But our security also inevitably depends on a greater capacity for autonomous European action. It really surprises me to hear so many reactions, so many doubts, to say it, to assume it, to carry it. In the words of General de Gaulle, "no alliance can be dissociated from the effort undertaken by each of its members, on their own behalf, at their own expense and according to their own interests". Yes, the real questions for Europeans are basically the questions they have to ask themselves, rather than the Americans: why have they reduced their defence effort so much since the 1990s? Why are they no longer prepared to make defence one of their budgetary priorities and to make the necessary sacrifices to that end, even though the risks are piling up? Why are we now having such complicated debates about the amounts to be allocated to the European Defence Fund that we have just set up - because it is a side issue, which others would take care of for us? Why are there such discrepancies between the defence budgets and capabilities of the European states, when the threats to which we are exposed are very largely common to us?
These are all questions that we Europeans have to ask ourselves. Europe must put itself in a position where it can better guarantee its security and act in its neighbourhood. The European Union has already set itself this objective of autonomous action. Imagine, it was at the Cologne European Council in 1999! Today, as twenty years ago, it is perfectly compatible with the desire for Europeans to re-engage and to be more credible and effective in NATO. This rebalancing is, moreover, what the United States would like to see.
That is why Europeans must today take greater responsibility for this Europe of defence, this European pillar within NATO. And I fully assume it, without hesitation! I want to make it very clear to you: I consider that one of my responsibilities is to ensure that this does not remain a dead letter, as it did after 1999. NATO and European defence are the two pillars of European collective security. Let us assume that! Let us face the facts, let us hear the United States of America say: "Spend more on your security, I will no longer be your guarantor of last resort, your protector, in the long run. "Let's take responsibility at last!
But European freedom of action, Europe's defence and security, cannot be based on a purely military approach.
To build the Europe of tomorrow, our standards cannot be under American control, our infrastructure, our ports and airports under Chinese capital and our digital networks under Russian pressure.
We need, at European level, to control our maritime, energy and digital infrastructures. Here too, we have been very much mistaken. In the 1990s and 2000s, we ended up thinking that Europe had become a large, comfortable market, a theatre of influence and predation at all costs. We even abandoned ourselves among Europeans, pushing so many countries in the south of our European Union to let investors take what we did not know how to buy, what we were pushing to privatise, even though these infrastructures were strategic.
What a mistake! We must, for these critical infrastructures, rediscover, at European level, a real policy of sovereignty!
This is the case for 5G infrastructures, the cloud, which is crucial for data storage, operating systems, submarine cable networks, which are critical systems in our globalized economy. At the European level, too, we need to control our access to space and decide for ourselves the standards that are imposed on our companies.
This policy of standards, this policy of strategic infrastructures, is essential. And it is essential for our collective security and our ability to act. We live in a world of interoperability, with increasingly digital equipment. To spend what we are spending to have perfect equipment and to hand over the connecting infrastructure, between our equipment and our countries, to others, without any guarantee, would still be strangely naive. You will forgive me if I do not want to participate.
European freedom of action depends on this economic and digital sovereignty. European interests, which only they alone are capable of defining, must be heard. It is up to Europe to define the regulatory framework it needs, because it is a question of protecting individual freedoms, the economic data of our companies, which is at the heart of our sovereignty, and our practical operational capacity to act autonomously as well.
We also need to strengthen Europe's technological independence and its ability to anticipate the next strategic breakthroughs. To do this we need an autonomous and competitive defence industrial base, a determined and massive innovation effort, mastery of our security technologies and control of our defence exports.
All this today presupposes an aggiornamento of the European approach, of these economic and budgetary approaches so that everyone can draw the consequences. We are no longer in the world of the 1990s!
The proper use of these tools of common sovereignty requires, first and foremost, of course, investment, an industrial policy, much stronger and more ambitious standards of sovereignty, but also the construction of a shared strategic culture, because our inability to think together about our sovereign interests and to act together in a convincing manner calls into question our credibility as Europeans every day. It offers the other powers the opportunity to divide us, to weaken us.
France is working to build this shared European strategic culture, on the basis of the significant progress made in just over two years, which I believe is already making the vision set out in 1999 more tangible: the European Defence Fund, enhanced cooperation and also the European Response Initiative that we proposed, which is far-reaching, desired and is being deployed.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
If France is to live up to its European ambitions and its history, it must remain sovereign or decide for itself, without being subjected to them, the transfers of sovereignty it would agree to, as well as the binding cooperation in which it would engage. And this is the fourth pillar of the strategy that I want for our country: true French sovereignty.
This desire for national sovereignty is in no way incompatible with our desire to develop European capabilities, I would even say that it is an indispensable prerequisite. We cooperate best when we can decide to cooperate on a sovereign basis.
