British/Italian Tempest (GCAP) Fighter : News and Discussion
- Thread starter Shekhar Singh
- Start date
Japan stops Saudi Arabia from acquiring 6th-gen GCAP fighter
It is anticipated that the transition from the McDonnell-Douglas F-15C/D Eagle and the Panavia Tornado IDS within the Royal Saudi Air Force could pose significant challenges in the immediate and forthcoming period.Within a mere span of thirty days, the capital of Saudi Arabia, Riyadh, has encountered two distinct instances of refusal for its combat aircraft programs. These rejections emanated from two disparate nations, Berlin and Tokyo, neither of which bear any partnership with each other. The cited reasons for these rejections are predominantly diplomatic, circling around the contentious issue of the Yemeni conflict and the imperative need for respect for human rights.
Nonetheless, a scenario is unfolding that could potentially favor France and its Dassault Aviation Rafale F4 in the intermediate term, although this would decidedly not be conducive to the interests of the SCAF!
It came to light in the middle of July that the German government had definitively thwarted the sale of forty-eight 4.5-generation Eurofighter EF-2000 Typhoon Tranche 4 combat aircraft, thereby inciting the ire of the United Kingdom.
Conversely, Spain and Italy, both integral members of the European consortium, had elected to maintain a somewhat lenient stance of neutrality towards Germany. It is plausible to infer that they were less than pleased with the fact that Saudi Arabia had brokered an arrangement with Great Britain, stipulating that the forty-eight aircraft under discussion be assembled solely by BAE Systems. This arrangement conspicuously excluded Airbus DS and Leonardo, permitting their involvement only in secondary processes.
The augmentation of the Royal Saudi Air Force’s fleet was intended with the addition of these aircraft, supplementing the existing seventy-two Typhoons already in service. Primarily, these new additions were designed to succeed the 80 Panavia Tornado IDS, which had been previously deployed for ground attack and tactical reconnaissance operations.
When it comes to examining Saudi Arabia, the issue of human rights frequently emerges as a contentious point. Germany’s stance, particularly, is characterized by a certain restraint in accepting that defense equipment, even if only partially produced by them, is employed in what is widely perceived as an ethnic conflict currently unfolding in Yemen. Furthermore, the Saudi judicial system’s predilection for implementing the death penalty—often using beheading or stoning—is viewed with deep disapproval by the German public, who are staunchly opposed to all forms of capital punishment.
Implications of a potential strain on the historically cordial diplomatic ties between Riyadh and Tokyo are now surfacing. It is noteworthy that the issue at hand is not Japan’s objection to the death penalty in Saudi Arabia, considering that the Japanese Empire itself maintains the same, albeit with infrequent executions.
Indeed, Tokyo has recently communicated unequivocally to both London and Rome its staunch opposition to Saudi Arabia’s participation in the 6th generation aircraft initiative, identified as the Global Combat Air Programme, previously named Team Tempest. This stance is underscored by the Japanese highlighting an undeniable reality: there is a conspicuous deficiency of experience in aeronautical technology within Saudi Arabia.
The apprehension is palpable that the latter scenario may decelerate the Euro-Asian program to such an extent that there may be a need to postpone the inaugural flight of the technological demonstrator. This, in turn, could potentially affect the timeline for the commencement of service of the initial production aircraft. The Royal Saudi Air Force had staked their hopes on the Tempest as the successor to their McDonnell-Douglas F-15C/D Eagle air defense and interceptor aircraft, a fleet which, in the span of a mere fifteen years, is predicted to degenerate into near obsolescence.
Consequently, in the foreseeable future, the assertive veto from Germany may indeed act as a catalyst in favor of Dassault Aviation. It has been public knowledge since the previous December that Saudi interests have been gravitating toward the Rafale F4. The unexpected setback concerning the Typhoon Tranche 4 could potentially expedite this shift.
Regarding the intricate issue of Human Rights, it is widely recognized that France occasionally averts its gaze, potentially undermining its own credibility. Yet, it is pertinent to acknowledge that in the realm of international relations, emotional considerations often yield to pragmatic necessities. Over a more extended timescale, it is plausible that Germany may impose a similar veto on the SCAF as it did on Typhoon Tranche 4. Furthermore, Spain could feasibly align itself with Germany on this contentious issue.
Indeed, one might speculate that Ryad could conceivably be propelled toward the protective embrace of the United States and its NGAD. This is a sixth-generation endeavor, which, it must be noted, is also presently in the throes of development.
