Opinion New QUAD Begins to Take Shape in the Middle East (US, India, Israel & UAE)

New Opportunities: India and the United States in a Changing Middle East
BACKGROUND PAPER NO. 9
BY JEFF M. SMITH

Jeff M. Smith is a Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation in Washington DC

Over the past decade, India has quietly transformed its engagement with the Middle East, witnessing diplomatic breakthroughs with Israel and several Gulf Arab states. At the same time, the Abraham Accords of late 2020—in which Israel normalized relations with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and later Morocco, and Sudan—opened a new chapter of diplomacy between Israel and the Arab Gulf states. These developments have expanded opportunities for multilateral engagement involving India, Israel, the UAE, and the United States, including the first meeting of a new “West Asian Quad” – sometimes referred to as I2U2 – among the four countries’ foreign ministers on October 18, 2021.

For India, this marks a break from past precedent. As a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, India was for most of the late 20th century a consistent, if somewhat formulaic, advocate of the Palestinian cause while keeping Israel at diplomatic arms-length. With a large Indian diaspora in the Gulf, New Delhi sought cordial working relations with the Gulf Arab states but remained suspicious of their close ties with rival Pakistan and links to Islamist extremism. Further complicating matters was India’s working relationship with Iran, a rival of Israel and the Gulf Arabs. While not a particularly warm embrace, India was a major purchaser of Iranian oil and collaborated with Tehran in support of the anti-Taliban northern alliance in Afghanistan.

This tilt toward Iran and the Palestinians at the expense of Israel and the Gulf Arabs also mirrored India’s Cold War relations with the superpowers. The latter were close allies of the United States. India, by contrast, had by the early 1970s found itself more aligned with the Soviet camp, in part due to the United States’ embrace of Pakistan. Just as the collapse of the Soviet Union rebalanced India’s engagement with Russia and the United States, India began reorienting away from Palestinian advocacy and toward greater engagement with Israel, and away from a pronounced tilt toward Iran and toward greater engagement with the Gulf Arab monarchies. At the same time, relations between Pakistan and the Gulf Arabs have soured, including over Pakistan’s refusal to join the Saudi-led campaign against Houthi rebels in Yemen.

India’s realignments – and the new geopolitical landscape of the Middle East – support U.S. foreign policy goals in the region. They enhance counterterrorism cooperation among likeminded partners and contribute to regional peace and stability at a time the U.S. government is seeking to rebalance attention and resources away from the Middle East and toward its priority theater, the Indo-Pacific. For U.S. policymakers, understanding the transformative changes that have taken place in India’s relations with Israel and the Gulf Arab states will be crucial for developing deeper cooperation in a range of economic, security, and technical areas in the years ahead.

India and Israel Draw Closer
In July 2017, Narendra Modi made history by becoming the first sitting Indian prime minister to visit Israel. This “coming out” party was a long time in the making, coming on the heels of decades of quiet defense cooperation. India voted against UN membership for Israel in 1949 and, although it recognized Israel in 1950, refused to exchange ambassadors or normalize diplomatic relations. While Israel supplied India with munitions during the 1965 India-Pakistan war, the two remained diplomatically estranged for most of the Cold War due to a variety of factors, including, Indian domestic politics, support for the Palestinian cause, and Israel’s proximity to the United States.

Encouraged in part by pro-Israel lawmakers and interest groups in the United States, the Indian government pursued some efforts to mend ties with Israel in the mid-1980s. In 1985, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi met Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres in New York during the United Nations General Assembly and that year India voted to abstain from an Arab-sponsored resolution designed to expel Israel from the UN.

In January 1992, shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, India normalized diplomatic relations with Israel and exchanged ambassadors.

Scholar Nicolas Blarel traces the major thaw in India-Israel relations and India’s “consensual pro-Israel tilt” to the India-Pakistan conflict at Kargil in 1999. That short war, he argues, “served a critical juncture in the bilateral relationship as India decisively turned towards Israel’s defense industry after finding itself short of crucial surveillance and military equipment to cope with Pakistani infiltrations.”

In 2003, India-Israel ties took a major step forward when Ariel Sharon became the first Israeli prime minister to visit India. Under the United Progressive Alliance government that ruled India from 2004-2014, there were few high-profile visits or breakthroughs but India assumed a relatively neutral position during the 2012 Israel-Gaza crisis. Behind the scenes, there was “an intensification of direct exchanges between the defense establishments.”

The pace of engagement quickened after Modi was elected prime minister in May 2014. As Chief Minister of Gujarat, he had visited Tel Aviv in 2006, promising to return one day as prime minister. Modi’s first external affairs minister, Sushma Swaraj, had served as chairwoman of the Indo-Israel parliamentary friendship group from 2006-2009. In September 2014, Modi met Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York. One month later, India announced it was acquiring over 250 Barak-I missiles from Israel for the Indian Navy and in November Indian Home Minister Rajnath Singh visited Israel.

