Air Engagement of Operation Sindoor : Analysis

Maybe with your research you know if with NETCOR, will give it a similar capability as PL15 and Chinese datalink combination?

And will the datalinks be omni-directional so that fighter can maneuver freely when providing mid course updates to BVR missiles (via AEW&Cs or ground datalink air picture) or will it be limited to certain cone like with FCR (radar) guidance?

Will our AEW&Cs also get this?
 
Maybe with your research you know if with NETCOR, will give it a similar capability as PL15 and Chinese datalink combination?

And will the datalinks be omni-directional so that fighter can maneuver freely when providing mid course updates to BVR missiles (via AEW&Cs or ground datalink air picture) or will it be limited to certain cone like with FCR (radar) guidance?

Will our AEW&Cs also get this?
Firstly, the PAF’s Link-17 is not a superior data link system. On the contrary, the Indian Air Force’s Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) is significantly more advanced—arguably light-years ahead in terms of capability and architecture. A detailed explanation is available here about Link-17:

Secondly, India has already achieved cooperative engagement capability (CEC). This was confirmed by the Chief of the SDI:

Moreover, this capability is not limited to AEW&CS platforms alone. The IACCS integrates a comprehensive sensor network, wherein the Air Situation Picture (ASP) transmitted to fighters is synthesized from multiple sources—including AEW&CS, ground-based surveillance radars, and both air- and ground-based ELINT systems. Crucially, weapon release decisions, including BVR missile launches, can be based on the ASP generated and provided by the IACCS.

As for the limited use of the Astra BVRAAM, which is fully integrated with IACCS and comparable in capability to the PL-15 (though not in range), my assessment is that the reason lies in inventory constraints. The Indian Air Force only flagged off the mass production of Astra last year, indicating that sufficient operational stockpiles may not yet be in place for widespread deployment.

 
My analysis of IAF's operation:
IAF is in a precarious situation. No IAF BVR missiles can get mid course updates from AEW&Cs or a UAV relay. This means they need to guided by the shooter itself or a buddy shooter, they will be under threat from PL-15 and PL-17 and may not be able to provide mid course updates throughout to ensure good probability of kill. Where as PAF or PLAAF shooter can engage in truly fire and forget tactic, shooter fires BVR and then rely on AEW&Cs or UAV relay to guide the missile via Chinese datalink.

Only solution is to develop a local tactical data link system like Link16. To update ASTRA missile series to work with this datalink. Re platforms need to update SU30MKI, MIG29UPG, LCA and our AEW&Cs with this datalink. Not sure if french platforms can be updated without huge OEM costs.

Till then, IAF will have to be defensive in air to air engagement and relying on SAMs (networked with VHF radars) like S400, MRSAM and Kusha (in future) for area denial. Longer range air to surface standoff weapons like Brahmos, Rudram 2 & 3 will provide deterrence against PLAAF and PAF (they are specially vulnerable to it).

Source for the images: Did the SPECTRA EW suite contribute to the alleged IAF Rafale loss on the 7th May 2025?

View attachment 44073

View attachment 44072
If such a link between awacs and fighter doesn't exist on Rafale, you can be sure it will be on the agenda !
 
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I am somewhat frustrated by the Indian reactions to the Rafale: there is a kind of discouragement and rampant underestimation of the aircraft that greatly saddens me. In my opinion, the aircraft has not failed, and even if one Rafale was hit, without causing the death of the pilot, that does not mean that the system does not work. There was an engagement involving around a hundred aircraft, and it is normal in war for there to be losses. One aircraft is not significant enough to say that performance targets have not been met.

Furthermore, the aircraft continued to be used without further losses, and in my opinion, we owe it the feat described here:


The satellite images from the last fifteen years suggest that this facility was also used as a research and simulation data collection centre for all new radars. It has been observed over the last decade that all aircraft collecting intelligence have been downloading data at this centre for integration with both old and new systems.
The IAF attacked the facility with extreme precision through an HVAC shaft directly leading to the main chamber of the UGF or HDBT. The internal size of the shaft was 45 cm, which is very small, even for measuring on an open-source image, as its single pixel measures 30 cm at the best resolution.
Hence, there was no margin for error, and the task must have been given to the best pilot with all data fed to the missile beforehand, including high-resolution (HiRes) images and pictures of the facility, especially the HVAC shaft.

