If that's for me, I need more info on what point you are making. Putting up a one hour video without an Australian doesn't help me.
Would actually make sense for the Australians to get their feet wet making 3 Scorpenes before embarking on the SSN journey.
The US and UK have no history in delivering ToT compared to the French. And any new SSN design's gonna take 10 years more than license production SSKs to start with.
A deal with the French in the next 2 years will get you all 3 Scorpenes by 2030-32. And you will also get a whole bunch of workers with 5-10 years' worth of experience. Plus Scorpenes are more suitable in a lot of locations. Right now, all you've got are a bunch of babies trying to deal with growups.
As far as the Americans and British are concerned, kangaroo hunting season is about to begin.
Sovereignty…
eurasiantimes.com
US To Deploy Powerful Fleet Of F-22 Raptors, F-35s, B2 Stealth Bombers To Australia To Deter Belligerent China - Pentagon Report
US To Deploy F-22s, F-35s, B2 Stealth Bombers To Australia To Deter Chinese Aggression - Pentagon Report
eurasiantimes.com
Blinken doubles down on China warning over Taiwan: 'Terrible consequences' if Beijing strikes
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken fired a warning shot at China, saying any move to invade Taiwan would bring "terrible consequences."
This should be posted in Taiwan running thread.
Blinken doubles down on China warning over Taiwan: 'Terrible consequences' if Beijing strikes
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken fired a warning shot at China, saying any move to invade Taiwan would bring "terrible consequences."us.yahoo.com
If I had to guess its USA leasing a nuclear sub to Australia ASAP + building them 4 Virginia class subs as USA is trying to get to 1 + 2 sub production. That means every other year USA probably instead of getting 2 subs gets 1 instead. From there the Gov will claim they will build the remaining 8, but in reality it will just be more US builds.
It's just not realistic for them to build it if the actually want it to matter on time.
It's just not realistic for them to build it if the actually want it to matter on time.
It was delayed due to the pandemic, plus they require 50 million dollars to bring it on track. More realistic is 2 subs per year either 1 virginia class + 1 columbia class , or 2 virginia class subs.
Looking at the current scenario they will make 1 for the Australians and 1 for USN till 2023.
You would be better guessing UK Astute. Mostly built in Australia. Meanwhile with the UK and US nuke subs operating out of Australia. With some Aussie crew added, till about 2040. While we continue to use our 6 Collins, that is being updated.
That's the same conclusion I also made after watching video of USIP, Kurt Campbell.
What is AUKUS and what is it not?
hat IS the new AUKUS partnership between the US, the UK and Australia? How does it fit with the Quad, ASEAN and other new forums like the government-tech Sydney Dialogue?This new ASPI Insight sets out what AUKUS is—a technology accelerator that’s’ about shifting the military balance in the Indo Pacific. Just as importantly, it sets out what AUKUS it isn’t, to reset some of the discussion that ahs made some assumptions here. AUKUS isn’t a new alliance structure, a competitor to the W Quad between Australia, India, Japan and the US, or a signal of decreased commitment to ASEAN forums by the AUKUS members.
And the Insight proposes some focus areas for implementation of this new ‘minilateral’ technology accelerator, including having a single empowered person in each nation charged with implementation and ‘obstacle busting’. This is to break through the institutional, political and corporate permafrost that has prevented such rapid technological adoption by our militaries in recent decades. As is the case with James Miller in the US, this person should report to their national leader, not from inside the defence bureaucracies of the three nations.
On purpose and urgency, the report identifies a simple performance metric for AUKUS implementers over the next three years. On 20 January 2025, when the Australian prime minister calls whoever is the US president on that day, AUKUS has become such a successful piece of the furniture, with tangible results that have generated broad institutional, political and corporate support that, regardless of how warm or testy this leaders’ phone call is (think Turnbull-Trump in January 2016), AUKUS’s momentum continues.