In the newfound realities of the 21st century, Saudi Arabia is confronted with a stark truth: its enormous economic prowess cannot purchase everything. There exists a distinct disparity between procuring football players and acquiring fighter planes, despite the often comparable financial cost of the two. The art of diplomacy, elusive to many nations, has been successfully navigated by Germany and Japan, each in their respective spheres of influence, as they understand the leverage they hold within their own domains.
So Japan will stop the export of GCAP and Germany will do the same with SCAF. I guess France and Britain are stuck.
We're going to replace Germany and Spain with India and the UAE
But we'll have to wait for the next president.At this point its better for France to leave SCAF and join India in AMCA program and for indigenous programs concentrate on Rafale F5 and Espadon.We're going to replace Germany and Spain with India and the UAE
We're going to replace Germany and Spain with India and the UAE
Doubt France will be willing to provide tech to any ME country, no matter the president. There's more money to be made with the least risk as just a perpetual market.
A Franco-British partnership was always more realistic, but that ship has sailed. The Brits will eventually have a CATOBAR carrier requirement once the QE class comes in for replacement in the 2050s.
The IAF and RAF ships have sailed, but with both India and Britain, you have a naval aircraft requirement for FCAS. So a tripartite agreement is possible between MN, IN and RN for both sister carriers and the SCAF.
Britain to build next generation fighter jets under historic deal
The Global Combat Air Programme project will be based in the UK and aims to create next-generation aircraft to take to the skies by 2035
www.telegraph.co.uk
Are the biggest risks to GCAP political and financial, rather than technological or industrial?(BAE Systems)
GCAP is the outcome of unexpected reverse-ferrets in both British and Japanese combat aircraft planning. The 2015 UK Defence Review indicated that Britain was still committed to buying 138 F-35s, and the conventional wisdom at the time was that the most the British industry could expect would be a future UCAV programme based on the BAE Systems Taranis demonstrator.
However, in the summer of 2018, the government was able to announce that the FCAS project was underway, Italy was on board as part of the industrial team, and there was a firm plan to fly the Tempest aircraft. It was mentioned at the time that the UK was talking to Japanese government and industry about a joint approach to FCAS and Japan’s F-X, but given the US-Japan relationship, this seemed a long shot.
Indeed, in December 2020 the Japanese MoD announced that it had chosen Lockheed Martin to work with MHI, but by 2022 the policy was seen to be reversing itself and the story of a new UK-Japan connection broke in July.
This collaboration is new, ambitious, expensive and definitely contains uncertainties, but there are reasons why the GCAP partners may think that maintaining national capability is worth the money. Designing a stealth-optimised fighter with better performance than the F-35 is no riskier than any new aircraft.
The F-35’s shape is more than 25 years old, and it is compromised by STOVL, CATOBAR and other specific ship-related requirements. The overall length was determined by the size of the elevator on the RN’s Invincible-class carriers, the F-35A/B wingspan was dictated by USMC deck-size limits, and CV landing characteristics dictated a quad-tail.
A single large engine located unusually far forward (STOVL-driven) means that internal systems are wrapped around the engine bay, a design challenge that was a contributor to weight gain.
So, while Tempest’s two engines might seem to add complexity, that’s offset by a cleaner systems configuration. The modified tailless delta planform reminds me of the Boeing X-32’s relatively thick transonic wing – that smaller wing could hold 20,000lbs of fuel, and available volume goes up with the cube of the span.
Tempest, therefore, promises longer range than the F-35A and a very large improvement over the -B, which is heavier and carries much less fuel. A bigger issue is avionics. GCAP will follow the lead set a decade ago by Saab, who designed a partitioned architecture for the JAS 39E Gripen: mission systems are separated from the flight-critical functions of flight and propulsion control and vehicle management.
On the F-22 and F-35, everything is integrated through dual integrated common processor banks, which demands extensive ‘regression testing’, validated in flight, to ensure that changes have not had undesirable and unintended effects on critical systems.
That’s a major reason why the R&D costs of the F-35 Technology Refresh 2 ICP and display upgrade and the associated Block 4 changes are at $16.5bn (and counting), and why the B-21 Raider has taken the partitioned approach.
An even larger issue is sovereignty. For Japan, that came down to a clear-cut decision: with a strong electronics industry and a little-discussed capability in guided weapons, a ‘right to modification and upgrade’ was firmly embodied in its requirements for an F-X partner.
Most likely, this was the issue on which the Lockheed Martin deal failed: the US government and Lockheed Martin may have assumed that Japan did not have another valid choice.
In the UK, there was a detectable sense of disenchantment about F-35, mostly within the RAF, after the 2012 reversal of the decision to acquire the F-35C. Specific concerns, other than the B’s short legs include the ‘black box’ nature of the sensor-fusion system which, despite its legally important role in determining whether or not a target is legitimate under prevailing rules of engagement, the ability to record, offload and exploit sensor data and share it with other assets is restricted.
