Thanks lol. There's no dearth of engagement hungry "OSNIT" out there on both sides
Operation Sindoor: Aftermath
- Thread starter Defc0n
- Start date
Thanks lol. There's no dearth of engagement hungry "OSNIT" out there on both sides
This is concerning. The drones' proliferation. Earlier it was unknown gunman now it unknown drone operators. This is not something a peace loving country should face.
So, indian govt should send indian army to bangladesh and pak to help them out
RAAA Agent that passed on real time info of ADS movement caught. RIP braveheart...
I'm not sure what we're waiting for. Why we haven't asked Dassault to start the integration of Rudram II/III and ASTRA II/III on Rafale? This won't happen overnight. So, why not get started now? Are we just waiting for Sindoor 2 to happen, and MOD/IAF will run like a headless chicken and make some last-minute purchases?
User trials are currently underway for both missile families currently. Could be a while before they are cleared for induction. When the order does come through, let's hope it'll be a substantial one like Nag Mk2.
So, Early december visit from both Putin and Netanyahu !!
Man, ii hope both of them come with a Hard drive full of battlefield data for AI training. That data would be worth buying 5 squadrons of S-400 and Su-57 if they insist, itself.
Don't underestimate the literal goldmine Russia, Ukraine & israel to an extent are sitting on. One full warfare, other attrition in counter terror battles.
There is some possibility of trade with them, let's if Pakistan can save their relation with Turks.
A fairly balanced take. Do give it a go.
swarajyamag.com
Summarised by Perplexity:
Here are the key takeaways from the article "Operation Sindoor Showed The IAF’s Strength, But Also Its Blind Spots":
Operation Sindoor Showed The IAF’s Strength, But Also Its Blind Spots
If one was scrolling through X or Twitter yesterday, it was impossible to miss the flood of citations for the gallantry awardees of Operation Sindoor.
swarajyamag.com
Summarised by Perplexity:
Here are the key takeaways from the article "Operation Sindoor Showed The IAF’s Strength, But Also Its Blind Spots":
- Operation Sindoor was a major success for the Indian Air Force (IAF), striking key terrorist complexes in Pakistan and neutralising Pakistani air counterattacks with precision.
- The operation demonstrated IAF’s capability when its Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) functioned effectively, but also revealed serious systemic weaknesses.
- The IAF’s strategy has been platform-centric, focusing on acquiring advanced aircraft like Rafales, rather than integrating all assets (fighters, sensors, command systems) for optimal performance.
- Network and integration issues: The lack of a secure, service-wide data link was exposed both during Balakot (2019) and in Sindoor, complicating coordination and response. Progress on network-centric warfare remains slow and uneven across IAF units.
- Pakistan, by contrast, has better integration via indigenous or Chinese data links, letting its assets operate in a unified way and changing tactical outcomes.
- Weaknesses in airborne early-warning (AEW&C): India’s fleet of Phalcon AWACS and indigenous Netra platforms has low serviceability and limited coverage, whereas Pakistan fields continuous Erieye AEW&C coverage.
- IAF delays in acquiring and operationalising more Netra AEW&C platforms and relying on distant next-gen projects has left India's airborne surveillance capabilities lagging.
- The focus on hardware over architecture and integration persists, resulting in gaps, especially in cross-domain (Army, Navy) operational awareness.
- India needs not only more aircraft, but also robust, secure networking, interoperable data links, and integrated operational systems—making these the highest modernisation priorities.
- The article concludes that networking, integration, and indigenous SDR development must become central to IAF modernisation, rather than being treated as technical afterthoughts. The success of Operation Sindoor must not mask the urgent need to fix these gaps.
A fairly balanced take. Do give it a go.
Operation Sindoor Showed The IAF’s Strength, But Also Its Blind Spots
If one was scrolling through X or Twitter yesterday, it was impossible to miss the flood of citations for the gallantry awardees of Operation Sindoor.
Summarised by Perplexity:
Here are the key takeaways from the article "Operation Sindoor Showed The IAF’s Strength, But Also Its Blind Spots":
- Operation Sindoor was a major success for the Indian Air Force (IAF), striking key terrorist complexes in Pakistan and neutralising Pakistani air counterattacks with precision.