This is probably the first of its kind, the most unique, and the smallest target hit by any air force in the entire world.

The after-strike imagery, which was released during the DGMO press conference, showed a large chunk of concrete which had risen above the surface, possibly with the explosion below the surface of a penetrating bomb.

The explosion must have been so large as to pulverise everything and everybody inside the HDBT instantly. The effect of the explosion was so significant that the multilayered concrete rebar roof was broken from below and thrown up.

This type of attack must be carried out with a diving trajectory and with sufficient precision to hit a target measuring 45 cm.

The Scalp has the following attack profile:
  • Low-altitude cruise flight (terrain following) using altimetric radar.
  • Arrival in the target zone with a moderate climb
  • Terminal dive on the target, with a very steep dive attack, precisely to strike the roofs of bunkers or underground installations (one of the most vulnerable areas).
This terminal attack is often at an angle of 60 to 75 degrees, i.e. almost vertical.

The Bramhos has the following attack profile:
  • Supersonic cruise flight (Mach 2.8 to Mach 3), typically at an altitude of 15 m to 500 m for the anti-ship profile, up to 14–15 km for an anti-ground profile.
  • As it approaches the target, it climbs back up to altitude (pop-up manoeuvre).
  • It then performs a terminal dive at 75–80° towards the target.
In terms of accuracy, the SCALP uses a DSMAC (Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation) terminal system, which compares infrared images of the target with an on-board footprint in real time and is capable of recognising specific shapes (e.g. hatches, air vents, building roofs, etc.), and can strike a known structural weak point, such as an air vent, if it is visually identifiable (in IR) and included in the mission plan.

The Brahmos has active radar terminal guidance in most versions (not optical), which is very effective against visible structures, vehicles or buildings, but less accurate for striking such a small target without external designation or very precise data. Block III has mountainous terrain navigation and dive attack capabilities, but is not designed for DSMAC or surgical precision infrared imaging.

If a 45 cm ventilation shaft was deliberately targeted to neutralise an underground command centre (C4), then the SCALP is the most plausible option, provided that this shaft had been visually mapped (IR imaging or satellite reconnaissance) and integrated into the missile's software. This would require meticulous advance planning, possibly involving human intelligence or SIGINT confirming the exact location of the weak point.
 
I am somewhat frustrated by the Indian reactions to the Rafale: there is a kind of discouragement and rampant underestimation of the aircraft that greatly saddens me. In my opinion, the aircraft has not failed, and even if one Rafale was hit, without causing the death of the pilot, that does not mean that the system does not work. There was an engagement involving around a hundred aircraft, and it is normal in war for there to be losses. One aircraft is not significant enough to say that performance targets have not been met.

Furthermore, the aircraft continued to be used without further losses, and in my opinion, we owe it the feat described here:




This type of attack must be carried out with a diving trajectory and with sufficient precision to hit a target measuring 45 cm.

The Scalp has the following attack profile:
  • Low-altitude cruise flight (terrain following) using altimetric radar.
  • Arrival in the target zone with a moderate climb
  • Terminal dive on the target, with a very steep dive attack, precisely to strike the roofs of bunkers or underground installations (one of the most vulnerable areas).
This terminal attack is often at an angle of 60 to 75 degrees, i.e. almost vertical.

The Bramhos has the following attack profile:
  • Supersonic cruise flight (Mach 2.8 to Mach 3), typically at an altitude of 15 m to 500 m for the anti-ship profile, up to 14–15 km for an anti-ground profile.
  • As it approaches the target, it climbs back up to altitude (pop-up manoeuvre).
  • It then performs a terminal dive at 75–80° towards the target.
In terms of accuracy, the SCALP uses a DSMAC (Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation) terminal system, which compares infrared images of the target with an on-board footprint in real time and is capable of recognising specific shapes (e.g. hatches, air vents, building roofs, etc.), and can strike a known structural weak point, such as an air vent, if it is visually identifiable (in IR) and included in the mission plan.

