Book Review
The Betrayal of East Pakistan - Lt. Gen. A.A.K Niazi
I started this book with one clear objective - I will read it without any bias. As I progressed, I realized the task I had set for myself was pretty hard.
The writer understandably has a great grudge against India. Indians destroyed his reputation and subjected him to an over the top surrender ceremony, which would have been hard on any professional soldier. This humiliation had left a festering wound which it is evident he suffered from till his end.
The book begins with his early life. He recounts his initial exploits, how he was nicknamed "Tiger", how well he performed in 65 etc. Then the lasting impact he left on Pak Army defenses in Sialkot and Lahore sector.
The book then moves to the events of 71. The usual whipping boys - Yahya, Bhutto and Mujib take turns on being the bad guy. The Larkana meeting is brought up. I also read a few others books namely A Stranger in my own country - Maj. Gen. Khadim Hussain Raja, Dead Reckoning - Memories of 1971 - Sarmila Bose and Vanquished Generals - Muntasir Mamun. The Larkana meeting and the plot to drop East Pakistan is frequently mentioned there as well so I am inclined to believe that bit. The reader of this review can derive his/her own judgement.
Gen. Niazi notes that the East Garrison was undersupplied, poorly equipped (the Chaffees lacked starters and fan belts) and severely worn out after months of fighting. Yet he says that the Pak Army pushed out Mukti Bahini and restored eastern borders in the early actions of 1971. After that there was limited border action only till Nov. So where did the months of fighting come up.
A few pages forward he claims his plan to take the war to India was shot down by GHQ. Gen. Niazi reasons that in mid 1971, India was ill prepared to fight and most units were not even in the eastern sector. His troops (which he himself calls underequipped and tired a few pages before) could sweep aside BSF, Indian regulars and Mukti Bahini and capture large areas of West Bengal and Northeast. How he planned to do that in hostile territory with enemy air superiority with no supplies coming his way, no air cover, no tanks and very little artillery is a question he did not bother answering.
Gen. Niazi then complains his plans were interfered with by GHQ and he was forced to defend all his borders. He also rejects the Dhaka bowl strategy that later commentators had proposed as a better option. He drew on his past experience and built obstacles, hardened defenses and created fortresses on the likely approach routes. His plan was to bleed Indian forces first and then withdraw to his fortress of Dhaka for the final battle. He believed he would have enough men and materiel to fight the Indians for a few weeks in which India would be made to cease fire by western pressure. He then critiques the Indian performance in the eastern sector and says - India fared poorly in each battle against his troops. He takes the example of Kamalpur and Hilli where Indians rushed headfirst into prepared defenses and took losses while the defenders held out till surrender. He also lists a few attacks that were in progress till Dec 15 where India had not managed to dislodge the defenders when the order for surrender came. He notes that all these places had plenty of ammunition and morale was high among the troops as they had seen India could not defeat them. The same troops that a few pages before were worn out and underequipped and poorly supplied. He also has a wild theory that the Russians advisors were on the battlefield and that they used Russian supplied poison gas against his troops!
The reader can refer to Indian planners writings on the subject and about Op. Windfall in particular to appreciate that India intended to bypass strong points and only engage them if absolutely necessary. Gen. Thapan's head first attack at Hilli was contrary to the plan and it shows in its results.
The writer decries the performance of the Pak army in the western sector where instead of hardened defenses they fought open battles with the Indian army and lost quite a bit of territory blowing away the "Defence of East lies in the West" theory. Niazi felt that in starting the war in December, GHQ had hurt his cause as it allowed India to cut him off totally. One wonders if India would have felt extra generous and not cut him off if he had invaded in Mid 1971 as he had originally planned.
The book is extremely critical of Tikka Khan, Rao Farman Ali (whom the writer has all but accused of treason). As per the writer Tikka Khan bungled up everything he touched and Farman Ali was a GHQ stooge who was in secret talks with Lt. Gen JFR Jacob. Another writer - Siddiq Saliq is dismissed as a paid ISI Hack. Another officer Maj. Gen. Abdul Majid Qazi who was initially praised lavishly for his performance vs India is accused of criminal negligence at the end for not interdicting Indian Airborne troops.
Finally the General talks of being forced to surrender by GHQ. He implies that he was asked to surrender overruling his desire to go Last Man Last Round. He maintains that he was in fighting sprit to the end, disputing other writers who claim he had broken down by the end.
Surprisingly Gen. Niazi is generous in his description of his POW experience. Though he does complain that Indians tried to convert his troops into spies where expectedly he claims they failed totally. Then he goes on to make the most absurd claims that Gen. Shahbeg Singh showed him a map of Khalistan. This was a full 6-7 years before Gen. Shahbeg Singh had even joined the Khalistan movement. And then he makes an even more outlandish claim that Gen. Shahbeg Singh warned him that he was going to be blamed for the debacle at Dhaka and claims this was the level of penetration that Indian intelligence had in Pakistan Establishment! One can only assume that Gen. Shahbeg Singh was dead at the time of writing and could not dispute Niazi's claims so made for a convenient target.
The last part of the book describes how the General was treated once he returned. How both Bhutto and Zia mistreated him. Niazi also claims that he met Bhutto once in prison when both were in custody courtesy Zia. He claims that Bhutto repented his mistreatment of Niazi in that meeting and sought his forgiveness. The book ends with a lament that the brave soldier was let down by corrupt leadership and conniving politicians.
The book shows Gen. Niazi as a complex personality. His track record shows he displayed a significant military talent. Wherever he has given references the reader can feel he was a good soldier. But at the same time his attempts to shift the blame towards everyone else and even claims that the enemy who had thrashed his army on the west could not hurt him at all in the East are not believable. Lt. Gen. A.A.K. Niazi was ultimately a victim of challenging circumstances which he had himself volunteered for (whether in innocence or arrogance) coupled with an overpowering enemy who did not offer him any chance of a win.