The French Way of War

Europe offcourse , dont forget Americans are nothing but European descendants

Therefore US is pushing Europe to Spend more on Defence

In Coming years Turkey will be a Real Threat to Europe along with Russia

Turkey Hates Europe because Europe Disbanded the Ottoman Empire and Created the Gulf Monarchies as a Rival to Turkey
 
The British Surrender at Yorktown, 1781
The British Surrender at Yorktown, 1781

In the summer of 1781, after six years of war, the American Army was struggling. The British occupied New York City. A second British army lead by General Lord Cornwallis ravaged the South - capturing Charleston, Richmond, and apparently was heading for the Chesapeake Bay. Mutiny plagued the American army in New York and New Jersey.

There was a glimmer of hope, however. The French, allied with the Americans since 1778, had landed six thousand troops in Rhode Island while the French fleet gathered in the Caribbean preparing to do battle with the British. General George Washington and the French commander, Comte de Rochambeau, met in May 1781 to plan their strategy. Washington wanted to attack the British in New York City. Rochambeau, fearful of attacking such a well fortified position and lacking confidence in the Continental Army's abilities, recommended marching south to battle Cornwallis in Virginia.

Washington finally acquiesced to the French position and on August 22, the two armies began their march from White Plains, New York to Virginia arriving in early September. As the combined American and French armies marched south, a battle between the French and British fleets in the Chesapeake Bay sealed the fate of General Cornwallis and his British troops at Yorktown. In the period from September 5 - 9, the French surprised the British fleet at the mouth of the Chesapeake forcing the British navy to retreat to New York, leaving General Cornwallis stranded.
After a five-day bombardment, the combined American and French forces attacked and overwhelmed Cornwallis's fortified position on the night of October 14. The British commander was left with no choice but to surrender, which he did on October 19. News of the surrender reached England on November 25 sending shock waves through the British government. Although King George III wanted to continue the battle, the surrender forced Prime Minister Lord North to resign in March 1782. His replacement began the peace process that culminated in the signing of the Treaty of Paris in September 1783 granting independence to the American colonies.

"The World Turned Upside Down"

General Cornwallis did not attend the surrender ceremony saying that he was not feeling well. His substitute, General O'Hara, first tried to surrender to the Comte de Rochambeau who directed the British officer to General Washington who in turn directed him to Washington's subordinate General Lincoln. During the ceremony a British band played the song "The World Turned Upside Down." Dr. James Thacher served with the Continental Army and published his account of the surrender some years later:

"At about twelve o'clock, the combined army was arranged and drawn up in two lines extending more than a mile in length. The Americans were drawn up in a line on the right side of the road, and the French occupied the left. At the head of the former, the great American commander [George Washington], mounted on his noble courser, took his station, attended by his aides. At the head of the latter was posted the excellent Count Rochambeau and his suite. The French troops, in complete uniform, displayed a martial and noble appearance; their bands of music, of which the timbrel formed a part, is a delightful novelty, and produced while marching to the ground a most enchanting effect.
The Americans, though not all in uniform, nor their dress so neat, yet exhibited an erect, soldierly air, and every countenance beamed with satisfaction and joy. The concourse of spectators from the country was prodigious, in point of numbers was probably equal to the military, but universal silence and order prevailed.

It was about two o'clock when the captive army advanced through the line formed for their reception. Every eye was prepared to gaze on Lord Cornwallis, the object of peculiar interest and solicitude; but he disappointed our anxious expectations; pretending indisposition, he made General O'Hara his substitute as the leader of his army. This officer was followed by the conquered troops in a slow and solemn step, with shouldered arms, colors cased and drums beating a British march. Having arrived at the head of the line, General O'Hara, elegantly mounted, advanced to his excellency the commander-in-chief, taking off his hat, and apologized for the non-appearance of Earl Cornwallis. With his usual dignity and politeness, his excellency pointed to Major-General Lincoln for directions, by whom the British army was conducted into a spacious field, where it was intended they should ground their arms.

The royal troops, while marching through the line formed by the allied army, exhibited a decent and neat appearance, as respects arms and clothing, for their commander opened his store and directed every soldier to be furnished with a new suit complete, prior to the capitulation. But in their line of march we remarked a disorderly and unsoldierly conduct, their step was irregular, and their ranks frequently broken.

But it was in the field, when they came to the last act of the drama, that the spirit and pride of the British soldier was put to the severest test: here their mortification could not be concealed. Some of the platoon officers appeared to be exceedingly chagrined when giving the word "ground arms," and I am a witness that they performed this duty in a very unofficer-like manner; and that many of the soldiers manifested a sullen temper, throwing their arms on the pile with violence, as if determined to render them useless. This irregularity, however, was checked by the authority of General Lincoln. After having grounded their arms and divested themselves of their accoutrements, the captive troops were conducted back to Yorktown and guarded by our troops till they could be removed to the place of their destination."

