General News, Questions And Discussions - Indian Navy

[Arpit]

This might come across as a disjointed article, but I was lightly pondering over the Indian Navy's operational mandate, how it has evolved over the years, how it might look like in the future, how it is intricately tied with India's diplomatic and economic growth and ambitions and how it influences our overall capital procurement and investments.

Currently, I would say we are a confused naval power. Partly due to a lack of an integrated national strategic security overview, but mainly because we aren't sure how much to extend our naval reach, whether our economy would support it, and due to general Indian bureaucratic myopia. Combined by our (mostly justified) land warfare-centrism necessitated by Chinese aggression and cross-border terror threats, the Indian Navy often finds itself receiving the midget's share of the defense budget and national scrutiny. This has led to the Navy's role being limited to within the inner rim of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), supporting and defending India's maritime trade, and complementing our security apparatus against a small, yet rapidly growing, Pakistani fleet.

What India's political bosses fail to see, or are perhaps oblivious to, is the obvious maritime threat looming over our heads, resulting from an increased Chinese hegemonistic doctrine. We still consider that the Chinese would be preoccupied with contending with the combined forces of the US Navy, the Japanese and the South Koreans in the South China Sea and the Pacific theater. While this is true, China already has the world's largest naval fleet, with its tech gap with the USN rapidly contracting. They are sure to spillover into the IOR, with at least a full-fledged, dedicated CBG, comprising 10-12 ships and submarines, supported by their growing logistic/support facilities in Southeast Asia and the Horn of Africa (Djibouti).

This leads me to an important assertion, which I hope to connect through and with multiple points. A nation's (and thus, its navy's) mandate is always defined by its current and future power-projection needs, however big or small scale they might be. We can take a look at some good examples. The US Navy has a statutory requirement of 11 supercarriers, with 5-6 being on-station at any given time, and 1 being permanently forward deployed (USS Ronald Reagan in Yokosuka, Japan). This has remained the case for a good 4-5 decades now, primarily driven by their global presence needed across multiple theaters for multiple objectives :
The Atlantic - posturing against the Russians
The Middle-East/the Mediterranean - regularly supporting coalition forces in their military objectives + securing trade routes
The Pacific - reorientation against China + protecting Taiwan
All theaters - Gunboat Diplomacy
How does this "presence" manifest itself? Deployments of Carrier Battle Groups, maintaining permanent naval bases, airfields and logistics hubs in pacts with allied nations, conducting joint exercises and FONOPs, etc. The point is, the Americans have a relatively clear mandate, a relatively clear idea how to achieve it, and a relatively active (and adequate) MIC and a procurement plan to support their Navy. The French naval composition can also be studied, to see how doctrinal requirements predicate naval procurements and assets.

So, where does that leave us?
I am here to hazard an educated guess on how our naval and power-projection policy would (and dare I say, should) look like in the next 10-15 years, with due consideration of all present and future threats, indigenous and adversarial capabilities and restrictions.
Here is a map of the IOR:
View attachment 26106






























First, let's have an overview of Indian naval assets and presence in the IOR:
(Currently operational, or under construction, or proposed in the near future)
1. Oman - A Listening post at Ras-al-Hadd and berthing rights for the Indian Navy at Muscat naval base. An establishment at Duqm for the Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy
2. Madagascar - a listening post and radar facility
3. Mauritius - a 3000 m long airfield with associated facilities to house troops and host P-8I MPA on Agaléga Island
4. Seychelles - a system of six coastal surveillance radars in Mahe, Alphonse, Farquhar, Astove and Assumption Island which are linked to Indian surveillance systems
5. Several naval facilities in the ANC and Lakshadweep islands, the former recently under upgradation with Japanese assistance.
6. The US-Japanese "Fish-Hook" underwater sub-monitoring SOSUS network, now extending from the Indian Mainland (Chennai) to Port Blair, and from Indira Point to Sumatra, Indonesia. Obviously, India is now part of this network and has access to all its resources and generated data, concerning Chinese subs.
Fish-Hook:
View attachment 26107
- Combine this with the numerous security arrangements we have ratified with many nations, primarily the US - GSOMIA, BECA, LEMOA and COMCASA, gaining large access to their vast ISR network while building our own, and tons of logistical pacts we have signed with Australia, Japan, the US, South Korea, France and Singapore. So our fuel and munitions logistics are pretty well diversified across the region. We also have the IRNSS (NAVIC) regional navigational system active with 7(+2) satellites in orbit, covering the entire IOR, with ongoing plans to add more sats to the constellation to increase the range up-to 3500 Km, plus upgrading its data resolution and other technical parameters. Our warships, therefore can use an indigenous, high-accuracy positioning system, use berthing and military facilities of several allied nations and exchange fuel and rations with friendly ships at sea or in port, thus greatly increasing their patrol endurance.

Thus, we see that the primary projection-multipliers for India's warships are pretty much already in place, and will continue to be heavily expanded upon, in the Eastern IOR and beyond, into the SCS. Also, we have managed to build up a rough naval doctrine as well, while discussing what we have and where we can use it.
"The Indian Navy is to be sufficiently capable to protect India's maritime trade and shipping routes from the Middle East to the South China Sea (and everywhere below it), while also having assets to protect India's military bases and assets in the entirety of the IOR (Agalega, Assumption, etc.), while also having sufficient capability for adequate power projection from the Red Sea to the outer reaches of the SCS."

This is a pretty big and most importantly, achievable and feasible ,goal to aim for, as India becomes the third largest economic and military power on Earth. Now, we are sufficiently equipped to deal with the navy's hard and soft assets, their current state and what is needed in the immediate future.

To be very frank, we are in a state of near-destructive atrophy. Placing piecemeal orders of billion dollar warships with several critical systems still imported, commissioning destroyers and frigates without their helicopter complements and towed arrays; and submarines without their heavy-weight torpedoes, having 60-year old hepters still flying, our carriers punching below their weights, our air-wing not being potent enough, somehow making do without dedicated minesweepers or LPDs or enough logistics ships, having some silver bullets but not enough numbers of literally anything and probably everything, grappling with an officer shortage for a while, etc.

