- Falcon
Introduction
The recent India-Pakistan stand-off in the aftermath of the Balakote Strike has brought to fore the need for the Government of India to support the Indian Armed Forces’ quest for creating operational & doctrinal flexibility, developing a plethora of military options in order to present to the Government of the day to respond to future incidents of the kind, as also modernization of the armed forces in order to effectively adapt to the rapidly changing future battlefields.
The introduction of Integrated Battle Groups, a formation that shall amalgamate the various arms and services of the army to create groups capable of carrying out sustained operations on short notice for a certain time interval in order to provide flexibility and effectiveness in military effort, has necessitated a relook at what remains one of the most important aspects of the modern day battlefield – that of Close Air Support (CAS).
Air & Land Power: The Relationship in the Modern Battlefield
In any war, depending upon the military situation, either the air power shall have the dominant role to play, or the land power. Their relationship is likely to shift over the course of a campaign, at times, even over a matter of few minutes to hours. At one extreme, the air power may dominate the battle space by augmenting the firepower of the army, obviating the need for artillery in some cases, while on the other, air power might coerce an opponent or destroy his/her military forces without a need for conduct of any ground operations.
One will not be wrong in saying that the air power’s greatest contribution is in weakening and impeding enemy forces before they can close with friendly troops. From the perspective of an air-force commander, the land power’s greatest contribution is in flushing and fixing enemy forces so that they can be destroyed by an air attack executed appropriately. The relationship has instances of pre-dominance of one power over other cyclically, but depends on a partnership to be effective.
Partnership does not, of course, imply having shared command between the respective commanders for the same operation, thus violating unity of command. It advocates an allocation of authority that maximizes the contributions of each partner toward a common endeavour, while working to employ the forces in a manner to maximize the benefit derived. Within the range of a land force formation’s organic weapons (normally 30 to 40 kilometers; may extend upto 100 kms for MBRLs), the land-force commander rightly expects to control air attacks. Indeed, he must have such control in order to integrate direct fires, artillery, rockets, attack helicopters, and fixed-wing aviation, so that synergistic operations that potentiate the employment of platforms, are ensured. Beyond that range, an air force commander should control air attacks, but with a view to assuring successful maneuver of land forces.
CAS: Analysis of Two Wars
An analysis of the air campaign conducted by NATO forces in Kosovo between Mar - Jun 1999 had interesting insights that underlined the importance of a partnership between the land and air components in a war. In the absence of a credible threat from NATO land forces, it was found that the Serb forces were free to disperse and hide in terrain that offered plenty of cover and concealment. For the number of sorties and the tempo of operations (ignoring the costs of same), the casualties inflicted on the Serb forces were quite light. As a result, it can be said that the air attacks against them were not effective. Indeed, Serb forces drove hundreds of thousands of Kosovar civilians from their homes during the NATO bombing at little cost to themselves.
In contrast, during Operation Enduring Freedom (2001-2014), the presence of a land power (Northern Alliance) effectively localized and contained the enemy (Taliban) allowing an effective employment of air power to degrade the fighting capability of Taliban which ensured the immense success of the operation in the initial stages.
The ‘partnership’ in operations is percolating to ever lower levels in the command channel. As India increasingly relies in deployment of small teams of special forces to achieve its military objectives, the requirement of effective land-air operations at micro level cannot be stressed enough.
CAS in Indian Armed Forces
A review of open source literature on Indian Armed Forces brings forth the reliance of Indian Army (IA) on Indian Air Force (IAF) for CAS. If the same literature is analysed for the composition of the Army Aviation, apart from few Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) Mk IV Weapons System Integrated (WSI) or Rudra and retrofitted Cheetah as Lancer, the Army Aviation has no platform that can effectively carry out CAS in a conventional setting.
Photo credit: Marina Lystseva
While certain defence analysts and experts have limited Indian Army’s requirement of a platform for CAS to merely rotary wing (RW) platforms, calling induction of sufficient numbers of ALH Mk IV (WSI) ‘Rudra’ , AH-64E Longbow and yet to be inducted Light Combat Helicopter (LCH) as more than enough to meet India’s CAS requirements, the modern day battlefield, coupled to the lessons learnt from the Feb 27th Indo-Pak aerial engagements, necessitate a relook at this myopic view.
HAL Light Combat Helicopter (LCH) (Credit The Economic Times)
The primary objectives of the Indian Air Force in the initial 24 to 48 hours of any conventional operation necessitated out of political directives issued shall be to degrade the enemy’s air force and C3I capability, locate and destroy the various missile TELs/Silos and undermine the ability of the enemy to deploy his non-conventional weapons. With the limitation in the number of platforms that IAF can effectively employ against an adversary such as Pakistan (while maintaining a minimal dissuasive posturing against traditional ally China), there shall be a severe shortage in both the priority and the ability of IAF to meet the CAS requirements of the IBGs that are expected to spearhead an Indian response in a very short time. It can easily be gauged that even on the transport front, the IAF’s super carriers like C-17s, IL-76s and An-32s will be employed to quickly move stores and equipment of the IAF as it picks up it’s own tempo of operations, leaving virtually no platform for employment of Special Forces in an effective strength to conduct operations in depth, let alone in support of the Army IBGs.
