Russian Retirement War
By: Ginvincible | April 4, 2021 | Strategic Front Research Foundation
By: Ginvincible | April 4, 2021 | Strategic Front Research Foundation
This would be a Russian war of territorial consolidation in Europe. The war might be seen as necessary to Russian elites as the Russian population ages and its economy continues to slow down. Securing as much buffer space in Europe has always been a prerogative to Moscow and when faced with an uncertain future going forward in the 21st century, Russian officials may decide to act sooner while they still maintain an edge in the region. It is apparent to Russian analysts that EU and NATO expansion will not stop, therefore preventing Western forces from being placed so close to the Russian heartland will take priority over continued goodwill and trust in Western intentions.
Russia can mask their buildup and subsequent invasion. The Russians have been conducting large scale military exercises in the region, involving hundreds of thousands of soldiers, thousands of armored vehicles and hundreds of ships and planes. The Russians can make use of one such exercise as an opportunity to instead invade Ukraine à la the Azerbaijan-Armenian war of 2020.
The war will initially go very poorly for Ukraine. Russia maintains a massive numerical and qualitative military edge over Ukraine. The Ukrainians have a large pool of reservists, but they are ill equipped and not as well trained as the actively deployable Russian forces. Russia possess a vast array of standoff weapons that have been tested extensively in Syria and Libya. Cruise missile attacks from land and sea, as well as continued airstrikes, artillery and rocket bombardments from all sides will crush any Ukrainian defenses. The flatlands of Eastern Ukraine will also play well into Russia’s massive advantage in armored warfare, and Russian tanks and other armored vehicles will wreak havoc through the countryside. Russia has always specialized in warfare over the great European plains, and this region of Ukraine will be difficult to defend.
Ukrainian defense will probably center along the Dnieper river. The only real advantage the Ukrainians have is the wide Dnieper river bisecting the country. The river is littered with dams that can be destroyed to flood regions being advanced upon by the Russians, therefore slowing its offense. The less equipped Ukrainian military can also create a harder to cross defensive line along the river. Cities to the east of the river will eventually be encircled and fall, but Ukraine west of the river should remain. The Ukrainians can only hold on for so long though. A Russia determined to take as much as possible will defeat Ukrainian forces along the Dnieper if there is no outside intervention on behalf of the Ukrainians.
NATO will have to step up to prevent the total capitulation of Ukraine. Judging by the response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and Turkish moves in the Caucuses and Levant; Europe has no appetite for an actual shooting war with Russia. What NATO can do is funnel supplies and equipment to the Ukrainians so that they can maintain their defensive line along the Dnieper. While putting boots on the ground will be politically non-viable, the vast logistical capabilities of the bloc will be able to supply the Ukrainians indefinitely. NATO can also amass troops along the Russian border in the Baltics and Kaliningrad, thus prying away supplies and equipment to meet that build up. Lastly, it would be prudent of NATO to occupy, or at least station with consent, forces in all lands west of the Dniester river. This includes the Bessarabia region of Ukraine and Moldova, and the Western Carpathian region of Ukraine. This option will give NATO the ability to prevent further Russian expansion into central Europe and the Balkans in the event of total Ukrainian capitulation. It also serves as a springboard for NATO deployment into Ukraine should that be agreed upon.
There are a few unknown quantities. If the current situation stands, Belarus is at risk of being absorbed into Russia as part of the Union State. If Belarus can maintain some independence, it might remain a neutral party. Regardless, Russian troops will probably maneuver through Belarus to attack eastern Ukraine and conduct strikes and raids across the Dnieper. Turkey is another nation that may or may not factor into the equation. While Turkey is a member of NATO, it is somewhat the black sheep of the alliance – choosing to pursue its own strategic objectives against the wishes, and to the detriment, of many other members. Turkey will at least grant passage of NATO vessels into the Black Sea to harass and draw attention of the Russian fleets and forces stationed there. Whether they will pressure Russia in the Caucus or take any significant action against the Russians is unknown. The Moldovan region of Transnistria is also an unknown in this situation. It is de-jure part of Moldova and is de facto independent. The region is separated from the rest of Moldova by the Dniester river and by its Russian speaking population. Occupation of the region is possible, and perhaps preferable as to prevent any Russian claims to the area in the future.
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