F1 camel race sweetie. You ought to fly down & see it for yourself. Just remember no cross dressing , 72 genders , wearing make up & other such funny business or you'd have the camel mounting you instead of the other way around.
Gulf and Middle east news and discussions
- Thread starter Shashank
- Start date
Damn ! I see that part about the camel mounting you thrilled you to bits , sweetie. Silly me , I should've known better . Always forget your orientation. @WHOHE
Meanwhile , in other news , this has to be some sort of revolution . Never thought I'd see this kind of news in my lifetime.
Also Blinken goes on record to clarify that US has no plans for regime change in Russia. I don't quite know what to marvel here - The sheer haughty arrogance of the US SecState or the dumbing down / Irishification of the western media & people.
What're your views Paddy ? @BMD
Iran fears push Israel, Arab nations to once-'unthinkable' security partnerships - Breaking Defense
One such arrangement would include real-time intel sharing about Iranian drones, a source told Breaking Defense.
breakingdefense.com
Better than our mki's if you want that answer primarily in terms of electronics. Inferior to the f-15EX by a margin.
#Turkey
(ForeignPolicy, may06)
The Middle East’s Kumbaya* Moment Won’t Last
The diplomatic resets and outreach underway are just competition by another means.
« Last week, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Saudi Arabia, where he met with King Salman and Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman. In late April, Iranian media confirmed that senior security officials from Saudi Arabia and Iran had met for a fifth round of normalization talks held under the auspices of the Iraqi and Omani governments. In March, Israel’s president, Isaac Herzog, visited Turkey—the first visit of a senior Israeli official to that country in 14 years. The same month, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad dropped in on Dubai’s Expo 2020 and met with Emirati leaders. Erdogan paid a visit to the United Arab Emirates in February after Abu Dhabi’s crown prince traveled to Turkey last November. And over the winter, the Emiratis and Iranians exchanged trade and investment delegations.All this diplomatic activity has certain corners of Washington buzzing about regional “de-escalation” and “realignment.” It is a data point for advocates of U.S. retrenchment from the Middle East, the logic being that if regional actors are behaving responsibly and settling their differences, then the United States can draw down and only return in the event of a crisis.
That sounds great, but I don’t buy it. Not the arguments in favor of retrenchment and offshore balancing; those make sense (though mostly only in journal articles—when the United States tried this in the 1970s, it didn’t work, resulting in a long-term U.S. commitment to Gulf security). What I don’t buy is that this recent flurry of diplomacy heralds some new era of peace, love, and understanding in the Middle East. Rather, the various resets and outreach underway in the region are merely another means by which its leaders can pursue the same competition and conflicts of the past decade.
Even for someone as deeply cynical as myself, it is good news that regional powers are talking to each other. The conventional wisdom is that money is driving a new regional atmosphere that puts a premium on investments and economic cooperation instead of proxy wars and troll armies.
Since Ankara is pushing much of the regional reset, that makes a lot of sense. Erdogan’s economic mismanagement has contributed to a yearslong lira crisis, and with inflation running at about 70 percent, the Turkish leader has vowed to grow the economy out of the calamity of his own making. Thus, he has dropped the bellicose rhetoric about the Emiratis being—among other nasty things—pirates, ignorant, and incompetent. Erdogan also transferred the trial (in absentia) of the individuals charged in the murder of Jamal Khashoggi to Saudi Arabia, ending any possibility that they will be held accountable. This is the geopolitical version of going hat in hand hoping for some investment from enormous Gulf sovereign wealth funds, trade deals, currency swaps, and perhaps drone sales.
In fairness, the Turkish government’s rapprochement with Israel is less about money—or even about Israel—than many might believe. Officials in Ankara reason that if they come to terms with the Israeli government, it will relieve pressure on them in Washington. There is something to this, of course. After all, a trilateral logic underpins Egypt’s relations with the United States in which Israel plays a role. The Turks seem to believe that pro-Israel and Jewish organizations in the United States will advocate on their behalf if Erdogan welcomes his Israeli counterpart and the two exchange phone calls.
Setting aside the crude view concerning the influence of these groups, there is little evidence advocacy groups representing American Jews or Israel’s supporters want to help Erdogan, whether to get Turkey out from under U.S. sanctions over Ankara’s purchase of the Russian-made S-400 missile defense system or to make the U.S. Justice Department’s investigation into alleged sanctions-busting and other chicanery by the Turkish government-controlled Halkbank go away.
When it comes to de-escalation with Iran, the Emiratis have reportedly expressed interest in investment opportunities there, in particular a renewable energy project. The Saudis and Iranians have not come that far. The best one can say about those meetings is that they continue to happen.
Still, even with all the smiles and talk of cooperation, it is hard not to believe something else is going on. After a decade of calling each other terrorists, accusing each other of being sources of regional instability, and arming each other’s opponents, the current declarations of a new era in brotherly relations are too neat and pat.
