Ukraine - Russia Conflict
- Thread starter randomradio
- Start date
Lol. Nothing to see here folks take his word for it the Kherson counteroffensive has failed no need to look it up....
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A Russian soldier who didn't want to fight in Ukraine and went into hiding after fleeing his post says 'none of us wanted this war'
The 24-year-old is one of hundreds of Russian soldiers who deserted or refused to fight in the war in Ukraine, The Wall Street Journal reported.
A Russian soldier who didn't want to fight in Ukraine and went into hiding after fleeing his post says 'none of us wanted this war'
Point de situation des opérations en Ukraine 1er juin 2022
Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)
Update on operations in Ukraine 1 June 2022
The situation is very fluid, with both sides multiplying small attacks - at battalion or company level over a few hundred metres, sometimes more than a kilometre - in an attempt to achieve operational successes by accumulation. The fighting is concentrated in five areas.
In the Kharkiv region, the Russians and Ukrainians are fighting for the possession of small towns and villages along the border. The issue for the Russians is to keep control of the E105 road that links Belgorod, a large rear base in Russia, to Kharkiv and above all, further east, the logistical axis that links Belgorod to Izium, via Voltchansk, Velykyi Burluk and Koupiansk. It is also a question of keeping artillery, especially on the Ukrainian side, and infiltration and sabotage forces, especially on the Russian side, as far away as possible in this 80 km space between the two cities.
The northern strip between Kharkiv and the border is held by several DNR/LPR regiments and militias and 5 or 6 Russian battle groups (BGs), supported by artillery across the border, facing the 72nd mechanised brigade, two territorial brigades and a National Guard brigade.
The eastern strip from the village of Starytsia 5km from the border to Pechenihy 30km south and 30km east of Kharkiv runs along the forest area of the Donets river source. Ukrainian forces, the 92nd mechanised brigade in particular, hold several bridgeheads on the eastern bank, especially at Staryi Saltiv in the centre of the strip. It is hardly possible to manoeuvre beyond this, especially to try to cut the Belgorod-Izium axis. Axes are scarce and the open area is largely under fire from Russian aircraft and artillery. At most, the Ukrainians can hope to harass the logistical axis from a distance by infiltrating the dense northern zone, but this is covered by Russian light infantry (Spetsnaz), and above all by long-range artillery guided from the ground by commandos and partisans or, above all, by drones. The needs of the battle in the Donbass have also led the Ukrainian forces to send reinforcements there.
In the Sloviansk region, Russian forces continue to press around the northern pocket of the city. In the west the Russian 2nd Motorised Division is trying to push back the 81st Air Assault Brigade from the Dovenhke-Krasnopillya forest area which commands the M03 road from Izium to Sloviansk. To the north and east, the 201st Motorised Division and the 90th Armoured Division exploited the capture of Lyman on 26 May to take control of the whole area north of the Donets River. The next Russian objective was likely to be Raihorodok beyond the Donets River and 2km north-east of Sloviansk. It will soon be difficult for the Ukrainian brigades - 81st and 57th motorised - to hold the pocket north of Sloviansk.
It is obviously in the Severodonetsk sector that the most important things are happening. The major problem for the defence of the city is its cut off from Lysysyshansk and thus the rest of Ukraine by the Donets River and concretely by a single intact bridge. Even if the political decision is painful, it seems preferable to withdraw the Ukrainian forces from Severodonetsk - perhaps 8,000 National Guards, militiamen and territorial troops - before they are locked up in the city as in Mariupol, and to postpone the firm defence of Lysysychansk.
But it is the fate of the entire salient that is now in question since the capture of Popasna on 7 May. While the northern zone, along the Donets, was for the moment rather calm after the serious failure of the attempt to cross at Bilohorvika on 6 and 7 May (one battle group lost), numerous battles were taking place on the other side. On the other hand, there is a lot of fighting on the front line between Toshkivka, 5 km south of Lysysychansk, and the western exit of Horlivka. Practically all the localities from Toshkivka to Soledar are subject to Russian attacks and Ukrainian counter-attacks. The Ukrainians committed four manoeuvre brigades and a territorial brigade to the battle against the Russian 127th Motorised Division and 57th Brigade and part of the Popasna 'marching' army corps with a dozen battalions of paratroopers, marines, air assault, wagner and separatist militia. This is clearly the most important battle of the moment. If the Ukrainians lose it, the T1302 axis from Lysychansk to Bakhmut may be threatened and all Ukrainian forces in the area may be surrounded. It is possible that Russian forces will renew action to the north, this time from Lyman-Ozerne towards Siversk, the capture of which would almost seal the fate of the forces in the salient.