References:
Cook, Don, The Long Fuse: How England Lost the American Colonies, 1760-1785 (1996); Thacher, James, M.D., A Military Journal During the American Revolutionary War, from 1775-1783 (1827) excerpted in Commager, Henry Steele and Richard Morris (ed.), The Spirit of 'Seventy Six v. 2 (1958).
How To Cite This Article:
"The British Surrender at Yorktown, 1781," EyeWitness to History, www.eyewitnesstohistory.com (2002).
 
We got them back in 1812. Not many nations will ever be able to claim to have marched into Washington DC and torched the White House whilst simultaneously beating France in Europe.
 
We got them back in 1812. Not many nations will ever be able to claim to have marched into Washington DC and torched the White House whilst simultaneously beating France in Europe.
You didn't beat France in Europe, the whole Europe came together to beat France. If you believe you beat France at that time, then in the same way France, which was the main winner of the First World War, beat Germany again in the Second World War.
 
You didn't beat France in Europe, the whole Europe came together to beat France. If you believe you beat France at that time, then in the same way France, which was the main winner of the First World War, beat Germany again in the Second World War.
The British blockade of the US was crucial to the victory against France and that's why the US tried invade Canada.

I really can't see the equivalence. Britain was not invaded by either Napoleon, nor the Germans in WWI or WWII. You must do better.

The last time you were any use as a military was 1066.
 
You didn't beat France in Europe, the whole Europe came together to beat France. If you believe you beat France at that time, then in the same way France, which was the main winner of the First World War, beat Germany again in the Second World War.

Brtish will strike back by becming a great naval power.
 
Why does everyone hate Macron .. lol:LOL:
SPEECH BY PRESIDENT EMMANUEL MACRON ON THE STRATEGY OF DEFENCE AND DETERRENCE TO THE STUDENTS OF THE 27TH CLASS OF THE SCHOOL OF WAR

7 FEBRUARY 2020

Today, the theatres of crisis in the Levant and Libya are also, because of the phenomena I have just described, a real test for the cohesion of the P5, which I hope will be able to meet at the summit and demonstrate its ability to fully assume its mandate for the maintenance of international peace and security, but also a test for the solidarity of the Atlantic Alliance. It is for this reason that I had some harsh words, which sounded like a wake-up call, and we were thus able, after last December's Summit, to launch a strategic review of NATO, which I want to be both ambitious and operational.

As whenever we face historic challenges, our response must be the same: boldness and renewed ambition. We must assume our responsibilities in this regard.

The choice before us is whether to take our destiny into our own hands or, abandoning any strategy of our own, to align ourselves with any power whatsoever.
This is why we need to take the plunge and rebuild the world order in the service of peace must be our course. France and Europe have a historic role to play in this.
Ladies and Gentlemen,

All our action must be at the service of one ambition, that of Peace, drawing on strong and effective multilateralism based on law.

Basically, there are four pillars to this strategy, in my view: the promotion of multilateralism that works, the development of strategic partnerships, the search for European autonomy and national sovereignty. These four elements form a whole, which gives our defence strategy its overall coherence and deep meaning.

First of all, as I said, we need multilateralism that works. It is through multilateralism that we will respond collectively to the problems facing us all.

France does not threaten anyone. She wants peace, a solid peace, a lasting peace. She has no expansionist aims. Its security and that of Europe presuppose that international relations remain governed by law, a law accepted and respected by all.

In this respect, we expect Europe's major partners to work to preserve and strengthen international law, not to weaken it. Transparency, trust and reciprocity are the basis of collective security.

For strategic stability, which involves seeking a balance of forces at the lowest possible level, is no longer guaranteed today. Behind the crisis in the major arms control and disarmament instruments, it is the security of France and Europe that is at stake.

This crucial debate must not take place above the heads of Europeans, in a direct and exclusive relationship between the United States, Russia and China. And I can see that this is the temptation of a few, sometimes of the main interested parties.

For Europeans, a rethought multilateralism in the service of collective security, in accordance with our founding principles, must combine two requirements, which are not contradictory if we want to guarantee peace: firstly, the promotion of a renewed international agenda for arms control, and secondly, real European investment in defence.