In 2015, Moshe Ya’alon became the first Israeli Defense Minister to visit India and Pranab Mukherjee became the first Indian president to visit Israel. The following year, India hosted Israeli President Reuven Rivlin and Israel hosted Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj. Modi then made a historic visit to Israel in July 2017 that cemented the paradigm shift in New Delhi. In January 2018, Netanyahu reciprocated with a visit to New Delhi. There the two sides signed an agreement on cyber security and later inked a pact to promote space cooperation.

During this period, India-Israel defense ties thrived. Between 2011-2020, India made roughly $2.7 billion in purchases of Israeli defense equipment, including UAVs, surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles, guided bombs, ammunition, anti-tank guided missiles, sensors, targeting pods, and fire control radar. Over that period Israel became the fourth-largest supplier of military hardware to India, after Russia, the US, and France.

From 2016-2020, India was the top importer of Israeli defense equipment, accounting for 43% of sales. In 2018 the Modi government also removed from a blacklist two Israeli defense companies that had been placed in restricted procurement categories in 2006 following allegations of corruption. Most recently, in January 2022, India’s Commerce Ministry confirmed Israel and India had begun talks on a Free Trade Agreement as the two sides celebrated 30 years of diplomatic relations.

India’s Broadening Relations with the UAE and Gulf
The UAE arguably constitutes India’s oldest and strongest partnership in the Gulf, one invigorated by Modi’s 2015 visit to the UAE, the first by an Indian prime minister in 34 years. Gradually, the relationship has evolved from a partnership narrowly defined by energy ties and the large Indian diaspora, to one characterized by cooperation across the realms of security, education, and investment. In a 2019 Brookings Institution survey of India’s strategic community, Israel and UAE ranked as India’s two most trusted partners in West Asia.

Once a point of friction, fighting terrorism has become a common cause, as the UAE and its neighbors increasingly came to see radical Islamist extremism as a threat. The Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi responded to Modi’s initial outreach with a state visit to India in February 2016 and again as Chief Guest for India’s Republic Day celebrations in January 2017. Modi returned to the UAE in February 2018 and August 2019. A scheduled visit to the UAE by Modi in January 2022 was postponed by COVID-19.

In 2020, the Indian Air Force participated in the Desert Flag air force exercises in the UAE and Indian Army chief General MM Naravane visited the UAE. The following August, the Indian Air Force Chief visited the UAE and India’s navy conducted drills with the UAE navy off the coast of Abu Dhabi. The large Indian diaspora in the Gulf has also increased the importance of the region for India. India’s Ministry of External Affairs estimates that there are roughly 3.5 million Indians living the UAE and 2.5 million living in Saudi Arabia. There are an additional 1 million in Kuwait, roughly 750,000 in both Oman and Qatar, and 300,000 in Bahrain.

New Openings and Initiatives
Just as India was breaking new ground with those two countries, Israel and the UAE witnessed their own historic diplomatic breakthrough via the Abraham Accords of 2020. The product of behind-the-scenes negotiating by senior Trump administration officials, a UAE-Israel diplomatic normalization agreement was reached in August 2020. It marked the third Arab state to normalize ties with Israel following Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994. The UAE agreement was followed by an Israel-Bahrain normalization agreement in September. In October, Sudan followed suit. In December, Morocco agreed to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel while the US agreed to recognize Moroccan sovereignty over the disputed territory of the Western Sahara.

The pacts generally allowed for the exchange of ambassadors and embassies, an increase in diplomatic interactions, the expansion of trade and people-to-people ties, and direct flights. Bilateral trade agreements followed, with India and Israel reaching a trade agreement in February 2022. An even bigger free trade agreement between Israel and the UAE was inked in April 2022.

The Biden administration has argued it would like to continue the “normalization” process between Israel and additional regional capitals. “We will encourage more countries to follow the lead of the Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco. We want to widen the circle of diplomacy,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken explained in September 2021.

One year after the Abraham Accords were signed, the foreign ministers of India, Israel, the UAE, and US held a quadrilateral dialogue. What began as a trilateral discussion between Israel, the UAE, and the US evolved into what some have dubbed the “West Asian Quad” when Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar was invited to join the virtual talks while on a diplomatic visit to the UAE. Blinken subsequently referred to it as I2U2, a reference to India, Israel, the UAE, and the United States.

The U.S. State Department said the four participants discussed “expanding economic and political cooperation in the Middle East and Asia, including through trade, combating climate change, energy cooperation, and increasing maritime security.” Other items on the agenda included people-to-people ties in science and technology, and Covid-19 relief efforts, and vaccine outreach. Israel’s foreign minister added that this new synergy “will help us work together on infrastructure, digital infrastructure, transport, ports, trains, maritime security, clean energy...four countries represented have a unique set of capabilities, knowledge, and experience."