The Brahmos has active radar terminal guidance in most versions (not optical), which is very effective against visible structures, vehicles or buildings, but less accurate for striking such a small target without external designation or very precise data. Block III has mountainous terrain navigation and dive attack capabilities, but is not designed for DSMAC or surgical precision infrared imaging.

If a 45 cm ventilation shaft was deliberately targeted to neutralise an underground command centre (C4), then the SCALP is the most plausible option, provided that this shaft had been visually mapped (IR imaging or satellite reconnaissance) and integrated into the missile's software. This would require meticulous advance planning, possibly involving human intelligence or SIGINT confirming the exact location of the weak point.
What's your take on this:


Quoting the full tweet:

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Arpit Kanodia

@arpitkanodia30
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Concerns Regarding Meteor Missile Integration and Rafale’s Future in IAFDespite the ongoing three-day conflict, there has been no confirmed usage or debris found of the Meteor Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Missile (BVRAAM) from the Indian Air Force (IAF)’s Rafale fleet. This raises important questions about its operational readiness. It appears the Meteor may not yet be fully integrated with the IAF Rafales attached with Golden Arrows and Falcons. One likely reason is the unresolved integration of the Meteor’s two-way datalink with IAF’s B-NET Software Defined Radio (SDR) systems—an issue reportedly still being addressed by Dassault Aviation.Considering the Rafale acquisition was finalized in 2016, the delay in achieving full integration, particularly of critical combat systems, is a cause for serious concern. Dassault’s responsiveness to customization requests appears to lag behind expectations, and this trend is visible in other areas as well. While global aerospace leaders are progressing toward GaN-based (Gallium Nitride) technologies, Dassault has only recently initiated work on next-generation radar systems. The SPECTRA Electronic Warfare (EW) suite, though robust, is also beginning to show its age.Modern warfare increasingly demands seamless integration between radar systems and EW suites operating in active modes. Competing platforms such as the F-16 with the Viper Shield suite already demonstrate this capability. By contrast, the Rafale (like the Tejas Mk1A) still depends on passive radar-EW integration, limiting its potential in modern electronic battlespaces. Where active modes of EW system are only compatible with passive modes of radar. Even the Meteor missile itself, once considered a cutting-edge BVRAAM, now faces obsolescence pressure from newer systems like India’s Astra Mk2 and Mk3, which are expected to incorporate AESA-based seekers—surpassing the Meteor’s traditional seeker technology.That said, the Rafale remains a high-performance fighter, particularly lauded for its reliability and operational availability. In high-tempo operations, it can perform 5–6 sorties per day, significantly outpacing platforms like the Su-30MKI, which typically manage 2–3.However, as the Indian Air Force evaluates contenders for the upcoming 114 Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) procurement, the Rafale must meet certain critical conditions to justify its selection:Mission Computer Customization: Dassault must permit the installation of an indigenous mission computer. This would enable seamless integration of Indian-developed sensors and weapons, many of which (e.g., Virupaksha AESA radar, Astra Mk3 BVRAAM, GaN-based EW suites) are potentially more advanced than current French systems.Databus Modernization: The Rafale’s architecture should be upgraded to support a high-speed, deterministic, time-triggered databus—preferably based on Ethernet interfaces. This is essential for future sensor fusion capabilities and to enable the Rafale to serve as a command platform within the HAL CATS (Combat Air Teaming System) ecosystem.Cockpit Revamp: The current Rafale cockpit design is rapidly aging. A modernization initiative should introduce a single large-area display, minimize reliance on physical switches and circuit breakers, and increase automation and situational awareness.Airframe Engineering Package Access: Full access to the Rafale airframe's engineering and design package is imperative. This will empower Indian agencies to independently integrate future indigenous or third-party systems without recurring dependencies on Dassault.In conclusion, unless Dassault Aviation agrees to these essential terms—essentially "MKIze" the Rafale—it risks becoming a high-cost, low-flexibility platform. If these conditions are met, the Rafale can remain a relevant and potent asset for the IAF; otherwise, its acquisition may turn into a strategic and financial liability.
"

@vstol Jockey, @randomradio
What do you make of the above tweet?
 