(Aukus, from an Indian perspective, ORF dec.2021)
A Divided Opinion in India
by Abhijit Singh
The jury in New Delhi is still out on AUKUS, the new security pact between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Eight weeks after it was announced, the issue continues to split political observers in India,with little clarity over whether the agreement benefits New Delhi or is detrimental to its interests.1 Many believe the pact is good for India and its Indo- Pacific partners.2 By clearly declaring its intention to deter China, proponents say AUKUS offers New Delhi vital ‘leverage’ in dealing with Beijing.3
As some see it, the continuing turbulence on India’s northern border, makes it imperative for New Delhi to avoid joining an anti-China alliance.4 The pact, they aver, allows India—a key US partner and Quad member—the freedom to set the terms of engagement with its neighbour, without formally participating in a China-containment initiative. In a post-Covid-19 era, New Delhi also needs to prioritise challenges in the non-military domain: vaccine diplomacy, infrastructure building, technology sharing, and climate change.5 Proponents say the pact allows New Delhi to focus on a developmental agenda, with a degree of assurance that that the strategic threat in the Indo Pacific is being robustly met.6
The sceptics disagree.7 They say that however noble its intended purpose, AUKUS undermines the strategic order in Asia. First, it is plainly provocative to China, and has the potential to destabilise the Western Pacific (with inevitable consequences for Indian Ocean states).8 AUKUS can accelerate an undersea arms race that is already underway, and could paradoxically tip the balance against America and its allies in Asia.9 Second, the agreement is prejudicial to French interests, serving only to alienate Paris, injecting distrust in the Western alliance. This, too, could have unintended strategic consequences.
From a maritime operations perspective, AUKUS gives many Indian experts pause. With the Indian navy’s conventional underwater capability fast shrinking, the possibility of Australian submarines in the Indian Ocean is not reassuring for India’s security observers.10 While they are happy for Australia — a Quad member and close partner of India in the Indo Pacific — to receive nuclear submarine technology from the US and the UK, Indian analysts are apprehensive of the possibility of a future increase in friendly nuclear attack submarines (SSNs/submersible ship nuclear) intheEasternIndianOcean.Suchascenariocould erode India’s regional pre-eminence in the Indian Ocean.11
Of greater concern for Indian observers is the possibility that provoked by AUKUS, China might respond—not so much in the congested South China Sea, already gridlocked with posturing and counter posturing—but in the Indian Ocean, where China has so far been relatively quiet. AUKUS could push China into assuming a more adventurous posture by deploying more warships and submarines in the Eastern Indian Ocean. Chinese naval ships could well stay clear of Indian waters, but their mere presence in the littorals is likely to put pressure on the Indian navy. In response, New Delhi might have to consider deploying warships in the Western Pacific, which could further aggravate tensions. AUKUS, critics say, could push India- China maritime dynamics into a negative spiral.
The possibility of Chinese aggressiveness in the Indian Ocean is not merely hypothetical. In recent months, China’s military and non-military activity in the IOR, has prompted the Indian navy to embark on a plan to develop a fleet of nuclear attack submarines. Ironically, the US has made no offer of help.12 The “very rare” nature of AUKUS – as announced by US officials immediately after the unveiling of the pact – leaves little to imagination.13 Washington does not anticipate technology sharing on nuclear submarines with any partners other than the UK and Australia.
While it has rarely received submarine technology from the US, New Delhi has been accepting of American discretion on the matter. India has instead relied on Russia for nuclear submarine technology, including in the construction of the reactor of India’s first SSBN/ submersible ship ballistic missile nuclear (Arihant) and in the acquisition (on lease) of a nuclear attack submarine. With the Indian Navy’s announcement of an indigenous SSN programme, however, there is a need for a nuclear reactor more powerful than the one installed in the Arihant (a non-war- fighting platform). Following the deepening of Quad ties, some in India were hopeful that the US would consider providing the Indian Navy with nuclear submarine propulsion technology. AUKUS gives many Indian experts pause.14
And yet, AUKUS goes well beyond the nuclear submarines.15 The pact’s ultimate goal is to prevail in the technology competition with China. Pooling resources and integrating defence and industrial supply chains is a way for the US, Australia, and the UK to beat China in the high-tech race for regional and global supremacy.16 As AUKUS partners expand cooperation in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and cyber operations, the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific could shift in ways New Delhi and other regional capitals have not entirely accounted for.