Now that I've ranted about what we are struggling with, I have to say that neither the Navy nor the Indian MIC is sitting around doing nothing.
- New ATLAS Electronik ACTAS systems are being procured and deployed fleet-wide.
- Newer warships are being armed with the ALH Mk-3 MR helos + 24 MH-60R helos being procured.
- Varunastra HWTs + TAL Shyena LWTs are entering production
- ALH Mk-3 MR helos being procured by the Navy and Coast Guard for base ops
- Vikky coming out of refit and Vikrant finishing trials
- Rafale F4.1 ISE being procured
- Intermittent Minesweeping kits being integrated almost fleet-wide
- New naval satellites planned and being built to complement GSAT-7C
- Naval MARCOS operators being probably the most adaptive of new tech in the country
- Shipyards expanding, spreading skills (frigate-building, etc.), adopting newer shipbuilding methods (Modular construction) and some more measures.....

However, in line with our newly established intentions, it is critical that we radically change our requirements, procurements and procedures, to better serve our needs:
- We need to significantly up-size our naval requirement numbers across ship-types. Roughly speaking, taking our limited expeditionary plans into account, we need at least:
- 4 aircraft carriers, at least 1 being EMALS-CATOBAR enabled, nuclear propulsion be damned (for now)
- 4 LPDs
- 24 destroyers
- 36 frigates
- 48 Corvettes/Coastal Warfare Ships
- 18 SSKs
- 6 SSNs
- 6 SSBNs
- 8 Refueling and Oiler Ships (Fleet Tankers)
- 18 LSTs
- 8 MCMVs
Basically, we need to roughly double our fleet size, in order to be an effective, true blue-water navy. Its entirely possible, when we look at the period between 2005 to 2015 - the Indian Navy nearly tripled its size of major warships. If we get a few more things right, we can achieve above figures by 2035-2040.

- Talking about specific ship designs, we really need to re-evaluate our approach at our shaping of offensive and defensive firepower. Our warships are too under-armed for their size, and the only argument that I've heard till date is to "leave room for future upgrades and weapon expansion". IMO, this is senseless. European navies build dedicated Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) and Anti-Sub Warfare (ASW) ships; we don't - we focus on the multirole aspect. Hence, we need a large VLS farm to contain numerous types of precision missiles, to fulfill each role effectively, on a single patrol.
48 is a number too low, and those RBU-6000s? What a monstrosity! As Parthu bhaiya once said not too long ago, it is better to have an Indian equivalent of the Rolling- Airframe Missile (RAM) Launcher, which is compact and more importantly - modular, meaning easy integration of ASW rockets, loitering munitions, short-range, point-defense SAMs, etc. A future replacement of the AK-630s would also be welcome. Plus, we really need to double down on stealth - we throw the word around too loosely! None of our ships have a proper, "flush" design, and single-point, vertical integration of many sensor systems is needed.

Temporarily ending this post..... will need a bit more time to think about a few more things...
Till then, your thoughts @randomradio, @_Anonymous_ ,@Gautam, @Parthu, @Ankit Kumar, @Fatalis , @vstol Jockey, @Sathya, @RASALGHUL and others.....??

You not even able to establish persistent ISR over LAC but want to double the navy size within 10-15 years? Hmmm.

PLA not going to do any kind of maritime landing in India. Unki aukad se bahar hai. But invasion through north eastern AP is quite high.

 

[zAn]

After 5 commissioning did IN or MOD sort out the primary armament for Kalvari class subs. After the agasta westland debacle killed the black shark torpedo deal nor able to find if we went for indigenous one or choose a different one from outside.

 

[randomradio]

This might come across as a disjointed article, but I was lightly pondering over the Indian Navy's operational mandate, how it has evolved over the years, how it might look like in the future, how it is intricately tied with India's diplomatic and economic growth and ambitions and how it influences our overall capital procurement and investments.

Currently, I would say we are a confused naval power. Partly due to a lack of an integrated national strategic security overview, but mainly because we aren't sure how much to extend our naval reach, whether our economy would support it, and due to general Indian bureaucratic myopia. Combined by our (mostly justified) land warfare-centrism necessitated by Chinese aggression and cross-border terror threats, the Indian Navy often finds itself receiving the midget's share of the defense budget and national scrutiny. This has led to the Navy's role being limited to within the inner rim of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), supporting and defending India's maritime trade, and complementing our security apparatus against a small, yet rapidly growing, Pakistani fleet.

What India's political bosses fail to see, or are perhaps oblivious to, is the obvious maritime threat looming over our heads, resulting from an increased Chinese hegemonistic doctrine. We still consider that the Chinese would be preoccupied with contending with the combined forces of the US Navy, the Japanese and the South Koreans in the South China Sea and the Pacific theater. While this is true, China already has the world's largest naval fleet, with its tech gap with the USN rapidly contracting. They are sure to spillover into the IOR, with at least a full-fledged, dedicated CBG, comprising 10-12 ships and submarines, supported by their growing logistic/support facilities in Southeast Asia and the Horn of Africa (Djibouti).

This leads me to an important assertion, which I hope to connect through and with multiple points. A nation's (and thus, its navy's) mandate is always defined by its current and future power-projection needs, however big or small scale they might be. We can take a look at some good examples. The US Navy has a statutory requirement of 11 supercarriers, with 5-6 being on-station at any given time, and 1 being permanently forward deployed (USS Ronald Reagan in Yokosuka, Japan). This has remained the case for a good 4-5 decades now, primarily driven by their global presence needed across multiple theaters for multiple objectives :
The Atlantic - posturing against the Russians
The Middle-East/the Mediterranean - regularly supporting coalition forces in their military objectives + securing trade routes
The Pacific - reorientation against China + protecting Taiwan
All theaters - Gunboat Diplomacy
How does this "presence" manifest itself? Deployments of Carrier Battle Groups, maintaining permanent naval bases, airfields and logistics hubs in pacts with allied nations, conducting joint exercises and FONOPs, etc. The point is, the Americans have a relatively clear mandate, a relatively clear idea how to achieve it, and a relatively active (and adequate) MIC and a procurement plan to support their Navy. The French naval composition can also be studied, to see how doctrinal requirements predicate naval procurements and assets.

