Kargil Conflict : Discussions

Ashwin

Agent_47
Staff member
Administrator
Nov 30, 2017
4,778
7,811
Bangalore
India, Pakistan had a ‘deal’ to end Kargil, but Delhi backed out: book

A new book by a Pakistani journalist claims that Pakistan and India had a “done deal” through backchannel diplomacy to end the Kargil confrontation at the end of June 1999, a month before it finally wound to a close with the withdrawal of Pakistani troops from their encroachments on the Indian side, and that India backtracked because it was confident that US pressure would force Pakistan to pull back.

Nasim Zehra had reported this “deal” at the time, and it was not denied by the Indian side. Her book From Kargil to The Coup: Events That Shook Pakistan, released in Pakistan last week, contains more details, but is mostly an indictment of a “clique of generals” headed by then Pakistan Army chief Pervez Musharraf, who planned and implemented the Kargil operation in secrecy and autonomously of the civilian government of Nawaz Sharif.

Released days after The Spy Chronicles: RAW, ISI and the Illusion of Peace by two former heads of the Indian and Pakistani intelligence agencies caused a backlash in Pakistan against the Pakistani co-author, Lt Gen Asad Durrani (retd), for appearing to endorse the view that Pakistani military had made several wrong decisions, Zehra’s book is a narration of how the military took that country to the brink in Kargil without the Sharif government’s authorisation, and finally pinned the blame on him, claiming that Pakistan would have achieved all the objectives of the operation if only the political leadership hadn’t panicked and succumbed to US pressure.

The book also comes at a time when Sharif, judicially ousted as Prime Minister in 2017 and disqualified for life by the Pakistan Supreme Court, is embroiled in a battle of wits with Pakistan Army, and has been painted as “pro-India” weeks ahead of national elections in which his party remains a powerful contender.

According to Zehra, an influential media voice in Pakistan, though the book may be seen as being “pro-Sharif”, it is also about the former Prime Minister’s naivete back in 1999.

When and whether Sharif got to know about Kargil has always been a question. Zehra is unequivocal that it was sprung on him nearly five months after the generals had begun implementing it, even as he and Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee had embarked on a diplomatic process with the Lahore Declaration in March 1999.

Zehra writes that when Sharif was finally told about the operation on May 17, 1999, the briefing was vague, and did not reveal that regular troops were involved, or that they had already crossed the LoC. He was told only that the Kashmir “war of liberation” had been “upgraded”, and that the first stage of the five-stage operation — which involved Mujahideen taking positions behind the lines — had been completed. Sharif asked no tough questions, and fell for flattery when told he would go down in history as the “liberator of Kashmir”, the book says..

“My book is about how Kargil derailed a [diplomatic] process [after the Lahore Declaration], that it led to Pakistan losing good strategic ground it had gained after the nculear tests and the Lahore summit, and as it played out, it exposed multiple weaknesses in how Pakistan policy is framed and executed,” Zehra told The Sunday Express from Islamabad. “It is about how the asymmetry of power within is best dealt through competent leadership and institutionalised decision-making.”

In the book, Zehra details how, when India responded with force that Musharraf had failed to foresee, he wanted Sharif to pull the Pakistan Army’s chestnuts out of the fire. The Prime Minister ended up doing with US help, in the process taking the national rap for calling off a “successful” operation. In fact, Zehra says, the July 4 statement after Sharif’s meeting with Bill Clinton in Washington announcing that Pakistan had agreed to withdraw, was a relief to the Pakistani troops on the ground. “We said a two rakaat prayer of gratitude to Allah,” Zehra quotes a Pakistani major as saying.

“Contrary to the allegations made against [Sharif ] that he had bartered away in Washington the military victory that the troops were winning in Kargil, [he] bought to a rapid close costly military, diplomatic and political losses…,” says the book.

In Zehra’s telling, in June 1999, after a flurry of visits by India’s backchannel envoy R K Mishra, Sharif’s backchannel envoy Niaz Naik visited New Delhi on June 27 and finalised an agreement under which “both sides” would respect the LoC determined by the 1972 Simla Agreement, military officers from both sides would meet for the purpose; both leaders would reiterate their commitment to the Lahore Declaration, and find a solution to Kashmir and other unresolved issues within a specified timeframe — “the two Prime Ministers had arrived at the conclusion that it could be done in 10 months”.

Sharif was to cut short a planned five-day visit to Beijing starting June 27, and stop over in New Delhi. On his way to Beijing, he was to issue a goodwill messsage to Vajpayee while over Indian airspace, and Vajpayee was to reciprocate. According to the book, the Indian PM asked Naik, who was leaving for Islamabad the same day, to return to Delhi on June 28 to prepare for Sharif’s visit. Naik returned to Islamabad with the message “All on board”.

