Islamic Republic of Pakistan : News, Discussions & Updates

Your long term alignment is west. You speak English not russian, children go to study in West, remittance comes from west, FPI comes from west, startup funding comes west, trade is with west, you have no territorial disputes with west, you have a territorial dispute with russian ally china.

The russia china axis can never replace west. Our actions should take this reality into account.
What???
The whole point of multi-alignment is to not be dependent on any one bloc/party. West is no longer a monolith either. India's long term alignment is to trade with everyone and take no sides in any conflict. Work in every direction. We will work with anyone who is willing to work with us.

And you cannot stop other parties from working with each other either. You cannot be angry at Ukraine for working with paxtan if you work with Russia. This is childish. Let them be.
 
What???
The whole point of multi-alignment is to not be dependent on any one bloc/party. West is no longer a monolith either. India's long term alignment is to trade with everyone and take no sides in any conflict. Work in every direction. We will work with anyone who is willing to work with us.

And you cannot stop other parties from working with each other either. You cannot be angry at Ukraine for working with paxtan if you work with Russia. This is childish. Let them be.
This is exactly what I am saying
 
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Officials also told CNN-News18 that Pakistan has already received more than 200 Chinese SH-15 self-propelled artillery guns and plans to expand the inventory to over 500 units.
In addition, Pakistan is reportedly upgrading its Cobra attack helicopter fleet while continuing investments in precision-guided weapons.
The reported plan includes a significant expansion of Pakistan's drone fleet, missile capabilities, artillery, air defence network and next-generation fighter aircraft, with China and Türkiye emerging as its principal defence partners.
According to top defence sources quoted by CNN-News18, Pakistan is planning to procure more than 1,000 Turkish Yiha drones as part of a broader effort to strengthen its unmanned combat capabilities.

The sources further said Pakistan is expected to induct 40 Chinese J-35 stealth fighter aircraft by the end of 2026.
 
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Above gave me the idea for my book #2 in the Himaldeshi universe:

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President Erdogan understood the immutable constraints of geopolitics. As a NATO member and perennial EU aspirant, Turkey would never be allowed to develop nuclear weapons.

So he laid plans within plans. "Enjoy our hospitality, bhaijaan," he offered the Field Marshal with a calculated smile that concealed decades of ambition.

While the world's attention lingered on Putin's folly and Israel's anschluss, unknown gunmen sparked panic across Pakistan. The Field Marshal, trapped by old suspicions and lesser instincts, saw India's hand. The liras in their pockets told the real story. As he jetted between Versailles and Ankara, imagining himself a great statesman while his own state came undone, unseen hands fanned old ethnic rivalries until Pakistan stood on the edge of balkanization.

The final move was never conquest; it was custody. When the international community demanded that the crumbling state’s nuclear arsenal be placed in the hands of a "stable guardian," there would be only one choice the Field Marshal trusted—not through coercion, but through years of carefully cultivated ummah solidarity.

"They call it the Islamic Bomb," he thought. "But history made a mistake. That inheritance was never destined for a b@st@rd lineage claiming the borrowed blood of Mughal conquerors. No, it belongs to the Ottoman Empire. Under my leadership the faithful will reclaim what the world has forgotten!"
 
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Holy moly!!! so many protestors killed!!! Number of dead has crossed 30. These are conservative estimates given by ISPR touts in reuters. At this rate we might see insurgency in PoK soon(inshalllah 😋)


Summary
  • Tuesday's clashes killed six protesters and one police official in Tararkhal, Khan said
  • Another protester and a security official were killed in Rawalakot, Khan added
  • The unrest ‌has killed around 30 people since June, by conservative estimates
MUZAFFARABAD, July 14 (Reuters) - Clashes between security forces and supporters of a banned protest group in Pakistan-administered Kashmir killed nine people on Tuesday, officials said, a ⁠day before the group planned a march against controversial electoral arrangements ahead of regional elections later this month.

The violence stems from a dispute over 12 seats reserved in the regional assembly for refugees who live elsewhere in Pakistan, a system protesters say dilutes local representation.

Poonch Divisional Commissioner Waheed Khan said protesters blocked a security convoy and attacked ‌officials ⁠in the Poonch sector.
"Police and security officials responded in self-defence," Khan told Reuters.

Six protesters and one police officer were killed in Tararkhal, while a protester and a security official died in ⁠a separate clash in Rawalakot, he said.
The Joint Action Committee (JAAC), banned in June under anti-terror laws, has called for a march on ⁠Rawalakot on Wednesday. Khan said security forces were prepared to prevent marchers from entering the city.

Around 30 people ⁠have been killed in the unrest since June, according to local estimates.
 
