Analysis Thoughts on Indian Nuclear Forces: Needs & Requirements of the Future

[Parthu]

Keeping in mind the fact that the S-5 class SSBN will probably have 12 missile tubes storing K-5 or K-6 intercontinental SLBMs (which will most definitely have Multiple Independently-targeted Re-entry Vehicles or MIRVs)....each S-5 boat, even if we assume a relatively modest MIRV capacity of 3 RVs per missile, would be carrying 36 nuclear warheads. Three such boats, if we assume each has it's own permanently assigned load of missiles, would require 108 warheads. If we're talking four boats (following the UK & France pattern of SSBN numbers) that goes to 144 warheads. That's close to the total stockpile that most experts assume India to have currently (~150 warheads).

If we assume 4 MIRVs per SLBM (like the slide I've shown below, shown by DRDO's then-chairman Dr. VK Saraswat at IIT-Bombay university) then it would be 48 warheads per sub, and 144 for Three boats and 192 for Four boats. With a quoted throwaway weight of 2 tons, likelihood is high for there to be indeed 4 x 500kg MIRVs per K-5/K-6.

Note that I'm discounting the Arihant/Arihant Stretch-class as I firmly believe they'll be retired as SSBNs and relegated to a less demanding role (like conventionally-armed SSGN) once a corresponding S-5 SSBN comes online.

K-5/K-6 Intercontinental-range SLBM​

However - it must be remembered that India, with two nuclear-armed hostile neighbours who share land borders, certainly has no plans of giving up it's land-based rail & road-mobile nuclear deterrent like UK & France have done. This portion of the triad will continue to be armed in the form of Agni-4, Agni-5 and the in-development Agni-6 with MIRVs (plus whatever Agni-1P derived MRBM replaces Agni-1/2). The Agni-6 is reportedly designed to have a throw weight of 3 tons, so we're again looking at a significant MIRV payload (again, refer to the slide I've linked below, from same source at IIT-Bombay presentation).

Even with an extremely conservative number of only 24 Agni-6 missiles, we'll need 96 warheads for them alone (again a 4-MIRV bus). And that's just the China-focused deterrent. The Pakistani threat will be having its own land-based deterrence with NG-MRBM (Agni-1P descendent to replace existing Agni-1 & 2) and even if we assume only unitary warheads, that's another bare minimum of 12-24 right there, making up about 100-120 warheads for the Land leg of triad.

Agni-5 and Agni-6 Intermediate-range BM


Agni-1P technology-demonstration Medium-range BM platform​

And we won't be giving up the Air-launched deterrent either (like UK has done), the presence of nuclear gravity bombs as well as the ongoing development of a nuclear-capable Liquid-Fuel Ramjet (LFRJ) ALCM intended for the Indian Rafales (very similar to the French ASMP-A missile) indicate that this leg of the triad is here to stay as well.

Make that another 12-24 nukes for the Air triad...and add a handful of reserves.

We're looking at a need of about:

144-192 -- for At-Sea deterrence
108-120 -- for land-based deterrence
12-24 -- for air-based deterrence
~10 -- strategic reserves

...a conservative, bare-minimum estimated requirement of between approx 274 to 346 warheads for the foreseeable future.​

The delays of Plutonium deliveries to the PFBR prototype reactor also point at the possibility of the Pu going to fill other, more pressing & strategically important requirements, like perhaps building more bombs.

Thoughts?

@Ashwin @suryakiran @randomradio @Amarante @Bon Plan @Picdelamirand-oil @BMD @Gautam

 

[randomradio]

We need to have 6 SSBNs at the minimum so 2 can always be deployed, with 1 more on standby. So S2, S3, S4 and S4* will remain in use. S2 can be relegated to development work though, once all of the S5 class are operational.

Since China's gone for silos, we need to give up on road and rail mobile options eventually and switch to silos as well. Why? Because road/rail versions react in 2 days, whereas silos can react in 10 minutes. Basically these missiles need to be flying before their missiles hit us. Road and rail mobile options are needed for conventional use, so we can separate strategic and conventional land nukes in this manner.

We need more for air based deterrence. Eventually bombers due to their range and endurance. Right now we can't threaten their main cities with fighter jets.

Currently, our nuclear deterrence versus China is very limited, and it's gonna be overmatched between 2025 and 2030 if we don't do anything today. All that we are close to achieving before 2025 is some limited capability via 3 small SSBNs, it's not enough. And silo-based deterrence has become a very critical need.

 

[Amarante]

(…) Since China's gone for silos, we need to give up on road and rail mobile options eventually and switch to silos as well.(…)

huh? a 48h delay for rail mobile weapons? i’m surprised, believing canisterisation could allow an immediate launch…

@Parthu i apologize for the delay in answering
(worse than drdo)

 

[randomradio]

(…) Since China's gone for silos, we need to give up on road and rail mobile options eventually and switch to silos as well.(…)

huh? a 48h delay for rail mobile weapons? i’m surprised, believing canisterisation could allow an immediate launch…

The warhead is demated with the delivery system and kept at a different location. This is meant to allow a chance for deescalation. So this is how deterrence was in South Asia.