This new minilateral dialogue among four disparate partners, unthinkable just a few years ago, is expected to endure. “The newly formed West Asian Quad between the UAE, India, Israel and the US is an offspring of the Abraham Accord,” explained the UAE Ambassador to India in February 2022.

The Saudi Question
The transformation of India’s ties with Saudi Arabia in recent years has arguably been no less revolutionary than the breakthrough in Indo-Israeli ties. The early seeds of an opening were planted in 2006, when Saudi King Abdullah visited India and signed the Delhi Declaration. In it, the two sides agreed “terrorism is a scourge for all mankind.” Ties were upgraded to a “strategic partnership” in 2010 when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Saudi Arabia. Two years later, Saudi Arabia apprehended and turned over to India a key terrorist involved in coordinating the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks from Pakistan, marking a new chapter in India-Saudi counterterrorism cooperation.

India-Saudi ties have reached new heights since the political ascent of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). Now the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia, MBS made a high-profile visit to India in February 2019 and Modi reciprocated with a visit to Saudi Arabia that October. Between meetings, the Saudi ambassador to India announced Riyadh was “looking at making investments in India potentially worth $100 billion in the areas of energy, refining, petrochemicals, infrastructure, agriculture, minerals and mining."

Saudi Arabia, he noted, was a key pillar of India's energy security, supplying 17% or more of India’s crude oil needs and 32% of its liquefied petroleum gas requirements. A consortium of Indian state owned energy firms is reportedly collaborating with Saudi Aramco and Abu Dhabi National Oil Co to build an over $40 billion coastal refinery and petrochemical project in Maharashtra due to be commissioned in 2025.

In 2019 Saudi Arabia also raised India’s quota for the Haj (the number of Indian Muslims permitted to make a religious pilgrimage to Mecca) to 200,000 and India introduced e-visas for Saudi citizens. Riyadh also released 850 Indian citizens detained in Saudi prisons and agreed to establish a Strategic Partnership Council with India to enhance cooperation.

In 2020, Gen. Naravane became the first Indian service chief to visit Saudi Arabia. The following year, India and Saudi Arabia conducted their first-ever naval exercise, “Al-Mohed Al-Hind.” In February 2022, the Royal Saudi Land Forces commander made his first-ever trip to India. There, the two sides agreed to expand defense ties “through military exchanges and training courses, exploring defense industrial collaboration and procurements.”

The transformation of India-Saudi ties in recent years has paralleled the relative souring of Pakistan-Saudi ties. Saudi Arabia has long been viewed as a key patron of Pakistan but in recent years the two countries have found themselves increasingly at odds. The rift arguably began in April 2015, when Pakistan’s parliament voted down a request from Riyadh to join a Saudi-led military coalition engaged in a military campaign against Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen. That year, Saudi Arabia began deporting Pakistanis from the Kingdom in large numbers.

Pakistan’s foreign minister later reported that between 2015 and 2019, Saudi Arabia deported 286,000 Pakistanis from the Kingdom for various reasons.

The relationship was further strained in 2019, when Saudi Arabia and the UAE largely refused Pakistani requests to condemn India for revoking the autonomous status of Kashmir. Instead, shortly after the Kashmir announcement the UAE granted Prime Minister Modi its highest civilian award. Saudi energy firm Aramco then announced it was eyeing a $75 billion investment in Indian energy firm Reliance. In February 2020, Saudi Arabia rejected a Pakistani request to convene a meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to criticize India over Kashmir.

Pakistan’s foreign minister then threatened to convene a separate meeting of Islamic countries “ready to stand with us on the issue of Kashmir.”

Saudi Arabia responded by calling on Pakistan to repay $1 billion of a $3 billion loan and reportedly ended an oil supply contract with Islamabad.

Looking Ahead
The winds of change sweeping the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent are producing new relationships, strategic outlooks, and multilateral groupings. Much of the change is being driven by an Indian government less wedded to Non-Aligned advocacy for the Palestinian cause and more open to ties with Israel; less invested in an exclusive relationship with Iran and more open to engagement the Gulf Arabs; and more open to cooperating with the United States across the region. India has not abandoned its relationships with Iran, Russia, or the Palestinians but it is no longer foreclosing engagement with others as a result.

The diplomatic realignments underway are also motivated by a changing economic landscape. In aggregate, the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council would represent India’s largest trading partner. India-Saudi bilateral trade is approaching $30 billion while Pakistan-Saudi bilateral trade has barely eclipsed $3 billion. Indian energy firms have become increasingly active in the UAE, with ONGC Videsh acquiring a 10% stake in a UAE offshore oilfield for $600 million in 2018. Two other Indian energy companies were awarded offshore exploration rights in 2019. Hundreds of Indian business and dozens of Indian banks now operate out of Dubai.