These requirements stem directly from the ambition for sovereignty and freedom of action that I have been carrying for Europe since my election. It is the counterpart of a rebalanced transatlantic relationship, an alliance in which Europeans are credible, effective partners. Europeans must be able to protect each other together. They must be able to decide and act alone when necessary. They must do so while never forgetting what history has taught them: democracy and law without force do not last long! Finally, they must at last make routine use of the mechanisms that ensure their solidarity.

That is why I am convinced that Europeans must first and foremost define together what their security interests are and decide sovereignly what is good for Europe.

Thus, there can be no defence and security project for European citizens without a political vision seeking to foster the gradual rebuilding of trust with Russia.

I am pursuing this project with determination. I expect Russia to be a constructive player in our common security. But we cannot be satisfied with the current situation, where the gap is widening and dialogue is being impoverished, while the security issues to be dealt with by Moscow are multiplying.

The main objective - and I have come back to this several times - of my approach to Russia is to improve the conditions for collective security and stability in Europe. This process will take several years. It will require patience and determination, and it will be conducted with our European partners. But we have no interest in delegating such a dialogue or locking ourselves into the current situation.

Within this framework, Europeans must also be able to propose together an international arms control agenda. Indeed, as I was saying just now, the end of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, the uncertainties about the future of the New Start Treaty and the crisis in the conventional arms control regime in Europe mean that by 2021 there is a possibility of pure military and nuclear competition, without constraints, such as we have not seen since the late 1960s. I am not describing an impossible or distant future. Simply what has been happening for several years now before our very eyes. Europeans must once again understand the dynamics of escalation and seek to prevent it or prevent it through clear, verifiable standards. For the law must serve our security here, by seeking to constrain and limit the most destabilising weapons and behaviour of potential adversaries.

We need a very clear European position on this subject, taking into account both the development of contemporary armaments, particularly Russian armaments, which could impact on our soil, and the interests of Europeans - of all Europeans, including in northern and central Europe. It must be said that the treaties that were still in force a few years ago no longer protected some of our partners.

Finally, we need to rethink the priorities of disarmament. For too long, Europeans thought that it was enough to set an example and that by disarming, other states would follow us. That is not the case! Disarmament cannot be an objective in itself: it must first improve the conditions of international security.

On these issues, France will mobilize the European partners most concerned, in order to lay the foundations of a common international strategy that we will be able to propose in all the forums where Europe is active.

And France, a nuclear power recognized by the Non-Proliferation Treaty and a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, will assume its responsibilities, particularly in the area of nuclear disarmament, as it has always done.

In the search for peace, France is committed to the logic of disarmament that serves global security and stability. In this regard, it has a record that is unique in the world, in line with its responsibilities and interests, having irreversibly dismantled its land-based nuclear component, its nuclear testing facilities and its facilities for the production of fissile material for weapons, and reduced the size of its arsenal, which is now less than 300 nuclear weapons. All these decisions are consistent with our rejection of any arms race and the maintenance of the format of our nuclear deterrent at a level of strict sufficiency.

This exemplary record gives France the legitimacy to demand from the other nuclear Powers concrete gestures towards global, progressive, credible and verifiable disarmament.

With regard to nuclear disarmament, I therefore call on all States to join us in setting out a simple agenda, in accordance with article VI of the NPT, based on four familiar points:

  1. Strict compliance with the central norm of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the preservation of its primacy on the occasion of its 50th anniversary in 2020. The NPT is the most universal treaty in the world. It is the only treaty that makes it possible to prevent nuclear war while bringing the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy to everyone.
  2. The commencement in the Conference on Disarmament of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for weapons, as well as the preservation and universalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. We are committed to this.
  3. The continuation of work on the verification of nuclear disarmament, which we are carrying out in particular with Germany, because any disarmament agreement is nothing if it cannot be verified in a robust manner.
  4. Finally, the launching of concrete work on strategic risk reduction, because the uncontrolled escalation of a local conflict into a major war is one of the most worrying scenarios today, which a series of simple and common-sense measures could effectively avert.
I also hear calls for the "trilateralization" or multilateralization of nuclear arms control or reduction agreements.

The Russian-American bilateral treaties reflect a history - the history of the Cold War - but also a reality that is still relevant today, namely the considerable size of the arsenals still held by Moscow and Washington, which are not on a par with those of the other nuclear-weapon states. In this respect, it is essential that the New Start Treaty be extended beyond 2021.

But after the collapse of the INF Treaty, France, for its part, would like to see broad discussions launched, in which Europe must make its voice heard and ensure that its interests are taken into account in negotiations on a new instrument capable of ensuring strategic stability on our continent. Let us be clear, if a broader negotiation and treaty are possible, we want them. If it is blocked by some, we cannot stand still. And Europeans must be stakeholders and signatories to the next treaty because this is our soil and a discussion that must not go over our heads.

