Opinion Possibility of German deindustrialization & its effect on EU

Hydrogen is very light but also very bulky: at normal pressure 1g of hydrogen occupies a volume of 11.2 litres, so it has to be put into high-pressure cylinders (700 bars) which are very heavy and in addition their filling consumes energy as well as the decompression which cools the cylinder which has to be warmed up a bit.

For storage, that isn't a problem. It will be static anyway, so we can build it as big and heavy as necessary, the size of buildings, which can then be used to generate electricity. This will be hydrogen's primary use, supporting the electric grid.

Hydrogen takes care of heavy vehicles and long distance driving. So, even if regular users prefer battery-operated cars within cities; buses, trucks and long distance car drivers can switch over to fuel cells. Assuming you need a 100 Kg tank to store 5-6 Kg of hydrogen, it's not a lot relative to the size and weight of such vehicles. But if buses, goods vehicles and ships switch over to hydrogen, it will solve India's inflation problem.

Storage for transportation, that's the point of producing it within the country. Proximity to the consumer means less need for transportation. Plus if we use existing gas pipelines, it will only mean transferring hydrogen from one static reservoir to another over a short distance of few tens to few hundred kilometers. So the vast quantities of storage required at critical infrastructure like ports and refineries will become unnecessary.

Specific to India, as a producer of hydrogen, if hydrogen can replace gasoline, then storage and transportation become irrelevant. Most other countries, unlike India, will have to import hydrogen, so it won't work out very well for them compared to battery vehicles.
 
Hydrogen is very light but also very bulky: at normal pressure 1g of hydrogen occupies a volume of 11.2 litres, so it has to be put into high-pressure cylinders (700 bars) which are very heavy and in addition their filling consumes energy as well as the decompression which cools the cylinder which has to be warmed up a bit.
There is such thing as metallic hydrogen.
 
Just as a thought exercise: toward end of this decade, how likely do you guys think it is that Germany could decide to ditch NATO and get into an alliance with Russia & China? Russia for energy, China for market access. This would of course leave them with no security cover from NATO/US which means that if the future German leadership (in no small part influenced by the huge industrial concerns which have a lot to lose if cheap energy & the Chinese market is no longer available) decides in favour of such a geopolitical realignment, German re-armament would become an inevitability.

Looking at the recent pace of arms buildup by countries like Poland I can't help but think its not just Russia they are concerned about. I think the Polish already have an appreciation of the economic & geopolitical pressures that will befall Germany in the near future, and are preparing for a worst case scenario as to what the German leadership could decide to do in response to said pressures. I think the powers that be are already seeing the pieces on the chessboard have started to move.

By the way, Poland has recently officially demanded $1.3 trillion reparations from Germany for WW2.


This just serves to illustrate the possibility of things to come (BMW moving Mini EV production to China):


The basic premise of this is that the current German political alignment is a result of certain economic conditions & equations being favourable to Germany as a result of maintaining that alignment - the question is, what will happen when those preconditions inevitably change.

Recall what I said in the OP "There are also a lot of EU countries neighbouring Germany who's own economic well-being is dependent in one way or another on the German manufacturing industry."

That, when combined with the effects of a slowing/receding economy (thanks to factors like the war, inflation, and rise in costs of energy due to Russia being taken off the market) is going to mean that the purchasing power of European economies (including UK) i.e. the size of the European consumer market, will reduce significantly.

One way for a manufacturing + export driven economy like Germany to compensate for that (or at least try to minimize the losses) is to double down on a growing consumer market the size of China. And if they ever want to even hope to see actual sustainable YoY growth again, they HAVE to find a source of energy that is at least as cheap as Russian natgas.

This creates a particular pressure for Germany. Increasingly, the US will want Europe to stop trading with China. They will want (and largely already achieved) Europe to stop trading with Russia. This has the potential to be a double-whammy for a manufacturing economy like Germany (hitting both production as well as consumption).

Germany is soon gonna have a decision to make:

1) Decide that they've had a good run while it lasted, and be happy to roll over and settle for a much smaller slice of the geopolitical power pie (there's no denying that the current economics-driven model has granted Germany more influence throughout Europe than they ever achieved through military means in the past) and let France take over political + economic leadership of Europe.

OR

2) Decide that the geopolitical events are shaping up so that the balance of power is shifting away from Berlin, all thanks to decisions being taken anywhere else except in Berlin, and that Germany will not stand for this. In other words, very similar to the kind of situations that led to the 1st world war.

I do not want to speculate as to which option they will choose.
 
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Just as a thought exercise: toward end of this decade, how likely do you guys think it is that Germany could decide to ditch NATO and get into an alliance with Russia & China? Russia for energy, China for market access. This would of course leave them with no security cover from NATO/US which means that if the future German leadership (in no small part influenced by the huge industrial concerns which have a lot to lose if cheap energy & the Chinese market is no longer available) decides in favour of such a geopolitical realignment, German re-armament would become an inevitability.