Since China operated SSBNs, we wanted to match that as well. But with China getting a large number of silos, the rules for deterrence have changed.

 

[Amarante]

The warhead is demated with the delivery system and kept at a different location. This is meant to allow a chance for deescalation. So this is how deterrence was in South Asia.

Since China operated SSBNs, we wanted to match that as well. But with China getting a large number of silos, the rules for deterrence have changed.

ok, nuke heads are demated and stored… i understand that. with delay consequence…

 

[randomradio]

ok, nuke heads are demated and stored… i understand that. with delay consequence…

Yep, we played by those rules since the 90s.

 

[Parthu]

The warhead is demated with the delivery system and kept at a different location. This is meant to allow a chance for deescalation. So this is how deterrence was in South Asia.

Since China operated SSBNs, we wanted to match that as well. But with China getting a large number of silos, the rules for deterrence have changed.

That defeats the purpose of canisterization.

 

[randomradio]

That defeats the purpose of canisterization.

Yes, we are basically giving up on the concept of demating our nukes when it comes to China. I believe we still have that system going with Pakistan though, at least for the time being. We may change our posture as older missiles are replaced and we also get robust counterforce capabilities through the IRF.

 

[Parthu]

Yes, we are basically giving up on the concept of demating our nukes when it comes to China. I believe we still have that system going with Pakistan though, at least for the time being. We may change our posture as older missiles are replaced and we also get robust counterforce capabilities through the IRF.

Exactly - the demating concept was more a result of launch-on-demand technologies not being available at the time than a true agreement toward building trust.

If anything, its Pakistan that requires us to have a true launch on demand capability. Between Pak & China, its the former that's more of a loose cannon, both due to policy of sabre-rattling as well as lack of conventional superiority which predisposes them toward nuclear option. If anything, its Pakistan that requires us to build a LoD capability.

Though realistically, in the current world & given China's capabilities in this area, a non-LoD capability is no capability at all.

That argument/policy was already put to rest when Arihant went on its first deterrence patrol in 2018.

 

[randomradio]

Exactly - the demating concept was more a result of launch-on-demand technologies not being available at the time than a true agreement toward building trust.

If anything, its Pakistan that requires us to have a true launch on demand capability. Between Pak & China, its the former that's more of a loose cannon, both due to policy of sabre-rattling as well as lack of conventional superiority which predisposes them toward nuclear option. If anything, its Pakistan that requires us to build a LoD capability.

Though realistically, in the current world & given China's capabilities in this area, a non-LoD capability is no capability at all.

That argument/policy was already put to rest when Arihant went on its first deterrence patrol in 2018.

We used air launched capability for fast response. It appears that demating the nukes was more to alleviate Pak's concerns about us launching a pre-emptive first strike.

It appears to me LoD is being worked on in parallel to CF capability, which we should get with the new SF command and the upcoming IRF.

I'd actually argue that the demand for LoD was felt as Pak's bomb numbers increased. Earlier, we could drop 10-20 small nukes by air in a few hours and finish the job. Pak could also do something similar. But the numbers were that small, not enough to dent either side's civilian or military capabilities to a severe extent. But today we are in the hundreds, enough to destroy major cities with waves, as well as most of our HQs and comm nodes. China's capabilities have also climbed up significantly since the 90s, although we were in a significantly weak position until Agni III.

In any case we have only just achieved some limited LoD. We only have a very small number of canisterised Agni Vs and Shauryas. We don't even have a Pak-specific LoD capability using a BM until Agni-P finishes tests. Our sea-based deterrence is still 3 years away from being fully established. Overall it will remain limited until we induct MIRVs.

 

[RISING SUN]

India modernising nuke arsenal with eye on China, says American report - Times of India

India continues to modernise its nuclear arsenal and operationalise its nascent triad, and the country's nuke strategy now appears to place increased emphasis on China, says a 2022 report of the Federation of American Scientists. At least four new weapon systems are under development to...

m.timesofindia.com

 

[marich01]

Rus withdrew from CTBT. So a valid discussion point at this stage.

https://twitter.com/x/status/1715049593917059238

 

[Rajput Lion]

Rus withdrew from CTBT. So a valid discussion point at this stage.

https://twitter.com/x/status/1715049593917059238

We should most definitely enhance our nuclear arsenal. Maybe even test a thermonuclear device somewhere down in future.

 

[jetray]

Rus withdrew from CTBT. So a valid discussion point at this stage.

https://twitter.com/x/status/1715049593917059238

might is right, another rubbish edifice called UN needs to crumble to expose the hollowness of west created regimes.

