Ukraine - Russia Conflict
- Thread starter randomradio
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Yeah, if you want a completely made up answer. Search AI generates answers that it feels suits the wishes of the asker and proceeds to cite sources which do not support (or even mention) its conclusions. But yeah, it's fast, just like eating uncooked food is fast, and just as with the latter, you can then proceed to make fast outputs yourself.
Other AI models are kissing Uncle Sam’s boots way harder than you are. You should feel the crisis, watch out or you'll get obsolete soon, you meat puppet..
Yeah, if you want a completely made up answer. Search AI generates answers that it feels suits the wishes of the asker and proceeds to cite sources which do not support (or even mention) its conclusions. But yeah, it's fast, just like eating uncooked food is fast, and just as with the latter, you can then proceed to make fast outputs yourself.
And that's exactly why those other AIs are a booming business, while you're not.
The first footage of the Russian Geran-5 kamikaze drone being used in Ukraine. The video shows a Russian Geran-5 drone striking a Ukrainian warehouse in the Kholodnohirsky district of Kharkiv.
A strike by Russian Geran-2 kamikaze drones hit a training camp for the Ukrainian Army's Special Operations Operations Center. Units of the 73rd Naval Center of the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces were stationed at the camp.
The video was filmed on the grounds of the former Zarya children's health camp on the banks of the Southern Bug River in the Mykolaiv region. The drone strikes hit personnel staging areas, storage areas for special-purpose vessels, and unmanned boats.
The video was filmed on the grounds of the former Zarya children's health camp on the banks of the Southern Bug River in the Mykolaiv region. The drone strikes hit personnel staging areas, storage areas for special-purpose vessels, and unmanned boats.
Russian FPV drones and Geran-2 kamikaze drones have begun actively attacking Ukrainian fuel and energy infrastructure. The video shows drone strikes on Ukrainian gas stations and fuel tankers. The exact location of the footage is not disclosed. The strikes on fuel infrastructure have led to fuel shortages in Ukraine's frontline territories. Fuel shortages have also emerged in some regions of Russia.
Yes, and this official statement confirms that the nature of the crisis has changed.
When Russia:
- bans exports of petrol and kerosene;
- is considering a total ban on diesel;
- draws on its reserves;
- sets up a special monitoring unit;
- and acknowledges regional shortages,
Putin’s statement that the major refineries are operating ‘at full capacity’ is, moreover, ambiguous. It does not mean that the entire Russian refinery network is functioning normally; it probably means that the units still available are being pushed to their limits. Damaged facilities, such as the Moscow refinery, are obviously not included in this operational capacity. That refinery could remain shut down for at least six months.
The 1.7 million tonnes of reserves may seem substantial, but they do not constitute a vast strategic stockpile on a Russian scale. They have already been mobilised to support the domestic market and are thought to be slightly below last year’s levels. Above all, a national stockpile does not automatically resolve the difficulties of distribution across regions, fuel grades and logistics networks.
A potential ban on diesel would be a further hurdle. Russia is a major exporter of diesel; giving up these sales, even temporarily, would result in a loss of foreign exchange and added value. Until now, it has compensated for damaged refineries by exporting more crude oil. But it cannot indefinitely:
- export crude oil;
- maintain exports of refined products;
- supply the army;
- ensure harvests;
- and maintain a normal civilian market,
The envisaged reliance on imports is even more telling. One of the world’s leading oil producers has been reduced to asking Kazakhstan for petrol and preparing for imports by sea, not because it lacks crude oil, but because it can no longer process and distribute it properly.
The phrase ‘refineries are running at full capacity’ is therefore less reassuring than it seems:
when all remaining capacity is already operating at maximum capacity and shortages persist, there is no longer any domestic industrial reserve to absorb the next shock.
The special task force set up by Putin demonstrates precisely this: the market no longer balances itself spontaneously. It must now be managed on a day-to-day basis, with export bans, the mobilisation of stocks, imports and the prioritised allocation of fuel.
This also provides a concrete measure of Ukraine’s effectiveness. Kyiv does not need to destroy the entire Russian oil industry. It simply needs to erode the system’s margins until every new strike forces Moscow to choose who will be rationed.
This is interesting, particularly because these counter-attacks are taking place in three distinct sectors rather than at a single local point.
At this stage, Mashovets is referring to the resumption of counter-attacks, not a general counter-offensive. The likely objective is, first and foremost, to recapture lost positions, eliminate Russian infiltrations, expand certain defensive zones and force Moscow to commit reserves.
On the Novooleksandrivka axis, Ukrainian forces have already succeeded in recent months in disrupting the Russian advance and regaining ground in the Oleksandrivka–Huliaipole sector. ISW assessments indicated that these actions had significantly reduced the pace of the Russian offensive and, in some cases, pushed its units back by several kilometres.
In Zaporizhzhia, recent geolocated imagery shows that the Ukrainians have cleared certain infiltrations around Stepnohirsk and are holding positions that Russian sources claimed to have captured. The Russians often operate there in small groups, which precisely creates opportunities for local counter-attacks when these groups are cut off from their reinforcements.
The Lyman axis is probably the most strategically important. Russia is seeking to advance towards Sloviansk and threaten Ukrainian lines of communication. Mashovets had already reported that Ukrainian counter-attacks were significantly slowing down the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army, which tends to over-commit troops and resources for limited tactical gains.
The fact that Ukraine is able to resume counter-attacks along these three axes suggests, at the very least:
- that it still has tactical reserves;
- that Russian forces do not have firm control over all their recent advances;
- that strikes on logistics and command posts may be beginning to create local opportunities;
- that the Russian initiative is no longer uniform across the entire front.
The key indicator to watch will be not so much the number of villages reported as three factors: the depth of the gains, their sustainability over several days, and whether Russia is forced to redeploy reserves from Kostiantynivka or Sloviansk. If this occurs simultaneously across several fronts, we will no longer be talking merely of local stabilisation, but of a genuine shift in the balance of initiative.
A scene from the repulsion of a Ukrainian FPV drone attack by Russian serviceman Nazariy Gura. The video was filmed near the village of Rodynske in Donbas, during the evacuation of several local residents. When the drone appeared, the Russian serviceman opened fire on it and dodged the attack. The soldier reportedly sustained a minor injury, but the evacuation continued.