Arihant-class SSBN - News & Discussions

the reason why ssbn program did not culminate into the ssn program up until now was again the political indecision, or lack of motivation. Our political leadership was happy with minimum credible deterrence doctrine. Hence neither the knowledge gained from Prithvi Agnis translated further into conventional war weapons like how China did , because GoI never intended for domestic proliferation into conventional war fighting instrument.
No, there was opposition from within the navy too. Recall that CNS Adm Ronnie Pereira even opposed leasing n subs back in the 80s (until India had gained experience building SSK under license). The political leadership would've deferred to advice from the navy on these matters as usual.


Why this is imp wrt the point of not generating enough pressure, here we have to consider the well being & safety of the submarine too. Arihant batch is prob not built for very high powerful rocket launch lke trident class or our K5 batch (justified by your ssn to ssbn conversion point). So using a much powerful canister launch mechanism is out of question. So to keep safety of the boat as well as a clean launch method while being submerged, this current mechanism is very well suited and executed + proven. It is a compromise but a well suited one.
Tbh, cold launch is probably safest for slbms. It absolutely eliminates the possibility of a misfire/cook off within the cell. Despite its technical constraints Arihant probably also pioneered the triple pack (K-15) VLS load out on a nuke sub.

Afaik, it wasn't until the Virginia class came along in the 2000s that the USN moved on to multi-pack VLS (Virginia Payload Module) for TLAM, etc.
 
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No, there was opposition from within the navy too. Recall that CNS Adm Ronnie Pereira even opposed leasing n subs back in the 80s (until India had gained experience building SSK under license). The political leadership would've deferred to advice from the navy on these matters as usual.
This is not uncommon esp for a very high value project like that. People leading the surface fleet would rather the budget went in their fleet improvement & expansion than a strategic asset & manpower deployed under a different command. Natural in service healthy competition & matter of different opinion. Since ATV was a strategic decision & a political choice, everything was swept away.
 
This is not uncommon esp for a very high value project like that. People leading the surface fleet would rather the budget went in their fleet improvement & expansion than a strategic asset & manpower deployed under a different command. Natural in service healthy competition & matter of different opinion. Since ATV was a strategic decision & a political choice, everything was swept away.
In this case though, GoI under Mrs IG/her successors overrode the CNS and approved the Chakra-1 lease.

The IN brass probably felt that the ATVP would cause a diversion of funds from other projects but eventually the whole prog was bought under the PMO and the rest is history.
 
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In this case though, GoI under Mrs IG/her successors overrode the CNS and approved the Chakra-1 lease.
Not a matter of though, it was pushed by the Govt. Lease choice might be due to whether it is better to train the Indian Navy crews by sending them to Sevastopol & train in the Black Sea , or train in Russia at some facility or have some old sub on lease to be trained in the own backyard. Which option look better?
Given the amount of Soviet involvement, possibly many more things went on we are not aware of.
 
Lease choice might be due to whether it is better to train the Indian Navy crews by sending them to Sevastopol & train in the Black Sea , or train in Russia at some facility or have some old sub on lease to be trained in the own backyard. Which option look better?
Leasing was the only option as Russia was and still is an NPT member. India was not in any formal military alliance with the SU so the sub came with strict terms and conditions- it was mandated to dock at a neutral port during war. But it was always meant to operate in Indian waters.

You contended that GoI didn't sanction SSNs as a follow-on to Arihant because of a lack of motivation/foresight. I'd say it was mainly due to technical issues (particularly limited access to reactor tech). That phase is behind us now that the 200MWe NNR is ready.
 
Leasing was the only option as Russia was and still is an NPT member. India was not in any formal military alliance with the SU so the sub came with strict terms and conditions- it was mandated to dock at a neutral port during war. But it was always meant to operate in Indian waters.