South of the Popasna pocket, Russian and separatist forces are pressing the Ukrainian 30th mechanised brigade to withdraw towards Bakhmut with a good chance of success, while the 1st DNR corps is attacking the 46th air assault brigade between Pivnichne and Niu-York on the western outskirts of Hrolivka, probably mainly as a diversion.
The Zaporajjia sector in Donetsk is the quietest at the moment. The density of forces on both sides is low and only minimal company-level operations and artillery duels are taking place. The Russians seem to be more concerned with organising the defence and organisation of the occupied area, and developing resistance activity, so far mostly passive. It is surprising that a more active guerrilla war has not been organised in the region. It was in the Kherson sector that the battalions armed with old T-62 tanks were assigned.
In the Kherson sector, the 80th Air Assault Brigade and several Ukrainian militias seized Davydiv Brid, an important road junction east of the Inhulets River, which was essential for the supply of the two Russian brigades north of the pocket and which were themselves attacked in Vysokopillya by two mechanised brigades and in Novovorontsovka, along the Dnieper, by a territorial brigade. Further south, between Kherson and Davydiv Brid the 14th Mechanised Brigade also attacked Snihurivka, possibly to fix the 34th Russian Brigade there. The towns of Kherson and Mykolayev are still firmly held by both sides.
With the balance of forces in the region, it is not clear why the Ukrainian forces are still holding the 5th Armoured Brigade in Odessa, one of their few reserves, in an attempt to shift the balance of power, especially in the Davydiv Brid sector and towards Nova Kakhovka, 20km further south on the Dnieper. But it is true that it is now difficult to carry out attacks over 20 km.
Note
We can see how difficult it is on both sides to carry out operations that are even slightly visible, without being caught under the "fire of the sky", that of the aircraft - attack planes and fighter-bombers, helicopters - which are perhaps less present than in previous major conflicts, if only because of the lack of precise ammunition, that of the infantry with its missiles and curved-fire rockets hitting the weak point of the armoured vehicles, that of the drones, of course, which are armed or which use rocket-propelled grenades, and lastly, that of the artillery, which is making its great return. The public now knows more names of artillery models than of tanks.
It is commonplace to talk about the death of the tank, which has buried all those who announced its loss, and it is fashionable to say that if armoured manoeuvres are impossible, it is because the Russian armies, and therefore also the Ukrainian armies, which are equally impeded, do not know how to do joint combat. It is perhaps more complicated than that. We'll talk about it again.
Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)
Update on operations in Ukraine 1 June 2022
The situation is very fluid, with both sides multiplying small attacks - at battalion or company level over a few hundred metres, sometimes more than a kilometre - in an attempt to achieve operational successes by accumulation. The fighting is concentrated in five areas.
In the Kharkiv region, the Russians and Ukrainians are fighting for the possession of small towns and villages along the border. The issue for the Russians is to keep control of the E105 road that links Belgorod, a large rear base in Russia, to Kharkiv and above all, further east, the logistical axis that links Belgorod to Izium, via Voltchansk, Velykyi Burluk and Koupiansk. It is also a question of keeping artillery, especially on the Ukrainian side, and infiltration and sabotage forces, especially on the Russian side, as far away as possible in this 80 km space between the two cities.
The northern strip between Kharkiv and the border is held by several DNR/LPR regiments and militias and 5 or 6 Russian battle groups (BGs), supported by artillery across the border, facing the 72nd mechanised brigade, two territorial brigades and a National Guard brigade.
The eastern strip from the village of Starytsia 5km from the border to Pechenihy 30km south and 30km east of Kharkiv runs along the forest area of the Donets river source. Ukrainian forces, the 92nd mechanised brigade in particular, hold several bridgeheads on the eastern bank, especially at Staryi Saltiv in the centre of the strip. It is hardly possible to manoeuvre beyond this, especially to try to cut the Belgorod-Izium axis. Axes are scarce and the open area is largely under fire from Russian aircraft and artillery. At most, the Ukrainians can hope to harass the logistical axis from a distance by infiltrating the dense northern zone, but this is covered by Russian light infantry (Spetsnaz), and above all by long-range artillery guided from the ground by commandos and partisans or, above all, by drones. The needs of the battle in the Donbass have also led the Ukrainian forces to send reinforcements there.