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I am somewhat frustrated by the Indian reactions to the Rafale: there is a kind of discouragement and rampant underestimation of the aircraft that greatly saddens me. In my opinion, the aircraft has not failed, and even if one Rafale was hit, without causing the death of the pilot, that does not mean that the system does not work. There was an engagement involving around a hundred aircraft, and it is normal in war for there to be losses. One aircraft is not significant enough to say that performance targets have not been met.
Logically speaking a singular engagement accompanied by a claimed loss does not warrant the pitchforks.

However, you have to see it from certain perspectives:
1. Gripes that were already there (cost).
2. Tech advancements and weapons integration.
3. The whole "golden" weapon facade that was a result of hype.
4. The regular questioning of the platform/effectiveness in many intl. media outlets.

This has created the present situation. I understand your concern. However, cooler heads and actual combat pilots prevail over all other things. Many people are in favour of the MKI route. Do not know if it is actually possible.
 
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Logically speaking a singular engagement accompanied by a claimed loss does not warrant the pitchforks.

However, you have to see it from certain perspectives:
1. Gripes that were already there (cost).
2. Tech advancements and weapons integration.
3. The whole "golden" weapon facade that was a result of hype.
4. The regular questioning of the platform/effectiveness in many intl. media outlets.

This has created the present situation. I understand your concern. However, cooler heads and actual combat pilots prevail over all other things. Many people are in favour of the MKI route. Do not know if it is actually possible.
When it comes to integrating weapons, for example, people think it's a matter of calculators and software access, but the main problem is the transition to the anechoic chamber to test configurations with the new weapon in order to measure the aircraft's signature with the weapon mounted, given that there is a combination of all operational configurations where there are mixed payloads where this weapon is present, including configurations where weapons have been fired or tanks dropped, all of which is necessary in order to update Spectra.
 
It's a series of malicious lies.

This is the complete overview of the System Development Integration (SDI), under which the entire Software Defined Radio (SDR) integration is managed. Please out where they are doing integration on M2000, leave alone Rafale.


The modifications made to NETCOR after the transfer of technology (ToT)—commonly referred to as the Operational Data Link (ODL)—fall under the purview of SDI. This is a joint intellectual property (IP) of the Indian Air Force (IAF) and Rafael Defence. While integration of SDR and subsequent rigs was part of original contract, it is still not happening.

To clarify, it is confirmed that Dassault was never granted access to the source code of NETCOR. Not even the Mirage 2000 integration reflects this, let alone the Rafale. While the evidence may be circumstantial, it is sufficiently compelling to support this assertion.

If one chooses to continue down that line of reasoning, it is entirely their prerogative. However, defending the indefensible has rarely yielded success.

An anecdotal point worth noting: during Operation Sindoor, neither the Tejas nor the Su-30MKI were splashed, despite flying a higher number of sorties. These aircraft were actively involved in BARCAP missions on the morning of 10th May.
 

This is the complete overview of the System Development Integration (SDI), under which the entire Software Defined Radio (SDR) integration is managed. Please out where they are doing integration on M2000, leave alone Rafale.


The modifications made to NETCOR after the transfer of technology (ToT)—commonly referred to as the Operational Data Link (ODL)—fall under the purview of SDI. This is a joint intellectual property (IP) of the Indian Air Force (IAF) and Rafael Defence. While integration of SDR and subsequent rigs was part of original contract, it is still not happening.

To clarify, it is confirmed that Dassault was never granted access to the source code of NETCOR. Not even the Mirage 2000 integration reflects this, let alone the Rafale. While the evidence may be circumstantial, it is sufficiently compelling to support this assertion.

If one chooses to continue down that line of reasoning, it is entirely their prerogative. However, defending the indefensible has rarely yielded success.

An anecdotal point worth noting: during Operation Sindoor, neither the Tejas nor the Su-30MKI were splashed, despite flying a higher number of sorties. These aircraft were actively involved in BARCAP missions on the morning of 10th May.
Correction; SDI-Software Development Institute
 
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Icebreaker have even smaller warhead than Rampage. Icebreaker is more like a smaller,cheaper SCALP.

It's more than sufficient for SEAD/DEAD.