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Non-paywalled link: https://archive.is/2hnU2

Is Pakistan turning its side of Kashmir into another Balochistan?​

Crackdown on key Azad Kashmir civic movement risks radicalizing peaceful protest
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Salman Rafi Sheikh
July 10, 2026 05:05 JST
20260707 Kashmir Protest

People chant slogans as they walk during a protest and shutter-down strike called by the banned Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC), an alliance of civil society groups, in Neelum Valley, Pakistani Kashmir on June 21. © Reuters
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Salman Rafi Sheikh is an assistant professor of politics at the Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani School of Humanities and Social Sciences at Lahore University of Management Sciences.

Pakistan-administered Kashmir was never really free, and Islamabad's actions have proven it.
In early June, Pakistan banned what is likely the largest civic movement in the region as as a terrorist organization, shut down internet services and deployed thousands of paramilitary personnel. The death toll from the ensuing clashes rose above 20, even as nominations opened for the July 27 legislative election. The narrative Pakistan has long promoted about the part of Kashmir under its control is now beginning to unravel in public.

The immediate trigger came on June 1, when the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) rejected a public demand to abolish the 12 legislative seats reserved for refugees from Indian-administered Kashmir in the AJK legislative assembly. The ruling was a major setback to the legal campaign the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC), a broad civil-society protest coalition, had pursued for nearly three years. Four days later, the Pakistan-administered Kashmir government banned JAAC under the territory's anti-terrorism law, accusing it of "creating anarchy" and "promoting hatred." The JAAC pressed ahead with a planned rally on June 9 anyway. The result was the worst unrest the territory has seen in years, exposing contradictions in Pakistan's Kashmir policy.

Islamabad has long contrasted Azad Kashmir's supposed autonomy with India's tighter control across the Line of Control. Yet that contrast has always rested more on rhetoric than reality
. Whatever government rules in Islamabad exercises decisive influence over politics in Muzaffarabad, the AJK capital, and the 12 refugee seats have been central to that arrangement. Occupied by representatives who do not reside in Azad Kashmir, these seats have often supplied the votes needed to make or unmake governments.

Therefore, the JAAC's demand to abolish them challenged one of the key institutional mechanisms of Islamabad's political leverage over the territory. That helps explain why the response was not negotiation, but a court battle followed by a terrorism designation. Reserved seats for refugees, however, is not the movement's only concern. The JAAC first emerged in 2023 over rising electricity charges and flour prices. But once the movement began questioning the political architecture underpinning Pakistan's control of AJK, it crossed a line the state was unwilling to tolerate.
The decision to invoke anti-terrorism legislation against a movement built around civic protest also reflects a broader pattern in Pakistan's politics. Nationalist movements in the restive southwestern region of Balochistan and rights campaigners in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in the northwest have faced very similar treatment. More recently, Baloch rights activist Mahrang Baloch was sentenced to life imprisonment after campaigning against enforced disappearances. This sentence will only reinforce the ongoing separatist insurgency in Balochistan.

alt
Faisal Mumtaz Rathore, prime minister of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, center, takes the oath of office in Pakistani-administered Kashmir on Nov. 18, 2025. © Getty Images


Could Kashmir become the next Balochistan? For three years, the JAAC has largely avoided organized violence -- restraint has been one of its greatest strengths. Yet recent events suggest the space for peaceful politics is shrinking. On June 14, one JAAC leader was charged with sedition after reportedly urging Kashmiri soldiers serving in Pakistan's military to abandon their posts. Whether this reflected official strategy or an individual's frustration matters less than what it reveals: a movement pushed outside normal politics is beginning to adopt language that would have been unthinkable only a year ago.

History suggests that insurgencies rarely emerge overnight. They develop when peaceful avenues for political participation are systematically closed, when civic organizations are criminalized, and when ordinary grievances are redefined as security threats. Branding disputes over electricity prices and electoral representation as terrorism may suppress dissent temporarily, but it also risks convincing people -- just like the Baloch -- that constitutional politics are irrelevant. If that perception hardens, AJK could face the kind of homegrown militancy that Pakistan has spent decades insisting belongs only across the Line of Control.

That outcome is still avoidable. One reform would require candidates contesting the 12 refugee seats to hold domicile in AJK, bringing these constituencies into line with residency standards that already apply elsewhere in Pakistan. There is a legitimate case for reserving representation for Kashmiri refugees. There is no good case for that representation going to people who have never lived among the voters they claim to speak for.
Another reform would establish a constitutionally protected forum for regular negotiation between the federal government and Azad Kashmir, modeled on Pakistan's Council of Common Interests. A permanent institution with scheduled meetings and binding dispute-resolution procedures would replace today's familiar cycle of protest, federal concessions, temporary calm, renewed confrontation and repression.