While these developments evolved organically, they complement U.S. foreign policy objectives in the region, strengthening bonds among likeminded partners. They present new opportunities for mini-lateral coalitions, like the West Asian Quad, and new arenas to operationalize cooperation. The joint statement issued by the West Asian Quad prioritized cooperation on water, agriculture, and education. India, Israel, and the U.S. are now discussing ways to collaborate in the development of 5G technologies. India is evaluating a U.S. offer for trilateral venture with Israel to develop futuristic combat vehicles. And, some in Israel are calling for enhanced India-Israel-UAE cooperation in space.

It is important not to overstate the implications of these realignments. There are still notable differences among the parties on thorny issues like
Iran, Russia, and China. A West Asian Quad would do little to help manage the Ukraine crisis or combat China’s intimidation of its neighbors. Nevertheless, India, Israel, and the United States have long shared common interests in the fight against terrorism and Islamist extremism. More recent changes in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and the thickening bonds among all parties, create new opportunities for cooperation and aid U.S. counterterrorism goals in the region. Finally, as the United States continues the painstaking process of pivoting assets and attention away from the Middle East and toward its priority theater, the Indo-Pacific, growing peace and cooperation among all four parties—India, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—contributes to stability while India’s growing influence in the region helps to counterbalance China’s expanding footprint there.
 

I2U2 can become a regional feature like the Quad: Jake Sullivan​

The U.S. believes that ‘I2U2’, a group comprising India, Israel, the U.S., and the UAE, can become “a feature” of the West Asian region, just like the Quad is for the Indo-Pacific.

This idea was articulated by U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan on board Air Force One, en route to Israel with U.S. President Joe Biden.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi is scheduled to meet virtually with Mr. Biden, Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid and UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan on Thursday.

“And we think I2U2 can become a feature of the broader region, just as the Quad has become a central pillar of the Indo-Pacific strategy of the United States,” Mr. Sullivan told the travelling press as per a transcript released by the White House.

His remarks were made in response to a question on what the objective was in bringing India “into so many issues” such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, the Quad and I2U2.

I2U2, which was launched last autumn, has been called the “West Asian Quad” by some commentators.

Mr. Sullivan said India was one of the most “strategically consequential countries” in the Indo-Pacific and therefore “should” play a central role in U.S. strategy. India also had a long-standing relationship with the Gulf countries and Israel, he said, adding that the U.S. was looking forward to Mr. Modi’s participation in the I2U2 summit.

India and the West Asian countries in I2U2 could come together and work on agricultural technology, an example of Mr. Biden’s vision for West Asia, according to Mr. Sullivan.

He said Mr. Biden had a vision for a globally integrated West Asian region, one that is not “just focused on issues that have been top of mind for American foreign policymakers over the last 20 years — terrorism and wars”.

Mr. Sullivan said there would be a “significant” announcement around food security and agricultural technology from the I2U2 meeting, as this was an area where there was a current crisis that the four countries could come together to address.

Russian oil​

With regard to price caps for Russian oil, the U.S. is engaging not just with the EU and the U.K. but also “key consuming countries” and others, including India and China, Mr. Sullivan said.

The U.S. was being “transparent, direct, and straightforward with the major consuming countries” about reducing Russian revenues while minimising economic disruptions globally, in the countries concerned, and the U.S., Mr. Sullivan said.

He indicated that the discussions were unlikely to conclude in days. The G7 group of the world’s advanced economies had agreed to explore the issue of oil caps when it met last month in Germany.

India’s partnership can be ‘game changer’ in I2U2 grouping: Former Israeli NSA​

The stated purpose of the meeting of the I2U2 forum, also dubbed the new Quad, is to discuss “the food security crisis and other areas of cooperation across hemispheres"

The formation of the new I2U2 grouping is a significant development where India's partnership can prove to be a "game changer", a former Israeli National Security Adviser has said ahead of the forum’s first high-level meeting which Prime Minister Narendra Modi will attend virtually
on Thursday.

The I2U2 - comprising India, Israel, the UAE and the US - was established in October 2021 following an initiative by the four countries' foreign ministers as part of External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar's visit to Israel.

In a virtual conference, the four foreign ministers agreed to utilise complementary capabilities to fulfil overlapping interests, thus bolstering cooperation and strengthening the strategic partnership between the new Quad partners.

As Israel prepares to welcome U.S. President Joe Biden on Wednesday in a packed three-day program that includes a high-level meeting of the new I2U2 forum in which Prime Minister Modi would participate virtually, Israel's former National Security Adviser, Maj Gen Yaakov Amidror told PTI that "India can also help to enhance and expand the scope of Abraham accords bringing in new countries".

"It has the ability to push others by saying that it is in the interest of the world," said Mr. Amidror, who continues to be active with several think-tanks.

