Again, I'm just speculating here. If they had mobilized large chunks of the army beforehand, the terrorists wouldn't have attacked. So they probably decided to use much smaller numbers of the army and other specialist units to throw the terrorists off guard. That's better than getting them to not attack and letting them walk around freely and plan other attacks.
First, the civilians should have got out of the way. There was no need for Doval to get brownie points by taking unilateral action (deciding which team to deploy and picking the NSG); there was no need for him to be there at all. Can you imagine Kissinger for instance, sitting in a Vietnamese base waiting for a raid into Cambodia to be completed? There is some deep insecurity in the man that drives him to take prominent positions (out of harm's way) whenever there is a photo opportunity.
Second, there is no reason to believe that the Army would have mobilised large numbers; nobody said so, nobody did so. This was not the Republic Day parade, after all. Pushing masses of people into a situation and hoping that numbers will overwhelm the hostiles is a typically civilian manoeuvre, one that a policeman used to
bundobust duty would automatically take. On the other hand, it was the Army, when left to do it right by its own seniors and by New Delhi, that got it right in Black Thunder; a look at the numbers there will be instructive.
Third, you are completely right in suggesting that keeping a low profile and enticing the hostiles to make their move was the correct thing to do. But that did not preclude precautionary measures: guarding the military assets, cautioning the family members and throwing a discreet ring around them (not necessarily of uniformed personnel), giving the hostiles clearly demarcated room to manoeuvre by placing defensive pickets in locations that automatically encourage the hostiles to go where they are wanted to go.
What the NSG failed to anticipate was the terrorists's point of entry. Once the perimeter was breached, we did lose some men in the mess halls, but then the terrorists failed to do anything else. Most other casualties were from battle. So I don't think the criticism on the NSG is warranted.
You are right here. The worrying thing about the point of entry is that it should never have been achievable to enter in the first place. That is not an NSG or an SF problem; that is purely a base administration problem. While there is no harm in letting re-employed reservists take up watch-and-ward duties, there needed to have been periodic inspections of intrusion-reporting electronic equipment and of the vulnerability of the perimeter defences. There was also need for the Garudas to be involved as a reaction team located on the airbase itself at all times. What else should an air force special force be doing? That the hostiles got through tells its own tale.
By the time the battle broke out, it was too late for anything but sharpening the pencils for the post-mortem.
Again I repeat: the NSG were not trained for this kind of role, and they were out of place. The overwhelming impression is that they were involved solely because they were under the direct control of the civilian authorities.
So the choice was between baiting them in with fewer numbers or simply move in a couple thousand troops and drive them away only for them to attack again on a different day.
There were very many variations possible. Not even one was tried.
The army was involved from the beginning.
Pathankot attack: A terror strike, some hard truths
By the evening of January 1, two army columns and two teams of special forces under Brigadier A.S. Bevli were in location at the air base, primarily tasked with protecting the technical area and vital assets. At 10 pm, 130 personnel of the NSG landed at the base. Another 80 personnel arrived at 2.30 am on January 2.
I thought you were the one who pointed out that large numbers would have been counter-productive.
From what I saw in the news, some of the terrorists did try to gain entry into the cantonment but were thwarted.
That was good work by the defensive cordon.
There is a lot more to be said about the whole thing; perhaps later. I am both tired and caught up in work.