Neither proposal requires a fundamental restructuring of the state. Both seek to widen political participation. But they require a government with democratic legitimacy. That makes the July 27 election especially consequential. Holding a vote while internet services remain suspended and the territory's largest civic movement remains banned will only deepen questions about the credibility of the outcome.

For years, Pakistan has argued that repression fuels instability in Indian-administered Kashmir. It now risks validating that argument on its own side of the Line of Control. If Islamabad continues to substitute coercion for politics, AJK may cease to be merely a site of recurring protest and become the birthplace of a homegrown insurgency created not by foreign infiltration but by the steady closure of peaceful political space.
 
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Why China Will Not Sell 5th-Generation J-35 Fighter Jets to Pakistan (Yet)

For China, the decision to sell the J-35 would carry ramifications far exceeding those of any previous Chinese arms sale.
By Yang Xiaotong
July 16, 2026


Why China Will Not Sell 5th-Generation J-35 Fighter Jets to Pakistan (Yet)

A J-35A fighter jet on display at the 2026 Singapore Airshow.

Credit: Ying Yu Lin
Since 2024, there have been on and off rumors claiming that Pakistan is on the verge of acquiring approximately 40 Chinese-made fifth-generation J-35 fighter jets. To date, however, no contract has been signed, nor has a single fighter been delivered. Recently, these rumors have resurfaced once again.

As things stand, neither Pakistan nor its longstanding rival, India, possesses any fifth-generation fighters. The acquisition of 40 J-35s by Pakistan would therefore be a game-changer, fundamentally altering the balance of power on the Indian subcontinent.

That said, Beijing is unlikely to approve such a sale in the near-term. It remains wary of upsetting the regional balance of power, particularly as it must prioritize meeting its domestic military needs – and Pakistan’s defense budget already stretched thin.

Unwilling to Upset the Balance of Power in South Asia

Over the past decade, China has provided Pakistan with extensive economic and military support – in part to establish it as a military counterweight to India. For Beijing, a Pakistan capable of holding its own forces India to divert resources away from the disputed China-India border, while simultaneously securing the section of the Belt and Road Initiative that traverses Pakistan-administered Kashmir.

Beijing, however, remains wary of giving Pakistan too decisive a military edge over India, lest it upset the delicate balance of power on the Indian subcontinent – and, in doing so, risk unravelling the already fragile peace.

Skirmishes already sporadically break out between India and Pakistan along the Line of Control – the de facto border partitioning the disputed region of Kashmir between Pakistani- and Indian-administered regions. Should Beijing decide to sell 40 J-35s to Pakistan, it would increase the likelihood of Islamabad seeking to alter the territorial status quo in Kashmir.

Although Pakistan spends far less on its military than India, it is already capable of punching well above its weight. During the 2025 India-Pakistan conflict, both sides were operating fourth-generation fighter jets – Pakistan’s Chinese-made J-10Cs and India’s French-made Rafales and Russian-made Sukhoi Su-30MKIs.

Despite its numerical disadvantage and technological parity, Pakistan shot down five Indian fighters without sustaining a single loss of its own. According to Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, Pakistan could have inflicted even greater losses but deliberately refrained from pressing its advantage – likely out of fear that a cornered India would resort to escalation.

The induction of J-35s would give Pakistan’s military a further leg up in future fighting – especially since India currently possesses no fifth-generation fighters and is unlikely to acquire any in the near-term. It is not in China’s interests to be drawn into a conflict between two nuclear-armed states in South Asia when its core interests in East Asia demands its undivided attention.

Domestic Military Needs Take Priorities

Currently, China has three aircraft carriers, with a fourth under construction and up to five more planned as part of its ambition to build a blue-water navy. Despite this rapid naval buildup, however, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Air Force relies on a single type of fifth-generation fighter capable of taking-off from carriers – the J-35.

Only two years have passed since the J-35 made its official debut. Production has yet to reach the numbers needed to fully equip China’s existing carriers. Even for a country widely dubbed the “world’s factory,” ramping up production will take time.

Time, however, is not on China’s side.

For the past decade, China and the United States have been locked in a geopolitical rivalry known as the “new Cold War.” Although relations somewhat eased after U.S. President Donald Trump traveled to China this May for high-level talks, underlying tensions remain.

For Beijing, this means that the PLAN must be able to stand toe-to-toe with the U.S. Navy’s 11 carriers and seven amphibious assault ships (each a de facto carrier in its own right) – and as soon as possible.

To sell 40 J-35s to Pakistan now, therefore, would be to set that timeline further back. Even a single squadron could leave China’s carriers understrength in the event of a naval stand-off with the U.S. Navy.

Beyond setting back China’s naval modernization goals, selling J-35s to Pakistan carries significant risks.