Looking at the recent pace of arms buildup by countries like Poland I can't help but think its not just Russia they are concerned about. I think the Polish already have an appreciation of the economic & geopolitical pressures that will befall Germany in the near future, and are preparing for a worst case scenario as to what the German leadership could decide to do in response to said pressures. I think the powers that be are already seeing the pieces on the chessboard have started to move.

By the way, Poland has recently officially demanded $1.3 trillion reparations from Germany for WW2.


This just serves to illustrate the possibility of things to come (BMW moving Mini EV production to China):



The basic premise of this is that the current German political alignment is a result of certain economic conditions & equations being favourable to Germany as a result of maintaining that alignment - the question is, what will happen when those preconditions inevitably change.

Recall what I said in the OP "There are also a lot of EU countries neighbouring Germany who's own economic well-being is dependent in one way or another on the German manufacturing industry."

That, when combined with the effects of a slowing/receding economy (thanks to factors like the war, inflation, and rise in costs of energy due to Russia being taken off the market) is going to mean that the purchasing power of European economies (including UK) i.e. the size of the European consumer market, will reduce significantly.

One way for a manufacturing + export driven economy like Germany to compensate for that (or at least try to minimize the losses) is to double down on a growing consumer market the size of China. And if they ever want to even hope to see actual sustainable YoY growth again, they HAVE to find a source of energy that is at least as cheap as Russian natgas.

This creates a particular pressure for Germany. Increasingly, the US will want Europe to stop trading with China. They will want (and largely already achieved) Europe to stop trading with Russia. This has the potential to be a double-whammy for a manufacturing economy like Germany (hitting both production as well as consumption).

Germany is soon gonna have a decision to make:

1) Decide that they've had a good run while it lasted, and be happy to roll over and settle for a much smaller slice of the geopolitical power pie (there's no denying that the current economics-driven model has granted Germany more influence throughout Europe than they ever achieved through military means in the past) and let France take over political + economic leadership of Europe.

OR

2) Decide that the geopolitical events are shaping up so that the balance of power is shifting away from Berlin, all thanks to decisions being taken anywhere else except in Berlin, and that Germany will not stand for this. In other words, very similar to the kind of situations that led to the 1st world war.

I do not want to speculate as to which option they will choose.

Another development to ponder in this light:

 
Just as a thought exercise: toward end of this decade, how likely do you guys think it is that Germany could decide to ditch NATO and get into an alliance with Russia & China? Russia for energy, China for market access. This would of course leave them with no security cover from NATO/US which means that if the future German leadership (in no small part influenced by the huge industrial concerns which have a lot to lose if cheap energy & the Chinese market is no longer available) decides in favour of such a geopolitical realignment, German re-armament would become an inevitability.
For a start, this scenario is entirely absurd.

To be able to enter into an alliance with Russia, they would have to leave the EU. Which, of course, they can; just like the UK could. But it would be disastrous for their economy. Going back to the Mark (as they could no longer use the €) would make them extremely uncompetitive, as the Mark would appreciate considerably compared to the €.

But the big problem is the question of market access. Even admitting China would give them unfettered access to their market -- something they never do -- the issue is that the Chinese market, even if you add in Russia on top (it barely changes any number as the Russian economy is a joke), is not worth losing the Western market. See, the rest of the West's GDP is still worth 2.5 times that of China. Don't get me wrong, the Chinese market is a very interesting one; but then again, every market no matter how small is interesting when you can freely access them with no drawbacks. When there are choices to make, however, you will, nearly always, make the choice that is the most in your interests, and for China to be the most interesting choice it doesn't need merely to outgrow the nominal GDP of the USA, but the nominal GDP of basically the entire Western world (which I roughly define as North America + Europe + Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea).

And it's doubtful China will get to be more interesting than all this in the foreseeable future.
 
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Just as a thought exercise: toward end of this decade, how likely do you guys think it is that Germany could decide to ditch NATO and get into an alliance with Russia & China? Russia for energy, China for market access. This would of course leave them with no security cover from NATO/US which means that if the future German leadership (in no small part influenced by the huge industrial concerns which have a lot to lose if cheap energy & the Chinese market is no longer available) decides in favour of such a geopolitical realignment, German re-armament would become an inevitability.

Looking at the recent pace of arms buildup by countries like Poland I can't help but think its not just Russia they are concerned about. I think the Polish already have an appreciation of the economic & geopolitical pressures that will befall Germany in the near future, and are preparing for a worst case scenario as to what the German leadership could decide to do in response to said pressures. I think the powers that be are already seeing the pieces on the chessboard have started to move.

By the way, Poland has recently officially demanded $1.3 trillion reparations from Germany for WW2.


This just serves to illustrate the possibility of things to come (BMW moving Mini EV production to China):



The basic premise of this is that the current German political alignment is a result of certain economic conditions & equations being favourable to Germany as a result of maintaining that alignment - the question is, what will happen when those preconditions inevitably change.

Recall what I said in the OP "There are also a lot of EU countries neighbouring Germany who's own economic well-being is dependent in one way or another on the German manufacturing industry."

