Russian Military Technology : Updates and Discussions

Soldier35

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Developers of the robot cosmonaut "Fedor". We have started testing the autonomous security robot "Marker". The Marker robotic platform began to be tested at the Russian Vostochny Cosmodrome. During the run-in of the security robot, autonomous patrolling of security routes, identification and interception of violators, counteraction to terrorist attacks and the fight against drones are practiced.



 

Soldier35

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The upgraded strategic Russian Tu-160M bomber will be the world's first aircraft armed with reverse launch missiles, the Russian Defense Ministry said. In January, the first Tu-160M built from scratch made its debut flight.



Russia has launched all missiles and a hypersonic Dagger missile. The Russian Ministry of Defense has published footage of exercises of the strategic deterrence forces.


 

Soldier35

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The Russian army used new weapons for the first time in Ukraine, the work of the remote mining engineering system "Agriculture" was filmed near Kharkov. The video shows the moment of remote installation of minefields. The operation of this installation is similar to the work of the Grad MLRS. The difference is that instead of the warhead of a 122 mm rocket, they carry cassettes with mines. After the installation of mines, this territory is plotted on an electronic map, there is no need to carry out mine clearance manually, mines can be remotely deactivated.

 

Soldier35

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Robot "Uran-6" - an armored robotic tracked vehicle, began to destroy mines and other explosive objects in Ukraine and Donbass, without endangering the life and health of people. Despite its size, Uran-6 is capable of towing even a 40-ton tank. The main task of the sapper robot is to make passages in minefields and quickly clear mine areas. The cleanliness of minesweeping is about 95%. The robot is designed to clear mines weighing from 100 grams to 4 kg and can move at a maximum speed of 5 km / h, making continuous sweeping about 1.6 meters wide. Reservation of the robot allows you to withstand the explosion of even an anti-tank mine. The control of the Uran-6 robot is remote. In open areas, the operator can be from him at a distance of up to 800 meters. The robot is able to overcome a wall up to 1.2 m high. The weight of the demining robot is about 7 tons.

 

Soldier35

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"Tor-M2" is a representative of a new generation of short-range air defense systems. Thanks to the improved arsenal, the complex is able to cover a front-line strip with a length of 20 km from the enemy's means of attack. The SAM works on the third line of defense. The first frontier is the area of responsibility of the S—300 and S-400 systems, the range of which exceeds 100 km. Buk complexes capable of hitting targets at a range of 50-70 km are operating at the middle boundary. The targets that break through this boundary are in the range of our short-range Tor-M2 complexes. The Tor-M2 air defense system is capable of capturing and destroying a target, even if it came within a distance of 1 km. The complex is equipped with 16 9M338 missiles and underwent a successful baptism of fire in Syria, destroying more than 45 drones. In 2020, it was reported that a small-sized, cheap missile for the Tor-M2 air defense system, designed to combat drones, was being created.

 
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Soldier35

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The work of Russian electronic warfare systems in Ukraine. The video shows the Murmansk-BN electronic warfare system, which carries out radio reconnaissance, interception of enemy signals and their suppression over the entire shortwave range at ranges up to 5000 km. The Murmansk-BN electronic warfare system is able to "stun" the territories of the EU countries closest to the Russian borders, disrupting military communications and leaving civilians without mobile communications. The Krasukha-4 electronic warfare system, the main task of this complex is to counter enemy aircraft, UAVs and missiles by affecting and disabling radar stations of aircraft at a range of up to 300 kilometers. The company commander spoke about the use of the Krasukha-4 electronic warfare system in Ukraine. "The complex has proven itself very well, works flawlessly in all weather conditions. Our main task is to cover the grouping of troops from radar reconnaissance and targeted enemy air strikes. During the operation, 12 Bayraktar complexes were discovered, we suppressed them and the complexes could not make a targeted strike on our groups."


 

Innominate

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A Key Reason for Russia’s Colossal Electronic Warfare Failure in Ukraine​

As modern Russian EW/EA systems get towed into barns by Ukrainian farm tractors, it could not be clearer how epically Russia failed in the EMS battlespace.​


As a 30-year US Air Force Electronic Warfare Officer, I spent a significant portion of my career learning and understanding how to fight in the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) domain, including Russian Electronic Warfare/Electronic Attack (EW/EA) systems.

