Franco-American military relations are relatively good, thanks to joint action in Africa and shared views on the Middle East. However, the excellent relations between the two countries must be qualified by the fierce competition between them in the arms sales sector. This fact sheet highlights the unbalanced competition between the French Rafale and the American F35.
The background
The F35 (or Joint Strike Fighter), the fighter aircraft built by Lockheed Martin, may be criticised, but it is nonetheless a formidable opponent for the Rafale. By seducing European countries, it is a vector for the destruction of the European defence aeronautics industry and hampers the ability of countries that choose it to design their own aircraft and retain their strategic independence.
European countries that contribute to Eurofighter have already opted for the F35, thereby giving up on maintaining a national industry. For cost reasons, the Rafale and Grippen will be the last examples of combat aircraft developed by a single country outside the United States, China and Russia.
The export success of the Rafale is essential to maintain the industrial chain in a context of severe budget constraints and postponement of national orders, while waiting to develop a new aircraft.
On the export market, the Rafale is seen as a high-quality system that is independent of the United States: this position means that we can sell to countries that do not accept the intrusive logic of the United States.
To stand up to the American giants, the French offer must combine technological excellence and strategic partnership through technology transfers or the integration of companies from the buyer country into the Rafale consortium.
The players
There are three players. The export of military equipment requires a manufacturer and a government commitment. In some cases, military alliances and the organisations that embody them play a driving role.
The manufacturers
On the French side, the Rafale Economic Interest Group (EIG) is led by Dassault Aviation and includes equipment manufacturers Thales and Safran. Dassault Aviation oversees around 60% of the aircraft's value and Thales nearly a quarter of the Rafale, which it equips with radars, communications equipment and computers.
Safran, which supplies engines, equipment, navigation systems and weapons, depending on the version, estimates its turnover on each aircraft at around €20 million (the aircraft is worth just over €80 million each).
MBDA (a joint subsidiary of Airbus, BAE Systems and Leonardo) supplies the missiles for export.
500 companies are involved in the programme, forming a veritable aeronautical ecosystem that provides over 7,000 highly skilled jobs in France.
The entire programme is valued at €40 billion over around 40 years, including development, industrialisation, production of 286 aircraft and integrated logistics support. The French army has ordered 180 aircraft.
Export sales of the Rafale are essential to the overall economics of the project.
On the American side, the F35 is a project designed by the Pentagon and developed since 1996 by the manufacturer Lockheed Martin with Northrop Grumman and BAE Systems (an American-British company) as its main partners.
Some ten partner countries have contributed more than 400 billion dollars to the funding of the programme (research and development in particular). Industrial and technological compensation is limited.
The States
The Rafale's recent export successes can be credited to a "French team" led by the government, which provides strategic backing and a long-term partnership with customer countries.
The US federal government is the other major state player. It guarantees a special relationship with the world's leading power.
NATO
The Atlantic Alliance comprises an integrated military organisation (NATO) under American command. NATO places a premium on interoperability and technological advance. It is therefore a powerful lever for American military industries in member countries, with the purchase of American equipment implying tacit American benevolence.
The nature of the balance of power between the Rafale and the F35
A balance of power is a relationship of conflict between several parties who oppose their forces. In this case, the forces are economic and military. It is therefore unbalanced. The United States has a dominant position on the international stage, undisputed military power, assertive leadership within NATO and a technological lead in strategic sectors. American policy therefore consists of maintaining this hegemony and thwarting the desire for national independence within the countries that are members or partners of the Atlantic Alliance.
The aim of the United States is to maintain a relationship of dependence and subjection, which translates into the purchase of American equipment and the resulting protection afforded to allied or partner countries.
In the Rafale - F35 confrontation, the balance of potential is very clearly in favour of the United States, which has an advantage due to the depth of its domestic market and the large number of orders from allied and satellite countries.
The strategies implemented by the players
They are obviously opposed. The two aircraft are true weapons systems covering a wide range of capabilities (multi-role aircraft). The American strategy is based on a "marketing" argument and NATO leverage.