That, when combined with the effects of a slowing/receding economy (thanks to factors like the war, inflation, and rise in costs of energy due to Russia being taken off the market) is going to mean that the purchasing power of European economies (including UK) i.e. the size of the European consumer market, will reduce significantly.

One way for a manufacturing + export driven economy like Germany to compensate for that (or at least try to minimize the losses) is to double down on a growing consumer market the size of China. And if they ever want to even hope to see actual sustainable YoY growth again, they HAVE to find a source of energy that is at least as cheap as Russian natgas.

This creates a particular pressure for Germany. Increasingly, the US will want Europe to stop trading with China. They will want (and largely already achieved) Europe to stop trading with Russia. This has the potential to be a double-whammy for a manufacturing economy like Germany (hitting both production as well as consumption).

Germany is soon gonna have a decision to make:

1) Decide that they've had a good run while it lasted, and be happy to roll over and settle for a much smaller slice of the geopolitical power pie (there's no denying that the current economics-driven model has granted Germany more influence throughout Europe than they ever achieved through military means in the past) and let France take over political + economic leadership of Europe.

OR

2) Decide that the geopolitical events are shaping up so that the balance of power is shifting away from Berlin, all thanks to decisions being taken anywhere else except in Berlin, and that Germany will not stand for this. In other words, very similar to the kind of situations that led to the 1st world war.

I do not want to speculate as to which option they will choose.

They can't leave the Western sphere of influence for the sake of some money, they can't leave the EU either. While they may lose out on business opportunities in China, it's not going to go down immediately, so they can hope other economies can compensate during the transition period.

China is also closing itself off like the SU did, so it's not gonna be a long term golden goose.

There will be a plan to contain China after five years or so as well, which means loss of business by default.

The oil and gas market will stabilise globally over the next two years or so.
 

Scholz's China-Appeasing Visit With Xi Triggers Backlash In Europe​


German Chancellor Olaf Scholz met with Chinese President Xi Jinping on Friday in Beijing, where the German leader was on the ground for just 11 hours, and he focused his talking points on the war in Ukraine and containing Russian aggression. But looming large was the symbolism and controversial messaging back home of such a high-level visit, Scholz's first as German chancellor. After all, he arrived with a team of top CEOs by his side. As CNN put it, the message is clear: "business with the world’s second-largest economy must continue"...

Accompanying Scholz on the whirlwind visit was a "delegation of 12 German industry titans, including the CEOs of Volkswagen (VLKAF), Deutsche Bank (DB), Siemens (SIEGY) and chemicals giant BASF (BASFY), according to a person familiar with the matter. They were expected to meet with Chinese companies behind closed doors," CNN continued in describing the optics. They also were given a rare exemption to China's typically strict quarantine and Covid measures for anyone entering the country.

Scholz's trip, despite being only a day-long, marked the first time a European head of state has visited China since Russia launched its invasion. It was further Scholz's first major foreign trip as Germany's chancellor, and comes just after Xi secured a third term as Communist party secretary and president of China.

"We are seeing discussions in China tending more towards autonomy and less economic ties. And these views are ones that need discussing," Scholz told a press briefing in Beijing. The trip was seen as an attempt to maintain cozy relations with China after key pillars of a successful German economic machine evaporated this year - namely cheap energy from Russia and a prior relaxed approach to security spending.

But as Politico points out, "To his critics, he's making exactly the same mistakes of overreliance on China as Berlin previously made with Russia."

Foremost among them is German Foreign Minister and Greens party member Annalena Baerbock, who didn't hide her disapproval and discomfort with Scholz's meeting in stating just ahead of the trip, "The federal chancellor has decided the time of his trip. Now it is crucial to make clear in China the messages that we laid down together in the coalition agreement," as cited in Der Spiegel newspaper. She and others are piling on pressure for a new, more assertive stance toward China.

"As is well known, we clearly stated in the coalition agreement that China is our partner on global issues, that we cannot decouple in a globalized world, but that China is also a competitor and increasingly a systemic rival,” said Baerbock. She added: "And that we will base our China policy on this strategic understanding and also align our cooperation with other regions in the world."
Seeking to defend himself against such growing criticisms, also as the EU is seeking to put pressure on Beijing to turn more definitively against Russia's war aims in Ukraine, Scholz wrote in an op-ed this week, "When I travel to Beijing as German chancellor, then I do so also as a European" - suggesting the trip in no way compromised the EU's united front.

However, he acknowledged, "It is here that new centers of power are emerging in a multipolar world, and we aim to establish and expand partnerships with all of them." And he noted, "Thus, in recent months, we have carried out in-depth coordination at the international level — with close partners such as Japan and Korea, India and Indonesia, and countries in Africa and Latin America too. At the end of next week, I will travel to Southeast Asia and the G20 summit, and while I’m visiting China, Germany’s federal president will be in Japan and Korea."

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Watch this space guys. Keep in mind the two big things: Energy and Markets.

Without them, Germany cannot survive. The only question is how far will they go for them.