From above, one can rationally conclude that for the first 48 hours, the Indian Army shall have to make do with it’s own complement of limited RW combat platforms and shall be expected to make sufficient progress in order to enable the Government of India to negotiate from a position of strength on the battlefield. While it is not an impossible target to achieve in face of the constraints, it shall, however, be both costly and difficult, sans a major augmentation of the Army Aviation in terms of platforms, both RW and Fixed Wing (FW).
An Indian Army Aviation 'Lancer'
While the Indian Army should be credited for having come up with the idea that resulted in Rudra, it still did not address the Army’s requirement to be able to concentrate aerial platforms in sufficient numbers or with sufficient payloads in a dynamic battlefield. A RW platform is excellent for operations at low levels, operating in an airspace that is protected by army’s integrated air defence units, both short and medium range, but suffers from the handicap that the enemy may not necessarily always be within range of own air defence coverage, nor be devoid of his own air defence elements that can easily target a slow moving, low level platform. For a contested air space, as is expected till IAF can establish an air superiority, with both the threat and the altitude being held constant, a FW aircraft not only provides greater speed and payload, but also a longer reach in comparison to a RW, with increased survivability and possibility of undertaking deeper interdiction missions in order to potentiate a ground offense. Potentially, a platform like HAL Hawk-I, operating in Army Aviation as a dedicated CAS platform, allows the Army to conduct deeper interdiction operations/CAS at a higher tempo than possible only with RW platforms.It was due to this important fact that both the IAF and IN have looked at possibility of using their Hawks in CAS roles, with the latter having extensively trained to employ them for same in various amphibious exercises.
The establishment of Aviation Brigades, as being discussed in the public domain, with a Fixed Wing component, essentially allows the IAF to free up all its assets to achieve its own operational directives - that of establishment of air superiority and denial of aerospace access to the enemy, while affording the Army the capability to employ air power for CAS/interdiction of enemy troops and armour in order to enhance the effectiveness of own operations by IBGs and achieve early gains in order to strengthen Indian position at the time of negotiations.
Views & opinions are strictly of the author.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
@nair @Ashwin @randomradio @_Anonymous_ et al
Just add on. Random thoughts typed for a topic that needs some concrete discussion and views to be made into an opinion actually.
Introduction
The recent India-Pakistan stand-off in the aftermath of the Balakote Strike has brought to fore the need for the Government of India to support the Indian Armed Forces’ quest for creating operational & doctrinal flexibility, developing a plethora of military options in order to present to the Government of the day to respond to future incidents of the kind, as also modernization of the armed forces in order to effectively adapt to the rapidly changing future battlefields.
The introduction of Integrated Battle Groups, a formation that shall amalgamate the various arms and services of the army to create groups capable of carrying out sustained operations on short notice for a certain time interval in order to provide flexibility and effectiveness in military effort, has necessitated a relook at what remains one of the most important aspects of the modern day battlefield – that of Close Air Support (CAS).
Air & Land Power: The Relationship in the Modern Battlefield
In any war, depending upon the military situation, either the air power shall have the dominant role to play, or the land power. Their relationship is likely to shift over the course of a campaign, at times, even over a matter of few minutes to hours. At one extreme, the air power may dominate the battle space by augmenting the firepower of the army, obviating the need for artillery in some cases, while on the other, air power might coerce an opponent or destroy his/her military forces without a need for conduct of any ground operations.
One will not be wrong in saying that the air power’s greatest contribution is in weakening and impeding enemy forces before they can close with friendly troops. From the perspective of an air-force commander, the land power’s greatest contribution is in flushing and fixing enemy forces so that they can be destroyed by an air attack executed appropriately. The relationship has instances of pre-dominance of one power over other cyclically, but depends on a partnership to be effective.
Partnership does not, of course, imply having shared command between the respective commanders for the same operation, thus violating unity of command. It advocates an allocation of authority that maximizes the contributions of each partner toward a common endeavour, while working to employ the forces in a manner to maximize the benefit derived. Within the range of a land force formation’s organic weapons (normally 30 to 40 kilometers; may extend upto 100 kms for MBRLs), the land-force commander rightly expects to control air attacks. Indeed, he must have such control in order to integrate direct fires, artillery, rockets, attack helicopters, and fixed-wing aviation, so that synergistic operations that potentiate the employment of platforms, are ensured. Beyond that range, an air force commander should control air attacks, but with a view to assuring successful maneuver of land forces.