All of this would still be acceptable if the new alliance were to complement the Quad. Many believe it does.17 There is something about AUKUS, however, that suggests it diminishes the value and usefulness of the Quad.18 Since its revival in 2017, the Quad has displayed strategic flexibility in dealing with China. The grouping’s allure is its mystique—the ability to drive non-traditional cooperation, and yet pose a strategic counter to China in the maritime domain. AUKUS, critics say, has taken some of that element away. The Quad has been shown to be a non-military, non-security grouping with agency in shaping the strategic narrative of the Indo-Pacific.19 The new alliance of the US, UK and Australia has seized the initiative.20
For the moment, Indian officials are being careful in articulating a formal position vis-à-vis AUKUS. On the eve of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the United States for the first in-person Quad summit in September, Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla stated that the deal was “neither relevant to the Quad nor likely to have any impact on its functioning.”21 This suggests an attempt to downplay the significance of AUKUS for India.22
For India, however, the imperative is to display solidarity with its Quad partners, especially at a time when tensions with China are again rising. The official narrative is that the new pact adds one more lever in efforts to balance China. Yet concerns in India’s security establishment vis-à- vis AUKUS are real. Despite an acknowledgement of Canberra’s strategic motivations to bolster strategic deterrence against China, there is a palpable sense among security watchers that the new alliance impinges on Indian stakes in the Indian Ocean.
A Divided Opinion in India
by Abhijit Singh
The jury in New Delhi is still out on AUKUS, the new security pact between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Eight weeks after it was announced, the issue continues to split political observers in India,with little clarity over whether the agreement benefits New Delhi or is detrimental to its interests.1 Many believe the pact is good for India and its Indo- Pacific partners.2 By clearly declaring its intention to deter China, proponents say AUKUS offers New Delhi vital ‘leverage’ in dealing with Beijing.3
As some see it, the continuing turbulence on India’s northern border, makes it imperative for New Delhi to avoid joining an anti-China alliance.4 The pact, they aver, allows India—a key US partner and Quad member—the freedom to set the terms of engagement with its neighbour, without formally participating in a China-containment initiative. In a post-Covid-19 era, New Delhi also needs to prioritise challenges in the non-military domain: vaccine diplomacy, infrastructure building, technology sharing, and climate change.5 Proponents say the pact allows New Delhi to focus on a developmental agenda, with a degree of assurance that that the strategic threat in the Indo Pacific is being robustly met.6
The sceptics disagree.7 They say that however noble its intended purpose, AUKUS undermines the strategic order in Asia. First, it is plainly provocative to China, and has the potential to destabilise the Western Pacific (with inevitable consequences for Indian Ocean states).8 AUKUS can accelerate an undersea arms race that is already underway, and could paradoxically tip the balance against America and its allies in Asia.9 Second, the agreement is prejudicial to French interests, serving only to alienate Paris, injecting distrust in the Western alliance. This, too, could have unintended strategic consequences.