France is playing the card of an aircraft with operational experience, greater versatility and strategic autonomy.
The American strategy
The F35 was born out of the USAF's need for a 5th generation fighter to guarantee air superiority, particularly against Russian aircraft, and to give it a psychological advantage over the competition.
Modern fighter aircraft can be divided into 3 categories:
However, this commercial gimmick needs to be qualified, as the F35 will need to be supported by F22 (5th generation) and 4th generation aircraft to compensate for its low payload capacity, reduced manoeuvrability and limitations in certain airborne missions (compared with the F22 or previous generation aircraft).
The aircraft is certainly remarkable, but not as accomplished and revolutionary as its designers would have us believe. What's more, it will have problems cohabiting with 4th generation aircraft in terms of interoperability and integration (or how its advantages become disadvantages).
The F35 also relies on NATO to establish itself on the export market. This leverage is twofold: firstly, the creation of an F35 club within the Alliance follows an exclusive logic. Other aircraft will find it difficult to interoperate with the F35. European countries that choose a weapon system other than the F35 could be sidelined and deprived of the ability to lead an air coalition.
Secondly, the F35 enables small countries to "buy" American protection, to take part in air operations with American support and thus to enhance their diplomatic profile. The F-35 is an outreach tool and the price to pay for participating in crisis resolution. The F35 can deliver nuclear weapons (the American B61 missile), enabling countries like Belgium to maintain a warning capability on European soil within the framework of NATO.
This is an undeniable asset and an opportunity to participate in nuclear deterrence. The Belgian specifications make no mention of this, but it is a decisive criterion for the Belgian authorities. Political ambition takes precedence over real military need.
The French strategy
It is above all pragmatic and is based on several arguments. First of all, the Rafale is a "combat proven" aircraft that has proven itself in operations in both its naval and air versions.
The deterioration in the global security environment is prompting some countries to make a choice that combines technological advance with cost control. The gradual entry into service of the F35 and its financial setbacks represent real opportunities for the French consortium.
France is much less intrusive and is proposing genuine strategic partnerships to buyer countries. The F35's technological leap is a hindrance because it increases our strategic dependence on the United States, which retains full control over the technology and therefore over the operational use of the aircraft.
The version offered for export is the F4 standard, which incorporates the latest technological developments and differs significantly from the version in service with the French Air Force. This is a strong commercial argument.
Brussels is also concerned about the United States' proselytising industrial policy and its desire to swallow up the European aeronautics industry. European defence therefore wants to invest in technologies that will enable a degree of strategic autonomy: while a European combat aircraft would probably be too strong a symbol at this stage, many of the technologies are general and transferable, which is of particular interest to the Commission.
The supplier's challenge: gaining the buyer's confidence
The volatility of the international security context is creating a demand for combat aircraft. Air weapons are strategic in modern conflicts. The Rafale is a credible alternative to the F35, as its operational successes demonstrate. The political upheavals in the United States are counter-productive and offer real opportunities for the French aircraft.
The pivot policy (refocusing American interests on the Pacific Rim) has made some of our European allies more aware of the need to promote alternative military and industrial solutions to American omnipotence.
The purchase of combat aircraft is a commitment for at least 30 years. So you need to have confidence in your supplier.
France offers in-depth partnerships to customers with industrial capacity or strategic relationships (as in the case of the Gulf States). Every euro invested in the defence sector generates the most spin-offs. The Rafale consortium enjoys an excellent reputation and could win new customers.
Paradoxically, the main threat to the Rafale is not the F35. Its cost and delivery delays, its questionable performance and the ultra-dependence it creates are real obstacles for purchasing countries.
The transfer of certain technologies (notably interconnectivity) to 4th generation American aircraft could undermine the Rafale's appeal. This retrofit is currently the main threat to the Rafale, which explains the direction taken by the F5 version of the Rafale.
