This interview of
Captain (Dr.) Gurpreet S Khurana was first published in the special issue: 'Indian Military Power' of
DSI magazine (Fr.), May 2022.
Sorry if it's been posted before.
The challenges of India's maritime strategy
What is your perception of Chinese maritime activism in the Indian Ocean?
Gurpreet S. Khurana: With the start of its anti-piracy mission in December 2008, China established a permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Since then, its naval footprint in these waters has expanded rapidly, including through the deployment of its intelligence gathering vessels. Its new generation Shang-class nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) are also constantly deployed in the northern Indian Ocean. The first of these submarines entered service with the PLA Navy in 2006, which in effect marked the genesis of the Indo-Pacific security link between the two oceans.
China has long sought to develop nodes of influence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) through various measures, which was first referred to in 2005 as the 'string of pearls' strategy. China's actions largely involve the sale of defense equipment and the development of strategic infrastructure. Recently, much of this has been incorporated into the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This creates the potential scenario where smaller regional littorals, especially island states, could become strategically dependent on China. In this way, Beijing is also trying to develop military logistics facilities in the ROI to strengthen its naval presence in the region. Its base in Djibouti has been operational since 2017. China could acquire more reliable and full-fledged military bases in other key locations such as Gwadar, Pakistan.
For India, this amounts to a competition for influence and the addition of a maritime dimension to the pre-existing Chinese continental threat. This poses a serious risk to India's vital interests, including its critical systems and infrastructure, and calls into question the Indian Navy's ability to establish maritime control in the region and its SLOC (Sea Lines Of Communications) interdiction strategy against China. Chinese SNAs also threaten India's nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) strongholds, and hence its nuclear second-strike capability. In a worst-case scenario for India, this could lead to a two-front conflict, with Pakistan joining China as a formal ally against India.
India cooperates a lot with Indian Ocean states, such as Mauritius and the Seychelles, but also with France, which is naturally present in the region. What is India's vision of the Indian Ocean?
India's national policy making places great emphasis on its regional role in preserving good order and a safe maritime environment in the Indian Ocean. The logic is partly linked to New Delhi's international obligations as a regional power; but more importantly, it is based on the belief that India cannot develop and progress in isolation unless its regional maritime neighbours also prosper with it. Accordingly, when commissioning an Indian-built vessel for the Mauritius Coast Guard in Port Louis in 2015, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi coined the concept of 'SAGAR', which is a Hindi word meaning 'ocean', and is an acronym for 'Security and Growth for All in the Region'. In particular, the SAGAR concept is meant to represent an 'inclusive' model of regional development, and is seen by countries in the region as a contrast to China's BRI, which is an 'extractive' development model based on China's self-help as an extra-regional actor. The SAGAR concept also means that economic prosperity is so closely linked to security that prosperity cannot be achieved without a secure and enabling regional environment. SAGAR has since become India's vision for the Indian Ocean and beyond, and the main policy directive guiding India's maritime security strategy.
Many countries are present in Djibouti, not only to support anti-piracy efforts in the Horn of Africa, but also for other missions: intelligence, protection of SLOCs, pre-positioning, etc. Why is India not present in Djibouti when it was very active against piracy? Did it have plans to open naval facilities around the ocean?
I suppose the fact that India did not choose to have a base in Djibouti can be attributed to the result of a simple cost/benefit assessment. India's geostrategic location and peninsular layout with island territories on its eastern and western coasts allow its naval forces to have a wide reach into the northern Indian Ocean. While a forward operating base in the Horn of Africa would have been desirable for India, it would not have materialised without a substantial financial cost. India's reciprocal logistical support arrangements with France and other countries in the region have further mitigated the need for its own facility in the region.
For India, the need for a forward base in the southern Indian Ocean has become more pressing; especially as the Indian Navy regularly assists smaller regional countries in the region - particularly island states - by undertaking surveillance and hydrographic surveys in their vast maritime areas. Accordingly, in 2015, India signed an agreement with the Seychelles to develop a joint naval base on Assumption Island. However, with the change of government in Port Victoria in 2020, the agreement was cancelled. Unconfirmed reports indicate that India may develop a naval base on North Agalega Island (Mauritius) for the use of the Mauritian Coast Guard. While it can be assumed that such a facility straddling China's main sea lines of communication could also be used by Indian naval units, it is not yet certain that it would bear fruit. Nevertheless, the reciprocal logistics agreement between India and France signed in 2015 could potentially allow Indian naval forces to use the facilities in Reunion and Mayotte. Similarly, a similar agreement with the United States signed in 2016 could provide access to Diego Garcia, extending India's naval reach and presence in the southern Indian Ocean.
India has been particularly keen to develop military cooperation with many navies over the past twenty years, including Vietnam. Will it become more involved in the South China Sea?