France, as part of its own responsibilities, is also ready to take part in discussions that would bring together the five nuclear-weapon States within the meaning of the NPT, on the priorities of nuclear disarmament, confidence-building and transparency on the arsenals and nuclear strategies of each of them. This discussion should aim at strengthening stability among the nuclear-weapon states and reducing the risk of unintended escalation in the event of conflict.
 
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This ambition of France, a balancing power in the service of peace and security, cannot be implemented without a dense network of friendships, strategic partnerships and alliances, and a global diplomatic capacity, because our security responsibilities and interests are global. That is for me the second pillar, which I was just mentioning, and which I would like to quickly return to.

France, yes, is part of a network of relations that stem from history and geography. Within this framework, it will continue to develop and deepen strategic partnerships on all continents.

Moreover, it is now taking part in all the major coalitions in the Levant and in Africa. But we have also built new regional structures in recent years. In the Sahel, it is resolutely fighting terrorism through Operation Barkhane with its international and African partners in the G5. The Pau Summit on 13 January clarified the framework of our operations and confirmed everyone's commitment. That is why I decided to send 600 additional soldiers to strengthen France's commitment to peace and security in this region. It is a real coalition that we have built in Pau, whose framework is the Barkhane force and the partnership with the G5 Sahel. But we will gradually engage friendly powers for the collective security of the region. We are at the heart of this new coalition. It is strategic for Africa, as it is for our security.

As a power bordering the Indo-Pacific, France also has special ties with Australia, India and Japan to preserve the sovereignty and freedom of navigation in this geographical area. It maintains its defence cooperation and solidarity with its partners in the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean and South-East Asia on a daily basis. This Indo-Pacific axis that we have, over the last two years, set out, explained and developed, is a reflection of our geography, the reality of the multiple military commitments we have been making for several years, the unprecedented exercises we have been conducting in the region, but also a reading of the world that we need to have. We are also an Indo-Pacific power, with nationals, bases and interests. Our ability to ensure this freedom in the region, to defend our interests, to protect the major energy and technological axes also depends on this new axis and these new forms of cooperation.

Clearly, at the heart of this global network, all our European partners and our North American allies have a very special place, which I will come back to later.
Finally, when I talk about its alliances and strategic partnerships, I want to stress our responsibility within our common framework, that of the United Nations, and the crucial role of peacekeeping operations.

*

The third pillar of our strategy, in addition to arms control and the networks of alliances, partnerships and diplomatic relations, is the set of concrete ambitions that we want to give to Europe's security and defence policy.

For a long time to come, Europe will only be able to draw its strength in defence matters from national armies. That is a certainty and the priority must be to restore the budgets and capabilities of those national armies.

On the other hand, we Europeans have begun to develop practical tools that will enable us to develop a common awareness, to defend shared interests and to act autonomously and in solidarity whenever necessary. This is the path of building a European freedom of action that complements and reinforces national sovereignty.

In this respect, we must dispel a misunderstanding here: the question for Europeans is not whether they should defend themselves with or without Washington, nor is it a question of whether the security of the United States is at stake in Asia or on our continent. France naturally participates in the community of allied nations bordering the Atlantic Ocean, whose values, principles and ideals it shares. It is faithful to its commitments in the Atlantic Alliance, which for 70 years has ensured the stability and collective security of its members and of Europe. And as such, I sometimes hear a lot of noise. But I prefer to look at the facts: France is a credible military player, which is present in combat on the ground and pays the price of blood. It proved this recently in the Sahel, once again. France is a reliable and supportive ally, even in hard times. It proved it again recently in Syria and Iraq. Finally, France is convinced that Europe's long-term security depends on a strong alliance with the United States. I reiterated this at the NATO summit in London, and France is experiencing this every day in its operations.
 
But our security also inevitably depends on a greater capacity for autonomous European action. It really surprises me to hear so many reactions, so many doubts, to say it, to assume it, to carry it. In the words of General de Gaulle, "no alliance can be dissociated from the effort undertaken by each of its members, on their own behalf, at their own expense and according to their own interests". Yes, the real questions for Europeans are basically the questions they have to ask themselves, rather than the Americans: why have they reduced their defence effort so much since the 1990s? Why are they no longer prepared to make defence one of their budgetary priorities and to make the necessary sacrifices to that end, even though the risks are piling up? Why are we now having such complicated debates about the amounts to be allocated to the European Defence Fund that we have just set up - because it is a side issue, which others would take care of for us? Why are there such discrepancies between the defence budgets and capabilities of the European states, when the threats to which we are exposed are very largely common to us?