So, where does that leave us?
I am here to hazard an educated guess on how our naval and power-projection policy would (and dare I say, should) look like in the next 10-15 years, with due consideration of all present and future threats, indigenous and adversarial capabilities and restrictions.
Here is a map of the IOR:
View attachment 26106






























First, let's have an overview of Indian naval assets and presence in the IOR:
(Currently operational, or under construction, or proposed in the near future)
1. Oman - A Listening post at Ras-al-Hadd and berthing rights for the Indian Navy at Muscat naval base. An establishment at Duqm for the Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy
2. Madagascar - a listening post and radar facility
3. Mauritius - a 3000 m long airfield with associated facilities to house troops and host P-8I MPA on Agaléga Island
4. Seychelles - a system of six coastal surveillance radars in Mahe, Alphonse, Farquhar, Astove and Assumption Island which are linked to Indian surveillance systems
5. Several naval facilities in the ANC and Lakshadweep islands, the former recently under upgradation with Japanese assistance.
6. The US-Japanese "Fish-Hook" underwater sub-monitoring SOSUS network, now extending from the Indian Mainland (Chennai) to Port Blair, and from Indira Point to Sumatra, Indonesia. Obviously, India is now part of this network and has access to all its resources and generated data, concerning Chinese subs.
Fish-Hook:
View attachment 26107
- Combine this with the numerous security arrangements we have ratified with many nations, primarily the US - GSOMIA, BECA, LEMOA and COMCASA, gaining large access to their vast ISR network while building our own, and tons of logistical pacts we have signed with Australia, Japan, the US, South Korea, France and Singapore. So our fuel and munitions logistics are pretty well diversified across the region. We also have the IRNSS (NAVIC) regional navigational system active with 7(+2) satellites in orbit, covering the entire IOR, with ongoing plans to add more sats to the constellation to increase the range up-to 3500 Km, plus upgrading its data resolution and other technical parameters. Our warships, therefore can use an indigenous, high-accuracy positioning system, use berthing and military facilities of several allied nations and exchange fuel and rations with friendly ships at sea or in port, thus greatly increasing their patrol endurance.

Thus, we see that the primary projection-multipliers for India's warships are pretty much already in place, and will continue to be heavily expanded upon, in the Eastern IOR and beyond, into the SCS. Also, we have managed to build up a rough naval doctrine as well, while discussing what we have and where we can use it.
"The Indian Navy is to be sufficiently capable to protect India's maritime trade and shipping routes from the Middle East to the South China Sea (and everywhere below it), while also having assets to protect India's military bases and assets in the entirety of the IOR (Agalega, Assumption, etc.), while also having sufficient capability for adequate power projection from the Red Sea to the outer reaches of the SCS."

This is a pretty big and most importantly, achievable and feasible ,goal to aim for, as India becomes the third largest economic and military power on Earth. Now, we are sufficiently equipped to deal with the navy's hard and soft assets, their current state and what is needed in the immediate future.

To be very frank, we are in a state of near-destructive atrophy. Placing piecemeal orders of billion dollar warships with several critical systems still imported, commissioning destroyers and frigates without their helicopter complements and towed arrays; and submarines without their heavy-weight torpedoes, having 60-year old hepters still flying, our carriers punching below their weights, our air-wing not being potent enough, somehow making do without dedicated minesweepers or LPDs or enough logistics ships, having some silver bullets but not enough numbers of literally anything and probably everything, grappling with an officer shortage for a while, etc.

Now that I've ranted about what we are struggling with, I have to say that neither the Navy nor the Indian MIC is sitting around doing nothing.
- New ATLAS Electronik ACTAS systems are being procured and deployed fleet-wide.
- Newer warships are being armed with the ALH Mk-3 MR helos + 24 MH-60R helos being procured.
- Varunastra HWTs + TAL Shyena LWTs are entering production
- ALH Mk-3 MR helos being procured by the Navy and Coast Guard for base ops
- Vikky coming out of refit and Vikrant finishing trials
- Rafale F4.1 ISE being procured
- Intermittent Minesweeping kits being integrated almost fleet-wide
- New naval satellites planned and being built to complement GSAT-7C
- Naval MARCOS operators being probably the most adaptive of new tech in the country
- Shipyards expanding, spreading skills (frigate-building, etc.), adopting newer shipbuilding methods (Modular construction) and some more measures.....

However, in line with our newly established intentions, it is critical that we radically change our requirements, procurements and procedures, to better serve our needs:
- We need to significantly up-size our naval requirement numbers across ship-types. Roughly speaking, taking our limited expeditionary plans into account, we need at least:
- 4 aircraft carriers, at least 1 being EMALS-CATOBAR enabled, nuclear propulsion be damned (for now)
- 4 LPDs
- 24 destroyers
- 36 frigates
- 48 Corvettes/Coastal Warfare Ships
- 18 SSKs
- 6 SSNs
- 6 SSBNs
- 8 Refueling and Oiler Ships (Fleet Tankers)
- 18 LSTs
- 8 MCMVs
Basically, we need to roughly double our fleet size, in order to be an effective, true blue-water navy. Its entirely possible, when we look at the period between 2005 to 2015 - the Indian Navy nearly tripled its size of major warships. If we get a few more things right, we can achieve above figures by 2035-2040.

- Talking about specific ship designs, we really need to re-evaluate our approach at our shaping of offensive and defensive firepower. Our warships are too under-armed for their size, and the only argument that I've heard till date is to "leave room for future upgrades and weapon expansion". IMO, this is senseless. European navies build dedicated Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) and Anti-Sub Warfare (ASW) ships; we don't - we focus on the multirole aspect. Hence, we need a large VLS farm to contain numerous types of precision missiles, to fulfill each role effectively, on a single patrol.
48 is a number too low, and those RBU-6000s? What a monstrosity! As Parthu bhaiya once said not too long ago, it is better to have an Indian equivalent of the Rolling- Airframe Missile (RAM) Launcher, which is compact and more importantly - modular, meaning easy integration of ASW rockets, loitering munitions, short-range, point-defense SAMs, etc. A future replacement of the AK-630s would also be welcome. Plus, we really need to double down on stealth - we throw the word around too loosely! None of our ships have a proper, "flush" design, and single-point, vertical integration of many sensor systems is needed.

Temporarily ending this post..... will need a bit more time to think about a few more things...
Till then, your thoughts @randomradio, @_Anonymous_ ,@Gautam, @Parthu, @Ankit Kumar, @Fatalis , @vstol Jockey, @Sathya, @RASALGHUL and others.....??

Our 30-year objective is to become the primary dominant force in the IOR. There's an age-old adage which says whoever controls the IOR controls the world, or at least Asia. It's 'cause most international trade happens via the IOR. Other countries have to come to us for security.

Our naval power is a reflection of our pockets. The deeper our pockets, the bigger and more powerful our navy. Right now, we are only a regional power, and an upgrade to great power is still a decade+ away. We need a third carrier, 4 LPDs and at least 2-3 SSNs for that status.

Our force projection caters only to the IOR. The IN wants to operate at least 6 carriers for the IOR alone. So, for the next 30 years, that's going to be our main objective.