You contended that GoI didn't sanction SSNs as a follow-on to Arihant because of a lack of motivation/foresight. I'd say it was mainly due to technical issues (particularly limited access to reactor tech). That phase is behind us now that the 200MWe NNR is ready.
Formal sanction can be done once the tech bases/building pillars are established & available, for which work goes on well before the official sanction. The technical challenge was always there, but overall the political leadership was more keen on a submarine class that can play the supposed deterrent role against 1 cbg at least. That was the sole aim and dream from the 1970s. This dream did not diverge into multiple application, the core principle of minimum credible deterrent as a policy was retained and matter went more complex after MTCR tech denial period, 1998 test & sanction period. These factors did influence the choice of building more subs + available resource crunch and possibly the USSR collapse also played some part.

So just like the knowledge gained from building the Agni series did not translate into making conventional weapons up until now (something that would have made western accusation of weapon proliferation more regular) , the ssn / ssbn conundrum is similar imo, an unwillingness from the political leadership to go past certain capability threshold which we achieved some time ago. Leadership dither on key questions and long tern capability enhancement resulting in loss of time, loss of decade without enough progress. Political leadership do not want to face threat from own too strong military (citing the neighborhood examples) nor do they want to face questions abroad from the other countries.
 
Formal sanction can be done once the tech bases/building pillars are established & available, for which work goes on well before the official sanction. The technical challenge was always there, but overall the political leadership was more keen on a submarine class that can play the supposed deterrent role against 1 cbg at least. That was the sole aim and dream from the 1970s. This dream did not diverge into multiple application, the core principle of minimum credible deterrent as a policy was retained and matter went more complex after MTCR tech denial period, 1998 test & sanction period. These factors did influence the choice of building more subs + available resource crunch and possibly the USSR collapse also played some part.

So just like the knowledge gained from building the Agni series did not translate into making conventional weapons up until now (something that would have made western accusation of weapon proliferation more regular) , the ssn / ssbn conundrum is similar imo, an unwillingness from the political leadership to go past certain capability threshold which we achieved some time ago. Leadership dither on key questions and long tern capability enhancement resulting in loss of time, loss of decade without enough progress. Political leadership do not want to face threat from own too strong military (citing the neighborhood examples) nor do they want to face questions abroad from the other countries.

What would you say is current approach. Has it finally gotten a spine to pursue capability despite western appherensions?

So far the advancement still seem "under the threshold", just that the threshold has risen due to China. But are there any sign that political leadership is moving towards long term vision that would give forces the ability to dominate ( anyone below China-US) , not just deter. I am asking , since you keep track of projects in development with decades long view.

Sudharshan Chakra seems a refreshing approach, but still defensive and not detrimental to west, other than diminishing role of Pak for their use vis a vis India. They can't influence China as they do pak, so not counting.
 
What would you say is current approach. Has it finally gotten a spine to pursue capability despite western appherensions?
We are still in minimum credible deterrence phase , any increment is due to the increase of threat matrix faced by the 3 services, not any motivated capacity expansion. Only the stance may have changed to a bit more proactive than passive reactive.
 
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@marich01: are you sure that 3m dia CRMCs are being experimented on for future slbms? More likely it should be for bigger satellite launch vehicles than VEDA if at all they are actually working onsuch CRMCs
 
The technical challenge was always there, but overall the political leadership was more keen on a submarine class that can play the supposed deterrent role against 1 cbg at least. That was the sole aim and dream from the 1970s. This dream did not diverge into multiple application, the core principle of minimum credible deterrent as a policy was retained and matter went more complex after MTCR tech denial period, 1998 test & sanction period
SSBNs don't do solo missions for a reason. They need escort SSNs for protection. This simple fact wouldn't have been lost on GoI/MoD. Since CLWR-1 was based on older gen tech, an SSN/hybrid variant wouldn't have been justified on cost and operational grounds.

Since the 1980s, we've been leasing Russian SSNs more for getting insights into n-reactor performance than training (+ ssbn escort). I'd say atleast the current govt would've sanctioned SSNs had our reactor tech been up to par. Arihant was originally meant to fire Sagarika CMs which would explain the (innovative for its time) 3-pack VLS silo which ultimately dictated the range and capability of both K-15 and the follow-on K4.

