Point de situation des opérations en Ukraine 15 mai 2022
Update on operations in Ukraine 15 May 2022
One month after the start of the "decisive" phase of the offensive for the complete conquest of the Donbass, Russian forces have conquered a pocket 15 km west and 20 km south of Izyum against four Ukrainian brigades. They seem to have stopped in this area, giving up on Barvinkove, a key point 40 km west of Sloviansk. Combined with the sterility of the attacks coming from the South and in particular from the city of Donetsk, the possibility of a large "pincer" encircling the Donetsk oblast is no longer credible.
Russian forces are now concentrating their efforts simultaneously but separately on the cities of Sloviansk and Severodonetsk. In the first case, the 2nd Guards Motorised Infantry Division in the Izyum pocket to the west of Sloviansk is pressing the 81st Air Assault Brigade with fire but not attacking. The main effort was made northeast of Sloviansk on the axis from Oleksandrivna to the Ozerne bridgehead, along the Sviati Hory nature park and the Donets River. North of the arc protecting Sloviansk, the Ukrainian 57th motorised brigade has retreated some ten kilometres in a week and it will soon be difficult to hold the town of Lyman. In the second case, Russian forces are increasing their attacks on the outskirts of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk.
The crossing of the Donets River in the area of the village of Bilohorivka ended on 13 May in a Russian disaster with the equivalent of a battle group of the 35th motorised brigade entirely destroyed by Ukrainian artillery. This episode shows how little tactical progress was made by some Russian forces who were unable to secure and organise a crossing zone. The Russians were more successful north of Popasna, in the direction of Lysychansk, which was still far away.
In summary, the Russian offensive is focusing more and more strictly on the conquest of Sloviansk and the Severdonetsk-Lysychansk pair, making do with limited attacks and many strikes along the rest of the Donbass arc and placing itself in a defensive posture in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions. The Russians are advancing very slowly, with significant losses, and when you lose a lot of men and equipment to gain little ground, the battle of manoeuvre tends to become a battle of attrition.
While the Russian support and logistics forces were less affected than during the battle of Kiev (better protection and less harassment on the rear axes), it can be estimated that the Russians lost the equivalent of one armoured-mechanised battalion (the 'shock' component of the battle groups, i.e. about 40 tanks and armoured infantry vehicles) every three days in this combat zone. That is the equivalent of one-fifth of the battle groups engaged in the area already neutralised (10 out of 48 including the Popasna area) and a potential of a few weeks of fighting at this rate and at this casualty rate, all other things being equal.
For the moment, if the Ukrainians are retreating, they are mainly exchanging ground for time gained and Russian losses, which can be estimated at twice theirs, considering the ratio of documented losses in combat vehicles (of the order of 1 to 4 in favour of the Ukrainians on the Oryx site, but undoubtedly underestimated in favour of the Ukrainians). So what can Russian forces expect in the coming month in this sector?
The dislocation of Ukrainian forces north of Sloviansk is unlikely, at best the Russians will see them withdraw to the city. The Russians may therefore be on the northern outskirts of Sloviansk by the end of the month or early June, with exhausted forces. Their prospects are more favourable for Severodonetsk where they are already on the outskirts of the city. They can hope at best to have the city surrounded by the end of the month. They will then have to fight inside the urban strongholds which, unlike Mariupol which was attacked at the beginning of the war, have been prepared for more than two months,
But things are not otherwise equal. Firstly, both adversaries can reinforce or relieve their forces in the area. The Russian forces would have about twenty battle groups in reserve in Belgorod, most of them from the withdrawal from the Kiev region. Perhaps they have been reconstituted and could therefore be deployed, in the area or elsewhere, as there is no shortage of needs. The Ukrainian forces still have some brigades, such as the 45th Air Assault Brigade in Poltava. In case of emergency, they can also transfer three or four brigades from the Kharkiv or Kherson sectors. The Ukrainians have also received and are receiving a lot of Western equipment, more than 240 tanks and 400 armoured infantry vehicles at the beginning of May, already more than they have lost in battle since the war began, and perhaps most importantly 200 pieces of artillery, 152 or 155 mm howitzers or multiple rocket launchers. At least as important in the immediate term, they are receiving fuel and ammunition. There was enough to supply the sector units but above all, in the longer term, to train new units.
But as proof of their confidence in the SKS (Sloviansk-Kramatorsk-Severodonetsk) sector's ability to resist, the Ukrainians are devoting their reserve forces to attacking elsewhere. They have made significant progress this week north of Kharkiv, where the forces currently hold only a small, 10km-wide pocket across the border from Kozacha Lopan to Vesele. The Russian forces, covered by Donetsk Republic battalions left behind, can consider themselves safe beyond a border that the Ukrainians can hardly cross, at least openly, or else they would probably provoke an official Russian declaration of war. The first effect of this advance, first to the east and then to the north of Kharkiv, by four Ukrainian brigades (one of which is territorial) is to remove the threat of Russian artillery from the city. On the contrary, it allows the main logistical axis from Belgorod to Izyum via Voltchansk to be threatened by a ground attack (Voltchansk is in Ukraine, 15 km from the nearest Ukrainian troops), by infiltration, even if the axis seems to be protected by the spetsnaz brigades and perhaps above all by precise long-range artillery (American M-777 or French Caesar).
The threat forced the Russian command to withdraw part of the forces from the Izyum pocket (and surprisingly not from Belgorod it seems) to protect Volchansk. Several Russian artillery groups have been moved to the border to carry out "fire diversions", notably on the Suzyum side.
On the other hand, the Ukrainian forces did not make any progress on the Kherson side where they had five manoeuvre brigades supported by two territorial brigades/National Guard against seven weakened Russian brigades/regiments. The balance of forces is more balanced than in the Kharkiv region, but it is there that the strategic potential in case of tactical success (threat to Crimea, recapture of the entire poorly defended southern zone) is the greatest.
If the Donbass front continues to resist, it is perhaps on this side that the Ukrainians should focus their efforts. Similarly, if the North Donbass front is blocked, it may be in the Zaporizhia-Donetsk area that the Russians have the most potential against the sparse Ukrainian forces. This might explain the reinforcement of Russian positions in the region from forces in Donetsk or Mariupol, where fighting continues.
www.vox.com