Having proved unable to impose their wills on their antagonists by force, regional leaders are now trying a different tack. The Emiratis, for example, have hardly fallen in love with Erdogan, and the smug grin on the Saudi crown prince’s face in one of the photographs taken during the Turkish president’s recent visit suggests that the Saudis, like the Emiratis, are well aware of Erdogan’s desperation over a failing economy and soft poll numbers.»
The Middle East’s Kumbaya Moment Won’t Last
The diplomatic resets and outreach underway are just competition by another means.
foreignpolicy.com
*To preserve your sanity i urge you not to search for kumbaya-YT-Baez in your browser. You’re warned.
/!\ i’m very sorry, my #88 post is incomplete.
Here is the following//end of the text from FP:
«This makes it a propitious moment for these Gulf states to gain some leverage with Ankara through their financial power—something they were unable to develop by, for instance, supporting Khalifa Haftar in Libya, who sought to overthrow a
Turkish ally, the internationally recognized Libyan government in Tripoli.
For their part, the Israelis are being cautious with the Turks. They do not trust Erdogan, but they seem to be playing along, especially if they can get something out of the Turkish leader’s need to improve his position in Washington. Getting Erdogan to clamp down on the Hamas terrorists operating out of Turkey, for example, would be a win for Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett.
At the same time, the Israelis are not willing to give up their strong economic and security ties with Greece and the Republic of Cyprus—two longtime nemeses of Turkey—for the sake of improved relations with Ankara. That’s similar to Egypt’s approach to Turkey’s concerted and thus far unsuccessful effort to court Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.
Think about that for a moment: The Turkish government wants to reset its relations with Israel and Egypt. Why the change of heart? In two words: Greece and Cyprus. The Israelis, Egyptians, Greeks, and Cypriots all tightened their ties with each other in response to Turkey’s needlessly aggressive posture in the Eastern Mediterranean. Lost in all the happy talk of de-escalation and realignment, it seems clear that Turkey is trying to peel two powerful friends away from Athens and Nicosia. Indeed, with Russia’s blitz into Ukraine dominating everyone’s attention, few have noticed the recent precipitous increase in Turkish incursions into Greek airspace over the Aegean Sea. It seems Turkey wants to de-escalate in some places so it can escalate elsewhere.
Then there is Iran’s dialogue with the UAE and Saudi Arabia. When the Emiratis and the Saudis sit down to talk with the Iranians, their vulnerability to Tehran—both its missiles and its proxies—is all too evident. Thus, they have good reason to reduce tensions, especially since they believe they can no longer count on the United States as a source of regional security and stability.
Let’s be clear, though: This de-escalation is intended to buy Saudi Arabia and the UAE time to figure out how best to meet the Iranian threat—be it by drawing closer to Israel, working with the Chinese and Russian governments, or developing nuclear technology. Sharing the region with Iran is not something its neighbors on the western side of the Gulf—with the exception of Qatar—are inclined to do.
Too often over the last two decades the United States has pursued policies based on faulty assumptions about the Middle East. Inferring that the current moment of seeming rapprochement is anything other than competition by another means would be another bad assumption on which to justify retrenchment. This kumbaya moment will not last.»
END.
Here is the following//end of the text from FP:
«This makes it a propitious moment for these Gulf states to gain some leverage with Ankara through their financial power—something they were unable to develop by, for instance, supporting Khalifa Haftar in Libya, who sought to overthrow a
Turkish ally, the internationally recognized Libyan government in Tripoli.
For their part, the Israelis are being cautious with the Turks. They do not trust Erdogan, but they seem to be playing along, especially if they can get something out of the Turkish leader’s need to improve his position in Washington. Getting Erdogan to clamp down on the Hamas terrorists operating out of Turkey, for example, would be a win for Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett.
At the same time, the Israelis are not willing to give up their strong economic and security ties with Greece and the Republic of Cyprus—two longtime nemeses of Turkey—for the sake of improved relations with Ankara. That’s similar to Egypt’s approach to Turkey’s concerted and thus far unsuccessful effort to court Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.
Think about that for a moment: The Turkish government wants to reset its relations with Israel and Egypt. Why the change of heart? In two words: Greece and Cyprus. The Israelis, Egyptians, Greeks, and Cypriots all tightened their ties with each other in response to Turkey’s needlessly aggressive posture in the Eastern Mediterranean. Lost in all the happy talk of de-escalation and realignment, it seems clear that Turkey is trying to peel two powerful friends away from Athens and Nicosia. Indeed, with Russia’s blitz into Ukraine dominating everyone’s attention, few have noticed the recent precipitous increase in Turkish incursions into Greek airspace over the Aegean Sea. It seems Turkey wants to de-escalate in some places so it can escalate elsewhere.