According to the book, an understanding had been reached about the points of an agreement that would be signed in Delhi between Sharif and Vajpayee. All other modalities, including Sharif’s flight over, and into Delhi, the contents of their respective goodwill messages, and the joint statement, too had been worked out.

The Pakistani side prepared Sharif’s message and faxed it at 5 pm, and waited for New Delhi to fax Vajpayee’s meesage.

“The message came at 10 pm, and it was a bombshell,” Zehra writes. Vajpayee was not inviting Sharif to Delhi, instead he was asking Pakistan to withdraw the intruders from Kargil so that bilateral dialogue could be resumed.

According to the book, Vajpayee also called Sharif right before his message was faxed over.

“I’m very happy, it’s good news,” Sharif said. But Vajpayee said, “There’s a mistake. I never said I would invite you. Come, but I will not invite you.”

Panicked officials in Pakistan reached out to Mishra and invited him to come to Pakistan the next day. But Mishra said he would need clearance to travel, and did not show up.

Zehra writes that there are three possible explanations for Delhi’s sudden reversal. First, that Islamabad may have imagined a “done deal” when none existed, but she dismisses this as unlikely, as Naik would not have gone to Delhi without something in the works. Second, that it was a ruse by Delhi to lead on Islamabad. But the most likely explanation, she says, was that the “hawks” in the Indian establishment had prevailed. The Vajpayee government was in touch with the Clinton Administration throughout the backchannel process, and was encouraged by the US and other international pressure on Pakistan to withdraw its troops.

Asked if any deal had indeed been agreed upon by the backchannel, Vivek Katju, a former MEA official who played a key role in India-Pakistan relations at the time, said he could not offer a comment without reading the book. But, he said: “The Pakistan Army stared at a complete defeat in Kargil, and was looking toward Nawaz Sharif to provide it a face saver”.

The book, which is yet to arrive in India, goes on to narrate Sharif’s dash to the US on July 4, Clinton’s insistence on the Pakistani withdrawal from Kargil, and subsequent events until Musharraf’s coup in October.

Though many Indian establishment figures point to Kargil for their opposition to a settlement on Siachen, Zehra says the roots of Kargil go back to India’s 1984 Operation Meghdoot.

She writes that the origin of Operation Koh-e-Paima, as the Kargil Operation was named by the Pakistan Army, lay in Pakistan’s desperation to wrest Siachen back from the Indian Army. In 1986, according to the book, the Planning Directorate of GHQ came with a plan to expel India from Siachen, with Kargil as the centre of the operation, as it was close to NH 1, India’s supply route to Siachen. It was this plan that Musharraf revived, according to the book.

Zehra told The Sunday Express, “The unsettled Jammu and Kashmir question has provided Pakistan and India, especially their armies, the opportunity for adventurism.”

India, Pakistan had a ‘deal’ to end Kargil, but Delhi backed out: book
 
Last edited:

vstol Jockey

Professional
Dec 1, 2017
5,927
11,531
New Delhi
Basically indian army get this cold start idea from kargil.they are adopting our strategies but we have changed our strategies now.
You really amaze me with your posts. When did Pak Army ever have IBGs? You have no depth and as a result you are forced to keep your formations close to border which allows you to mobilise quickly. You never had IBGs.
Indian CSD is designed to neutralise this very advantage of Pak Army and turn it in their nightmare. The IBGs can move rapidly across the theatre and can chose a point to launch attack. This will force you to move and commit your reserves very early in the battle as a delay will destroy your nation. In case your strike corps launch an offensive in India, they too will be attacked by these IBGs in the rear to cut off your lines of communication. The strike corps of India will join the Party once we have captured part of your territory and your forces are forced to fight in unprepared defenses and areas.
You have no strategy against IBG and CSD.
 
  • Like
Reactions: RATHORE

Arsalan123

Banned
Jun 3, 2019
1,450
237
Sindh, Pakistan
You really amaze me with your posts. When did Pak Army ever have IBGs? You have no depth and as a result you are forced to keep your formations close to border which allows you to mobilise quickly. You never had IBGs.
Indian CSD is designed to neutralise this very advantage of Pak Army and turn it in their nightmare. The IBGs can move rapidly across the theatre and can chose a point to launch attack. This will force you to move and commit your reserves very early in the battle as a delay will destroy your nation. In case your strike corps launch an offensive in India, they too will be attacked by these IBGs in the rear to cut off your lines of communication. The strike corps of India will join the Party once we have captured part of your territory and your forces are forced to fight in unprepared defenses and areas.
You have no strategy against IBG and CSD.
Sir I know about ibgs and other armored thrust theory but objective of cold start is similar to that of kargil.occupy enemy land, negotiate things on your own terms.
 