The background
The F35 (or Joint Strike Fighter), the fighter aircraft built by Lockheed Martin, may be criticised, but it is nonetheless a formidable opponent for the Rafale. By seducing European countries, it is a vector for the destruction of the European defence aeronautics industry and hampers the ability of countries that choose it to design their own aircraft and retain their strategic independence.
European countries that contribute to Eurofighter have already opted for the F35, thereby giving up on maintaining a national industry. For cost reasons, the Rafale and Grippen will be the last examples of combat aircraft developed by a single country outside the United States, China and Russia.
The export success of the Rafale is essential to maintain the industrial chain in a context of severe budget constraints and postponement of national orders, while waiting to develop a new aircraft.
On the export market, the Rafale is seen as a high-quality system that is independent of the United States: this position means that we can sell to countries that do not accept the intrusive logic of the United States.
To stand up to the American giants, the French offer must combine technological excellence and strategic partnership through technology transfers or the integration of companies from the buyer country into the Rafale consortium.
The players
There are three players. The export of military equipment requires a manufacturer and a government commitment. In some cases, military alliances and the organisations that embody them play a driving role.
The manufacturers
On the French side, the Rafale Economic Interest Group (EIG) is led by Dassault Aviation and includes equipment manufacturers Thales and Safran. Dassault Aviation oversees around 60% of the aircraft's value and Thales nearly a quarter of the Rafale, which it equips with radars, communications equipment and computers.
Safran, which supplies engines, equipment, navigation systems and weapons, depending on the version, estimates its turnover on each aircraft at around €20 million (the aircraft is worth just over €80 million each).
MBDA (a joint subsidiary of Airbus, BAE Systems and Leonardo) supplies the missiles for export.
500 companies are involved in the programme, forming a veritable aeronautical ecosystem that provides over 7,000 highly skilled jobs in France.
The entire programme is valued at €40 billion over around 40 years, including development, industrialisation, production of 286 aircraft and integrated logistics support. The French army has ordered 180 aircraft.
Export sales of the Rafale are essential to the overall economics of the project.
On the American side, the F35 is a project designed by the Pentagon and developed since 1996 by the manufacturer Lockheed Martin with Northrop Grumman and BAE Systems (an American-British company) as its main partners.
Some ten partner countries have contributed more than 400 billion dollars to the funding of the programme (research and development in particular). Industrial and technological compensation is limited.
The States
The Rafale's recent export successes can be credited to a "French team" led by the government, which provides strategic backing and a long-term partnership with customer countries.
The US federal government is the other major state player. It guarantees a special relationship with the world's leading power.
NATO
The Atlantic Alliance comprises an integrated military organisation (NATO) under American command. NATO places a premium on interoperability and technological advance. It is therefore a powerful lever for American military industries in member countries, with the purchase of American equipment implying tacit American benevolence.
The nature of the balance of power between the Rafale and the F35
A balance of power is a relationship of conflict between several parties who oppose their forces. In this case, the forces are economic and military. It is therefore unbalanced. The United States has a dominant position on the international stage, undisputed military power, assertive leadership within NATO and a technological lead in strategic sectors. American policy therefore consists of maintaining this hegemony and thwarting the desire for national independence within the countries that are members or partners of the Atlantic Alliance.
The aim of the United States is to maintain a relationship of dependence and subjection, which translates into the purchase of American equipment and the resulting protection afforded to allied or partner countries.
In the Rafale - F35 confrontation, the balance of potential is very clearly in favour of the United States, which has an advantage due to the depth of its domestic market and the large number of orders from allied and satellite countries.
The strategies implemented by the players
They are obviously opposed. The two aircraft are true weapons systems covering a wide range of capabilities (multi-role aircraft). The American strategy is based on a "marketing" argument and NATO leverage.
France is playing the card of an aircraft with operational experience, greater versatility and strategic autonomy.
The American strategy
The F35 was born out of the USAF's need for a 5th generation fighter to guarantee air superiority, particularly against Russian aircraft, and to give it a psychological advantage over the competition.