Furthermore, due to the small size of our economy, we don't have deep interests outside the IOR, there's nothing for us to protect that other countries cannot do on their own. For example, Philippines can protect themselves better than we can protect them. The rest is handled by the US. And at this time, we are not ready to step on American toes. Even the Chinese are at least 10 years away from doing that, and we are most definitely 30 years away. So, as long as we control the IOR, other powers can do whatever the heck they want elsewhere, the IOR gives us plenty of bargaining power, much more than other countries can get by controlling the Atlantic or Pacific.

 

[randomradio]

Danke Schon!

Though admittedly, I wrote this cuz I was too tired studying inorganic chemistry for my JEE Mains this Sunday, but will definitely have the second part up soon - it mainly deals with special ops, satellite strengths, ancillary shipbuilding reforms and so on...

Good luck for your exams.

 

[randomradio]

First we need to decide on immediate aims.

We need 4 distinct Commands.

1. Western Naval Command (Streching from Gujarat to Goa)

Responsibility: Should be able to fend of all of Pakistan Navy, mount a amphibious assault in Karachi or protect our sea lines all alone, without any assistance from assets of other commands.

2. Southern Naval Command: Lakhsadweep Islands, Karanataka , Kerela and Tamil Nadu

Responsibility:- Presence and security of our assets in Red Sea, Gulf region, Southern IOR (Seychelles, Mauritius, Maldives, etc) , all on its own.

3. Eastern Naval Command :- Andhra coast to West Bengal coast.

Responsibility: Should be able to fend off hostile Bangladesh Navy and Burmese Navy on its own. And ensure a sea based credible continuos nuclear deterrence.

4. A&N Command

Responsibility:- Protection our interests in Malacca and be the sword against PLAN.

This should be the aim till 2040. All these 4 commands should be able to execute these things on their own, without expecting any help from other commands.

Now once these are defined, then we can go and decide what ships are required where.

My shopping list would be like

1. Fleet of 8+ SSBNs , so that we have ideally 2 SSBNs active everytime. We need to have enough warheads on station so that both China and Pakistan can be fully destroyed together. (Under ENC)

2. Fleet of 12+ SSNs : (Under SNC and ENC) To protect the SSBN patrols and total dominance in the IOR. I don't think SSNs are necessary for dealing with Pakistan or Bangladesh.

3. Fleet of 24+ SSKs :- (Under WNC, ENC and ANC)

4. Fleet of 6-8 Minesweepers for each command. So like 24-28 atleast.

Rest accordingly to what resources are left.

The entire IOR must be under 1 command. Otherwise our PM will have to deal with the juris-my dick-tion excuse.

In fact, had it not been for the Himalayas, the entire country would have been under just one command.

PS: The IN plans on using surface and underwater robots and helicopters for minesweeping rather than dedicated ships, although some will be bought eventually. The US has the same plan.

 

[Ankit Kumar]

The entire IOR must be under 1 command. Otherwise our PM will have to deal with the juris-my dick-tion excuse.

In fact, had it not been for the Himalayas, the entire country would have been under just one command.

PS: The IN plans on using surface and underwater robots and helicopters for minesweeping rather than dedicated ships, although some will be bought eventually. The US has the same plan.

Replace the word command with fleets then.

And put the 4 fleets under 1 peninsular command headed by IN.

 

[randomradio]

Replace the word command with fleets then.

And put the 4 fleets under 1 peninsular command headed by IN.

We don't have enough assets for 4 fleets. China has 3 fleets and just 1 fleet will be as big as the IN over the next few years. If we split our navy into 4 fleets, then a single fleet commander won't have enough mass against a single extra-large PLAN fleet. It's worse against the USN today. Earlier, we had to deal with 2 US fleets, but both had limited assets for the IOR. But with their new organisation under IPACOM, we now have to bear the full brunt of the US Pacific fleet. So that's effectively 1 fleet the size of the IN and another fleet that's twice the size of the IN.

And this is without counting the British and Japanese fleets, both extensions of the USN, and each one roughly equal to the IN. The French were supposed to help balance things out, but they have decided to surrender even before the fight.

'China cannot be out, China must be in': France says it's diverging with Washington on Beijing ties

France's President Emmanuel Macron is reportedly planning a trip to China in the coming weeks to discuss energy and trade.

www.cnbc.com

I guess the Solomons have them spooked. Even the Australians. Such a chad move by China.

Something about mass:

Citing UK-France War, US Naval Expert Warns Chinese Navy Could 'Defeat' Much Superior US Navy In Actual War

US naval expert has warned that US Navy might lose to China’s (PLA) Navy, which enjoys a huge numerical advantage over the US.

eurasiantimes.com

This is why I actually prefer just 1 fleet under 1 command. This is also the reason why the USN has combined 2 continental fleets into a single fleet under IPACOM. The reality is commanders DO NOT like to share.

Anyway, I had pointed this out years ago. In the long term, we need 3 fleets. 2 fleets for IOR, the existing setup, and one fleet for the rest of the world. But this third fleet is necessary after 30 years. This fleet can operate in the Pacific and Atlantic as necessary and can be placed under its own command. I called it the "Global Fleet". As the size grows, it can be further split apart into continental fleets like the USN.

 

[D68]

Sorry to break up the discussion. Dumping some more pics from Varuna. Low res cos official IN pics.

 

[D68]

We don't have enough assets for 4 fleets. China has 3 fleets and just 1 fleet will be as big as the IN over the next few years. If we split our navy into 4 fleets, then a single fleet commander won't have enough mass against a single extra-large PLAN fleet. It's worse against the USN today. Earlier, we had to deal with 2 US fleets, but both had limited assets for the IOR. But with their new organisation under IPACOM, we now have to bear the full brunt of the US Pacific fleet. So that's effectively 1 fleet the size of the IN and another fleet that's twice the size of the IN.

And this is without counting the British and Japanese fleets, both extensions of the USN, and each one roughly equal to the IN. The French were supposed to help balance things out, but they have decided to surrender even before the fight.

'China cannot be out, China must be in': France says it's diverging with Washington on Beijing ties

France's President Emmanuel Macron is reportedly planning a trip to China in the coming weeks to discuss energy and trade.

www.cnbc.com

I guess the Solomons have them spooked. Even the Australians. Such a chad move by China.