Deathstar

Well-Known member
Jun 1, 2019
1,622
951
India
P
Siachen was different because before siachen,we ordered some type of jacket order to British company and this news reached new Delhi so we were caught without any preparation.kargil was totally different and basically cold start is also same.
What did u achieve from Kargil war??
1. A coup.
2. Worldwide humiliation.
3. Proxy war is the way forward.
 

Arsalan123

Banned
Jun 3, 2019
1,450
237
Sindh, Pakistan
P

What did u achieve from Kargil war??
1. A coup.
2. Worldwide humiliation.
3. Proxy war is the way forward.

1) temporary hold of Indian strategic location.

2) indian government begs Washington to intervene

3) initial damage to indian army was more than enough to remember for decades

4) attacking pakistani strategy.gd bakshi said " hum bhat bura pit rhe the"

5) pakistan army defensive mentality turned into attacking and aggressive mentality

6) results can be seen during operation parakram.aggressive Pak army and nightmare for India.
 

Arsalan123

Banned
Jun 3, 2019
1,450
237
Sindh, Pakistan
I'm mechanical engineer by education and into HVAC by profession. There's a reason I don't comment on neuro surgery. But don't ever let that prevent you from commenting on it. You can seek guidance from your illustrious seniors out here @BMD ; @Guynextdoor

Human manifestations of foot n mouth disease.
Kindly read the story of jackets which Pak army ordered from British company.read history general.
 

_Anonymous_

Senior Member
Dec 4, 2017
14,520
10,493
Mumbai
1) temporary hold of Indian strategic location.

2) indian government begs Washington to intervene

3) initial damage to indian army was more than enough to remember for decades

4) attacking pakistani strategy.gd bakshi said " hum bhat bura pit rhe the"

5) pakistan army defensive mentality turned into attacking and aggressive mentality

6) results can be seen during operation parakram.aggressive Pak army and nightmare for India.
@Ashwin ; @nair ; @Arvind ; @suryakiran ; @BlackOpsIndia . Please shift this to the funny section. We have already had the thread on Pakistan shut down. If you persist in your favourite fetish of allowing this to be platform for ppl of all nationalities to participate sans any fear of bias, it requires intense moderation failing which we get such pearls of wisdom as above along with gyaan like the 1965 war was a victory for Pakistan, 1971 was a tactical loss, nothing's wrong with the Pakistani economy except corruption And Imran Khan is the Mahdi.
 

vstol Jockey

Professional
Dec 1, 2017
5,927
11,531
New Delhi
Sir I know about ibgs and other armored thrust theory but objective of cold start is similar to that of kargil.occupy enemy land, negotiate things on your own terms.
CSD is not because of Kargil but due to your terrorists attacking our Parliament building. The aim of CSD is to make shallow thrusts to capture territory and allow for strike corps to operate from a position of far superior advantage. CSD aim is to create confusion and complete break down of command, control, communication and decision making process of the enemy to throw its military in disarray. Your lack of depth allows us to quickly dismember you with multiple thrusts across the border and you will never know which IBG is going to hold on to the territory and which is being used to create path for strike corps to roll in. The multiple thrust lines will also ensure that your reserves are stretched and unable to offer any major resistance. If you stop even 50% of the IBGs, the others will get thru. Please remember all these IBGs are fully backed by Holding Corps so it will be impossible for you to do any major damage to them.
Your TNWs are the only option which are not an option. You use them and we will remove you from the face of earth. We are going to use city busters in retaliation. If you use city busters against us, we have BMD and within 5mins will kill over 75% of Pak population with near 100% casualties in Punjab. You might have some survive in FATA and Baluchistan.
 

Deathstar

Well-Known member
Jun 1, 2019
1,622
951
India
1) temporary hold of Indian strategic location.

2) indian government begs Washington to intervene

3) initial damage to indian army was more than enough to remember for decades

4) attacking pakistani strategy.gd bakshi said " hum bhat bura pit rhe the"

5) pakistan army defensive mentality turned into attacking and aggressive mentality

6) results can be seen during operation parakram.aggressive Pak army and nightmare for India.

