at BARC on the Khukri. Lieutenant VK Jain came aboard the Khukri on 6 December, the day the Khukri reached Bombay.

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INS Khukri Memorial | Jasumati Patel/TwitterHangor gives away her location
That submarines could pick up ship’s sonars at least twice the range of the detection capability of surface ships was known not only to the Indian Navy but to all the navies of the world. However, surface ships had the advantage of much higher speed and manoeuvrability as compared to submarines.

It was about this time, that is on 5 December, that the location of the Hangor was detected by direction finders of the Indian Navy. The direction finders placed the enemy submarine approximately 16 nautical miles away from Diu. Having located an enemy submarine in Indian waters, action had to be initiated to hunt and destroy this submarine before it could damage Indian ships. The curious part of this incident is that in published material both in India and Pakistan no one examined in depth why the Hangor gave away her location by breaking well-established and accepted procedure by communicating on high frequency (HF) transmissions, as these were likely to be intercepted and her location pinpointed.

Some information, however, is available in ‘Bubbles of Water’, an anthology of short stories. The story ‘Repairing the air conditioner on patrol’ shows that the Hangor was having trouble with her air conditioner sometime around 1 December and that this was a major repair task and could only be carried out if she surfaced. The risk to do this in enemy waters was immense but the captain took the risk, surfaced, and repaired the air conditioner which, according to his estimate, would take more than a day and a half, that is, thirty-six hours. She apparently informed Karachi of her predicament and asked for orders. Her HF transmission was, however, intercepted by the Indian Navy direction finders on 5 December and that is how she was located. This happened around 5 December and not the date mentioned in the article, that is, 1 December.

If this is correct then there is a connection between the Khukri’s claim of encountering an enemy submarine and damaging it.

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INS Khukri | Youtube ScreengrabWaiting to attack
Naval Headquarters now ordered the Western Fleet to hunt and destroy the enemy submarine detected in Indian waters near Diu. This order was passed on to the commander of the F-14 Squadron, Captain Mahendra Nath Mulla. The squadron was, however, now reduced to two anti-submarine frigates, the Kuthar not being available.

The two anti-submarine frigates left Bombay for their mission on 8 December and by the morning of 9 December were approaching the reported location of the enemy submarine. This was the ‘Hunter-Killer Force’ according to the TAS (Torpedo and Anti-Submarine specialists) of Western Naval Command! Due to its long-range detection capability, the Hangor detected the Khukri and the Kirpan much before these two ships were even aware that they were now close to their target. The Hangor came up to view the scene and dived down again and confirmed that the Khukri and the Kirpan were searching for her using the rectangular pattern of search, which is a well-known drill and known to all Commonwealth and NATO countries. Thus it was possible for the crew of the Pakistan submarine to anticipate and work out exactly where and when the Khukri and Kirpan would be at a particular point of time and when they would be most vulnerable. She positioned herself accordingly.

The Khukri and the Kirpan were in blacked-out condition, that is, no lights on these ships were visible. Unaware of the presence of the enemy submarine, they carried out their drills following the laid down rectangular pattern of search. Meanwhile the Hangor waited for them to come within the area most favourable for their destruction.

Hangor goes for the kill
On board the Khukri, Captain Mulla was having difficulty in coping with the experimental sonar, as this required him to reduce his speed to approximately 12 knots whereas, when conducting hunter-killer anti-submarine operations, speed was essential to out-manoeuvre and destroy a lurking submarine.

He was also aware that according to laid-down practice he was required to zigzag, a procedure to frustrate enemy submarine commanders. This was a tried and tested anti-submarine tactic but it required discipline and vigilance by all watch-keepers. The basic question was: would this not further lower the speed of the Khukri? Captain Mulla was already irked at having to restrict his speed from more than 14 to 10-12 knots. Would zigzagging be useful if his speed was further reduced? After all he was not evading the submarine, the basic purpose of zigzagging. On the contrary, he was charged to locate and destroy it. For that he needed maximum speed, already denied to him on account of the experimental sonar. He was, therefore, faced with two contradictory requirements – zigzagging to evade the submarine or speed to destroy it.

Commander Manu Sharma states the Khukri in fact was zigzagging and if zigzagging further reduced the speed of the Khukri then what speed was she doing when she was hit? Captain Mulla expressed his exasperation to Lieutenant Jain who decided to once again explain to him how the experimental sonar functioned. At this juncture Lieutenant Jain asked for some red and blue pencils to explain this on a chart. The Hangor, meanwhile, waited for the Khukri and the Kirpan to come to the anticipated location she had decided was the best to fire her torpedoes.