Amid the building excitement around Mr. Biden's trip to the region during which Israel and the United States are expected to declare a "strategic partnership", including a joint commitment to foil Iran's nuclear ambitions using "all elements of national power", the discussion of I2U2 leaders has received wide attention.

Experts believe that it has the potential to build on the Abraham accords to expand regional partnership beyond the Middle East, specifically on energy, tech and economic issues.

The stated purpose of the meeting of the I2U2 forum, also dubbed the new Quad, is to discuss “the food security crisis and other areas of cooperation across hemispheres".

Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid and Biden in Jerusalem will be joined virtually by Prime Minister Modi and United Arab Emirates President Mohamed bin Zayed on Thursday afternoon for the discussions.

The leaders' remarks at the start of the event will be broadcast live, an official release said on Tuesday.

"Trade, where Israel can serve as a bridge, agriculture, food security and sophisticated technology are likely to prominently figure in the talks", Mr. Amidror said.

The former Israeli NSA said that Mr. Biden's visit will definitely help build a positive momentum among Arab states looking to normalise ties with Israel and also nudge several others who are part of the "under the table crowded scene".

With the Russian-Ukrainian war posing new challenges in the energy market in Europe and in the Middle East, Mr. Amidror said that Greece, Cyprus and Israel working together on natural gas pipeline projects can be an important development also in the context of the I2U2 discussions.

"Add India to this new situation, where Israel is a bridge with Europe and India another big trading partner in the whole context - it will be a game changer", he noted.

The European Union, as per reports, aims to cut its reliance on Russian gas by two-thirds this year and end all Russian fossil fuel imports by 2027 due to Moscow's invasion of Ukraine.

Cyprus, Greece and Israel have agreed to build the world's longest and deepest underwater power cable that will traverse the Mediterranean seabed and link their electricity grids.

Dr. Oshrit Birvadker, a lecturer at IDC Herzliya and a research fellow at Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, who is a foreign policy expert specialising in India, feels that one of the most important goals of Mr. Biden's visit, apart from helping to balance global oil prices and lowering

US inflation ahead of the upcoming congressional elections, is to strengthen the United States' strategic alliances in the region.

"This is a direct continuation of what previous Presidents like Mr. Obama and Mr. Trump did. It is a bit reminiscent of earlier times when the United States formed identical alliances during the Cold War," Dr. Oshrit told PTI.

"The I2U2 is one of many strategies designed to demonstrate the return of the American leadership to the global arena by connecting countries with common interests. The US administration sees China as a rival and tries to deal with its activities in various ways," Ms. Oshrit points out.

"The U.S. is concerned with the growing Chinese presence in the Middle East, not to mention signing a 25-year strategic partnership agreement in March 2021 (with Iran) which will give Beijing a military foothold in the region. One way (of dealing with it) is, of course, to strengthen the strategic alliances", Ms. Oshrit added.

Several prominent commentators in the Israeli media have also pointed out that the alliance is an effort to counter China's growing influence and foil Iran's nuclear ambitions.

Even though the forum has been touted as an economic alliance they argue that it goes hand in hand with politics and there is a major political agenda behind the grouping.

Mr. Amidror points out in the context that India cannot be a part of a security alliance given its traditional ties with Iran, but it does not stop it from being a strong economic partner.

"Economic means political. This is the U.S way of dealing with its interest in the middle east and the Indian pacific by cooperating with countries who share the same vision.

“A small group of this kind may push for one of the critical economic corridors, the Arab-Mediterranean corridor, which will maximize the potential and profit of any country taking part in it. For India, we know it is a net profit, mainly because of the complexity and instability presented by the INSTC path," Ms. Oshrit said.

The momentum of such a corridor strengthens India against China in competition for connectivity and is a strategic advantage for Washington. And today it is very clear that a strong India is ideal for America, she said.

"Besides, by working together these countries could have the potential to prevent the global food crisis, affect food prices, keep inflation low and stabilise economies. We are all aware of the evidence of the interaction between changes in global food prices and political instability,", Ms. Oshrit added.

Lev Aran, a former coordinator of the Israel-India Parliamentary Friendship League and a columnist for several publications, sees India's participation in the I2U2 forum as a "final verdict" on the doubters who do not see much of a change in India's policy towards Israel and in the
Middle East in general.

"It is for me the final verdict on those voices that call not to make a big deal out of this growing closeness as nothing has fundamentally changed and sides continue to play the balancing role.

“Something fundamental has changed here which marks a transition in India's policy in the Middle East and I do not think that future change in governments in India would lead to backtracking in the major strides taken over the last several years", Mr. Aran said.

He said most of the policymakers have slowly understood that the Palestinian issue is not the key issue in the region but a local one that the two sides have to deal with and sort out directly.

Mr. Aran also sees the I2U2 forum as a part of a new profound axis which is very much a political alliance in nature as well, beyond its economic utility.