If that were not the case, I don't think the babus in GoI would've sanctioned the building of S5 (+P77) while the 1st gen boats were still rolling off SBC production lines.

ATVP costs run into tens of thousands of crores but are kept off the books under PMO oversight.

Not inducting SSNs was never about strategic restraint but the lack of operational viability.
 
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SSBNs don't do solo missions for a reason. They need escort SSNs for protection. This simple fact wouldn't have been lost on GoI/MoD. Since CLWR-1 was based on older gen tech, an SSN/hybrid variant wouldn't have been justified on cost and operational grounds.

Since the 1980s, we've been leasing Russian SSNs more for getting insights into n-reactor performance than training (+ ssbn escort). I'd say atleast the current govt would've sanctioned SSNs had our reactor tech been up to par. Arihant was originally meant to fire Sagarika CMs which would explain the (innovative for its time) 3-pack VLS silo which ultimately dictated the range and capability of both K-15 and the follow-on K4.

If that were not the case, I don't think the babus in GoI would've sanctioned the building of S5 (+P77) while the 1st gen boats were still rolling off SBC production lines.

ATVP costs run into tens of thousands of crores but are kept off the books under PMO oversight.

Not inducting SSNs was never about strategic restraint but the lack of operational viability.
Our SSBNs will stay in Bay of Bengal cuz from there using our K4s we can strike most of China and all of Pakistan, and our Navy is the master of the Bay of Bengal. Its highly unlikely PLAN can pose any realistic threat in Bay of Bengal until and unless they build long range nuclear UUVs and produce them en masse to send a number of them to IOR, and even then these UUV have to get past our sonar nets around Andaman islands.

As for surface threats to our SSBN dare I elaborate on the surface supremacy of the Indian Navy in Bay of Bengal? I dont think I need to. The truth is India is blessed with a very good geographical location wtr to China. If we were in the place of say Korea or Japan, we would most definitely need SSNs to protect and escort SSBNs. But we aren't and have the luxury of having a second strike deterrence right in ohr backyard which is also very far away from the adversary. The only Navy in the world which poses a very serious threat to our SSBNs now is Uncle's navy but Uncle isn't our strategic enemy at all. Yet.

SSNs are being pursued to shadow PLAN subs and ships in the larger IOR and to conduct ops far away from our traditional sphere of influence, maybe SCS if our subs are quiet enough.
 
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@marich01: are you sure that 3m dia CRMCs are being experimented on for future slbms? More likely it should be for bigger satellite launch vehicles than VEDA if at all they are actually working onsuch CRMCs
Very hard to tell at present, it will have some LV use very likely. Whether the same translates into an underwater launched system is not certain. Since the upcoming slbm itself is quite big and capable, possibly at par with existing in service systems worldwide, I do not understand where is the improvement opportunity for something like a rumoured K6 (apart from more payload ie mirvs). Some HGV payload for underwater system is very tricky.
 
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Very hard to tell at present, it will have some LV use very likely. Whether the same translates into an underwater launched system is not certain. Since the upcoming slbm itself is quite big and capable, possibly at par with existing in service systems worldwide, I do not understand where is the improvement opportunity for something like a rumoured K6 (apart from more payload ie mirvs). Some HGV payload for underwater system is very tricky.
The main difficulty of underwater launched HGV is fitting the glide vehicle in a specialized fairing so it can eject properly right, as well as handling height of overall system to fit inside submarine without too big of a hump?
 
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Our SSBNs will stay in Bay of Bengal cuz from there using our K4s we can strike most of China and all of Pakistan, and our Navy is the master of the Bay of Bengal. Its highly unlikely PLAN can pose any realistic threat in Bay of Bengal until and unless they build long range nuclear UUVs and produce them en masse to send a number of them to IOR, and even then these UUV have to get past our sonar nets around Andaman islands.
Until the new naval base at Rambilli is ready, our Arihant class boats will be under constant sat surveillance. This is evident from the number of times Chinese spy ships have shown up to monitor our missile tests lately and at the exact time.

