Neither of those equations favour the US/Allies. I've gone over some of the details regarding China's industrial capabilities in another thread, read my replies from the linked post onwards:
Pretty big development. https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/01/china-suddenly-building-fleet-of-special-barges-suitable-for-taiwan-landings/ This new ship design is meant to navigate around the lack of landing beaches in Taiwan. Difficult to invade during Trump's era though. The last...
www.strategicfront.org
Any effort to resupply/rebuild US/Allied infrastructure along the First or Second Chain involves a logistics tail that spans the width of the Pacific. China's logistics are right there.
As I said, in order to make China pay a similar price vis-a-vis the damage they could do in that timeframe, the US will need capabilities that can impose an overwhelming air superiority over mainland China within the first few days. That capability doesn't exist because sortie rates of F-22s & F-35s will plummet once First Chain bases are under saturation strikes. No sustained sortie generation = no air superiority.
Only way to sustain that sortie rate is with planes that are: 1) Capable of operating from bases farther out, and 2) Are available in sufficient numbers to generate enough sorties.
That means building up a large enough fleet of F-47 and B-21. The B-2 will still be able to penetrate but there's too few of those airframes. There's a reason why they want ~100+ B21s.
And then there's the fact that unlike Iran, China actually possesses the ISR capabilities needed to properly target moving Carriers.