Update on operations in Ukraine 28 May 2022 - The Battle of Donbass 2
The North Donbass front is attracting more attention than ever and is shaping up to be a decisive battle that will absorb efforts in the coming weeks, perhaps until the end of the summer if both sides have the resources to sustain such intense fighting until then.
It should be remembered that this front is divided into two separate but mutually influencing operational sectors. In the west, there is the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk (SK) pair and in the east the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk (SL) pair, the four major target cities of the Russian forces at the top of two major north-south urban axes that join the two separatist republics. Together, the two sectors represent a rectangle 50 km deep and 100 km wide, the size of half a French department. It is divided in the middle by the Siversk River, which joins the city of the same name to the road junction of Bakhmut from north to south. Bakhmut commands SL either directly via the T1302 road or indirectly and more difficultly via Siversk.
Facing the Sloviansk sector, the Russian forces were now smaller after having been the main sector. All the effort of the 201st DM, helped in the East by the 90th DB consisted in threatening to encircle the city of Lyman and to force the 95th air assault brigade to withdraw towards Sloviansk. It is also possible that this withdrawal will also force the 57th Motorised Brigade to withdraw behind the Donets River. At this stage, these two brigades and the 81st Air Assault Brigade in front of Yzium can hold the heights north of Sloviansk fairly well. The situation is much more critical for the Ukrainians on the eastern side.
Russian forces and the 2nd Corps of the Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) pressed the SL sector from all sides. In the north, between Ozerne and Lysychansk, three Ukrainian brigades - 79th Air Assault, 128th Mountain and 58th Motorised - held the high ground for 40km against the 90th Armoured Division (AD) and four or five Russian brigades (8-10 battle groups, BGs) beyond the Donets River. The city of Severodonetsk itself was approached along three-quarters of its periphery by the 127th Motorised Infantry Division (MD), reinforced by an LNR regiment and the Chechen grouping, i.e. 5 to 8 BGs facing two National Guard brigades, a territorial brigade and the Slavic regiment. Again, the Ukrainians held, despite the firepower of at least one Russian artillery brigade, in addition to the BGs' organic artillery
The largest Russian force grouping - 7th Air Assault Division, Baltic and Pacific Marine Infantry Brigades, Wagner Group and 150th DM, i.e. a dozen battle groups (BGs) - attacked from Popasna in all directions. To the south, it threatened to encircle the 30th Ukrainian Mechanised Brigade and would probably force it to withdraw. To the north, towards SL, and in conjunction with the westward thrust of the LNR forces and the Russian 57th Brigade, it threatened to encircle the 17th Armoured Brigade in the Hirske-Toshkivka area. To the west, he approached Soledar, a few kilometres from Bakhmut, on SL's main supply route. The capture of Soledar, and then of Siversk from Ozerne in the north, would be enough to cut off Severodonetsk-Lysychansk from all communication. This would leave the nine Ukrainian brigades and regiments, about 1/6th of the Ukrainian ground task force, trapped.
This prospect presents the Ukrainian forces with several difficult options.
The first would be to counter-attack in order to clear the area, and thus logically try to retake Popasna. This would require a manoeuvre mass of several brigades. For the moment, only the 4th armoured brigade seems to be available in the Kramatorsk area, but it would be possible to transfer the 48th air assault brigade in reserve to Poltava (it is not clear why this has not already been done) and perhaps one or two armoured brigades from the north or southwest.
The problem is, and the Russians have already been confronted with this to a large extent, that it is difficult to manoeuvre classically in a dense fire zone if you are not visible and spotted. Placed in the current context, the German counter-attack of February 1943 towards Kharkov with two armoured corps would be immediately spotted and hit from the sky from attack aircraft to air-to-ground missiles/rockets from helicopters or drones or precise artillery shells. To manoeuvre, they must now be either mobile, dispersed and camouflaged, or on the contrary, highly protected in small spaces. For having operated 'the old way' between the two, the Russian armoured-mechanised columns were corroded and frozen in the battle of Kiev. In the same way that the Americans in Korea moved from motorised columns to trenches from 1950 to 1951, Russian forces now moved from secure lines and protected rears, advancing under artillery cover, i.e. never more than 20 kilometres from the batteries in a very '1918' style.
If the Ukrainian forces were able to advance on retreating forces in the Kiev region or on curtain forces north of Kharkiv, they came up against the fortified lines in the Kherson region. A visible attack on the Popasna high ground under the envelope of Russian air and artillery strikes may succeed, but it will be a long, difficult and undoubtedly very costly exercise.
The second option is to stay put and defend the positions foot to foot, relying on the resilience of the town and the wear and tear on the Russian forces. This strategy worked well in the north, where the besieged towns of Chernihiv and Soumy were finally cleared after helping to hinder the Russian manoeuvre. It failed in Mariupol, where Ukrainian forces were unable to force the Russians out of a more defensible and controllable southern area than the north. While Mariupol was able to hold large Russian forces for two months and undoubtedly inflict heavy casualties, its fall was the biggest Ukrainian defeat of the war with several full brigades lost. It is therefore an even riskier gamble as Western material aid will inevitably stall after immediate possibilities are exhausted and the formation of new battalions to send into battle, before forming new brigades, is likely to take some time.
The last option, probably the most realistic militarily but also the most difficult politically, would be to abandon Severodonetsk and Lysychansk, now emptied of the vast majority of its inhabitants, and to withdraw all the brigades beyond the Siversk river and rely on a new urban defence line from Sloviansk to Kostiantynivka. This would be an exchange of space, largely empty, for forces and time. However, it would also be a very tricky manoeuvre to organise under Russian pressure, but possible.
Military operations are never linear. Phases of waiting can be suddenly followed by accelerations following sudden and sometimes surprising successes. After some surprising Ukrainian successes, in fact moves that took advantage of Russian weaknesses, the Russians regained the initiative. However, the battle for Donbass is far from over, let alone the military operations of this war, or even this war in the long run. There will be more surprises on both sides.