The US also has tight control over mission data files (MDFs), including electronic order-of-battle data. MDFs for the UK, Italy, Japan and other F-35 operators are exclusively generated by the USAF’s 350th Spectrum Warfare Wing at Eglin AFB, Florida.
A final overarching argument for sovereignty in critical military capabilities has existed since November 2016, when the US electorate awarded the presidency to Donald Trump who has a fascination for autocrats and autocracy and utter contempt for allies and alliances.
It could happen again in 2024, and radical isolationism is a more powerful force in US politics than at any time since 1940. People in government might not talk about this danger, but it would be grand misfeasance to ignore it.
GCAP is the outcome of unexpected reverse-ferrets in both British and Japanese combat aircraft planning. The 2015 UK Defence Review indicated that Britain was still committed to buying 138 F-35s, and the conventional wisdom at the time was that the most the British industry could expect would be a future UCAV programme based on the BAE Systems Taranis demonstrator.
However, in the summer of 2018, the government was able to announce that the FCAS project was underway, Italy was on board as part of the industrial team, and there was a firm plan to fly the Tempest aircraft. It was mentioned at the time that the UK was talking to Japanese government and industry about a joint approach to FCAS and Japan’s F-X, but given the US-Japan relationship, this seemed a long shot.
Indeed, in December 2020 the Japanese MoD announced that it had chosen Lockheed Martin to work with MHI, but by 2022 the policy was seen to be reversing itself and the story of a new UK-Japan connection broke in July.
This collaboration is new, ambitious, expensive and definitely contains uncertainties, but there are reasons why the GCAP partners may think that maintaining national capability is worth the money. Designing a stealth-optimised fighter with better performance than the F-35 is no riskier than any new aircraft.
The F-35’s shape is more than 25 years old, and it is compromised by STOVL, CATOBAR and other specific ship-related requirements. The overall length was determined by the size of the elevator on the RN’s Invincible-class carriers, the F-35A/B wingspan was dictated by USMC deck-size limits, and CV landing characteristics dictated a quad-tail.
A single large engine located unusually far forward (STOVL-driven) means that internal systems are wrapped around the engine bay, a design challenge that was a contributor to weight gain.
So, while Tempest’s two engines might seem to add complexity, that’s offset by a cleaner systems configuration. The modified tailless delta planform reminds me of the Boeing X-32’s relatively thick transonic wing – that smaller wing could hold 20,000lbs of fuel, and available volume goes up with the cube of the span.
Tempest, therefore, promises longer range than the F-35A and a very large improvement over the -B, which is heavier and carries much less fuel. A bigger issue is avionics. GCAP will follow the lead set a decade ago by Saab, who designed a partitioned architecture for the JAS 39E Gripen: mission systems are separated from the flight-critical functions of flight and propulsion control and vehicle management.
On the F-22 and F-35, everything is integrated through dual integrated common processor banks, which demands extensive ‘regression testing’, validated in flight, to ensure that changes have not had undesirable and unintended effects on critical systems.
That’s a major reason why the R&D costs of the F-35 Technology Refresh 2 ICP and display upgrade and the associated Block 4 changes are at $16.5bn (and counting), and why the B-21 Raider has taken the partitioned approach.
An even larger issue is sovereignty. For Japan, that came down to a clear-cut decision: with a strong electronics industry and a little-discussed capability in guided weapons, a ‘right to modification and upgrade’ was firmly embodied in its requirements for an F-X partner.
Most likely, this was the issue on which the Lockheed Martin deal failed: the US government and Lockheed Martin may have assumed that Japan did not have another valid choice.
In the UK, there was a detectable sense of disenchantment about F-35, mostly within the RAF, after the 2012 reversal of the decision to acquire the F-35C. Specific concerns, other than the B’s short legs include the ‘black box’ nature of the sensor-fusion system which, despite its legally important role in determining whether or not a target is legitimate under prevailing rules of engagement, the ability to record, offload and exploit sensor data and share it with other assets is restricted.
The US also has tight control over mission data files (MDFs), including electronic order-of-battle data. MDFs for the UK, Italy, Japan and other F-35 operators are exclusively generated by the USAF’s 350th Spectrum Warfare Wing at Eglin AFB, Florida.
A final overarching argument for sovereignty in critical military capabilities has existed since November 2016, when the US electorate awarded the presidency to Donald Trump who has a fascination for autocrats and autocracy and utter contempt for allies and alliances.
It could happen again in 2024, and radical isolationism is a more powerful force in US politics than at any time since 1940. People in government might not talk about this danger, but it would be grand misfeasance to ignore it.