Something about mass:

Citing UK-France War, US Naval Expert Warns Chinese Navy Could 'Defeat' Much Superior US Navy In Actual War

US naval expert has warned that US Navy might lose to China’s (PLA) Navy, which enjoys a huge numerical advantage over the US.

eurasiantimes.com

This is why I actually prefer just 1 fleet under 1 command. This is also the reason why the USN has combined 2 continental fleets into a single fleet under IPACOM. The reality is commanders DO NOT like to share.

Anyway, I had pointed this out years ago. In the long term, we need 3 fleets. 2 fleets for IOR, the existing setup, and one fleet for the rest of the world. But this third fleet is necessary after 30 years. This fleet can operate in the Pacific and Atlantic as necessary and can be placed under its own command. I called it the "Global Fleet". As the size grows, it can be further split apart into continental fleets like the USN.

To be fair, French just want to make money. It doesn't make sense for them to piss off China at the behest of the US. Most of the EU is like this, the UK is no different. Japan and Austrialia are much more assertive so Japan could be our best partner wrt to countering PLAN if it wasn't for their close US ties. Here's hoping they distinguish themselves from USN a little bit with their recently announced military budget increase. In-fact, if they want to be a major player in the region, they will have to.

It's much better to have a partner that's invested in countering PLAN due to their proximity. The UK, France and even the US being so far away will naturally not have the same level of threat-perception and urgency.

 

[Ankit Kumar]

We don't have enough assets for 4 fleets. China has 3 fleets and just 1 fleet will be as big as the IN over the next few years. If we split our navy into 4 fleets, then a single fleet commander won't have enough mass against a single extra-large PLAN fleet. It's worse against the USN today. Earlier, we had to deal with 2 US fleets, but both had limited assets for the IOR. But with their new organisation under IPACOM, we now have to bear the full brunt of the US Pacific fleet. So that's effectively 1 fleet the size of the IN and another fleet that's twice the size of the IN.

And this is without counting the British and Japanese fleets, both extensions of the USN, and each one roughly equal to the IN. The French were supposed to help balance things out, but they have decided to surrender even before the fight.

'China cannot be out, China must be in': France says it's diverging with Washington on Beijing ties

France's President Emmanuel Macron is reportedly planning a trip to China in the coming weeks to discuss energy and trade.

www.cnbc.com

I guess the Solomons have them spooked. Even the Australians. Such a chad move by China.

Something about mass:

Citing UK-France War, US Naval Expert Warns Chinese Navy Could 'Defeat' Much Superior US Navy In Actual War

US naval expert has warned that US Navy might lose to China’s (PLA) Navy, which enjoys a huge numerical advantage over the US.

eurasiantimes.com

This is why I actually prefer just 1 fleet under 1 command. This is also the reason why the USN has combined 2 continental fleets into a single fleet under IPACOM. The reality is commanders DO NOT like to share.

Anyway, I had pointed this out years ago. In the long term, we need 3 fleets. 2 fleets for IOR, the existing setup, and one fleet for the rest of the world. But this third fleet is necessary after 30 years. This fleet can operate in the Pacific and Atlantic as necessary and can be placed under its own command. I called it the "Global Fleet". As the size grows, it can be further split apart into continental fleets like the USN.

True. Resources are an issue. That's why I only listed down the submarines.

Even if nothing which I wrote gets done, the assets/squadrons deployed in Mumbai and in the worst case scenario supported by units based out of Karwar should be able to take on whole of PN without any assistance from assets assigned to east.

But then again this discussion is about what ideally should happen. And 24+ SSK, 10-12 SSNs, 6-8 SSBNs in 2040, that's bare minimum. Bare minimum.

Nothing which I wrote is wrong imo.

 

[_Anonymous_]

Frankly I don't know where do these delusions of grandeur come from about operating 2-3 fleets including a "global fleet " after thirty yrs ?

After 30 yrs assuming the status quo continues ( which is very unlikely ) circa 2050 , China is likely to be a 15 AC navy at least & twice as large as the USN . They're already neck at neck as far as the numbers go in surface vessels except in a few notable items viz ACs today.

For us to operate two fleets we'd need the equivalent of another IN as it exists today with an increase in the tonnage of the AC fleet ( I'm referring to 2 mid size carriers of 65000 displacement ) & 12-18 subs all with N propulsion to operate in the eastern Pacific among other sundries like LPD / LHD , more ISR based platforms , etc if we're to challenge the Chinese on their turf & admittedly even that'd be inadequate . But it'd still count for something substantial.

Who out here except for the usual suspect is punting we'd do so by 2050 ?

 

[D68]

Frankly I don't know where do these delusions of grandeur come from about operating 2-3 fleets including a "global fleet " after thirty yrs ?

After 30 yrs assuming the status quo continues ( which is very unlikely ) circa 2050 , China is likely to be a 15 AC navy at least & twice as large as the USN . They're already neck at neck as far as the numbers go in surface vessels except in a few notable items viz ACs today.

For us to operate two fleets we'd need the equivalent of another IN as it exists today with an increase in the tonnage of the AC fleet ( I'm referring to 2 mid size carriers of 65000 displacement ) & 12-18 subs all with N propulsion to operate in the eastern Pacific among other sundries like LPD / LHD , more ISR based platforms , etc .

Who out here except for the usual suspect is punting we'd do so by 2050 ?

For sure, the fleet size will be proportional to the size of our economy as it currently is. That is for certain. No Indian govenment is willing to spend disproportionately on the military. It's cheaper to avoid conflict diplomatically for the time being. When our GDP is 10 trillion, then we can have 2 fleets.

 

[Ashwin]

The entire IOR must be under 1 command. Otherwise our PM will have to deal with the juris-my dick-tion excuse.

In fact, had it not been for the Himalayas, the entire country would have been under just one command.

PS: The IN plans on using surface and underwater robots and helicopters for minesweeping rather than dedicated ships, although some will be bought eventually. The US has the same plan.

We don't have enough assets for 4 fleets. China has 3 fleets and just 1 fleet will be as big as the IN over the next few years. If we split our navy into 4 fleets, then a single fleet commander won't have enough mass against a single extra-large PLAN fleet. It's worse against the USN today. Earlier, we had to deal with 2 US fleets, but both had limited assets for the IOR. But with their new organisation under IPACOM, we now have to bear the full brunt of the US Pacific fleet. So that's effectively 1 fleet the size of the IN and another fleet that's twice the size of the IN.

And this is without counting the British and Japanese fleets, both extensions of the USN, and each one roughly equal to the IN. The French were supposed to help balance things out, but they have decided to surrender even before the fight.