From a maritime operations perspective, AUKUS gives many Indian experts pause. With the Indian navy’s conventional underwater capability fast shrinking, the possibility of Australian submarines in the Indian Ocean is not reassuring for India’s security observers.10 While they are happy for Australia — a Quad member and close partner of India in the Indo Pacific — to receive nuclear submarine technology from the US and the UK, Indian analysts are apprehensive of the possibility of a future increase in friendly nuclear attack submarines (SSNs/submersible ship nuclear) intheEasternIndianOcean.Suchascenariocould erode India’s regional pre-eminence in the Indian Ocean.11
Of greater concern for Indian observers is the possibility that provoked by AUKUS, China might respond—not so much in the congested South China Sea, already gridlocked with posturing and counter posturing—but in the Indian Ocean, where China has so far been relatively quiet. AUKUS could push China into assuming a more adventurous posture by deploying more warships and submarines in the Eastern Indian Ocean. Chinese naval ships could well stay clear of Indian waters, but their mere presence in the littorals is likely to put pressure on the Indian navy. In response, New Delhi might have to consider deploying warships in the Western Pacific, which could further aggravate tensions. AUKUS, critics say, could push India- China maritime dynamics into a negative spiral.
The possibility of Chinese aggressiveness in the Indian Ocean is not merely hypothetical. In recent months, China’s military and non-military activity in the IOR, has prompted the Indian navy to embark on a plan to develop a fleet of nuclear attack submarines. Ironically, the US has made no offer of help.12 The “very rare” nature of AUKUS – as announced by US officials immediately after the unveiling of the pact – leaves little to imagination.13 Washington does not anticipate technology sharing on nuclear submarines with any partners other than the UK and Australia.
While it has rarely received submarine technology from the US, New Delhi has been accepting of American discretion on the matter. India has instead relied on Russia for nuclear submarine technology, including in the construction of the reactor of India’s first SSBN/ submersible ship ballistic missile nuclear (Arihant) and in the acquisition (on lease) of a nuclear attack submarine. With the Indian Navy’s announcement of an indigenous SSN programme, however, there is a need for a nuclear reactor more powerful than the one installed in the Arihant (a non-war- fighting platform). Following the deepening of Quad ties, some in India were hopeful that the US would consider providing the Indian Navy with nuclear submarine propulsion technology. AUKUS gives many Indian experts pause.14
And yet, AUKUS goes well beyond the nuclear submarines.15 The pact’s ultimate goal is to prevail in the technology competition with China. Pooling resources and integrating defence and industrial supply chains is a way for the US, Australia, and the UK to beat China in the high-tech race for regional and global supremacy.16 As AUKUS partners expand cooperation in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and cyber operations, the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific could shift in ways New Delhi and other regional capitals have not entirely accounted for.
All of this would still be acceptable if the new alliance were to complement the Quad. Many believe it does.17 There is something about AUKUS, however, that suggests it diminishes the value and usefulness of the Quad.18 Since its revival in 2017, the Quad has displayed strategic flexibility in dealing with China. The grouping’s allure is its mystique—the ability to drive non-traditional cooperation, and yet pose a strategic counter to China in the maritime domain. AUKUS, critics say, has taken some of that element away. The Quad has been shown to be a non-military, non-security grouping with agency in shaping the strategic narrative of the Indo-Pacific.19 The new alliance of the US, UK and Australia has seized the initiative.20
For the moment, Indian officials are being careful in articulating a formal position vis-à-vis AUKUS. On the eve of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the United States for the first in-person Quad summit in September, Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla stated that the deal was “neither relevant to the Quad nor likely to have any impact on its functioning.”21 This suggests an attempt to downplay the significance of AUKUS for India.22
For India, however, the imperative is to display solidarity with its Quad partners, especially at a time when tensions with China are again rising. The official narrative is that the new pact adds one more lever in efforts to balance China. Yet concerns in India’s security establishment vis-à- vis AUKUS are real. Despite an acknowledgement of Canberra’s strategic motivations to bolster strategic deterrence against China, there is a palpable sense among security watchers that the new alliance impinges on Indian stakes in the Indian Ocean.
An Australian nuke sub is gonna come into play only in the late 2030s or early 2040s. By then the geopolitical situation will be very different from what the article assumes. China will have 10+ carriers by then, so their permanent large scale presence in the IOR is assured.