 

[marich01]

US already tested one

https://twitter.com/x/status/1715283661891993849

 

[jetray]

US already tested one

https://twitter.com/x/status/1715283661891993849

They have a low yield nuetron bomb, possibly refining on that. These have more radiation than blast impact. For a cntry that shamelessly dropped two nukes on civilians they wont have any hesitation doing the same again. Given these dont do much physical damage but will render the place radioactive and kill all the living organisms it will be easy for them to use without attracting much attention.

 

[_Anonymous_]

This is a very interesting article by I D R W which is now kicking up a storm among self declared TTs in our favourite country in the whole wide world - Paxtan.

Now I know the site itself is disreputable & is banned out here . Hence the SS. But the contents of the article are very interesting to say the least.

What's your opinion ? @Gautam

I couldn't quite get the multiplying factor of 106 years in the 2nd SS.

 

[Gautam]

This is a very interesting article by I D R W which is now kicking up a storm among self declared TTs in our favourite country in the whole wide world - Paxtan.

Now I know the site itself is disreputable & is banned out here . Hence the SS. But the contents of the article are very interesting to say the least.

What's your opinion ? @Gautam

I couldn't quite get the multiplying factor of 106 years in the 2nd SS.

Oh boy this is going to be a long one:

Well, the original article was published by a Pakistani author in 2018 based on 2014 data:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328731944_Estimating_India's_Nuclear_Weapons_Producing_Capability

I.D.R.W. has done what they usually do. Even there they have screwed up. In the original article the author argues India has enough weapons grade Plutonium for 839 bombs & enough reactor grade plutonium for 75 bombs. That is total of 914 Plutonium based weapons. India also has enough weapons grade Uranium for 130 bombs. That adds up to a total of 1044 nuclear bombs.

If we want to calculate India's total weapons potential, we must do it chronologically. All of the numbers you have ever heard of India's nuclear bombs are all estimates by either American or Pakistani authors. So, we must be aware of underlying biases.

The number we often hear is from the US publication Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (BAS) which is quoted by SIPRI & then quoted by think tanks & news media. For 2024 the number is 172. But we have to remember that Bulletin of Atomic Scientists only calculates weapons grade & reactor grade Uranium. They do this because they believe that India has a larger stockpile of the rest of the materials needed to make thermonuclear bomb. Uranium is relatively scarce & thus used to estimate.

But boosted fission bombs can be made without using any Uranium. Thermonuclear bombs can also be made without Uranium, the tertiary stage with enriched U-238 tamper needs to be removed. Their estimate doesn't take those in consideration. Also, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists assume that India uses ~15 kg of enriched Uranium per bomb. This is based on the 1980s booster fission design that was tested in 1998. In that design ~15 kg enriched Uranium core would give us a 150-kiloton bomb. Whereas the 200-kiloton Thermonuclear will use ~8kg of Uranium.

So, in summary, what the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (BAS) are saying is that in 2024 they estimate that India has enough enriched Uranium for 174 numbers of 1980s design 150 kiloton boosted fission bombs.


So, the estimated number of bombs we have depends on whether you think India has standardized the 150-kiloton bomb or the 200-kiloton bomb across its entire arsenal.

A more realistic scenario would be that we employ a mix of sub-kiloton yield tactical bombs on short/medium range cruise missiles & fighters, medium yield bombs on stand-off range cruise missiles, SRBMs & IRBMs & high yield bombs on ICBMs & SLBMs. That would make estimations significantly more complicated.

Now, other than the BAS here are some other agencies/organizations making estimated of India's nuclear bomb potential:

In 2012, American scientist Henry Sokolski, the then Executive Director of The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center testified before the U.S. Economic and Security Review Commission. The testimony was about China's nuclear weapons, but he did mention India in passing:



Source: https://www.npolicy.org/article_fil...gs-Uncertainties_and_Concerns_(TESTIMONY).pdf

In 2015, the Pakistani newspaper Dawn cited Pakistani scholars and said that:

Contrary to international estimates which give a watered-down view, Pakistani assessment is that India has enough fissile material, both reactor- and weapon-grade plutonium, for more than 2,000 warheads.

A paper published by the International Institute of Strategic Studies this year noted: “New Delhi’s plutonium stocks also continue to pile up; according to one Pakistani assessment, by the end of 2013 India had produced enough weapons- and reactor-grade plutonium (0.8-1tn and 15tn respectively) for 2,000 warheads.”

Source: Broadest deterrence capability to be kept

In 2017, Pakistani scholar Monsoor Ahmed writing for the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School gave out an Indian and Pakistani Fissile Material Weapon Equivalent Potential. Now this is based on some dated information, but it is still useful as a general marker:


Source: https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/...ublication/India's Nuclear Exceptionalism.pdf

From the various reports so far we have the following:

As more PHWRs & FBRs become operational this bomb making potential will continue to climb. Of course, we are not going to push all fissile material we have into bombs. Having 2000+ bombs doesn't serve any purpose. We need to have around 400-450 at most.