'China cannot be out, China must be in': France says it's diverging with Washington on Beijing ties

France's President Emmanuel Macron is reportedly planning a trip to China in the coming weeks to discuss energy and trade.

www.cnbc.com

I guess the Solomons have them spooked. Even the Australians. Such a chad move by China.

Something about mass:

Citing UK-France War, US Naval Expert Warns Chinese Navy Could 'Defeat' Much Superior US Navy In Actual War

US naval expert has warned that US Navy might lose to China’s (PLA) Navy, which enjoys a huge numerical advantage over the US.

eurasiantimes.com

This is why I actually prefer just 1 fleet under 1 command. This is also the reason why the USN has combined 2 continental fleets into a single fleet under IPACOM. The reality is commanders DO NOT like to share.

Anyway, I had pointed this out years ago. In the long term, we need 3 fleets. 2 fleets for IOR, the existing setup, and one fleet for the rest of the world. But this third fleet is necessary after 30 years. This fleet can operate in the Pacific and Atlantic as necessary and can be placed under its own command. I called it the "Global Fleet". As the size grows, it can be further split apart into continental fleets like the USN.

This reasoning simply forgets our western neighbour. They are becoming a good enough adversity after recent rebalancing. Ten SSKs and some of them SSBs. It is a credible threat. But I agree that more than two don't make sense.

 

[_Anonymous_]

For sure, the fleet size will be proportional to the size of our economy as it currently is. That is for certain. No Indian govenment is willing to spend disproportionately on the military. It's cheaper to avoid conflict diplomatically for the time being. When our GDP is 10 trillion, then we can have 2 fleets.

We've not even reached 4 trillion USD as of today howering around 3.5 trillion USD at best. 10 trillion USD is a long way away off , most likely by 2040 if at all . Even then the increase in sheer numbers will have to be tempered with replacements which in itself is a big task .

Ideally we ought to be having 2 light carriers + 2 mid sized carriers ( or at least 1 mid sized carrier ) , ~24 DDGs , ~40 FFGs , 12-18 SSKs , 6 SSNs , 6 SSBNs as of today . We'd end up having these by 2040-45 T/L . Is that good enough for a 2 fleet Navy ? Not at all .

 

[randomradio]

To be fair, French just want to make money. It doesn't make sense for them to piss off China at the behest of the US. Most of the EU is like this, the UK is no different. Japan and Austrialia are much more assertive so Japan could be our best partner wrt to countering PLAN if it wasn't for their close US ties. Here's hoping they distinguish themselves from USN a little bit with their recently announced military budget increase. In-fact, if they want to be a major player in the region, they will have to.

It's much better to have a partner that's invested in countering PLAN due to their proximity. The UK, France and even the US being so far away will naturally not have the same level of threat-perception and urgency.

Most of Europe is irrelevant in the water though. France is a P5 member, and China is a military threat to France. The ostrich-head-sand metaphor is fitting here. France is in denial, the current leadership is soft. They don't realise yet that have no choice but to fight.

UK is part of AUKUS, so they have a dog in the fight already. Their intentions are clear. They also plan on expanding their navy.

https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2021/march/22/20210322-defence-review

Over the next decade there will be seven new classes of ships being built in British yards, including three classes of frigates: the Type 26, 31 and the new Type 32s.

It means by the start of the 2030s, the Royal Navy will have more than 20 frigates and destroyers, aiming to grow to 24 with the introduction of the Type 32s.

UK to inject £4 billion into shipbuilding to deliver 150 naval and civil vessels

The shipbuilding fund was originally announced in 2020 but the strategy has been refreshed, with Boris Johnson set to mention "rising Russian aggression".

news.sky.com

The UK will inject £4 billion into regional shipbuilding to deliver more than 150 new naval and civil vessels over the next 30 years, the government said.

You can see that they are very serious about expansion of their navy.

The Chinese taking Taiwan alone will screw up the US. It's because the USN will get kicked out of the Western Pacific. And all their allies are part of the second island chain, and they have mutual defence treaties with these countries. After China takes Taiwan, next up will be SoKo. Following that will be Japan. So the US will get sucked into a fight nevertheless. Without Taiwan, protecting SoKo and Japan is impossible.

China likes territory, including French territories in the Pacific. If the US gets pushed out of Taiwan, you can bet that base in Solomon will be built.

True. Resources are an issue. That's why I only listed down the submarines.

Even if nothing which I wrote gets done, the assets/squadrons deployed in Mumbai and in the worst case scenario supported by units based out of Karwar should be able to take on whole of PN without any assistance from assets assigned to east.

But then again this discussion is about what ideally should happen. And 24+ SSK, 10-12 SSNs, 6-8 SSBNs in 2040, that's bare minimum. Bare minimum.

Nothing which I wrote is wrong imo.

No issues with the numbers your quoted, just the organisation of the fleets.

We are not facing a two-front threat in the water yet though, so it's not such a big issue at this time.

 

[D68]

We could get there by 2035. Here is a projection by Bloomberg.

Bloomberg - Are you a robot?

www.bloomberg.com

Ofc, this was pre-covid (2019) and the nature of long term GDP forecasts being what it is... not dependable but if we take it as an approximation, $10t by 2035 is possible and would be pretty nice. Project 18 should be nearly complete by then or at least close. Having 5 13t destroyers with a large no. of missiles will make a good difference. Like @SammyBoi pointed out, our current DDGs are kinda under equipped.

In terms of carriers, imo Vikramaditya and Vikrant would be complemented well by with 40,000t-60,000t CATOBAR carrier; nuclear propulsion, EMALS the works. The ability to field AEW aircraft would be a nice addition. If we had access to VTOL aircraft (F35), a couple of America/Izumo class boats would be viable but all these assets would mean investing in more frigates and submarines.

It's easy and fun to play admiral but who knows what the future holds.

 

[randomradio]

This reasoning simply forgets our western neighbour. They are becoming a good enough adversity after recent rebalancing. Ten SSKs and some of them SSBs. It is a credible threat. But I agree that more than two don't make sense.

A single fleet under a single command doesn't forget our Western neighbour. It simply means 1 commander will handle both enemies. The IAF will have a single command for the entire IOR.

The US IPACOM is just 1 fleet that takes care of 4 potential major enemies/rivals; China, Russia, India and others (ME and Indonesia). A single command means there's only 1 guy incharge of the entire region, no matter how many enemies. This means it will be a capability-based force rather than an adversary-specific force. For example, the UK and France have an adversary-specific military force, but with some expeditionary capabilities against weak enemies elsewhere.