"I don't think people in Tehran see it as a part of commercial cooperation. They won't buy into this argument," Mr. Aran said.

The U.S. had earlier set up the Quad, the Asian Pacific Quad, with the US, Australia, India and Japan which is also seen by many as a forum to counter Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific region.
 

What You Need to Know About the I2U2​


A new ‘Quad’ aims to deepen economic cooperation among Israel, India, the UAE and the United States.

As part of his visit earlier this month to the Middle East, President Biden participated in the first leaders summit of a new grouping made up of Israel, India, the United Arab Emirates and the United States. Known as the I2U2, the countries’ foreign ministers formed the bloc in the fall of 2021 to deepen technological and private sector collaboration in the region and tackle transnational challenges in six focus areas: water, energy, transportation, space, health and food security. Beyond the announcement of a food security initiative and a hybrid renewable generation facility for India, little was revealed about what’s next for I2U2.

The first leaders summit of the I2U2, Jerusalem, July 14, 2022. (Doug Mills/The New York Times)
The first leaders summit of the I2U2, Jerusalem, July 14, 2022. (Doug Mills/The New York Times)
USIP’s Ambassador Hesham Youssef and Daniel Markey look at the vision animating I2U2, what each country aims to achieve and the potential areas of cooperation.


Is there any sort of normative or principled vision behind the I2U2?​


Markey: Each of I2U2’s leaders stressed the group’s desire to mobilize private sector capital and technologies to solve practical, shared challenges. Trade and transit infrastructure, clean energy, waste treatment and critical and emerging technologies were all identified as priorities. Largely missing, however, was any overarching, principled vision of what unites these four states in partnership. The omission is noteworthy in part because the I2U2 often draws comparisons with the Indo-Pacific’s “Quad,” whose members — Japan, the United States, Australia and India — often stress the unifying force of their democratic practices.


Practical cooperation may prove sufficient to sustain I2U2. That said, an aspirational vision for the group’s core identity would not be all that difficult to find, given the striking religious diversity of its members. By highlighting their shared commitment to pluralism and cooperation across faiths, I2U2 could become a venue for cooperation on a variety of other initiatives. It could pair pragmatic, development-oriented problem-solving with peacebuilding across religious and communal divides. In addition, the shift would offer the Biden administration a means to broaden its vision of world order from one that is primarily defined by “democracy versus authoritarianism” to one that considers other important features of national identity and helps to build different sorts of bridges with strategic but undemocratic partners like the UAE. Third, an I2U2 that advances pluralism across its member states could also encourage the practice of related values — including protections for minority, religious and human rights — within them as well.


What do these countries aim to achieve with the I2U2?​


Markey: India sees clear and tangible benefits from the I2U2, starting with the group’s first two announcements: a $2 billion investment and technological assistance for agricultural initiatives in two Indian states, Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh; and support for a hybrid renewable energy project in Gujarat. I2U2 thus offers a model and platform for sustained mobilization of capital from the UAE that is supported by Israeli and American technologies and championed by Washington.


In addition, given India’s close ties with both Israel and the UAE, New Delhi has much to like about the I2U2 as a diplomatic device to accelerate, deepen and guarantee the ongoing normalization of relations between Jerusalem and Abu Dhabi. Israel supplies critical military technologies to India, but prior generations of Indian leaders tended to downplay those defense ties, in part for domestic political reasons and in part to placate their Arab neighbors. Nowadays, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has the luxury of being unapologetic in his outreach to his Israeli counterparts. To be sure, the Abraham Accords and I2U2 don’t entirely solve India’s balancing act in West Asia, given New Delhi’s continued wish to retain good ties with Tehran, but they do help.


Finally, I2U2 offers India an opportunity to cooperate with the United States on its own terms: not as a junior associate or a formal ally, but as a self-confident and “strategically autonomous” partner. I2U2’s emphasis on voluntary economic initiatives rather than binding multilateral trade deals (like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) that India has repeatedly rejected is also attractive. In that narrow respect, I2U2 resembles Washington’s new Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, which India has also joined.


Youssef: The UAE is working to become one of the most globally connected players in the region. One of the pillars of this strategy is to pivot to Asia. But in contrast to the U.S. pivot to Asia aiming at confronting China, the UAE considers China one of its main partners in achieving this objective. I2U2 is also one of the ways the UAE is balancing its relations with its two main Asian partners: China and India.


The rapid advancement in UAE-India relations started around 2015. The UAE is India’s third-largest trading partner, and earlier this month they signed a free-trade agreement that is expected to increase their bilateral trade from $59 billion to over $100 billion in five years. The UAE also recently signed a free-trade agreement with Israel, and they are planning to increase annual bilateral trade to over $10 billion in the next five years. One year after establishing relations, trade reached $885 million, according to Israel’s economy minister. It remains to be seen whether this target would be exceeded because of I2U2 engagement and projects.