My analysis of IAF's operation:
IAF is in a precarious situation. No IAF BVR missiles can get mid course updates from AEW&Cs or a UAV relay. This means they need to guided by the shooter itself or a buddy shooter, they will be under threat from PL-15 and PL-17 and may not be able to provide mid course updates throughout to ensure good probability of kill. Where as PAF or PLAAF shooter can engage in truly fire and forget tactic, shooter fires BVR and then rely on AEW&Cs or UAV relay to guide the missile via Chinese datalink.

Only solution is to develop a local tactical data link system like Link16. To update ASTRA missile series to work with this datalink. Re platforms need to update SU30MKI, MIG29UPG, LCA and our AEW&Cs with this datalink. Not sure if french platforms can be updated without huge OEM costs.

Till then, IAF will have to be defensive in air to air engagement and relying on SAMs (networked with VHF radars) like S400, MRSAM and Kusha (in future) for area denial. Longer range air to surface standoff weapons like Brahmos, Rudram 2 & 3 will provide deterrence against PLAAF and PAF (they are specially vulnerable to it).

Source for the images: Did the SPECTRA EW suite contribute to the alleged IAF Rafale loss on the 7th May 2025?

View attachment 44073

View attachment 44072

Our AWACS are not suitable for BVR launches.
 
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I am somewhat frustrated by the Indian reactions to the Rafale: there is a kind of discouragement and rampant underestimation of the aircraft that greatly saddens me. In my opinion, the aircraft has not failed, and even if one Rafale was hit, without causing the death of the pilot, that does not mean that the system does not work. There was an engagement involving around a hundred aircraft, and it is normal in war for there to be losses. One aircraft is not significant enough to say that performance targets have not been met.

Furthermore, the aircraft continued to be used without further losses, and in my opinion, we owe it the feat described here:




This type of attack must be carried out with a diving trajectory and with sufficient precision to hit a target measuring 45 cm.

The Scalp has the following attack profile:
  • Low-altitude cruise flight (terrain following) using altimetric radar.
  • Arrival in the target zone with a moderate climb
  • Terminal dive on the target, with a very steep dive attack, precisely to strike the roofs of bunkers or underground installations (one of the most vulnerable areas).
This terminal attack is often at an angle of 60 to 75 degrees, i.e. almost vertical.

The Bramhos has the following attack profile:
  • Supersonic cruise flight (Mach 2.8 to Mach 3), typically at an altitude of 15 m to 500 m for the anti-ship profile, up to 14–15 km for an anti-ground profile.
  • As it approaches the target, it climbs back up to altitude (pop-up manoeuvre).
  • It then performs a terminal dive at 75–80° towards the target.
In terms of accuracy, the SCALP uses a DSMAC (Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation) terminal system, which compares infrared images of the target with an on-board footprint in real time and is capable of recognising specific shapes (e.g. hatches, air vents, building roofs, etc.), and can strike a known structural weak point, such as an air vent, if it is visually identifiable (in IR) and included in the mission plan.

The Brahmos has active radar terminal guidance in most versions (not optical), which is very effective against visible structures, vehicles or buildings, but less accurate for striking such a small target without external designation or very precise data. Block III has mountainous terrain navigation and dive attack capabilities, but is not designed for DSMAC or surgical precision infrared imaging.

If a 45 cm ventilation shaft was deliberately targeted to neutralise an underground command centre (C4), then the SCALP is the most plausible option, provided that this shaft had been visually mapped (IR imaging or satellite reconnaissance) and integrated into the missile's software. This would require meticulous advance planning, possibly involving human intelligence or SIGINT confirming the exact location of the weak point.

To be fair, if SCALP was used, it speaks for the weapon, not the Rafale. Similarly, examples of Rampage on Jaguar and Brahmos on MKI does not determine platform suepriority over the Rafale either.

If Rafale was shot down using a SAM or AAM, then we need to figure out the conditions of how it was shot down. If it was short distance, lack of reaction time, then fine. But if it was long distance, mid-course was provided by fighters and AWACS, then we need to figure out how the failure occurred. In case a satellite was used, that's the introduction of a new form of warfare. In case it was the PL-15, then we need to figure out how vulnerable the aircraft is to an AESA seeker, and so on.
 