The IA is converting into a capability-based force too, although it should take a decade or more before it happens. What it means is the IA will be capable of handling any adversary, not just Pakistan or China. That's including the US, Europe and even our neighbours in the IOR. This requires significant changes in training, ToE and coordination with other services. For example, we may have to invade Somalia and Dijbouti to get to the PLAN base there. Or send troops to French and allied island territories in the IOR and Pacific for protection. Stuff meant to make us a great power.

Overall the IN needs to grow in size by 3 times. Twice as big by 2050 and then another 30% or so for other oceans after 2050, possibly by 2060. 10 years is enough time to build 20-30 new large ships and subs. That's effectively about 350 ships. In comparison, the USN will be 350-400 ship strong whereas the Chinese could be as much as 1000, they are at 450 today, to counter USN plus allies. The USN had 1200 large ships at the end of WW2, so the Chinese may eventually intend to match or exceed that, they have this thing about measuring dicks.

 

[randomradio]

We could get there by 2035. Here is a projection by Bloomberg.



Ofc, this was pre-covid (2019) and the nature of long term GDP forecasts being what it is... not dependable but if we take it as an approximation, $10t by 2035 is possible and would be pretty nice. Project 18 should be nearly complete by then or at least close. Having 5 13t destroyers with a large no. of missiles will make a good difference. Like @SammyBoi pointed out, our current DDGs are kinda under equipped.

In terms of carriers, imo Vikramaditya and Vikrant would be complemented well by with 40,000t-60,000t CATOBAR carrier; nuclear propulsion, EMALS the works. The ability to field AEW aircraft would be a nice addition. If we had access to VTOL aircraft (F35), a couple of America/Izumo class boats would be viable but all these assets would mean investing in more frigates and submarines.

It's easy and fun to play admiral but who knows what the future holds.

Our GDP today is big enough to plan for a larger navy. For example, when the P-18 comes up for construction, we don't really need to stop with just 5.

Our DDGs are not under-equipped either. A Kolkata class has got more firepower than an AB class for a naval battle. The USN ships have more VLS because their SAMs aren't as capable as the Barak 8 and they need other type of weapons to support their expeditionary role, like LACMs. None of their ships have as many AShMs as a Kolkata class, nor are they as capable as a Brahmos. They rely more on their air capabilities for the anti-ship role, although they are moving towards increasing their AShM inventory because of China.

Our ships have exclusively been built to fight other ships at sea. It's part of our no-invasions stance. The P-18 is set to change that because we are now moving towards great power status, and that requires the ability to invade other countries by sea.

 

[Amarante]

This interview of Captain (Dr.) Gurpreet S Khurana was first published in the special issue: 'Indian Military Power' of DSI magazine (Fr.), May 2022.
Sorry if it's been posted before.

The challenges of India's maritime strategy​

What is your perception of Chinese maritime activism in the Indian Ocean?

Gurpreet S. Khurana: With the start of its anti-piracy mission in December 2008, China established a permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Since then, its naval footprint in these waters has expanded rapidly, including through the deployment of its intelligence gathering vessels. Its new generation Shang-class nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) are also constantly deployed in the northern Indian Ocean. The first of these submarines entered service with the PLA Navy in 2006, which in effect marked the genesis of the Indo-Pacific security link between the two oceans.​

​

China has long sought to develop nodes of influence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) through various measures, which was first referred to in 2005 as the 'string of pearls' strategy. China's actions largely involve the sale of defense equipment and the development of strategic infrastructure. Recently, much of this has been incorporated into the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This creates the potential scenario where smaller regional littorals, especially island states, could become strategically dependent on China. In this way, Beijing is also trying to develop military logistics facilities in the ROI to strengthen its naval presence in the region. Its base in Djibouti has been operational since 2017. China could acquire more reliable and full-fledged military bases in other key locations such as Gwadar, Pakistan.​

​

For India, this amounts to a competition for influence and the addition of a maritime dimension to the pre-existing Chinese continental threat. This poses a serious risk to India's vital interests, including its critical systems and infrastructure, and calls into question the Indian Navy's ability to establish maritime control in the region and its SLOC (Sea Lines Of Communications) interdiction strategy against China. Chinese SNAs also threaten India's nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) strongholds, and hence its nuclear second-strike capability. In a worst-case scenario for India, this could lead to a two-front conflict, with Pakistan joining China as a formal ally against India.​

​

India cooperates a lot with Indian Ocean states, such as Mauritius and the Seychelles, but also with France, which is naturally present in the region. What is India's vision of the Indian Ocean?

India's national policy making places great emphasis on its regional role in preserving good order and a safe maritime environment in the Indian Ocean. The logic is partly linked to New Delhi's international obligations as a regional power; but more importantly, it is based on the belief that India cannot develop and progress in isolation unless its regional maritime neighbours also prosper with it. Accordingly, when commissioning an Indian-built vessel for the Mauritius Coast Guard in Port Louis in 2015, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi coined the concept of 'SAGAR', which is a Hindi word meaning 'ocean', and is an acronym for 'Security and Growth for All in the Region'. In particular, the SAGAR concept is meant to represent an 'inclusive' model of regional development, and is seen by countries in the region as a contrast to China's BRI, which is an 'extractive' development model based on China's self-help as an extra-regional actor. The SAGAR concept also means that economic prosperity is so closely linked to security that prosperity cannot be achieved without a secure and enabling regional environment. SAGAR has since become India's vision for the Indian Ocean and beyond, and the main policy directive guiding India's maritime security strategy.​

​

Many countries are present in Djibouti, not only to support anti-piracy efforts in the Horn of Africa, but also for other missions: intelligence, protection of SLOCs, pre-positioning, etc. Why is India not present in Djibouti when it was very active against piracy? Did it have plans to open naval facilities around the ocean?