Without delving into classified details, Russian systems were formidable, well made, and incorporated modern technology. For decades, it was believed any US/Russia war would be a slugfest, much of it executed in a denied or degraded EMS.

On February 24, the initial thrust of Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, the media parroted that “Electronic warfare and cyber attacks have started” repeatedly. Most of these reports were based on what their analysts assessed to be the “first wave” of strikes.

It’s known that the EW/EA hardware, such as vehicles, jammers, and antennas, were in Ukraine, but six weeks into the war, it’s clear that Russian EW/EA systems have been largely ineffective.

This failure has been excellent for Ukraine but raises the crucial question: “Why did Russia’s formidable EW/EA systems fail?” Did intelligence assessments get it wrong?

Maybe partly, but after a closer look, there is significant evidence that Russia’s EW/EA failure wasn’t hardware-related — it was humanware-related.

Foundational Background​

Electronic Attack (EA) simply refers to offensive combat efforts in the electromagnetic spectrum. In most cases, it is considered a harassing fire.

For the victim, it’s an annoyance. There likely isn’t a human alive who has used a cell phone and hasn’t experienced a “dropped” signal. It’s frustrating, but after a few reattempts, the call is reconnected, or the caller simply gives up.

By and large, it is the same situation in combat. In some cases, it’s the targeting of communication devices, while in others, it’s a jammed and washed-out radar scope. Both are the result of intentional action to deny communication or effective use of an enemy radar system.

Good militaries train their personnel to operate in a degraded EMS, such as taking measures to regain communications or fix their radar screens to mitigate the jamming’s impacts.

This means that while EA has a decaying value, the initial and short time of attack can buy time to protect friendly forces.

In the example of a fighter strike package that flies at 500 miles an hour, five minutes of effective jamming means nearly 50 miles of protection. Ten minutes is 100 miles.

The US learned the value of EA long ago, building numerous ground-based and airborne jamming platforms, some of which I flew in combat. But long before my first combat hour, there were hundreds of flight hours of training.

US Training: Building the Humanware​

In both the EC-130H Compass Call and the EA-6B Prowler, training was based on a “Crawl, walk, run” construct. Aircrew first learns the systems’ academics, then gets taught how to fly it safely, and finally learns to operate the weapon system. But it went farther than that.

Once aircrew learned to operate the weapons system, they would join other platforms, such as a large strike group of aircraft. A critical piece of this training evolution was to ensure the jamming system could target enemy signals while ensuring friendly forces could use the EMS unhindered.
Although this sounds simple enough, it is not. As Prussian general and military theorist Carl von Clausewitz said: “In war, while everything is simple, even the simplest thing is difficult.”

Once a force structure of integrated arms can operate together, the next training step is for that force to operate in an enemy-jammed environment where now an opposition force also gets to compete in the EMS.

Such training exercises are challenging, and some events are unsuccessful. Additionally, the mission debriefs of “Who shot who” as well as “Who jammed who” could be chippy. Egos were checked, but the aircrew learned to operate as a cohesive fighting force in the end.

Armed Forces-Wide Training​

Such training isn’t unique to the Air Force. The Navy trains surface ships, subsurface ships, and airborne assets. The Army prepares its soldiers at some world-class training ranges, and so do the Marines.

Being able to operate in a degraded or denied EMS environment is something our military trains for constantly. Through realistic training scenarios, airmen, sailors, soldiers, marines, and guardians all learn the tactics, techniques, and procedures to fight through EA challenges (but are often a pain in the rear end to employ).

Denied or degraded EMS usage is often infuriating and always seems to surface at the most crucial moments. In fact, EA is arguably one of the best examples of the phrase “Fog of War.”

So, what about Russian EMS training?

Obviously, I have never trained with Russian EW/EA units, but I can extrapolate Russia’s likely training based on its effect in Ukraine and from drawing on my own experiences.

It appears highly likely that Russia’s EW/EA training only progressed to a combined arms level with no real opposition forces. Lacking an opposition force, there was no real training for Russian forces to learn how to “fight through” the jamming.

There are at least four reasons for this assessment, which are outlined below.

Russia Abandoned EA Effort Early​

From all media reports, Russia abandoned its EA effort early on in the conflict. There are two likely reasons for this.

First, in many cases, weapons systems that employ EA provide little feedback on the success of their efforts. There’s no explosion, and unless friendly intelligence assets are relaying the enemy their frustrations about jamming, operators are often “going on faith” that their tactics are working.