Since its establishment, the UAE has had strong relations with the United States. The I2U2 summit and a bilateral meeting on the margin of the summit with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and Egypt, Jordan and Iraq helped to overcome some tensions with the Biden administration and table others.


The UAE and India are focused on pursuing economic cooperation through I2U2, and it seems that the United States and Israel are willing to go along with this approach. However, it is not clear whether any of them will introduce geopolitical objectives to I2U2 in the future. This would be problematic as the countries in the group have conflicting positions on how to deal with China, Russia and Iran that may affect the future of the group and its prospects of success. The UAE in particular will strive to avoid this risk. Israel's ambassador to India stressed that the group is "not against anyone,” adding that “it's for our people and for making the world a better place," an important message that was not echoed widely enough.


The Jerusalem Declaration signed during the Biden reflects the strength of Israeli relations with the United States. I2U2 is also a demonstration of the extent to which the United States is committed to advancing Israel’s integration in the region particularly since the Abraham Accords laid the ground for establishing this group and the Biden administration vowed to support this process.


Israel’s newly established relations with the UAE have been quite warm and are advancing at a rapid, perhaps even surprising, pace. Other than the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, and the more recent Negev Forum, I2U2 is the most visible platform that Israel shares with an Arab country.


Israel has significantly advanced its relations with India since the 1990s. Negotiations surrounding a free trade agreement have made substantial progress, amid a backdrop of intensifying Israel-India economic cooperation. First, Israel-India bilateral trade increased from $200 million in 1992 — when India formally established its embassy in Tel Aviv — to $6.35 billion in 2021. Second, the Haifa Port project that was initially awarded to China and which the Pentagon repeatedly warned Israel to cancel, was reportedly awarded to a joint Indian-Israeli bid that will operate the port until 2054. Third, Israel is India’s major defense supplier: India makes up 42% of Israeli arms exports at an estimated annual value of $1 billion. Between 2015-2019, Indian arms imports from Israel increased by 175%. I2U2 and the projects agreed in the summit are likely to substantially increase India-Israel bilateral trade.


What are the current and future areas of cooperation and potential risks for the group?​


Youssef: Cooperation among I2U2 members represents key areas in the 21st century global economy. The group should avoid entering into geopolitical issues that could derail its principal objective. For example, a number of experts fear that the UAE’s current foreign labor force may be replaced with Indian workers. Another danger is that I2U2 falls victim to mission creep. Although the group should not spread itself too thin, I2U2 can expand by advancing cooperation in new areas in the future or by pursuing cooperation with other partners in both the Middle East and South Asia.


I2U2 has huge potential, and its composition provides ample opportunities for win-win cooperation. The United States has vast capabilities in every conceivable area; India has massive human resources and talents; Israel has advanced technology in a number of important fields; and the UAE is advancing innovative policies, attracting start-ups and willing to invest substantial resources. However, the burden of its sustainability will mainly lie with the UAE and Israel — the main beneficiaries — to maintain the interest of the United States and India and justify its continuation.


 

India to contribute in economic growth of Middle East, S Asia under I2U2​

India has said it has vital stakes in peace and prosperity in the Middle East and through the newly-formed I2U2 grouping and it is confident of making significant contributions to energy, food security and economic growth in the region and South Asia.

Four-nation grouping I2U2 comprises India, Israel, the UAE and the US. I stands for India and Israel and U for the US and UAE.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi attended the first virtual summit of the coalition on July 14 and said the grouping would make an important contribution in areas of energy security, food security and economic growth.

With US President Joe Biden, Israeli Premier Yair Lapid and UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan listening, Modi said the grouping has established a positive agenda and its framework is a good model for practical cooperation in the face of increasing global uncertainties.

"India has vital stakes in peace and prosperity in the Middle East. During a recent virtual I2U2 summit, the leaders of India, Israel, the UAE and the US agreed to increase joint investment in six key areas of water, energy, transport, space, health and food security, Charg d'affaires in India's Permanent Mission to the UN Ambassador R Ravindra said at the UNSC open debate on the Question of Palestine on Tuesday.

We are confident that with I2U2, we will make significant contributions to energy security, food security and economic growth in the Middle East and South Asia, he said.

After the first virtual meeting of I2U2 on July 14, a joint statement said this unique grouping of countries aims to harness the vibrancy of our societies and entrepreneurial spirit to tackle some of the greatest challenges confronting our world, with a particular focus on joint investments and new initiatives in water, energy, transportation, space, health, and food security.

US Ambassador to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield said at the Security Council meeting that "the I2U2 Virtual Summit of India, Israel, the UAE, and the United States the President showed the potential of closer cooperation between Israel and other countries in and outside the region.

Ravindra, however, expressed concern over the developments in Israel and Palestine, in particular, the continued violent attacks and the killing of civilians and the acts of destruction and provocation.