These are all questions that we Europeans have to ask ourselves. Europe must put itself in a position where it can better guarantee its security and act in its neighbourhood. The European Union has already set itself this objective of autonomous action. Imagine, it was at the Cologne European Council in 1999! Today, as twenty years ago, it is perfectly compatible with the desire for Europeans to re-engage and to be more credible and effective in NATO. This rebalancing is, moreover, what the United States would like to see.
That is why Europeans must today take greater responsibility for this Europe of defence, this European pillar within NATO. And I fully assume it, without hesitation! I want to make it very clear to you: I consider that one of my responsibilities is to ensure that this does not remain a dead letter, as it did after 1999. NATO and European defence are the two pillars of European collective security. Let us assume that! Let us face the facts, let us hear the United States of America say: "Spend more on your security, I will no longer be your guarantor of last resort, your protector, in the long run. "Let's take responsibility at last!

But European freedom of action, Europe's defence and security, cannot be based on a purely military approach.

To build the Europe of tomorrow, our standards cannot be under American control, our infrastructure, our ports and airports under Chinese capital and our digital networks under Russian pressure.

We need, at European level, to control our maritime, energy and digital infrastructures. Here too, we have been very much mistaken. In the 1990s and 2000s, we ended up thinking that Europe had become a large, comfortable market, a theatre of influence and predation at all costs. We even abandoned ourselves among Europeans, pushing so many countries in the south of our European Union to let investors take what we did not know how to buy, what we were pushing to privatise, even though these infrastructures were strategic.

What a mistake! We must, for these critical infrastructures, rediscover, at European level, a real policy of sovereignty!

This is the case for 5G infrastructures, the cloud, which is crucial for data storage, operating systems, submarine cable networks, which are critical systems in our globalized economy. At the European level, too, we need to control our access to space and decide for ourselves the standards that are imposed on our companies.

This policy of standards, this policy of strategic infrastructures, is essential. And it is essential for our collective security and our ability to act. We live in a world of interoperability, with increasingly digital equipment. To spend what we are spending to have perfect equipment and to hand over the connecting infrastructure, between our equipment and our countries, to others, without any guarantee, would still be strangely naive. You will forgive me if I do not want to participate.

European freedom of action depends on this economic and digital sovereignty. European interests, which only they alone are capable of defining, must be heard. It is up to Europe to define the regulatory framework it needs, because it is a question of protecting individual freedoms, the economic data of our companies, which is at the heart of our sovereignty, and our practical operational capacity to act autonomously as well.

We also need to strengthen Europe's technological independence and its ability to anticipate the next strategic breakthroughs. To do this we need an autonomous and competitive defence industrial base, a determined and massive innovation effort, mastery of our security technologies and control of our defence exports.

All this today presupposes an aggiornamento of the European approach, of these economic and budgetary approaches so that everyone can draw the consequences. We are no longer in the world of the 1990s!

The proper use of these tools of common sovereignty requires, first and foremost, of course, investment, an industrial policy, much stronger and more ambitious standards of sovereignty, but also the construction of a shared strategic culture, because our inability to think together about our sovereign interests and to act together in a convincing manner calls into question our credibility as Europeans every day. It offers the other powers the opportunity to divide us, to weaken us.

France is working to build this shared European strategic culture, on the basis of the significant progress made in just over two years, which I believe is already making the vision set out in 1999 more tangible: the European Defence Fund, enhanced cooperation and also the European Response Initiative that we proposed, which is far-reaching, desired and is being deployed.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

If France is to live up to its European ambitions and its history, it must remain sovereign or decide for itself, without being subjected to them, the transfers of sovereignty it would agree to, as well as the binding cooperation in which it would engage. And this is the fourth pillar of the strategy that I want for our country: true French sovereignty.

This desire for national sovereignty is in no way incompatible with our desire to develop European capabilities, I would even say that it is an indispensable prerequisite. We cooperate best when we can decide to cooperate on a sovereign basis.

Defence is at the heart of our sovereignty and is the foundation of any political community.

Our defence strategy is therefore defined, first and foremost, by its ability to protect our citizens, to contribute to the security and peace of Europe and its approaches.

But it is not limited to that. It must also give us the capacity to defend our sovereign interests throughout the world, in line with our geography overseas and the density of our strategic partnerships. It must enable us to assume our responsibilities in the maintenance of international peace and security. It must protect us from blackmail and thus preserve our decision-making autonomy. It must allow us to maintain our rank and influence among nations. In short, it must guarantee us control over our own destiny.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, an idealistic vision gave credence to the idea that the world had become less dangerous and led to a gradual reduction in the share of our national wealth devoted to defence. It was, at bottom, the time of the Peace Dividend.