A quick side note, good EA training is invaluable when it comes to being able to demonstrate the impact of jamming during a post-mission debrief. It gives the operator confidence their systems are effective.

Second, one of the most common problems of EA in an undisciplined and/or undertrained force is the possibility of fratricide jamming. When the Russian forces activated their jammers during the initial invasion, Ukraine likely did the same thing.

All this jamming would have been agonizing to military leaders on both sides, but which side does this hurt more? The offensive force that’s trying to move and attack. Defensive and prepositioned forces are not immune to jamming, but the effect is far less detrimental to their efforts.

Arguably, Russian commanders at some point ordered their jammers to “Cease Buzzer” (the NATO codeword for “stop jamming”). The implications of this order are significant because it effectively means that Russia was going to, in part, surrender some of the EMS to Ukraine.

This order also made it clear that Russian forces had little (if any) combined force training in a dense jamming environment.

Cellular Communications​

Media reports also suggest that Russian forces often rely on cellular communications, in some cases more than on their military-issued radios. The simple reason for this? “You fight like you train.”

It is highly likely that Russian soldiers have grown far more comfortable talking on these devices (which provide greater clarity) than the cumbersome, noisy, staticky, and logistically difficult-to-use military-designed communication systems.

Should these reports be accurate about Russian cell phones and Chinese open wireless communications, it would serve as a gold mine for Ukrainian intelligence collection, another part of the greater EW battle called “Electronic Surveillance.”

Implementation​

While I have received many briefings about new Russian EW systems during my career, most of those briefings focused on assessed capability. I cannot recall a single briefing regarding how well Russia implemented its systems in a greater conflict or in a combined arms exercise.

In fairness to the intelligence community, I don’t think I ever asked that question either — nor did anyone I know.

Perhaps unwise, but most of us assumed Russia trained its forces in EW/EA systems similar to the US. Clearly, that’s not the case.

Problem With Russia’s Military Doctrine​

Russia’s military execution is doctrinally challenged. Their long known “Centralized Execution” doctrine means that no one or nothing in the battlespace can do anything until the commanding general gives the go-ahead.

Given recent technological advances, the sheer complexity of today’s combined operations cannot be managed by a single person. Therefore, the West has doctrinally preached “Decentralized Execution” and trained forces to carry out this approach, allowing young officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) the freedom to make local decisions on how to achieve the orders handed down by the leadership.

Young NCOs and officers will make mistakes, but they will learn to mitigate most of those through training and more training.

Russia’s Centralized Execution approach creates the problem of proximity to conflict in which leaders must operate. This is why Russia has lost more than a handful of generals in just a month of fighting. Centralized control demands generals are up close and personal to the battlespace, which comes with increased risk.

Russian doctrine demands leaders continually pass orders and directives down the chain of command or their forces won’t act.
I’ve often said, a well-trained Russian soldier will allow the enemy to climb into his foxhole before fighting if there’s no order to engage. The reason is the soldier has far greater fear of Russian military leadership than they do of the enemy.

Epic Failure​

So, as modern Russian EW/EA systems get towed into barns by Ukrainian farm tractors, it could not be clearer how epically Russia failed in the EMS battlespace.

Just like every other form of warfare, combined arms training truly requires all assets on the battlefield and in the battlespace to cooperate, coordinate, and compete.

I’m grateful to the US military for forcing me to train in this area, even when I was sick of it.

Now, if I could just get an apology from every F-16 and F-15 pilot who cursed my name at the Nellis Officer’s Club bar when they were certain my jamming was the cause of their mission failure. A fighter pilot apology? Ha. Well, one can dream.
 
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BMD

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_Anonymous_

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Why is Russia buying IADS from Iran? @Hydra, @RISING SUN, @Ashwin, @Picdelamirand-oil, @Bon Plan, @Amarante.

Tells you more about the Irishification of the western media & it's audiences than it does the state of Russian IADS.
 
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Lolwa

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Why is Russia buying IADS from Iran? @Hydra, @RISING SUN, @Ashwin, @Picdelamirand-oil, @Bon Plan, @Amarante.

Highly doubt it. Although bavar 373 is a pretty sophisticated system. And Russians would find it pointless using them since they are inferior to the s400's and s300's. Maybe the Iranians want to test their equipment in Ukraine.
 