Defence is at the heart of our sovereignty and is the foundation of any political community.
Our defence strategy is therefore defined, first and foremost, by its ability to protect our citizens, to contribute to the security and peace of Europe and its approaches.
But it is not limited to that. It must also give us the capacity to defend our sovereign interests throughout the world, in line with our geography overseas and the density of our strategic partnerships. It must enable us to assume our responsibilities in the maintenance of international peace and security. It must protect us from blackmail and thus preserve our decision-making autonomy. It must allow us to maintain our rank and influence among nations. In short, it must guarantee us control over our own destiny.
In the aftermath of the Cold War, an idealistic vision gave credence to the idea that the world had become less dangerous and led to a gradual reduction in the share of our national wealth devoted to defence. It was, at bottom, the time of the Peace Dividend.
This choice, this reordering of budgetary priorities, seemed justified when considerable arsenals had been accumulated on both sides of the Iron Curtain. However, the great mistake was probably, in Europe alone, to prolong it over the last 20 years or even accelerate it during the financial crisis, while other major or regional powers were maintaining or even strengthening their defence efforts.
Basically, the last ten years have led to a profound gap. Europeans have continued to cut back, reduce, cut back, when others have stopped doing so, or even reinvested, accelerating technological change and speeding up their own capabilities.
The format and capabilities of our armies have been directly impacted. At the same time, however, they were increasingly called upon to take part in regional crisis-management operations, which were increasingly varied and remote. The need to tailor defence tools to meet much greater challenges "at the top of the spectrum" was often forgotten.
This double scissor effect led to a growing gap between the level of our military capabilities and the reality of the changing international environment as I have just described it to you.
That is why, in order to halt the slow erosion of our military capabilities and adapt them to this new strategic environment, I have decided that an unprecedented budgetary effort will be made in the field of defence. This is a major and lasting effort, and I fully assume it before the Nation.
Let me say it again, very clearly, today. I sometimes hear, I am surprised at this, doubts, questions and the desire for revision. Let us be clear, the issues we are talking about are too strategic and important. The words spoken must be followed by actions that are in line with them, and they must be long-lasting, because we are talking about long-term programmes. What I have committed our nation to is something that will be held over the long term with strength. Let no one lose energy in seeking to revisit it.
But the budget is only one indicator of the effort. In defence, as in other areas of public policy, it is not primarily the budgetary prism that should guide us. For this effort is nothing if it is not at the service of a strategic vision.
What must guide us is the reality of the threats of today and tomorrow for France and the French, for Europe and Europeans. It is the right balance to keep between managing the short term and taking the long term into account. It means anticipating future threats and continually adapting to new modes of conflict. This is what we want to preserve nationally and what we freely choose to do in cooperation with our partners.
To meet these requirements, France needs a comprehensive, modern, powerful, balanced defence tool, implemented by responsive and forward-looking armies.
We can be proud of our armies. Our defence tool must enable us to meet three major challenges:
First of all, of course, to protect our citizens, our territory and its air and sea approaches against all types of threats and aggression. This is the primary basis of our existence as a nation and the very essence of our sovereignty.
On a daily basis, this objective brings together the soldier of Operation Sentinel, the surveillance frigate and the air defence patrol. Overhanging, as part of the permanent posture of deterrence, the silent watch of the crews of our SSBNs and strategic air forces ensures the protection of the territory and the population and, beyond that, the protection of our vital interests every day.
Responsible to the Nation for the security of our country and its future, I have the responsibility to protect France and the French people against any threat from the State against our vital interests, wherever it comes from and whatever its form.
This ultimate responsibility, at the heart of the presidential function, is one that I assume every day with the utmost determination. It is exercised through nuclear deterrence. This exercise of deterrence - like the transparency and confidence that we owe to the international community as a "nuclear-weapon State" within the meaning of the NPT - requires a strictly defensive, clear and predictable doctrine, the main foundations of which I wish to recall here.
If, by any chance, a State leader were to underestimate France's visceral attachment to its freedom and contemplate attacking our vital interests, whatever they may be, he must be aware that our nuclear forces are capable of inflicting absolutely unacceptable damage on its centres of power, i.e. its political, economic and military nerve centres.
Our nuclear forces have been configured for this with the necessary flexibility and responsiveness. In the event of any misunderstanding regarding France's determination to preserve its vital interests, a single, non-renewable nuclear warning could be issued to a State aggressor to send a clear signal that the nature of the conflict has changed and to restore deterrence.
In this context, France relies daily on the two components of its nuclear forces, which are complementary. I have taken and will continue to take the decisions necessary to maintain their operational credibility over the long term, at the level of strict sufficiency required by the international environment.