The first target, in fact, was not the Khukri but the Kirpan, the first to come within the designated target area. These torpedoes were meant to activate below the keel of the target ship so that it would break the keel and the ship would sink in minutes. The torpedo homed in to the Kirpan but failed to explode due to a faulty mechanism. With the firing of this torpedo, the position of the Hangor was given away and she had the choice of slipping away or staying on and firing another torpedo. Since both ships were still quite some distance away, the Hangor decided to fire another torpedo.

The Kirpan was now aware that she had been targeted and would, in fact, have heard the torpedo at least 1000 yards away and could, therefore, take evasive action. The Khukri, however, continued on its course and so the Hangor turned its attention to the Khukri and fired two more torpedoes, one at the Khukri and another at the Kirpan. The first probably exploded beneath the keel of the Khukri near the magazine, breaking it in two and activating the Khukri’s ammunition and the second aimed at the Kirpan did no damage perhaps due to the ability of the Kirpan to take evasive action. The Khukri sank in minutes. The time was 8.45 p.m. on 9 December 1971.
 
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bishwa (@bishwa55900127) Tweeted:
This day in 1971, 9 #PakistanAirForce pilots fled Dhaka for Burma in a Twin Otter.

#PAF had kept 2 Twin Otters hidden near Tezgaon Airfield. One was totaled by the #IAF . The other was used for the getaway.

The ceasefire happened on 16th Dec, 8 days after they fled. bishwa on Twitter ( )

I'm betting all of them went to occupy senior positions in the PAF. In fact I'm betting one of them went on to be the ACM.

@Arsalan123 ; @safriz
There is no bravery in attacking a country who is already fighting inside.we were fighting inside our country but you interfered and because our forces was on the other side,you won.this is history.abhinandan is reality.before abhinandan,there was another pilot who was captured during Musharraf era.you are talking about bravery of iaf.have some shame.we aren't a country who is responsible for the better treatment of your pilots.and by the way,iaf created world record of destroying large number of jets in a year.congratulations.
 
There is no bravery in attacking a country who is already fighting inside.we were fighting inside our country but you interfered and because our forces was on the other side,you won.this is history.abhinandan is reality.before abhinandan,there was another pilot who was captured during Musharraf era.you are talking about bravery of iaf.have some shame.we aren't a country who is responsible for the better treatment of your pilots.and by the way,iaf created world record of destroying large number of jets in a year.congratulations.
If there wasn't a 1965, there wouldn't be a 1971. Remember that. Moreover, if you think taking one Wing Co Abhinanandan as a PoW somehow equates to the 91,000 PoWs India took in Bangladesh who incidentally were involved in laying train tracks for 2 years in India as opposed to the less than 48 hours you took to release him after jamai treatment , then Congratulations.

Coming back to the pilot you took prisoner during the Kargil war, there was one more pilot whom you also killed in your custody mutilating his corpse after torturing him to death. Pakistanis talking of shame having lost every single war it fought is very rich indeed. Even the lowly ANA is slapping you on your western border not to mention the Iranians who keep intruding into Balochistan to undertake their operations every now & then.You guys know only how to surrender or flee like the episode I've described above.

IAF trains vigorously. Hence the accident rates are high. Do have a look at the man hours an F-16 has after its MLU and how many hours of flying PAF does on it annually to get a clue. While you're on it, consider the JF-17 as well for similar parameters.
 
LCA TEJAS (INDIA) ‏‏ایل سی اے تیجس (@Leopard212) Tweeted:
The Massacre At Dacca University, during Operation Searchlight by Pakistan Army.
The film shows the killings of professors and students by an execution squad.
The film is blurry, but not entirely.

P.s. Not for faint hearted and pregnant women
#Remembering1971 LCA TEJAS (INDIA) ‏‏ایل سی اے تیجس on Twitter ( )
LCA TEJAS (INDIA) ‏‏ایل سی اے تیجس (@Leopard212) Tweeted:
Op Searchlight: Seldom known or ever discussed, as Rao Farman Ali and Khadim Raja were drawing up the Bengali genocide plans in Dacca-,March 1971, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was in Dacca, at that point of time.
Bhutto, would be killed by his own Army, unmercifully.
#Remembering1971 LCA TEJAS (INDIA) ‏‏ایل سی اے تیجس on Twitter ( )

The entire thread is interesting.
 
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