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BMD

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Highly doubt it. Although bavar 373 is a pretty sophisticated system. And Russians would find it pointless using them since they are inferior to the s400's and s300's. Maybe the Iranians want to test their equipment in Ukraine.
It would be impossible to be inferior to an S-400 right now.

Back in Libya in '86, one SA-5 failed to catch an SR-71 and another went off course and blew up a hospital. Russian IADS is a danger to itself and others.
 

_Anonymous_

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It would be impossible to be inferior to an S-400 right now.

Back in Libya in '86, one SA-5 failed to catch an SR-71 and another went off course and blew up a hospital. Russian IADS is a danger to itself and others.


You may be right about them Iranian SAMs being better than the S-300 Missile air defence systems Paddy.

However all such accidents with US systems must be due to human errors.

I mean I wouldn't be surprised if some or all these characters shared a common ethnic background of the usual suspects in such cases .
 

Soldier35

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The UR-77 "Meteorite" mine-clearing installation, also known as the "Snake Gorynych", was created on the basis of the 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled howitzer and is designed to make moves in anti-tank minefields during the battle. The UR-77 "Meteorite" installation, with the help of rockets, fires powder charges placed in hoses at a distance of about 500 meters. After that, the car drives back, the hose with the charge is stretched and it is activated. One of the episodes of the combat use of the UR-77 in Ukraine was caught on video

 
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_Anonymous_

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The UR-77 "Meteorite" mine-clearing installation, also known as the "Snake Gorynych", was created on the basis of the 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled howitzer and is designed to make moves in anti-tank minefields during the battle. The UR-77 "Meteorite" installation, with the help of rockets, fires powder charges placed in hoses at a distance of about 500 meters. After that, the car drives back, the hose with the charge is stretched and it is activated. One of the episodes of the combat use of the UR-77 in Ukraine was caught on video

Check this clip out Paddy & sweetie . This is what a news clip ought to be all about. Clear crisp consise & amazingly shot . Boy , I sure don't envy the Ukrainians. Now compare this to the schoolboy footage you consistently inflict on us . @BMD ; @Innominate.
 
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_Anonymous_

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Some fairly pumped up claims seen as their last system was thwarted by some drones and sub-sonic AShMs.
I've yet to see reports of any destruction of their S-400 systems in either Ukraine or Syria. I fact I very much doubt the deployment of S-400 systems in Ukraine.
 
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Soldier35

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The newest 2021 Russian bouncing anti-tank mines PTKM-1R appeared in Ukraine. The mine is designed to destroy armored vehicles in the upper hemisphere. When the target approaches 50 m, the seismic sensor of the mine issues a command to shoot the combat element. The combat element moves along a ballistic trajectory, its sensors, thermal and radar, begin to scan the earth's surface. After detecting the target, the warhead is undermined and hits enemy equipment from above in the most vulnerable parts - the roof, turret and hull. Mines weight 20 kg

The work of the Russian portable ground reconnaissance radar "Fara-VR" in combat conditions in Mariupol. The video shows how the operator on the remote control marks the targets and directs the tankers and the crew of the BMP at him, who alternately fire at the targets. The radar is intended for reconnaissance of moving ground targets and transmission of target designation. Detected targets are displayed on the screen, you can even notice when a person just leaned out of the window. The "Fara-VR" station is able to detect a moving truck at a distance of up to 10 kilometers, a tank up to 8 and a person at a distance of up to 4 kilometers. The complex is capable of scanning the area itself and aiming automatic small arms and grenade launchers at the target. The mass of the portable reconnaissance radar station "Fara-VR" is 12 kilograms, you can install and start working in just 3 minutes. The time of continuous operation of the radar from a set of standard batteries is 12 hours.

 

Soldier35

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The corvette "Gremyashchy" of the Pacific Fleet launched a rocket of the newest Russian anti-submarine complex "Answer". The 91RE2 anti-submarine missile is launched from universal ship launchers. In the area where the target is located, the rocket drops a torpedo by parachute into the water. Next, the torpedo independently searches for a submarine using its sonar equipment. Missile guidance can be carried out not only by ships, but also by anti-submarine helicopters and airplanes. The firing range of the missile is about 50 km, the flight speed is Mach 2.5. The MPT anti-submarine torpedo is installed on the 91RE2 rocket as a warhead, which can reach speeds of up to 45 knots with a range of 8 km and a depth of up to 450 m. That's all for today. Friends, thanks for watching, we will cover everything.