This choice, this reordering of budgetary priorities, seemed justified when considerable arsenals had been accumulated on both sides of the Iron Curtain. However, the great mistake was probably, in Europe alone, to prolong it over the last 20 years or even accelerate it during the financial crisis, while other major or regional powers were maintaining or even strengthening their defence efforts.

Basically, the last ten years have led to a profound gap. Europeans have continued to cut back, reduce, cut back, when others have stopped doing so, or even reinvested, accelerating technological change and speeding up their own capabilities.

The format and capabilities of our armies have been directly impacted. At the same time, however, they were increasingly called upon to take part in regional crisis-management operations, which were increasingly varied and remote. The need to tailor defence tools to meet much greater challenges "at the top of the spectrum" was often forgotten.

This double scissor effect led to a growing gap between the level of our military capabilities and the reality of the changing international environment as I have just described it to you.

That is why, in order to halt the slow erosion of our military capabilities and adapt them to this new strategic environment, I have decided that an unprecedented budgetary effort will be made in the field of defence. This is a major and lasting effort, and I fully assume it before the Nation.

Let me say it again, very clearly, today. I sometimes hear, I am surprised at this, doubts, questions and the desire for revision. Let us be clear, the issues we are talking about are too strategic and important. The words spoken must be followed by actions that are in line with them, and they must be long-lasting, because we are talking about long-term programmes. What I have committed our nation to is something that will be held over the long term with strength. Let no one lose energy in seeking to revisit it.

But the budget is only one indicator of the effort. In defence, as in other areas of public policy, it is not primarily the budgetary prism that should guide us. For this effort is nothing if it is not at the service of a strategic vision.

What must guide us is the reality of the threats of today and tomorrow for France and the French, for Europe and Europeans. It is the right balance to keep between managing the short term and taking the long term into account. It means anticipating future threats and continually adapting to new modes of conflict. This is what we want to preserve nationally and what we freely choose to do in cooperation with our partners.

To meet these requirements, France needs a comprehensive, modern, powerful, balanced defence tool, implemented by responsive and forward-looking armies.

We can be proud of our armies. Our defence tool must enable us to meet three major challenges:

First of all, of course, to protect our citizens, our territory and its air and sea approaches against all types of threats and aggression. This is the primary basis of our existence as a nation and the very essence of our sovereignty.

On a daily basis, this objective brings together the soldier of Operation Sentinel, the surveillance frigate and the air defence patrol. Overhanging, as part of the permanent posture of deterrence, the silent watch of the crews of our SSBNs and strategic air forces ensures the protection of the territory and the population and, beyond that, the protection of our vital interests every day.

Responsible to the Nation for the security of our country and its future, I have the responsibility to protect France and the French people against any threat from the State against our vital interests, wherever it comes from and whatever its form.

This ultimate responsibility, at the heart of the presidential function, is one that I assume every day with the utmost determination. It is exercised through nuclear deterrence. This exercise of deterrence - like the transparency and confidence that we owe to the international community as a "nuclear-weapon State" within the meaning of the NPT - requires a strictly defensive, clear and predictable doctrine, the main foundations of which I wish to recall here.

If, by any chance, a State leader were to underestimate France's visceral attachment to its freedom and contemplate attacking our vital interests, whatever they may be, he must be aware that our nuclear forces are capable of inflicting absolutely unacceptable damage on its centres of power, i.e. its political, economic and military nerve centres.

Our nuclear forces have been configured for this with the necessary flexibility and responsiveness. In the event of any misunderstanding regarding France's determination to preserve its vital interests, a single, non-renewable nuclear warning could be issued to a State aggressor to send a clear signal that the nature of the conflict has changed and to restore deterrence.

In this context, France relies daily on the two components of its nuclear forces, which are complementary. I have taken and will continue to take the decisions necessary to maintain their operational credibility over the long term, at the level of strict sufficiency required by the international environment.

But our territory, like that of Europe, is not isolated from the world. This is, in my view, the second challenge to which I wanted to return. Indeed, we are living at the pace of the crises that are shaking our direct environment. We are suffering the consequences of these crises which are disturbing more distant regions or seas, made ever closer by economic flows and human exchanges.

In order to defend our security interests, we must therefore take up the second challenge, which is, on the one hand, the failure of States, leaving entire societies in the grip of violence and armed gangs, and, on the other, the disorder that is spreading to common spaces, be they oceanic, exo-atmospheric or cyber.