What's your take on this:


Quoting the full tweet:

"
See new posts



Conversation​





Arpit Kanodia
@arpitkanodia30
Follow

Concerns Regarding Meteor Missile Integration and Rafale’s Future in IAFDespite the ongoing three-day conflict, there has been no confirmed usage or debris found of the Meteor Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Missile (BVRAAM) from the Indian Air Force (IAF)’s Rafale fleet. This raises important questions about its operational readiness. It appears the Meteor may not yet be fully integrated with the IAF Rafales attached with Golden Arrows and Falcons. One likely reason is the unresolved integration of the Meteor’s two-way datalink with IAF’s B-NET Software Defined Radio (SDR) systems—an issue reportedly still being addressed by Dassault Aviation.Considering the Rafale acquisition was finalized in 2016, the delay in achieving full integration, particularly of critical combat systems, is a cause for serious concern. Dassault’s responsiveness to customization requests appears to lag behind expectations, and this trend is visible in other areas as well. While global aerospace leaders are progressing toward GaN-based (Gallium Nitride) technologies, Dassault has only recently initiated work on next-generation radar systems. The SPECTRA Electronic Warfare (EW) suite, though robust, is also beginning to show its age.Modern warfare increasingly demands seamless integration between radar systems and EW suites operating in active modes. Competing platforms such as the F-16 with the Viper Shield suite already demonstrate this capability. By contrast, the Rafale (like the Tejas Mk1A) still depends on passive radar-EW integration, limiting its potential in modern electronic battlespaces. Where active modes of EW system are only compatible with passive modes of radar. Even the Meteor missile itself, once considered a cutting-edge BVRAAM, now faces obsolescence pressure from newer systems like India’s Astra Mk2 and Mk3, which are expected to incorporate AESA-based seekers—surpassing the Meteor’s traditional seeker technology.That said, the Rafale remains a high-performance fighter, particularly lauded for its reliability and operational availability. In high-tempo operations, it can perform 5–6 sorties per day, significantly outpacing platforms like the Su-30MKI, which typically manage 2–3.However, as the Indian Air Force evaluates contenders for the upcoming 114 Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) procurement, the Rafale must meet certain critical conditions to justify its selection:Mission Computer Customization: Dassault must permit the installation of an indigenous mission computer. This would enable seamless integration of Indian-developed sensors and weapons, many of which (e.g., Virupaksha AESA radar, Astra Mk3 BVRAAM, GaN-based EW suites) are potentially more advanced than current French systems.Databus Modernization: The Rafale’s architecture should be upgraded to support a high-speed, deterministic, time-triggered databus—preferably based on Ethernet interfaces. This is essential for future sensor fusion capabilities and to enable the Rafale to serve as a command platform within the HAL CATS (Combat Air Teaming System) ecosystem.Cockpit Revamp: The current Rafale cockpit design is rapidly aging. A modernization initiative should introduce a single large-area display, minimize reliance on physical switches and circuit breakers, and increase automation and situational awareness.Airframe Engineering Package Access: Full access to the Rafale airframe's engineering and design package is imperative. This will empower Indian agencies to independently integrate future indigenous or third-party systems without recurring dependencies on Dassault.In conclusion, unless Dassault Aviation agrees to these essential terms—essentially "MKIze" the Rafale—it risks becoming a high-cost, low-flexibility platform. If these conditions are met, the Rafale can remain a relevant and potent asset for the IAF; otherwise, its acquisition may turn into a strategic and financial liability.
"

@vstol Jockey, @randomradio
What do you make of the above tweet?

If you see a pic via OSINT of a weapon integrated with an aircraft, it means it's been fully integrated and is either undergoing trials or is fully operational. Most likely the latter when we look at the history of such releases by IAF.

Lack of BNET integration on Rafale is Pakistani propaganda. The same thing they said about Mig-21 and MKI in 2019 when both were integrated.

You can bet Rafale was integrated with BNET on priority, probably even before it first arrived in India in 2020.
 

This is the complete overview of the System Development Integration (SDI), under which the entire Software Defined Radio (SDR) integration is managed. Please out where they are doing integration on M2000, leave alone Rafale.


The modifications made to NETCOR after the transfer of technology (ToT)—commonly referred to as the Operational Data Link (ODL)—fall under the purview of SDI. This is a joint intellectual property (IP) of the Indian Air Force (IAF) and Rafael Defence. While integration of SDR and subsequent rigs was part of original contract, it is still not happening.

