The French Way of War

You forget Yorktown for exemple.
Where the beautifull UK asses were kicked.

Or Fontenoy....
You forget 1812 where we beat the US and France at the same time. We're the reason the Whitehouse is called the Whitehouse.

Waterloo and Trafalgar will always trump anything you can lay on us.
Maybe because of Brexit. Brits became irrelevant.
EU became irrelevant.
UK is the useless idiot of USA. And were never usefull to Europe.
Now they are nowhere. Thanks Boris ! Good job !
We have your submarine deal though, so f,uck you. :D
 
Maybe because of Brexit. Brits became irrelevant.
With AUKUS it is France that have made themselves irrelevant is the Pacific. Macron has also declared that France is entirely uninterested in the regional threat posed by China.
 
Rafale, sous-marins Scorpène, frégates FDI... Les trois leçons des contrats d’armement français

Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)

Rafale, Scorpene submarines, FDI frigates... The three lessons of French arms contracts

Why the French defence industry is generally successful in exports. The three lessons of arms contracts, an analysis by the Vauban Group.
If any demonstration were needed of France's ability to be a great, independent and radiant nation, its recent arms contracts would provide it without question. Far from being contributions to a utopian Europe of defence, which will always buy American and will never free itself from the American hold that NATO perpetuates without reason, these contracts attest on the contrary that a country like France still weighs significantly in the concert of great nations on major issues of which Defence is a pillar. Three major lessons emerge from recent French export sales.

First lesson


Independent diplomacy pays. Contrary to the current doxa in Paris, Brussels and Berlin, national independence is not a disadvantage but on the contrary a decisive commercial advantage in the field of armaments. The reason is simple: the export of a sovereign weapon system such as frigates, submarines and fighter planes is nothing other than the projection abroad of a French model based on sovereignty. French weapons systems are all designed to serve an independent diplomacy organised around deterrence, and therefore sovereign.

The list of countries that have bought the Rafale or the Scorpene amply demonstrates this. Greece seeks first of all French reassurance in the face of a pro-Turkish European Union and NATO in order to assert its sovereign rights in the face of an aggressive Turkey; India needs submarines and weapons aircraft without any constraint of use in the face of the Pakistani and Chinese double front: only France and Russia can offer it modern armaments without the risk of embargoes or restrictions on their use; Egypt, threatened by Libyan chaos, Islamist terrorism in Sinai and the Ethiopian dam, wants to count on modern armaments free of use; The UAE, that "little Sparta" (in the words of the former US Secretary of Defense, General James Mattis), is in the same situation with Iran but also with the United States of America, which is incapable of consistent diplomacy and always anxious to control its allies.

There is no doubt that Indonesia, France's next target, will in turn be seduced by this sovereign made in France. These contracts give France the means not only to maintain its position on the world stage but also to strongly reinforce its diplomatic positions. Whatever the advocates of European or NATO multilateralism may say, sovereignty pays and is exported well because it meets a growing need of countries that want to assert their own in a chaotic world.

Lesson two

Independence has a price that must be paid. These export successes are first and foremost the success of a whole national system organised around the objective of a complete and independent armed forces model. The price to pay is a sharply rising defence budget. After two disarmament programming laws (2009-2012, then 2014-2019), the current programming law is only a band-aid law, certainly growing, certainly executed, but which we know very well is still insufficient, without a major financial effort in the near future, to reach the 2030 army model.

However, all the parliamentary reports and all the hearings of the chiefs of staff confirm it: the steps to be taken are still ahead of the armies in order to make up for the temporary reductions in capacities, train the armies for high intensity, guarantee the maintenance in operational condition and increase the army formats which are too limited in terms of men, infrastructures, equipment and ammunition. The financial effort that some presidential candidates have set at between 55 and 60 billion euros per year must be matched by an equally important effort to ensure that this budgetary mass is rapidly translated into tangible military capabilities. Specification, contracting and production will thus have to be aligned so that the future 2023-2028 military programming law (LPM) enables the armed forces to win the bet of the 2030 army model.

Lesson Three

Independence requires a return to coherence. If the current LPM is a step in the restoration of power, the French defence doctrine suffers from a fundamental incoherence. The divergence between the financing of a national armed forces model organised around deterrence and a diplomacy that strives to drown it in a European and NATO maelstrom is, in the long run, unsustainable, unreadable and incoherent. The illusion of "European strategic autonomy", already swept away three times by the former coalition in Berlin, has just been swept away again by the SPD, the Worms and the German Liberals who do not even mention it in their contract.

NATO remains the cornerstone for all European countries, and especially for France's three allies: the UK, Germany and Italy. France therefore finds itself in the schizophrenic position of having joined NATO but trying by all means to escape from it through initiatives that do not appeal to anyone. Similarly, the great Franco-German alliance, sealed by the Treaty of Aix La Chapelle, did not produce any of its fruits because from the outset, neither Paris nor Berlin pursued the same doctrinal, military and industrial objectives, nor were they part of the same alliance framework. Worse still, France's defence policy depends on the goodwill of the German Bundestag's Budget Committee for its future major equipment, and the bilateral agreement on exports, a simple intergovernmental arrangement, is now at the mercy of a new coalition that will pursue an even more restrictive policy on the arms markets.

Finally, Brussels will have to be brought to heel under Article 346 of the EU Treaty: The absurd decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on the working time of military personnel, the pacifist projects of the European Parliament in the field of arms exports and the Commission's taxonomy project which promises the drying up of funding for the defence industry of European countries, are all pure follies which threaten the French military and industrial system and which only the authority of a new president will make it possible to put a stop to.

France, an independent political interlocutor


The conclusion will be self-evident for the next president: it will be necessary to drastically revise the framework of France's alliances so that diplomacy finally corresponds to the tool. This coherence, which General De Gaulle had imposed and organised, will have to be the number one agenda of the next president. No drama is expected, since the clarification that will result from this will certainly lead to healthier opportunities for cooperation on new doctrinal and industrial bases in accordance with the partners' well understood national interests. The industrial nationalism that is evident everywhere in Europe, from Sweden to Italy, via the United Kingdom, Spain and Germany, is not an obstacle, but rather the reality from which balanced cooperation that respects national competences must be built. The Lancaster House Treaty and the nEURon programme had shown the way forward.

It is this coherence that is actively sought by France's export customers. Egypt, Greece, India and the UAE did not buy European but French; they acquired submarines, frigates and fighter planes from France only to find a politically independent and technologically efficient partner that would provide them with the tools necessary for their own sovereign diplomacy. This is the most important message that Abu Dhabi has sent loud and clear to France. May the presidential candidates remember this, otherwise it is the end of French armament.