That is why, in compliance with international law and our responsibilities as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, our armies contribute every day, through the stationing of our presence and sovereignty forces overseas and through our external operations, to crisis prevention and the stabilization of regions where chaos is on the rise.

I also wanted France to strengthen its capabilities in the new areas of confrontation. In addition to intelligence and cyber defence, in which we are investing over the long term, space defence will be strengthened and reorganised within a new space command attached to the air force. As for artificial intelligence, it is one of the priorities of the new Defence Innovation Agency.

As an expression of the strategic rivalry between states, certain regional crises today represent credible, but not exclusive, hypotheses in which we could, for the first time in a long time, have to face a third challenge, that of having to confront directly, in an uncontrolled escalation, a hostile power, possibly with nuclear weapons or allied with a power possessing weapons of mass destruction.

This third challenge is the very concrete result of the changes in the threat I mentioned earlier.

The taking of a territorial pledge, the destabilisation of one of our allies or strategic partners, the calling into question of entire foundations of international law are no longer just scenarios from the past. They could, tomorrow, justify committing our land, naval or air forces alongside our allies in a major conflict to defend collective security, respect for international law and peace.

In this respect, our defence strategy is a coherent whole: conventional forces and nuclear forces are constantly supporting each other. Whenever our vital interests are likely to be threatened, conventional military manoeuvres can be part of the exercise of deterrence. The presence of robust conventional forces then makes it possible to avoid strategic surprise, to prevent the rapid creation of a fait accompli or to test the adversary's resolve at the earliest possible stage, forcing him to reveal his true intentions de facto. In this strategy, our nuclear deterrent remains, as a last resort, the keystone of our security and the guarantee of our vital interests. Today, as in the past, it guarantees our independence, our freedom of assessment, decision and action. It prohibits the adversary from betting on the success of escalation, intimidation or blackmail.
As Head of State, I am the guarantor of long time, because my responsibility as head of the armies is to protect our Nation from threats, by setting the horizon at several decades.

Nuclear deterrence has played a fundamental role in preserving international peace and security, particularly in Europe. I am firmly convinced that our deterrence strategy retains all its stabilizing virtues and remains a particularly valuable asset in the world of competition between powers, disinhibition of behaviour and erosion of norms that is now taking shape before our very eyes.

France's nuclear strategy, whose doctrinal bases I mentioned earlier, is fundamentally aimed at preventing war.

Our nuclear forces are not directed against any country, and France has always refused to allow nuclear weapons to be considered a weapon of battle. I reaffirm here that France will never engage in a nuclear battle or any kind of graduated response.

Moreover, our nuclear forces play a deterrent role of their own, particularly in Europe. They strengthen Europe's security by their very existence, and in this regard have a truly European dimension.

On this point, our independence of decision is fully compatible with unshakeable solidarity with our European partners. Our commitment to their security and defence is the natural expression of our ever closer solidarity. Let us be clear: France's vital interests now have a European dimension.
In this spirit, I would like to see the development of a strategic dialogue with our European partners, who are ready to do so, on the role of the French nuclear deterrent in our collective security.

European partners who wish to embark on this path could be involved in exercises by French deterrent forces. This strategic dialogue and these exchanges will naturally contribute to the development of a genuine strategic culture among Europeans.

Our nuclear forces, of course, also make a significant contribution to the overall strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance's deterrence, alongside British and American forces. France does not participate in the Alliance's nuclear planning mechanisms and will not participate in them in the future. However, it will continue to contribute to political-level thinking aimed at strengthening the Alliance's nuclear culture.

As early as 1995, France and the United Kingdom, the only European nuclear powers, made it clear that they could not imagine a situation in which the vital interests of one of the two countries could be threatened without the vital interests of the other also being threatened.

Today I want to solemnly reaffirm this statement. The high level of mutual trust enshrined in the Lancaster House Treaties of 2010, whose tenth anniversary we are celebrating this year, is reflected on a daily basis in unprecedented cooperation on nuclear issues. We will pursue it with determination, and Brexit does not change that.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Before concluding, I would like to take a few more moments to deepen before you the reflection on the meaning of the strategy of deterrence in today's world.
First of all, on this subject, we must acknowledge the existence of an ethical debate on nuclear weapons, which is not new and to which Pope Francis contributed very recently during his visit to Hiroshima.

There is also a legal and strategic debate: faced with a deteriorating international environment, some people, including in Europe, have recently embarked on a prohibitionist approach, based largely on an absolute imperative and simple strategic reasoning: to eliminate fear, to eliminate war, it would be enough to eliminate nuclear weapons!