I suppose the fact that India did not choose to have a base in Djibouti can be attributed to the result of a simple cost/benefit assessment. India's geostrategic location and peninsular layout with island territories on its eastern and western coasts allow its naval forces to have a wide reach into the northern Indian Ocean. While a forward operating base in the Horn of Africa would have been desirable for India, it would not have materialised without a substantial financial cost. India's reciprocal logistical support arrangements with France and other countries in the region have further mitigated the need for its own facility in the region.​

​

For India, the need for a forward base in the southern Indian Ocean has become more pressing; especially as the Indian Navy regularly assists smaller regional countries in the region - particularly island states - by undertaking surveillance and hydrographic surveys in their vast maritime areas. Accordingly, in 2015, India signed an agreement with the Seychelles to develop a joint naval base on Assumption Island. However, with the change of government in Port Victoria in 2020, the agreement was cancelled. Unconfirmed reports indicate that India may develop a naval base on North Agalega Island (Mauritius) for the use of the Mauritian Coast Guard. While it can be assumed that such a facility straddling China's main sea lines of communication could also be used by Indian naval units, it is not yet certain that it would bear fruit. Nevertheless, the reciprocal logistics agreement between India and France signed in 2015 could potentially allow Indian naval forces to use the facilities in Reunion and Mayotte. Similarly, a similar agreement with the United States signed in 2016 could provide access to Diego Garcia, extending India's naval reach and presence in the southern Indian Ocean.​

​

India has been particularly keen to develop military cooperation with many navies over the past twenty years, including Vietnam. Will it become more involved in the South China Sea?

India's 2015 Maritime Security Strategy document states that the South China Sea (SCS) is within India's areas of maritime interest, albeit as a 'secondary zone' (as opposed to the northern Indian Ocean, which is a 'primary zone'). With about 20% of its total merchandise trade passing through the SCS, and its oil and gas joint ventures in the Vietnamese Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), India is a major player in a secure SCS, including for the benefit of freedom of navigation in accordance with an established rules-based order. India's concerns are illustrated by China's objections to its oil exploration projects in Vietnam's EEZ. In July 2011, the Indian warship INS Airavat, while sailing in the Vietnamese EEZ, was warned by a Chinese voice that it was "entering Chinese waters". Such incidents significantly influence national policy-making in New Delhi. At the ADMM-Plus [ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus] meeting held in June 2021, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh said, "India hopes that the negotiations on the Code of Conduct (SCS) will lead to outcomes that are consistent with international law and will not prejudice the legitimate rights and interests of nations (like India) that are not participating in these discussions."​

​

New Delhi has thus been keen to play a constructive role in the area, both bilaterally with the SCS littorals and in the multilateral forums centred on ASEAN and the Quad. Specifically, India has been involved in capacity building of local maritime security forces. This is aimed at enabling countries in the region to stand on their own feet and reduce their power asymmetries vis-à-vis China. Notably, India would soon export BrahMos supersonic missiles to the Philippines.​

​

The navy's overseas deployments in the SCS (and beyond) are intended to reassure friendly countries and the Indian diaspora by demonstrating national will. In May 2020, following the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, the Indian Navy launched the 'SAGAR' mission, sailing its ships to provide essential medicines and medical liquid oxygen supplies to several countries in the region, including Vietnam, to help their citizens overcome the pandemic. The Navy should continue to undertake similar actions in the SCS as an instrument of India's foreign policy. Indian warships deployed in the region are also prepared and equipped to respond to humanitarian contingencies related to natural disasters and maritime accidents. In addition, such deployments would help India develop strategic and operational situational awareness in the region and strengthen deterrence against China.​

India is developing its capabilities on all fronts: submarines and aircraft carriers, but also on the surface, destroyers, frigates and corvettes. What are the main challenges in building the Indian Navy?

The Indian Navy plans to increase its current force level of 137 ships to 170 ships by 2027. This would include three aircraft carriers, two of which would be domestically built. With self-reliance a national priority, India has developed a fairly robust shipbuilding industry. However, it continues to be deficient in some high-end technologies. While 90% indigenisation has been achieved in the 'floating' component (hulls and structures), the proportion is 65% in the 'motion' category (propulsion and power generation), and only 45% in the 'combat' category (weapons and sensors). However, breakthroughs have been made in some areas such as supersonic missiles, sonar and even torpedoes. The lack of local aircraft, helicopters and UAVs is another deficit, which is currently filled by imports. The revival of national expertise in submarine construction has been another challenge. This is being addressed in partnership with France in the ongoing P75 (Scorpene) conventional submarine project. At the same time, India has successfully developed its domestic industry to build nuclear submarines. However, equipping these submarines with appropriate weapons and sensors would be a difficult task.​

​

The dilution of the navy's primary (military) role after the Mumbai terrorist attack has also posed a major, albeit transitory, challenge to naval force planning. Naval force development has traditionally focused on long-range capabilities. However, after the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack by Pakistan-based operatives, the navy was tasked with leading India's coastal security apparatus and was forced to introduce fast interceptors and detection equipment to bolster the defence of ports, naval bases and airfields, and also raised a new specialised force called the Sagar Prahari Bal, which means 'Ocean Sentry Force'. This has meant that much of the navy's financial allocation has been diverted to such brown water capabilities, at the expense of offshore systems. Despite this, in recent years the navy has managed to maintain the envisaged 60% proportion of offshore platforms in the total naval force.​

What could be the next steps in the cooperation between India and France? What would be desirable?

Indo-French cooperation in naval and maritime security has gradually strengthened since 1983, when the two countries started conducting bilateral naval exercises. These exercises were later named 'Varuna' in 2001 and have since grown in scope and complexity. Moreover, over the last two decades, I have personally witnessed the progressive deepening of the interface between the Indian Navy and the French naval forces in the Indian Ocean under ALINDIEN. In their first maritime dialogue in 2015, India and France signed the Defence Logistics Agreement, followed by the 'White Shipping' information sharing agreement in 2017. More recently, France has appointed a naval liaison officer at the Indian Fusion Information Centre (IFC-IOR) near New Delhi.​

​

France sees India as a key pillar of its Indo-Pacific strategy. Due to the demanding and dynamic nature of the emerging geopolitical and security environment in the Indo-Pacific region, India and France will need to think outside the box to achieve a quantum shift in the existing level of cooperation, rather than an iterative progression as hitherto. The first imperative for Indo-French cooperation lies in the area of undersea warfare and undersea domain awareness. It would include sharing of information and advanced technologies, including for nuclear submarine propulsion. In addition, to meet humanitarian and other contingencies in the ROI, India is seeking to commission large amphibious ships, which could be built in partnership using the French Mistral-class LHD design. In addition, India needs the partnership of France (and other EU states) to combat various forms of maritime crime in the western ROI. The anti-piracy coordination between the Indian Navy and EUNAVFOR is a very successful model for such cooperation. France's upgrade to full membership of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) in December 2020 has opened up new avenues for cooperation with India. /deepl​

 

[Amarante]

A Decade of Transformation IN 2011-2021 : Signalling Power and Partnerships​