Secondly, with BD turning hostile (and our n-sub fleet growing), India will need to disperse our ssbns over a wider area to ensure the survival of our NFU deterrent.

Given how things are going, the US could well secure a base at BDs St Martin's Island. They seem to be quite keen on it or they wouldn't have gone to the extent of engineering the whole student protest/social revolution in that country. Net result: BoB is no longer the safe haven it once was for ssbn ops.
 
Until the new naval base at Rambilli is ready, our Arihant class boats will be under constant sat surveillance. This is evident from the number of times Chinese spy ships have shown up to monitor our missile tests lately and at the exact time.

Secondly, with BD turning hostile (and our n-sub fleet growing), India will need to disperse our ssbns over a wider area to ensure the survival of our NFU deterrent.

Given how things are going, the US could well secure a base at BDs St Martin's Island. They seem to be quite keen on it or they wouldn't have gone to the extent of engineering the whole student protest/social revolution in that country. Net result: BoB is no longer the safe haven it once was for ssbn ops.
Bangladesh's pathetic band of fishing boats it calls a navy hardly poses any threat to us or any of our assets if they become militarily hostile. Arihant is indeed under sat surveillance but which adversary has the capabilities to use that surveillance to actually threaten our SSBNs? PLAN doesn't pose a threat to India in the wider IOR let alone the BoB yet.

As for US, first of all why would it even care about our SSBNs currently when it poses no threat at all to US interests in any shape or form? Our SSBNs are slow, small, noisy in comparison and the SLBMs they carry cannot reach the US from BoB so why would the US even care about Arihant class which is anyways a weapon aimed at its main adversary? You're saying the main bully wants to prevent a third person from fielding something which can harm the enemy of that bully. Why would it want to do so?

Second of all US is NOT a strategic adversary, so why would you even factor them having a base in BD as a threat? US will not be a strategic adversary for a while so factoring them in with our current nuclear deterrence plan is not proper, we need to first focus on China. And China is no way capable of gaining the supremacy it needs in BoB to sink our SSBNs due to geographic and technological considerations. BoB is literally our playground wtr to deterrence against China.

Just because US is getting chummy with Pakistan doesnt mean they are a strategic adversary we need to build a nuclear deterrence against!
 
Bangladesh's pathetic band of fishing boats it calls a navy hardly poses any threat to us or any of our assets if they become militarily hostile. Arihant is indeed under sat surveillance but which adversary has the capabilities to use that surveillance to actually threaten our SSBNs? PLAN doesn't pose a threat to India in the wider IOR let alone the BoB yet.

As for US, first of all why would it even care about our SSBNs currently when it poses no threat at all to US interests in any shape or form? Our SSBNs are slow, small, noisy in comparison and the SLBMs they carry cannot reach the US from BoB so why would the US even care about Arihant class which is anyways a weapon aimed at its main adversary? You're saying the main bully wants to prevent a third person from fielding something which can harm the enemy of that bully. Why would it want to do so?

Second of all US is NOT a strategic adversary, so why would you even factor them having a base in BD as a threat? US will not be a strategic adversary for a while so factoring them in with our current nuclear deterrence plan is not proper, we need to first focus on China. And China is no way capable of gaining the supremacy it needs in BoB to sink our SSBNs due to geographic and technological considerations. BoB is literally our playground wtr to deterrence against China.

Just because US is getting chummy with Pakistan doesnt mean they are a strategic adversary we need to build a nuclear deterrence against!
China has effectively plugged BD into its string of pearls strategy with investments in Chittagong Port and elsewhere. Up until now, it was just their listening stn on Myanmar's Cocos Islands that was a concern for the IN.

PLAN ships now routinely make port calls at Chittagong. This could soon include seabed mapping/undwerwater surveillance ships of the kind that were docking at SL ports earlier. (Judging by the diplomatic protests GoI lodged with Colombo at the time, these visits were attempts to collect intel)

What I'm getting at is BoB is getting increasingly contested by extra-regional powers. This means India will need to hedge its bets by extending ssbn patrol zones beyond its immediate periphery.