Then there is Iran’s dialogue with the UAE and Saudi Arabia. When the Emiratis and the Saudis sit down to talk with the Iranians, their vulnerability to Tehran—both its missiles and its proxies—is all too evident. Thus, they have good reason to reduce tensions, especially since they believe they can no longer count on the United States as a source of regional security and stability.
Let’s be clear, though: This de-escalation is intended to buy Saudi Arabia and the UAE time to figure out how best to meet the Iranian threat—be it by drawing closer to Israel, working with the Chinese and Russian governments, or developing nuclear technology. Sharing the region with Iran is not something its neighbors on the western side of the Gulf—with the exception of Qatar—are inclined to do.
Too often over the last two decades the United States has pursued policies based on faulty assumptions about the Middle East. Inferring that the current moment of seeming rapprochement is anything other than competition by another means would be another bad assumption on which to justify retrenchment. This kumbaya moment will not last.»
END.
Has more advanced avionics and engine than the MKI and all other jets save for the Rafale in our inventory. The SA carries an older AESA and EW suite along with outdated MMI, so it's far behind in capability terms compared to the F-15EX. But even the F-15EX is not usable against China, so the SA is also useless to us.
Why is the Israel-UAE trade pact more than just another international deal?
Israel and the United Arab Emirates signed a historic trade agreement on May 31 with an aim to do trade worth more than $10 billion annually. The UAE is now the first country in the Arab world to have a free trade agreement with Israel.The deal comes two years after the then US President Donald Trump first brokered the process of normalisation of ties between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain through the Abraham Accords in 2020.
What is the deal?
After the deal, tariffs will be removed or reduced on 96% of goods traded between the two countries. The UAE predicted the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement would boost annual bilateral trade to more than $10 billion within five years. Trade was already at $1.2 billion in 2021, according to the Israeli data.
“Our agreement will accelerate growth, create jobs and lead to a new era of peace, stability, and prosperity across the region,” the Emirati trade minister, Thani al-Zeyoudi, said on Twitter.
The UAE has of late engaged in talks for similar accords with Indonesia and South Korea. It signed an agreement with India in February that eliminated duties on goods which account for 90% of India’s exports to the UAE by value.
How must the deal be viewed given the Gulf region’s history?
The relations among countries in the region, particularly the Gulf, are shaped by multiple, complex factors – geopolitics over the control of oil and other valuable resources, rivalry between Sunni-majority Saudi Arabia and Shia-majority Iran, and the Israel-Palestine conflict.
The Israel-Palestine conflict has always cast a shadow on how nations in the region deal with Israel. However, there have been attempts at establishing peace. The 1993 Oslo Accord, signed by the leaders of Palestine and Israel in the US with the cooperation of Norway, was a landmark moment. Though it did not achieve success in ending the conflict, it led to a kind of thaw in relations between Israel and MENA (Middle East and North African) countries in both official and unofficial ways. Jordan signed its peace deal with Israel in 1994.
In a 2021 report by the Brookings Institute titled ‘The emergence of GCC-Israel relations in a changing Middle East’, it was noted how this still did not result in a domino effect because of the Arab world’s historic support for Palestine.
It noted that in 2002, Saudi Arabia led the Arab Peace Initiative, which outlined the principle of first establishing a Palestinian state and then normalising relations between the Arab world and Israel. But even in Saudi Arabia, this view is expected to soften due to the presence of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
The Brookings report also says as per Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, “The principal threats to the UAE and its allies are an expansionist Iran and transnational political Islamists.” Israel is seen as a formidable regional power that shares these views, so a better ties with it makes strategic sense. The promise of being closer to “the US strategic orbit” is an important factor too.
What has been noted by many is the speed with which that pact has been inked, coming just two years after Israel and UAE established official relations. The trade deal, observers say, points towards the changing priorities of Arab nations, and their willingness to engage with Israel despite the outstanding issues.
How sustainable are these ties?
Trade and cooperation has been growing, even as the UAE has simultaneously been critical of Israel’s actions towards Palestinians. In the summer of 2021, shortly after violence erupted in the Gaza Strip, Israel’s Foreign Minister visited the UAE in June to inaugurate the country’s embassy despite the UAE condemning the eviction of Palestinians by Israeli authorities in the lead-up to the violence.
Al-aqsa Mosque has been a flashpoint often, with violence breaking out this year as well. The UAE foreign ministry on Monday again condemned “storming” of the Al-aqsa compound in Jerusalem by “extremist settlers under the protection of Israeli forces”, and then on Tuesday signed the deal with Israel.
Explained: Why is the Israel-UAE trade pact more than just another international deal?
The UAE is now the first country in the Arab world to have a free trade agreement with Israel.
indianexpress.com