1. Temporary hold?ok what did it gave to u? nothing
2. I didn't see Vajpayee running to the Washington , i saw only Nawaz banging Clinton's doors , who pulled the troops back first?Nawaz Sharif , u conclude why
3.initial damage was high because we were counter attacking and u occupied higher positions yet your casualties are high according to your own then PM NaWAz Sharif
4. ISI then head called Kargil as a major disaster
5. Your mentality was always attacking (48,65.71) but in Kargil you tried to be defensive and got a bloody nose.
6. Operation Parakram was done after Parliament attack and it highlighted need to newer strategies hence cold start , your rhetoric is irrelevant
PS: War's outcome is determined over OBJECTIVES achieved , Soviet casualties were higher in WW2 yet they are victors
Your objectives in Kargil : occupy positions and negotiate Siachen - failed
Our objective : clear rats from mountains - success
 

Arsalan123

Banned
Jun 3, 2019
1,450
237
Sindh, Pakistan
CSD is not because of Kargil but due to your terrorists attacking our Parliament building. The aim of CSD is to make shallow thrusts to capture territory and allow for strike corps to operate from a position of far superior advantage. CSD aim is to create confusion and complete break down of command, control, communication and decision making process of the enemy to throw its military in disarray. Your lack of depth allows us to quickly dismember you with multiple thrusts across the border and you will never know which IBG is going to hold on to the territory and which is being used to create path for strike corps to roll in. The multiple thrust lines will also ensure that your reserves are stretched and unable to offer any major resistance. If you stop even 50% of the IBGs, the others will get thru. Please remember all these IBGs are fully backed by Holding Corps so it will be impossible for you to do any major damage to them.
Your TNWs are the only option which are not an option. You use them and we will remove you from the face of earth. We are going to use city busters in retaliation. If you use city busters against us, we have BMD and within 5mins will kill over 75% of Pak population with near 100% casualties in Punjab. You might have some survive in FATA and Baluchistan.

I agree with you and understands your idea.
 

RATHORE

Lion of Rajputana
Banned
Dec 2, 2017
1,654
1,949
USA
@Ashwin ; @nair ; @Arvind ; @suryakiran ; @BlackOpsIndia . Please shift this to the funny section. We have already had the thread on Pakistan shut down. If you persist in your favourite fetish of allowing this to be platform for ppl of all nationalities to participate sans any fear of bias, it requires intense moderation failing which we get such pearls of wisdom as above along with gyaan like the 1965 war was a victory for Pakistan, 1971 was a tactical loss, nothing's wrong with the Pakistani economy except corruption And Imran Khan is the Mahdi.


Hum Bolega To.jpg
 

suryakiran

Team StratFront
Dec 1, 2017
782
963
Bangalore
1) temporary hold of Indian strategic location.

2) indian government begs Washington to intervene

3) initial damage to indian army was more than enough to remember for decades

4) attacking pakistani strategy.gd bakshi said " hum bhat bura pit rhe the"

5) pakistan army defensive mentality turned into attacking and aggressive mentality

6) results can be seen during operation parakram.aggressive Pak army and nightmare for India.

If one goes to war, one needs an objective. And if one needs to win the war, you need to achieve the objective.

Kargil was conceived to cut supplies to the Siachen area and northern territories held by India, including Turtuk. Was that achieved? Going by the fact, that, I was in Turtuk last year and Siachen is nowhere in Pakistani hands, objectives were definitely not met.

I am not sure, what is discussed in Pakistan, but what Kargil did is change the way India looks at Pakistan. The change you see in Indian nuclear doctrine is a direct result of Kargil and the Parliament attack sealed the Indian military strategy. The Sunderji doctrine is now history.

Operation Parakram has less to do with the 'aggressive Pakistani army and more to do with logistical issues in mobilisation. These include in overall concept of Strike Corps, railway infrastructure, last mile road infrastructure and of course the military mindset.

So let's now objectively see what Pakistan has achieved vis-a-vis India, post Kargil and the Parliament attack.

a. Change of nuclear policy from no first strike to no first strike against non nuclear states and the right to strike, even if we believe there is possibility of launch. This includes, striking Indian columns within Pakistani territory. Any 'attempt' to launch will result in a nuclear strike by India on your cities. While, Pakistanis keep talking about lowering the threshold with the introduction of the theater nuclear weapons, we have lowered it with assuring a thermo nuclear response on your cities. I don't understand how this is a good thing for Pakistan.

b. The change in military doctrine from a defensive offence strategy to a offensive defense strategy. Which means, we are now assuring you, we will cross the international border. Which we did on 26th February. You responded by using stand off from across your side. Pakistan lacks the ability and the depth to launch any military offensive, sustain it and then defend from the Indian response. The Indian CBG is a direct result of this doctrinal change.

c. Infrastructural changes resulting in rapid mobilisation across the Pak border. Let me give you a very specific example. Feel free to check with people from the PA. Sometime in March, the IA was moving tanks along the IB to and fro. They were moved 100+ kms over night and appear south and couple of days later appear north of where they were supposed to be. Why do you think, the PA was continuosly trying to send UAVs and they were shot down in Raj-Guj area? While you may think so what, any Armoured Corps commander will tell you about the nightmare of having to deal with rapid changes in areas of thrust.