But our territory, like that of Europe, is not isolated from the world. This is, in my view, the second challenge to which I wanted to return. Indeed, we are living at the pace of the crises that are shaking our direct environment. We are suffering the consequences of these crises which are disturbing more distant regions or seas, made ever closer by economic flows and human exchanges.
In order to defend our security interests, we must therefore take up the second challenge, which is, on the one hand, the failure of States, leaving entire societies in the grip of violence and armed gangs, and, on the other, the disorder that is spreading to common spaces, be they oceanic, exo-atmospheric or cyber.
That is why, in compliance with international law and our responsibilities as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, our armies contribute every day, through the stationing of our presence and sovereignty forces overseas and through our external operations, to crisis prevention and the stabilization of regions where chaos is on the rise.
I also wanted France to strengthen its capabilities in the new areas of confrontation. In addition to intelligence and cyber defence, in which we are investing over the long term, space defence will be strengthened and reorganised within a new space command attached to the air force. As for artificial intelligence, it is one of the priorities of the new Defence Innovation Agency.
As an expression of the strategic rivalry between states, certain regional crises today represent credible, but not exclusive, hypotheses in which we could, for the first time in a long time, have to face a third challenge, that of having to confront directly, in an uncontrolled escalation, a hostile power, possibly with nuclear weapons or allied with a power possessing weapons of mass destruction.
This third challenge is the very concrete result of the changes in the threat I mentioned earlier.
The taking of a territorial pledge, the destabilisation of one of our allies or strategic partners, the calling into question of entire foundations of international law are no longer just scenarios from the past. They could, tomorrow, justify committing our land, naval or air forces alongside our allies in a major conflict to defend collective security, respect for international law and peace.
In this respect, our defence strategy is a coherent whole: conventional forces and nuclear forces are constantly supporting each other. Whenever our vital interests are likely to be threatened, conventional military manoeuvres can be part of the exercise of deterrence. The presence of robust conventional forces then makes it possible to avoid strategic surprise, to prevent the rapid creation of a fait accompli or to test the adversary's resolve at the earliest possible stage, forcing him to reveal his true intentions de facto. In this strategy, our nuclear deterrent remains, as a last resort, the keystone of our security and the guarantee of our vital interests. Today, as in the past, it guarantees our independence, our freedom of assessment, decision and action. It prohibits the adversary from betting on the success of escalation, intimidation or blackmail.
As Head of State, I am the guarantor of long time, because my responsibility as head of the armies is to protect our Nation from threats, by setting the horizon at several decades.
Nuclear deterrence has played a fundamental role in preserving international peace and security, particularly in Europe. I am firmly convinced that our deterrence strategy retains all its stabilizing virtues and remains a particularly valuable asset in the world of competition between powers, disinhibition of behaviour and erosion of norms that is now taking shape before our very eyes.
France's nuclear strategy, whose doctrinal bases I mentioned earlier, is fundamentally aimed at preventing war.
Our nuclear forces are not directed against any country, and France has always refused to allow nuclear weapons to be considered a weapon of battle. I reaffirm here that France will never engage in a nuclear battle or any kind of graduated response.
Moreover, our nuclear forces play a deterrent role of their own, particularly in Europe. They strengthen Europe's security by their very existence, and in this regard have a truly European dimension.
On this point, our independence of decision is fully compatible with unshakeable solidarity with our European partners. Our commitment to their security and defence is the natural expression of our ever closer solidarity. Let us be clear: France's vital interests now have a European dimension.
In this spirit, I would like to see the development of a strategic dialogue with our European partners, who are ready to do so, on the role of the French nuclear deterrent in our collective security.
European partners who wish to embark on this path could be involved in exercises by French deterrent forces. This strategic dialogue and these exchanges will naturally contribute to the development of a genuine strategic culture among Europeans.
Our nuclear forces, of course, also make a significant contribution to the overall strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance's deterrence, alongside British and American forces. France does not participate in the Alliance's nuclear planning mechanisms and will not participate in them in the future. However, it will continue to contribute to political-level thinking aimed at strengthening the Alliance's nuclear culture.
As early as 1995, France and the United Kingdom, the only European nuclear powers, made it clear that they could not imagine a situation in which the vital interests of one of the two countries could be threatened without the vital interests of the other also being threatened.
Today I want to solemnly reaffirm this statement. The high level of mutual trust enshrined in the Lancaster House Treaties of 2010, whose tenth anniversary we are celebrating this year, is reflected on a daily basis in unprecedented cooperation on nuclear issues. We will pursue it with determination, and Brexit does not change that.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Before concluding, I would like to take a few more moments to deepen before you the reflection on the meaning of the strategy of deterrence in today's world.
First of all, on this subject, we must acknowledge the existence of an ethical debate on nuclear weapons, which is not new and to which Pope Francis contributed very recently during his visit to Hiroshima.