CAS: Analysis of Two Wars
An analysis of the air campaign conducted by NATO forces in Kosovo between Mar - Jun 1999 had interesting insights that underlined the importance of a partnership between the land and air components in a war. In the absence of a credible threat from NATO land forces, it was found that the Serb forces were free to disperse and hide in terrain that offered plenty of cover and concealment. For the number of sorties and the tempo of operations (ignoring the costs of same), the casualties inflicted on the Serb forces were quite light. As a result, it can be said that the air attacks against them were not effective. Indeed, Serb forces drove hundreds of thousands of Kosovar civilians from their homes during the NATO bombing at little cost to themselves.
In contrast, during Operation Enduring Freedom (2001-2014), the presence of a land power (Northern Alliance) effectively localized and contained the enemy (Taliban) allowing an effective employment of air power to degrade the fighting capability of Taliban which ensured the immense success of the operation in the initial stages.
The ‘partnership’ in operations is percolating to ever lower levels in the command channel. As India increasingly relies in deployment of small teams of special forces to achieve its military objectives, the requirement of effective land-air operations at micro level cannot be stressed enough.
CAS in Indian Armed Forces
A review of open source literature on Indian Armed Forces brings forth the reliance of Indian Army (IA) on Indian Air Force (IAF) for CAS. If the same literature is analysed for the composition of the Army Aviation, apart from few Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) Mk IV Weapons System Integrated (WSI) or Rudra and retrofitted Cheetah as Lancer, the Army Aviation has no platform that can effectively carry out CAS in a conventional setting.
Photo credit: Marina Lystseva
While certain defence analysts and experts have limited Indian Army’s requirement of a platform for CAS to merely rotary wing (RW) platforms, calling induction of sufficient numbers of ALH Mk IV (WSI) ‘Rudra’ , AH-64E Longbow and yet to be inducted Light Combat Helicopter (LCH) as more than enough to meet India’s CAS requirements, the modern day battlefield, coupled to the lessons learnt from the Feb 27th Indo-Pak aerial engagements, necessitate a relook at this myopic view.
HAL Light Combat Helicopter (LCH) (Credit The Economic Times)
The primary objectives of the Indian Air Force in the initial 24 to 48 hours of any conventional operation necessitated out of political directives issued shall be to degrade the enemy’s air force and C3I capability, locate and destroy the various missile TELs/Silos and undermine the ability of the enemy to deploy his non-conventional weapons. With the limitation in the number of platforms that IAF can effectively employ against an adversary such as Pakistan (while maintaining a minimal dissuasive posturing against traditional ally China), there shall be a severe shortage in both the priority and the ability of IAF to meet the CAS requirements of the IBGs that are expected to spearhead an Indian response in a very short time. It can easily be gauged that even on the transport front, the IAF’s super carriers like C-17s, IL-76s and An-32s will be employed to quickly move stores and equipment of the IAF as it picks up it’s own tempo of operations, leaving virtually no platform for employment of Special Forces in an effective strength to conduct operations in depth, let alone in support of the Army IBGs.
From above, one can rationally conclude that for the first 48 hours, the Indian Army shall have to make do with it’s own complement of limited RW combat platforms and shall be expected to make sufficient progress in order to enable the Government of India to negotiate from a position of strength on the battlefield. While it is not an impossible target to achieve in face of the constraints, it shall, however, be both costly and difficult, sans a major augmentation of the Army Aviation in terms of platforms, both RW and Fixed Wing (FW).
An Indian Army Aviation 'Lancer'
While the Indian Army should be credited for having come up with the idea that resulted in Rudra, it still did not address the Army’s requirement to be able to concentrate aerial platforms in sufficient numbers or with sufficient payloads in a dynamic battlefield. A RW platform is excellent for operations at low levels, operating in an airspace that is protected by army’s integrated air defence units, both short and medium range, but suffers from the handicap that the enemy may not necessarily always be within range of own air defence coverage, nor be devoid of his own air defence elements that can easily target a slow moving, low level platform. For a contested air space, as is expected till IAF can establish an air superiority, with both the threat and the altitude being held constant, a FW aircraft not only provides greater speed and payload, but also a longer reach in comparison to a RW, with increased survivability and possibility of undertaking deeper interdiction missions in order to potentiate a ground offense. Potentially, a platform like HAL Hawk-I, operating in Army Aviation as a dedicated CAS platform, allows the Army to conduct deeper interdiction operations/CAS at a higher tempo than possible only with RW platforms.It was due to this important fact that both the IAF and IN have looked at possibility of using their Hawks in CAS roles, with the latter having extensively trained to employ them for same in various amphibious exercises.
The establishment of Aviation Brigades, as being discussed in the public domain, with a Fixed Wing component, essentially allows the IAF to free up all its assets to achieve its own operational directives - that of establishment of air superiority and denial of aerospace access to the enemy, while affording the Army the capability to employ air power for CAS/interdiction of enemy troops and armour in order to enhance the effectiveness of own operations by IBGs and achieve early gains in order to strengthen Indian position at the time of negotiations.
Views & opinions are strictly of the author.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
@nair @Ashwin @randomradio @_Anonymous_ et al
Just add on. Random thoughts typed for a topic that needs some concrete discussion and views to be made into an opinion actually.