India's 2015 Maritime Security Strategy document states that the South China Sea (SCS) is within India's areas of maritime interest, albeit as a 'secondary zone' (as opposed to the northern Indian Ocean, which is a 'primary zone'). With about 20% of its total merchandise trade passing through the SCS, and its oil and gas joint ventures in the Vietnamese Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), India is a major player in a secure SCS, including for the benefit of freedom of navigation in accordance with an established rules-based order. India's concerns are illustrated by China's objections to its oil exploration projects in Vietnam's EEZ. In July 2011, the Indian warship INS Airavat, while sailing in the Vietnamese EEZ, was warned by a Chinese voice that it was "entering Chinese waters". Such incidents significantly influence national policy-making in New Delhi. At the ADMM-Plus [ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus] meeting held in June 2021, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh said, "India hopes that the negotiations on the Code of Conduct (SCS) will lead to outcomes that are consistent with international law and will not prejudice the legitimate rights and interests of nations (like India) that are not participating in these discussions."
New Delhi has thus been keen to play a constructive role in the area, both bilaterally with the SCS littorals and in the multilateral forums centred on ASEAN and the Quad. Specifically, India has been involved in capacity building of local maritime security forces. This is aimed at enabling countries in the region to stand on their own feet and reduce their power asymmetries vis-à-vis China. Notably, India would soon export BrahMos supersonic missiles to the Philippines.
The navy's overseas deployments in the SCS (and beyond) are intended to reassure friendly countries and the Indian diaspora by demonstrating national will. In May 2020, following the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, the Indian Navy launched the 'SAGAR' mission, sailing its ships to provide essential medicines and medical liquid oxygen supplies to several countries in the region, including Vietnam, to help their citizens overcome the pandemic. The Navy should continue to undertake similar actions in the SCS as an instrument of India's foreign policy. Indian warships deployed in the region are also prepared and equipped to respond to humanitarian contingencies related to natural disasters and maritime accidents. In addition, such deployments would help India develop strategic and operational situational awareness in the region and strengthen deterrence against China.
India is developing its capabilities on all fronts: submarines and aircraft carriers, but also on the surface, destroyers, frigates and corvettes. What are the main challenges in building the Indian Navy?
The Indian Navy plans to increase its current force level of 137 ships to 170 ships by 2027. This would include three aircraft carriers, two of which would be domestically built. With self-reliance a national priority, India has developed a fairly robust shipbuilding industry. However, it continues to be deficient in some high-end technologies. While 90% indigenisation has been achieved in the 'floating' component (hulls and structures), the proportion is 65% in the 'motion' category (propulsion and power generation), and only 45% in the 'combat' category (weapons and sensors). However, breakthroughs have been made in some areas such as supersonic missiles, sonar and even torpedoes. The lack of local aircraft, helicopters and UAVs is another deficit, which is currently filled by imports. The revival of national expertise in submarine construction has been another challenge. This is being addressed in partnership with France in the ongoing P75 (Scorpene) conventional submarine project. At the same time, India has successfully developed its domestic industry to build nuclear submarines. However, equipping these submarines with appropriate weapons and sensors would be a difficult task.
The dilution of the navy's primary (military) role after the Mumbai terrorist attack has also posed a major, albeit transitory, challenge to naval force planning. Naval force development has traditionally focused on long-range capabilities. However, after the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack by Pakistan-based operatives, the navy was tasked with leading India's coastal security apparatus and was forced to introduce fast interceptors and detection equipment to bolster the defence of ports, naval bases and airfields, and also raised a new specialised force called the Sagar Prahari Bal, which means 'Ocean Sentry Force'. This has meant that much of the navy's financial allocation has been diverted to such brown water capabilities, at the expense of offshore systems. Despite this, in recent years the navy has managed to maintain the envisaged 60% proportion of offshore platforms in the total naval force.
What could be the next steps in the cooperation between India and France? What would be desirable?
Indo-French cooperation in naval and maritime security has gradually strengthened since 1983, when the two countries started conducting bilateral naval exercises. These exercises were later named 'Varuna' in 2001 and have since grown in scope and complexity. Moreover, over the last two decades, I have personally witnessed the progressive deepening of the interface between the Indian Navy and the French naval forces in the Indian Ocean under
ALINDIEN. In their first maritime dialogue in 2015, India and France signed the Defence Logistics Agreement, followed by the 'White Shipping' information sharing agreement in 2017. More recently, France has appointed a naval liaison officer at the Indian Fusion Information Centre (IFC-IOR) near New Delhi.
France sees India as a key pillar of its Indo-Pacific strategy. Due to the demanding and dynamic nature of the emerging geopolitical and security environment in the Indo-Pacific region, India and France will need to think outside the box to achieve a quantum shift in the existing level of cooperation, rather than an iterative progression as hitherto. The first imperative for Indo-French cooperation lies in the area of undersea warfare and undersea domain awareness. It would include sharing of information and advanced technologies, including for nuclear submarine propulsion. In addition, to meet humanitarian and other contingencies in the ROI, India is seeking to commission large amphibious ships, which could be built in partnership using the French Mistral-class LHD design. In addition, India needs the partnership of France (and other EU states) to combat various forms of maritime crime in the western ROI. The anti-piracy coordination between the Indian Navy and
EUNAVFOR is a very successful model for such cooperation. France's upgrade to full membership of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) in December 2020 has opened up new avenues for cooperation with India.
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