He said India has consistently advocated against all such acts of violence and reiterated New Delhi's call for its complete cessation.

He stressed that the absence of a political settlement between Israel and Palestine did not augur well for long-term regional peace and stability.

In addition to the stated political support for a two-state solution, the international community must expend energies and political capital to reinvigorate the Middle East peace process, he said.

Ravindra said India believes that the peaceful resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict would bring lasting peace and stability to the region.

He reiterated the need for an early resumption of the political course by launching credible direct negotiations on all final status issues.

India has consistently called for direct peace negotiations between Israel and Palestine, which, we believe, is the best path towards achieving the goal of a two-state solution, he said.

He said that these negotiations must be based on the internationally agreed framework, taking into account the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people for statehood and Israel's legitimate security concerns.

Ravindra said all unilateral measures that unduly alter the status quo on the ground and undercut the viability of the two-state solution must be eschewed.

The international community and this Council must send a strong signal against any step preventing the possibility of durable peace between Israel and Palestine, he said.

India urged the parties to focus on addressing the urgent security and economic challenges, including the precarious financial situation of the Palestinian Authority, and chart a clear path for discussing key political issues.

We recognise the international community's recent confidence-building measures for the Palestinians and the important steps Israel has taken to ease Palestine's economic situation, he said.

Such initiatives are in the interest of both parties and help maintain stability and discourage the possible recurrence of terror and violence. Moreover, these initiatives should create a conducive environment leading to political dialogue, he said.

Intra-Palestinian unity is critical for the well-being of the Palestinian people, he said and expressed hope that efforts to achieve reconciliation between all Palestinian parties will bear fruit soon and help in overcoming the current stalemate, leading to legislative and Presidential elections in Palestine.

Given our long-standing and firm commitment to the establishment of a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine, within secure, recognised and mutually agreed borders, living side by side with Israel in peace and security, India will remain fully supportive of all efforts to restart the peace process, he said.
 

Israel’s former envoy to India appointed Adani’s Haifa port chairman​

FORMER AMBASSADOR of Israel to India Ron Malka Sunday said he has taken over the charge as Executive Chairman of Haifa Port Company (HPC), which is owned by a consortium of Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone Ltd (APSEZ) and Israel’s Gadot Group.

“I’m honored and privileged to take office today as Executive Chairman of the Haifa Port Company, on behalf of @AdaniOnline. The experience and expertise of Adani and Gadot, combined with the dedication of the port workers, will take Haifa Port to new heights of prosperity,” his tweet read.
The Adani Group did not respond to queries on the appointment.

In July 2022, a consortium of India’s Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone Ltd (APSEZ) and Israel’s Gadot Group won the tender for privatizing the Port of Haifa, the second largest port in Israel handling over half of Israel’s container cargo.

Through the winning bid of $1.18bn, the Adani-Gadot consortium has secured the rights to buy 100 per cent shares of HPC.

The APSEZ-Gadot Group consortium completed the acquisition of HPC from the government of Israel on January 10, 2023. While APSEZ holds 70 per cent in the project, Gadot holds the balance 30 per cent. The concession period of Haifa port is up to 2054.

Located in northern Israel, Haifa is one of Israel’s two biggest commercial ports, handles nearly half of Israel’s container cargo, and is also a principal port for passenger traffic and cruise ships. The existing infrastructure at Haifa Port includes two container terminals and two multi-cargo terminals.

Ron Malka, who was named Israel’s ambassador to India in 2018, was not a career diplomat, but had a strong business and finance background. An MBA with a PhD in economics, he was brought to impart focus and direction to economic ties between the two countries.

Malka provided financial advice and guidance to companies and institutions in the Israeli market, and international companies in public and private projects. In addition, he had served as economic advisor to the Israeli Prime Minister’s Commission to review the defence budget.

During his stay, discussions on the India-Israel Free Trade Agreement and the Haifa port project picked pace. The Covid-19 pandemic that struck in early 2020, however, broke the momentum. Upon his return to Israel in the latter half of 2021, Malka was named the Director General of the Israel’s Ministry of Economy, which is equivalent to Commerce and Industry Secretary in the Indian government. The Ministry of Economy in the Israeli government looks after Commerce, Industry and Labour.

The total developed quay length of the Haifa port measures over 2,900 metres. The maximum draft available ranges from 11 metres to 16.5 metres. It has a Roll-on Roll-off (RORO), a cruise terminal with various passenger facilities and a waterfront length of 2 km for development. During 2021, HPC handled 1.46 million TEUs of containers, 2.56 million tons of general and bulk cargo.
 
USA, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and India may soon develop a joint infrastructure that connects Gulf and Arab countries via a railway network and also extends to India via shipping lanes. the seeds of such a joint infrastructure programme were first laid out over 18 months ago in another forum called I2U2 which comprises the likes of the India, Israel, US and UAE.