A US presence on St Martin's brings back memories of Dec 1971 for many. It will alter our strategic calculus wrt the US and will be the start of a strategic rivalry in all but name.
 
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China has effectively plugged BD into its string of pearls strategy with investments in Chittagong Port and elsewhere. Up until now, it was just their listening stn on Myanmar's Cocos Islands that was a concern for the IN.

PLAN ships now routinely make port calls at Chittagong. This could soon include seabed mapping/undwerwater surveillance ships of the kind that were docking at SL ports earlier. (Judging by the diplomatic protests GoI lodged with Colombo at the time, these visits were attempts to collect intel)

What I'm getting at is BoB is getting increasingly contested by extra-regional powers. This means India will need to hedge its bets by extending ssbn patrol zones beyond its immediate periphery.

A US presence on St Martin's brings back memories of Dec 1971 for many. It will alter our strategic calculus wrt the US and will be the start of a strategic rivalry in all but name.
China is obviously mapping the seabed for military use, but currently and over the next decade, how can they make use of that? They will send maybe small fleet of frigates, destroyers which will need to be re fuelled (i highly doubt this will happen in Bangladesh because if it does it means whichever government is there will definitely be toppled by us and the Kanglus are well aware of this). They are making SSNs but the SCS and pacific are highly contested regions with Korea Japan Taiwan and of course the US Navy there so they will have the bulk of their SSNs in that region to protect their current and upcoming SSBN. It will take until 2035 for PLAN to have a sustained presence in IOR and even then, it won't be enough to match the Indian Navy. And that's for the wider IOR. For assertion of dominance in BoB its even more difficult when there's SMART missiles, P8I Posiedons, UUVs, aircraft carrier fleets, etc from our side watching it. BoB is literally like our personal lake from which our second strike capability rests and the only one which can challenge us in that lake is uncle!

And I beg your pardon but are you entailing that a US presence in some island (which is serious not denying that) automatically means they are a full strategic adversary? And by strategic I mean an adversary for which India needs to develop a nuclear deterrent for with ICBM and SLBM capable of reaching that adversary. Do you think the US with that presence will be that type of adversary? Many here hate uncle for being chummy with the Pakistanis and I dont like it too but let's be realistic, the US has 0 space in our deterrence calculation right now and that will be the case for a long time to come. The US is a completely different adversary compared to China, its far more quiet and is extremely unlikely to confront India in the hard power domain. As for China, we need to deter them with a robust nuclear arsenal so that they get second thoughts of starting any misadventure in the border.

Hence when we talk about the BoB as a lake for our second strike deterrence, how does the US factor in this at all? Our deterrence is not even aimed at the US in the first place. And we can only send SSBN beyond our lake when S5 is ready and armed with K5 SLBM and our P75I and P77 are ready to escort the SSBNs along with P18 class destroyers etc. We will need total dominance over IOR in all spectrum which will take until 2040 for us to achieve. Until then however BoB is firmly OUR lake.
 
As far as I know, no steel cutting has happened beyond the 4 Arihant vessels. Long lead items are most probably in the procurement process for S5 Class. That's were this news is emanating from. I am expecting steel cutting on 1st S5 by mid of 2027.
 
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China is obviously mapping the seabed for military use, but currently and over the next decade, how can they make use of that? They will send maybe small fleet of frigates, destroyers which will need to be re fuelled (i highly doubt this will happen in Bangladesh because if it does it means whichever government is there will definitely be toppled by us and the Kanglus are well aware of this)

BD is only a pawn in a great game being played by the Chinese against us. Apparently, the naval base on St Martin's Island was built (likely also funded) by China. This likely includes exclusive basing rights for PLAN patrols (similar to Hambantota, SL). This is an evolving threat that India is likely watching closely.

To make matters worse, the Americans are now getting access to this base. This is clearly because of a behind the scenes collusion between the two.