Modern fighter aircraft can be divided into 3 categories:
- Generation 4 (entered service between 1970 and 1990), distinguished by the technical advances made in microprocessors, which have significantly enhanced avionics;
- Generation 4+ (between 1990 and 2000), which includes the Rafale and is characterised by improvements in radar coverage and avionics;
- Generation 5 (since 2000), that of the F35, which combines stealth and networking of the aircraft with other units.
However, this commercial gimmick needs to be qualified, as the F35 will need to be supported by F22 (5th generation) and 4th generation aircraft to compensate for its low payload capacity, reduced manoeuvrability and limitations in certain airborne missions (compared with the F22 or previous generation aircraft).
The aircraft is certainly remarkable, but not as accomplished and revolutionary as its designers would have us believe. What's more, it will have problems cohabiting with 4th generation aircraft in terms of interoperability and integration (or how its advantages become disadvantages).
The F35 also relies on NATO to establish itself on the export market. This leverage is twofold: firstly, the creation of an F35 club within the Alliance follows an exclusive logic. Other aircraft will find it difficult to interoperate with the F35. European countries that choose a weapon system other than the F35 could be sidelined and deprived of the ability to lead an air coalition.
Secondly, the F35 enables small countries to "buy" American protection, to take part in air operations with American support and thus to enhance their diplomatic profile. The F-35 is an outreach tool and the price to pay for participating in crisis resolution. The F35 can deliver nuclear weapons (the American B61 missile), enabling countries like Belgium to maintain a warning capability on European soil within the framework of NATO.
This is an undeniable asset and an opportunity to participate in nuclear deterrence. The Belgian specifications make no mention of this, but it is a decisive criterion for the Belgian authorities. Political ambition takes precedence over real military need.
The French strategy
It is above all pragmatic and is based on several arguments. First of all, the Rafale is a "combat proven" aircraft that has proven itself in operations in both its naval and air versions.
The deterioration in the global security environment is prompting some countries to make a choice that combines technological advance with cost control. The gradual entry into service of the F35 and its financial setbacks represent real opportunities for the French consortium.
France is much less intrusive and is proposing genuine strategic partnerships to buyer countries. The F35's technological leap is a hindrance because it increases our strategic dependence on the United States, which retains full control over the technology and therefore over the operational use of the aircraft.
The version offered for export is the F4 standard, which incorporates the latest technological developments and differs significantly from the version in service with the French Air Force. This is a strong commercial argument.
Brussels is also concerned about the United States' proselytising industrial policy and its desire to swallow up the European aeronautics industry. European defence therefore wants to invest in technologies that will enable a degree of strategic autonomy: while a European combat aircraft would probably be too strong a symbol at this stage, many of the technologies are general and transferable, which is of particular interest to the Commission.
The supplier's challenge: gaining the buyer's confidence
The volatility of the international security context is creating a demand for combat aircraft. Air weapons are strategic in modern conflicts. The Rafale is a credible alternative to the F35, as its operational successes demonstrate. The political upheavals in the United States are counter-productive and offer real opportunities for the French aircraft.
The pivot policy (refocusing American interests on the Pacific Rim) has made some of our European allies more aware of the need to promote alternative military and industrial solutions to American omnipotence.
The purchase of combat aircraft is a commitment for at least 30 years. So you need to have confidence in your supplier.
France offers in-depth partnerships to customers with industrial capacity or strategic relationships (as in the case of the Gulf States). Every euro invested in the defence sector generates the most spin-offs. The Rafale consortium enjoys an excellent reputation and could win new customers.
Paradoxically, the main threat to the Rafale is not the F35. Its cost and delivery delays, its questionable performance and the ultra-dependence it creates are real obstacles for purchasing countries.
The transfer of certain technologies (notably interconnectivity) to 4th generation American aircraft could undermine the Rafale's appeal. This retrofit is currently the main threat to the Rafale, which explains the direction taken by the F5 version of the Rafale.