In the Sloviansk region, Russian forces continue to press around the northern pocket of the city. In the west the Russian 2nd Motorised Division is trying to push back the 81st Air Assault Brigade from the Dovenhke-Krasnopillya forest area which commands the M03 road from Izium to Sloviansk. To the north and east, the 201st Motorised Division and the 90th Armoured Division exploited the capture of Lyman on 26 May to take control of the whole area north of the Donets River. The next Russian objective was likely to be Raihorodok beyond the Donets River and 2km north-east of Sloviansk. It will soon be difficult for the Ukrainian brigades - 81st and 57th motorised - to hold the pocket north of Sloviansk.
It is obviously in the Severodonetsk sector that the most important things are happening. The major problem for the defence of the city is its cut off from Lysysyshansk and thus the rest of Ukraine by the Donets River and concretely by a single intact bridge. Even if the political decision is painful, it seems preferable to withdraw the Ukrainian forces from Severodonetsk - perhaps 8,000 National Guards, militiamen and territorial troops - before they are locked up in the city as in Mariupol, and to postpone the firm defence of Lysysychansk.
But it is the fate of the entire salient that is now in question since the capture of Popasna on 7 May. While the northern zone, along the Donets, was for the moment rather calm after the serious failure of the attempt to cross at Bilohorvika on 6 and 7 May (one battle group lost), numerous battles were taking place on the other side. On the other hand, there is a lot of fighting on the front line between Toshkivka, 5 km south of Lysysychansk, and the western exit of Horlivka. Practically all the localities from Toshkivka to Soledar are subject to Russian attacks and Ukrainian counter-attacks. The Ukrainians committed four manoeuvre brigades and a territorial brigade to the battle against the Russian 127th Motorised Division and 57th Brigade and part of the Popasna 'marching' army corps with a dozen battalions of paratroopers, marines, air assault, wagner and separatist militia. This is clearly the most important battle of the moment. If the Ukrainians lose it, the T1302 axis from Lysychansk to Bakhmut may be threatened and all Ukrainian forces in the area may be surrounded. It is possible that Russian forces will renew action to the north, this time from Lyman-Ozerne towards Siversk, the capture of which would almost seal the fate of the forces in the salient.
South of the Popasna pocket, Russian and separatist forces are pressing the Ukrainian 30th mechanised brigade to withdraw towards Bakhmut with a good chance of success, while the 1st DNR corps is attacking the 46th air assault brigade between Pivnichne and Niu-York on the western outskirts of Hrolivka, probably mainly as a diversion.
The Zaporajjia sector in Donetsk is the quietest at the moment. The density of forces on both sides is low and only minimal company-level operations and artillery duels are taking place. The Russians seem to be more concerned with organising the defence and organisation of the occupied area, and developing resistance activity, so far mostly passive. It is surprising that a more active guerrilla war has not been organised in the region. It was in the Kherson sector that the battalions armed with old T-62 tanks were assigned.
In the Kherson sector, the 80th Air Assault Brigade and several Ukrainian militias seized Davydiv Brid, an important road junction east of the Inhulets River, which was essential for the supply of the two Russian brigades north of the pocket and which were themselves attacked in Vysokopillya by two mechanised brigades and in Novovorontsovka, along the Dnieper, by a territorial brigade. Further south, between Kherson and Davydiv Brid the 14th Mechanised Brigade also attacked Snihurivka, possibly to fix the 34th Russian Brigade there. The towns of Kherson and Mykolayev are still firmly held by both sides.
With the balance of forces in the region, it is not clear why the Ukrainian forces are still holding the 5th Armoured Brigade in Odessa, one of their few reserves, in an attempt to shift the balance of power, especially in the Davydiv Brid sector and towards Nova Kakhovka, 20km further south on the Dnieper. But it is true that it is now difficult to carry out attacks over 20 km.
Note
We can see how difficult it is on both sides to carry out operations that are even slightly visible, without being caught under the "fire of the sky", that of the aircraft - attack planes and fighter-bombers, helicopters - which are perhaps less present than in previous major conflicts, if only because of the lack of precise ammunition, that of the infantry with its missiles and curved-fire rockets hitting the weak point of the armoured vehicles, that of the drones, of course, which are armed or which use rocket-propelled grenades, and lastly, that of the artillery, which is making its great return. The public now knows more names of artillery models than of tanks.
It is commonplace to talk about the death of the tank, which has buried all those who announced its loss, and it is fashionable to say that if armoured manoeuvres are impossible, it is because the Russian armies, and therefore also the Ukrainian armies, which are equally impeded, do not know how to do joint combat. It is perhaps more complicated than that. We'll talk about it again.
Intercepted audio shows 2 Russian officers cursing out Putin and other commanders in charge of the Ukraine invasion
In audio recordings obtained by Radio Svoboda, senior Russian military officers can be heard bad-mouthing those in charge of the Ukraine invasion.