There is also a legal and strategic debate: faced with a deteriorating international environment, some people, including in Europe, have recently embarked on a prohibitionist approach, based largely on an absolute imperative and simple strategic reasoning: to eliminate fear, to eliminate war, it would be enough to eliminate nuclear weapons!
I have the utmost respect for the considerations that have been expressed. But for its part, France, as a nuclear-weapon State, which bears responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, only partially shares this vision of the reality of our world. I would like to share with you my vision of the balances on which the Non-Proliferation Treaty is based and the ethical reasoning that must be applied to preserve peace.
The ultimate goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in the context of general and complete disarmament is contained in the preamble to the NPT. But in the reality of our world, progress towards that goal can only be gradual and based on a realistic perception of the strategic context.
In the absence of a recipe for the rapid elimination of nuclear weapons from our world, the advocates of abolition are basically attacking the legitimacy of nuclear deterrence, and above all, let us say, where it is easiest, that is, in our European democracies.
I do not believe, however, that the choice is between a moral absolute without any link to strategic realities, on the one hand, and a cynical return to the mere balance of power without the law, on the other.
For my part, I will not fall into the trap of this false alternative. It is destabilizing for the international security architecture and does not live up to France's ambitions for peace, multilateralism and the rule of law.
My responsibility is to ensure the security of our country, while respecting its international commitments, in particular those of the NPT.
But that does not mean that France is abandoning ethical questions about nuclear weapons. A democracy must ask itself the question of the aims of its nuclear deterrence policy, which carries with it moral dilemmas and paradoxes.
To that end, we must grasp deterrence in all its aspects, which means placing it in a broader political framework relating to our vision of the world order.
In 1945, nuclear weapons ushered in a new age for humanity, giving it the means for its own destruction and thus making it aware of the unity of its destiny. Its spread was limited in 1968 by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a sort of photograph of the nuclear world of the time - it noted the existence of five nuclear-weapon States - and which, with rare exceptions, has stood the test of time. In so doing, the possession of nuclear weapons confers on the political leaders of the countries concerned a responsibility of a moral magnitude unprecedented in history. As far as France is concerned, I fully assume this responsibility.
We have no choice but to confront the imperfection of the world and to face, with realism and honesty, the problems it poses to us.
I cannot therefore give France the moral objective of disarming democracies in the face of powers or even dictatorships that would retain or develop their nuclear weapons.
Unilateral nuclear disarmament would be tantamount for a nuclear-weapon State such as ours to exposing itself and its partners to violence and blackmail, or to relying on others to ensure its security.
I reject that prospect. And let's not be naïve: a withdrawal by France, whose arsenal can in no way be compared to that of the United States or Russia, would not have the slightest knock-on effect on the other nuclear powers.
In the same spirit, France will not adhere to a treaty banning nuclear weapons. This treaty will not create any new obligations for France, either for the State or for public or private actors on its territory.
In reality, disarmament only makes sense if it is part of a historic process of limiting violence.
The strategy of deterrence already contributes to this, even paradoxically. In deterrence as practised by France, it is indeed the possibility of unacceptable harm to a potential adversary which, without even the threat being uttered, restricts effective violence.
Let us recognize, however, that this deterrent rationality is not sufficient to found peace, in the full sense of the term, that is to say, a state that is not a mere inhibition of violence, but rather genuine cooperation and harmony among all.
Our goal must be to work towards a different international order, with an effective world government capable of establishing and enforcing the law.
This goal of transforming the international order is not just an ideal. It is already charting a political and strategic path that must enable us to make concrete progress.
To that end, it is essential to limit the role of deterrence to the extreme circumstances of self-defence.
Nuclear weapons must not be conceived as tools of intimidation, coercion or destabilization. They must remain instruments of deterrence for the purpose of preventing war.
France's nuclear doctrine falls strictly within this framework.
I call on the leaders of the other nuclear Powers to demonstrate the same transparency in their doctrine of deterrence and to renounce any temptation to instrumentalize this strategy for coercive or intimidating purposes.
This, ladies and gentlemen, is what I wanted to tell you today about France's place in the world, about its European ambition, about its defence and deterrence strategy.
Let us look to our future with lucidity and determination.
Clear-sighted, because we cannot pretend that globalisation and technological progress do not overturn the models of the past. More than ever, our strategic thinking must adapt to the ups and downs of our environment, while taking a long-term view. Let us have the courage to look at the world as it is, as it will evolve. There is no inevitability, but there may be historical errors in not wanting to look at it.
Determination too: determination to remain France, France proud of its history, France proud of its values and respectful of its commitments. France is fiercely attached to remaining master of its destiny, within a Europe re-founded for the common good.
Long live the Republic and long live France!