How did any of the above help Pakistan post Kargil? It only resulted in a more aggressive India. If the Pakistani objective was to ensure India re-organises and gets aggressive, Pakistan has succeeded in its objective.
 

Arsalan123

Banned
Jun 3, 2019
1,450
237
Sindh, Pakistan
If one goes to war, one needs an objective. And if one needs to win the war, you need to achieve the objective.

Kargil was conceived to cut supplies to the Siachen area and northern territories held by India, including Turtuk. Was that achieved? Going by the fact, that, I was in Turtuk last year and Siachen is nowhere in Pakistani hands, objectives were definitely not met.

I am not sure, what is discussed in Pakistan, but what Kargil did is change the way India looks at Pakistan. The change you see in Indian nuclear doctrine is a direct result of Kargil and the Parliament attack sealed the Indian military strategy. The Sunderji doctrine is now history.

Operation Parakram has less to do with the 'aggressive Pakistani army and more to do with logistical issues in mobilisation. These include in overall concept of Strike Corps, railway infrastructure, last mile road infrastructure and of course the military mindset.

So let's now objectively see what Pakistan has achieved vis-a-vis India, post Kargil and the Parliament attack.

a. Change of nuclear policy from no first strike to no first strike against non nuclear states and the right to strike, even if we believe there is possibility of launch. This includes, striking Indian columns within Pakistani territory. Any 'attempt' to launch will result in a nuclear strike by India on your cities. While, Pakistanis keep talking about lowering the threshold with the introduction of the theater nuclear weapons, we have lowered it with assuring a thermo nuclear response on your cities. I don't understand how this is a good thing for Pakistan.

b. The change in military doctrine from a defensive offence strategy to a offensive defense strategy. Which means, we are now assuring you, we will cross the international border. Which we did on 26th February. You responded by using stand off from across your side. Pakistan lacks the ability and the depth to launch any military offensive, sustain it and then defend from the Indian response. The Indian CBG is a direct result of this doctrinal change.

c. Infrastructural changes resulting in rapid mobilisation across the Pak border. Let me give you a very specific example. Feel free to check with people from the PA. Sometime in March, the IA was moving tanks along the IB to and fro. They were moved 100+ kms over night and appear south and couple of days later appear north of where they were supposed to be. Why do you think, the PA was continuosly trying to send UAVs and they were shot down in Raj-Guj area? While you may think so what, any Armoured Corps commander will tell you about the nightmare of having to deal with rapid changes in areas of thrust.

How did any of the above help Pakistan post Kargil? It only resulted in a more aggressive India. If the Pakistani objective was to ensure India re-organises and gets aggressive, Pakistan has succeeded in its objective.
I will reply you later.i read all.your points.
 

Arbit

Banned
Dec 4, 2017
124
171
You have won kargil.you deserves celebration.

Glad you acknowledge. It took your country, its collective intelligentsia, general public and Pervez Musharraf, 10-15 or what 20 years to admit?

how do you look at your face in the mirror.
 
  • Like
Reactions: Paro

Arsalan123

Banned
Jun 3, 2019
1,450
237
Sindh, Pakistan
Glad you acknowledge. It took your country, its collective intelligentsia, general public and Pervez Musharraf, 10-15 or what 20 years to admit?

how do you look at your face in the mirror.
When we look in the mirror,we only think about gd bakshi.he is the only general who accepted hammering received by India.thank you lol.
 

Deathstar

Well-Known member
Jun 1, 2019
1,622
951
India
When we look in the mirror,we only think about gd bakshi.he is the only general who accepted hammering received by India.thank you lol.
Dude see your own PMs statements on Kargil casualties , you will die of shame
Wanna watch video of Pakistani soldiers holding white flags to pick their comrades bodies??go search on YT
Now thats a hammering
A simple Wikipedia search on Kargil war will show you that according to NAWAZ SHARIF casualty figures for pukis are 2700-4000. Even we didn't claim such a high toll loll
Screenshot_2019-07-27-21-46-53-843_com.android.chrome.png