- The operation demonstrated IAF’s capability when its Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) functioned effectively, but also revealed serious systemic weaknesses.
- The IAF’s strategy has been platform-centric, focusing on acquiring advanced aircraft like Rafales, rather than integrating all assets (fighters, sensors, command systems) for optimal performance.
- Network and integration issues: The lack of a secure, service-wide data link was exposed both during Balakot (2019) and in Sindoor, complicating coordination and response. Progress on network-centric warfare remains slow and uneven across IAF units.
- Pakistan, by contrast, has better integration via indigenous or Chinese data links, letting its assets operate in a unified way and changing tactical outcomes.
- Weaknesses in airborne early-warning (AEW&C): India’s fleet of Phalcon AWACS and indigenous Netra platforms has low serviceability and limited coverage, whereas Pakistan fields continuous Erieye AEW&C coverage.
- IAF delays in acquiring and operationalising more Netra AEW&C platforms and relying on distant next-gen projects has left India's airborne surveillance capabilities lagging.
- The focus on hardware over architecture and integration persists, resulting in gaps, especially in cross-domain (Army, Navy) operational awareness.
- India needs not only more aircraft, but also robust, secure networking, interoperable data links, and integrated operational systems—making these the highest modernisation priorities.
- The article concludes that networking, integration, and indigenous SDR development must become central to IAF modernisation, rather than being treated as technical afterthoughts. The success of Operation Sindoor must not mask the urgent need to fix these gaps.
My thought exactly. And that's why it pisses me off when entire focus of debate to judge IAF is on squadron strength, importing this and that jets.
This discourse instead let the officers responsible for lacksidal networking get away and also pressurises govt to show something on big FA terms. When actual need should be the ecosystem. Various "in development" projects of DRDO.
The officers?
This is roughly how an order is decided
1. The officers draw specs based on modern day standards - year 1
2. Specs shared with Defense Min - year 2
3. Defense ministry passes on to Fin Ministry - year 3
4. Fin Babus debate over costs internally - year 4,5
5. Fin Min allows tendering process - year 6
7. Tender details built, rebuilt, rebuilt, rebuilt, rebuilt .... - year 7,8
8. MEA weighs in to alter tender details because some "important ally" is feeling left out. - year 9
9. Tender details rebuilt and issued - year 10
10. Lowest Bid vendor - L1 identified. - year 13
11. Real Negotiations start - year 14
12. Specs are outdated, price has escalated due to Forex fluctuation - year 15
13. Fin Min says cant afford new price
14. Air Force says new process will take another decade erode capacity further
15. Fin Min, Def Min, Air Force reach middle ground, trimmed capability to reduce costs.
16. Deliveries start - year 18
17. Full capacity missing, being added - years 19,20
18. 20 years after launch, full spec capability missing. Contracted capability at 80-90%
The procurement process is so thoroughly mucked up with so many son in laws to accommodate that its a miracle anything gets done
Ironically, as the article itself points out, the IN is far better placed with its Link 2 TDL now its 3rd generation.
The IAF has been working on the ODL project for years now, with active collaboration from an Israeli vendor. The project started much earlier than the 2019 EP deal for BNET SDRs.
The tech exists but the implementation is as slow as ever. Wonder how the new Vayulink fits into the picture?
Foreign vendors are jealous girlfriends. They offer a platform with excellent parameters but tie you into their walled garden with proprietary tech that is closed to outside integrations.
You need a good radar - desi version is years away. You get an ELTA ? But will it mate with the desi missile ? or will you be tied to the foreign one?
The trouble is timelines for different build projects seldom coincide and the forces need capability in hand and not in brochures to defend the border.
Must appreciate the folks at WESEE who developed and iterated Link-2 into what it is today. Ironic that the IAF isn't looking to standardize DL protocols with the IN even as it integrates upper echelon C4ISR systems.
Whether it is because of technical limitations or the usual turf wars is anybody's guess.
Again - its about who sacrifices years of planning and adopts the larger part of the other's protocols & systems.
Why are we here - that would take up too much time and forum space.