There is is reason for the Americans to park their fleet in BoB, other than to needle India. Diego Garcia gives them a ringside view of our missile tests, naval and air traffic 24x7 anyway. Trump is doing this to make us fall in line.

It will take until 2035 for PLAN to have a sustained presence in IOR and even then, it won't be enough to match the Indian Navy.

That's just cope. The PLAN is already the largest in the world in terms of numbers. Sure, they are currently focused on Taiwan reunification.

But they are building new airbases facing India, rotating H6 bombers and J-20s besides working overtime to overcome their tactical weaknesses (in terms of altitude-related range/payload limitations) via 6G J-50/36.

Despite the official disengagement, they have stayed put at positions across Ladakh and adjoining areas since 2023-24. Similarly, if they surge naval forces to the IOR and BoB, the IN will be stretched thin.

Even the mighty Americans are preparing for attacks on hardened bases like DG and Hawai via a rapid dispersal/prepositioning strategy. India will likely need to do something similar and fast.
 
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BD is only a pawn in a great game being played by the Chinese against us. Apparently, the naval base on St Martin's Island was built (likely also funded) by China. This likely includes exclusive basing rights for PLAN patrols (similar to Hambantota, SL). This is an evolving threat that India is likely watching closely.

To make matters worse, the Americans are now getting access to this base. This is clearly because of a behind the scenes collusion between the two.

There is is reason for the Americans to park their fleet in BoB, other than to needle India. Diego Garcia gives them a ringside view of our missile tests, naval and air traffic 24x7 anyway. Trump is doing this to make us fall in line.



That's just cope. The PLAN is already the largest in the world in terms of numbers. Sure, they are currently focused on Taiwan reunification.

But they are building new airbases facing India, rotating H6 bombers and J-20s besides working overtime to overcome their tactical weaknesses (in terms of altitude-related range/payload limitations) via 6G J-50/36.

Despite the official disengagement, they have stayed put at positions across Ladakh and adjoining areas since 2023-24. Similarly, if they surge naval forces to the IOR and BoB, the IN will be stretched thin.

Even the mighty Americans are preparing for attacks on hardened bases like DG and Hawai via a rapid dispersal/prepositioning strategy. India will likely need to do something similar and fast.
Not at all cope if one does a level headed analysis. First of all PLAN is largest in number of ships not tonnage (the US Navy is literally 2 times bigger in terms of tonnage, surface fleet tonnage of US Navy alone is almost as much as the ENTIRE PLAN tonnage) and their fleet is dominated by conventionally powered ships, they have 0 nuclear powered surface ships. Their nuclear submarine fleet is only 12 including SSBNs. All of this to face off against the navies of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Phillipines and the largest and most advanced Navy in history, the US Navy in the East. So it's them who will be stretched thin if they want a sustained presence in IOR now or in 5 years.

The US Navy with all those nuclear powered surface and submarine assets needs a global array of bases to sustain their presence, and the PLAN is unlikely to have such bases even in IOR in the near future to sustain a presence of which there will be a bigger need due to the fact PLAN has barely 2 handefuls of nuclear powered assets. The Gwadar port is very vulnerable geographically, we are unlikely to let BD give PLAN permanent port access. Only SL port they have poses a threat and even that is vulnerable to Indian strikes during a risis. They can only achieve a permanent presence in IOR once they have 2 nuclear powered aircraft carriers with their own battle groups as they can keep one nuclear carrier in IOR and the other in Pacific. China today hasn't even completed even 50% of their first nuclear powered carrier and it will take them a decade more to build, test, practice and then fully field 2 nuclear powered carriers.

BTW how does them having airbases facing India gonna affect the PLAN posture in IOR? They would need air launched standoff weapons of 2000 KM even then how can those sink Arihant? DFZF stationed in Tibet poses a threat to surface fleets but our SSBNs would still be safe. Any PLAN fleet entering IOR would similarly have to contend with Brahmos ALCMs and GLCM not to mention LRHASHM and SMART missiles all of which can cover vast swathes if not all of BoB.