To clarify, it is confirmed that Dassault was never granted access to the source code of NETCOR. Not even the Mirage 2000 integration reflects this, let alone the Rafale. While the evidence may be circumstantial, it is sufficiently compelling to support this assertion.

If one chooses to continue down that line of reasoning, it is entirely their prerogative. However, defending the indefensible has rarely yielded success.

An anecdotal point worth noting: during Operation Sindoor, neither the Tejas nor the Su-30MKI were splashed, despite flying a higher number of sorties. These aircraft were actively involved in BARCAP missions on the morning of 10th May.

BNET is NATO-compatible and plug and play, it doesn't require direct integration into the core systems of the Rafale.
 
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To be fair, if SCALP was used, it speaks for the weapon, not the Rafale. Similarly, examples of Rampage on Jaguar and Brahmos on MKI does not determine platform suepriority over the Rafale either.

If Rafale was shot down using a SAM or AAM, then we need to figure out the conditions of how it was shot down. If it was short distance, lack of reaction time, then fine. But if it was long distance, mid-course was provided by fighters and AWACS, then we need to figure out how the failure occurred. In case a satellite was used, that's the introduction of a new form of warfare. In case it was the PL-15, then we need to figure out how vulnerable the aircraft is to an AESA seeker, and so on.
Yes, but @vstol Jockey complains that the weapon is very expensive, but there are still trade-offs.
 
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An anecdotal point worth noting: during Operation Sindoor, neither the Tejas nor the Su-30MKI were splashed, despite flying a higher number of sorties. These aircraft were actively involved in BARCAP missions on the morning of 10th May.
As per @vstol Jockey Rafale had to go nearest the border because of Hammer's short range and Su-30MKIs had to go and bail them out of trouble. What you're saying now makes plenty of sense. Anyways, IAF and Dassault need to work together to overcome these issues. Rafale, as it exists, is an absolute great platform.
 
As per @vstol Jockey Rafale had to go nearest the border because of Hammer's short range and Su-30MKIs had to go and bail them out of trouble. What you're saying now makes plenty of sense. Anyways, IAF and Dassault need to work together to overcome these issues. Rafale, as it exists, is an absolute great platform.
The issue at hand is not one of range, or did the Rafale entered contested airspace.

It was well within the anti air bubble of the S-400 air defense system.

This suggests a potential gap in integration rather than a deficiency in capability. A plausible explanation is that the Rafale is not yet fully integrated into the IACCS network, unlike platforms such as the Su-30MKI. As a result, to mitigate the risk of fratricide or blue-on-blue engagements, full anti air bubble wasn’t involved.



The events of the morning of 10th May were particularly significant, with the entire SAM network active and firing while Su-30MKIs, Tejas, and MiG-29s were airborne—and were part of BARCAP.

BTW, EW suite of MKI and Tejas worked quite well, they not only bailed out Rafale, but also M2000 at several places.
 
The issue at hand is not one of range, or did the Rafale entered contested airspace.

It was well within the anti air bubble of the S-400 air defense system.

This suggests a potential gap in integration rather than a deficiency in capability. A plausible explanation is that the Rafale is not yet fully integrated into the IACCS network, unlike platforms such as the Su-30MKI. As a result, to mitigate the risk of fratricide or blue-on-blue engagements, full anti air bubble wasn’t involved.



The events of the morning of 10th May were particularly significant, with the entire SAM network active and firing while Su-30MKIs, Tejas, and MiG-29s were airborne—and were part of BARCAP.

BTW, EW suite of MKI and Tejas worked quite well, they not only bailed out Rafale, but also M2000 at several places.
This is a serious issue. One of the reasons I'm against F-35s acquisition is exactly this. If any exotic jet can't be synced into our system then it's nothing but a flying white elephant. Dassault and IAF seriously need to resolve this by the former providing all source codes for their jets especially if we are going to order over 100 of these via Make-in-India/MRFA.

As time goes by, things said by Vstol sir about Rafale's performance/shortcomings during the Ops are proving to be absolutely correct. We were literally shocked when he revealed this stuff post the OP.
 
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