I have the utmost respect for the considerations that have been expressed. But for its part, France, as a nuclear-weapon State, which bears responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, only partially shares this vision of the reality of our world. I would like to share with you my vision of the balances on which the Non-Proliferation Treaty is based and the ethical reasoning that must be applied to preserve peace.

The ultimate goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in the context of general and complete disarmament is contained in the preamble to the NPT. But in the reality of our world, progress towards that goal can only be gradual and based on a realistic perception of the strategic context.

In the absence of a recipe for the rapid elimination of nuclear weapons from our world, the advocates of abolition are basically attacking the legitimacy of nuclear deterrence, and above all, let us say, where it is easiest, that is, in our European democracies.

I do not believe, however, that the choice is between a moral absolute without any link to strategic realities, on the one hand, and a cynical return to the mere balance of power without the law, on the other.
For my part, I will not fall into the trap of this false alternative. It is destabilizing for the international security architecture and does not live up to France's ambitions for peace, multilateralism and the rule of law.

My responsibility is to ensure the security of our country, while respecting its international commitments, in particular those of the NPT.

But that does not mean that France is abandoning ethical questions about nuclear weapons. A democracy must ask itself the question of the aims of its nuclear deterrence policy, which carries with it moral dilemmas and paradoxes.

To that end, we must grasp deterrence in all its aspects, which means placing it in a broader political framework relating to our vision of the world order.

In 1945, nuclear weapons ushered in a new age for humanity, giving it the means for its own destruction and thus making it aware of the unity of its destiny. Its spread was limited in 1968 by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a sort of photograph of the nuclear world of the time - it noted the existence of five nuclear-weapon States - and which, with rare exceptions, has stood the test of time. In so doing, the possession of nuclear weapons confers on the political leaders of the countries concerned a responsibility of a moral magnitude unprecedented in history. As far as France is concerned, I fully assume this responsibility.

We have no choice but to confront the imperfection of the world and to face, with realism and honesty, the problems it poses to us.

I cannot therefore give France the moral objective of disarming democracies in the face of powers or even dictatorships that would retain or develop their nuclear weapons.

Unilateral nuclear disarmament would be tantamount for a nuclear-weapon State such as ours to exposing itself and its partners to violence and blackmail, or to relying on others to ensure its security.

I reject that prospect. And let's not be naïve: a withdrawal by France, whose arsenal can in no way be compared to that of the United States or Russia, would not have the slightest knock-on effect on the other nuclear powers.

In the same spirit, France will not adhere to a treaty banning nuclear weapons. This treaty will not create any new obligations for France, either for the State or for public or private actors on its territory.

In reality, disarmament only makes sense if it is part of a historic process of limiting violence.

The strategy of deterrence already contributes to this, even paradoxically. In deterrence as practised by France, it is indeed the possibility of unacceptable harm to a potential adversary which, without even the threat being uttered, restricts effective violence.

Let us recognize, however, that this deterrent rationality is not sufficient to found peace, in the full sense of the term, that is to say, a state that is not a mere inhibition of violence, but rather genuine cooperation and harmony among all.

Our goal must be to work towards a different international order, with an effective world government capable of establishing and enforcing the law.

This goal of transforming the international order is not just an ideal. It is already charting a political and strategic path that must enable us to make concrete progress.

To that end, it is essential to limit the role of deterrence to the extreme circumstances of self-defence.

Nuclear weapons must not be conceived as tools of intimidation, coercion or destabilization. They must remain instruments of deterrence for the purpose of preventing war.

France's nuclear doctrine falls strictly within this framework.

I call on the leaders of the other nuclear Powers to demonstrate the same transparency in their doctrine of deterrence and to renounce any temptation to instrumentalize this strategy for coercive or intimidating purposes.

This, ladies and gentlemen, is what I wanted to tell you today about France's place in the world, about its European ambition, about its defence and deterrence strategy.
Let us look to our future with lucidity and determination.

Clear-sighted, because we cannot pretend that globalisation and technological progress do not overturn the models of the past. More than ever, our strategic thinking must adapt to the ups and downs of our environment, while taking a long-term view. Let us have the courage to look at the world as it is, as it will evolve. There is no inevitability, but there may be historical errors in not wanting to look at it.

Determination too: determination to remain France, France proud of its history, France proud of its values and respectful of its commitments. France is fiercely attached to remaining master of its destiny, within a Europe re-founded for the common good.

Long live the Republic and long live France!
 
You're in the EU, friends don't get any denser than that.
Eh eh!
As early as 1995, France and the United Kingdom, the only European nuclear powers, made it clear that they could not imagine a situation in which the vital interests of one of the two countries could be threatened without the vital interests of the other also being threatened.