The J-35 originally began its lifecycle as a privately funded project by the Chinese aircraft manufacturer Shengyang Aircraft Corporation to attract foreign buyers. At first, the J-35’s development lacked official PLA backing. As the project matured, however, the PLA took interest, leading to the J-35’s induction by both the air force and the navy.

As the only Chinese fifth-generation fighter capable of taking off from carriers, the J-35 has become the backbone of the PLAN Air Force, fundamentally shifting the calculus. An export variant remains under development, but its fate now hangs in the air.

While Pakistan stands as one of China’s most important partners, Beijing would be shortsighted to overlook Pakistan’s longstanding close ties with the United States.

A telling example is Pakistan’s fleet of approximately 75 U.S.-made F-16 fighters, which form the backbone of the PAF. These aircraft require routine maintenance that can only be carried out by U.S. technicians. As a result, U.S. technicians are a recurring presence at Pakistani airbases – which inevitably includes the very same bases where J-35s would be stationed, should China agree to sell them.

This overlap creates a scenario where sensitive Chinese technology would be placed within close physical proximity to U.S. technicians, thereby raising concerns of technological leakage.

Admittedly, J-35s sold to Pakistan would be an export variant, stripped of the aircraft’s most advanced features. Yet even with these downgrades, many of the J-35’s core features will remain unchanged. Even the leakage of seemingly minor features – such as the J-35’s radar signature – could give the United States and its allies an edge over China in future conflicts.

For China, therefore, the decision to sell the J-35 would carry ramifications far exceeding those of any previous Chinese arms sale. The J-10, for example, is a capable but considerably older model with comparatively less sensitive technology. Any espionage, therefore, would pose only limited risks. The J-35, by contrast, represents the pinnacle of Chinese military aviation, making its sale a gamble of an entirely different magnitude.

No Economic Incentives

Just a year ago, Pakistan’s economy was showing signs of recovery from the economic crisis that beset it between 2021 and 2024. Today, however, much of that progress has been undone.

The outbreak of the Israel-U.S. war on Iran this February saw Pakistan cast in the role of mediator when no other countries could or would shoulder that responsibility. Diplomatically, that gamble paid off. Pakistan’s international standing improved. Its economy, however, paid a steep price. Oil and gas prices skyrocketed, while remittances plummeted, leaving Pakistan once again reeling from “three highs and one low”: high debt, high inflation, high deficit, and low growth.

Against this backdrop, even if Beijing were willing to sell Pakistan 40 J-35s, Pakistan would not be able to afford it. The country has been trapped in a debt spiral for over a decade, with over half of its tax revenues devoted to servicing loans. That leaves little room for all other state functions – including defense.

This tight defense budget could make it difficult to even cover the upkeep of 40 J-35s, let alone finance their purchase without diverting funds from more pressing needs – a trade-off that cash-strapped Pakistan can hardly afford.

Theoretically, Beijing could finance Pakistan’s J-35 purchase through loans, as it did with the J-10. In practice, however, it lacks the strategic incentive to do so (as outlined earlier) and such a move would, moreover, remove the economic incentive.

Beijing’s earlier decision to sell Pakistan J-10s was out of necessity. At the time, the balance of power on the Indian subcontinent was tilting in India’s favor, and Beijing could not afford to stand idly by while that happened. For years, the PAF had relied on its U.S.-made F-16s, which, while once capable, are showing their age. More importantly, the PAF’s F-16s are hamstrung by stringent U.S. end-user agreements that prohibited their use against India.

Now that the PAF has 36 J-10s, however, that problem has become a thing of the past. These J-10s have bought Pakistan some much-needed breathing room – and for a country teetering on the edge of yet another economic crisis, J-35s are a white elephant best left for another day.

Looking Ahead

While Beijing is unlikely to approve the sale of J-35s to Pakistan in the near-term, this does not mean that it will never do so. In fact, Pakistani pilots have already begun training to operate the fighter, suggesting that preparations are underway.

Two scenarios could prompt Beijing to approve the sale. The first is if India acquires fifth-generation fighters, which would decisively tilt the balance of power on the Indian subcontinent in India’s favor. The second is if Pakistan finds itself caught on the backfoot in a conflict with India. In either case, China would step in by selling J-35s – whether at a discounted price or through loans – both to prevent a decisive Pakistani defeat and to preserve its regional influence.
 
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As Pakistan stepped into the global centre-stage through Iran war mediation, it hired a US lobbying firm to push Washington for boosted security cooperation and minerals investment, the contract shows.

The two-year, $1.2-million lobbying agreement, filed in a public official database, began in May, spanning a period officials and experts say is critical to converting the goodwill Pakistan has earned with Donald Trump's administration into tangible bilateral benefits.

"How long the dramatic improvement in relations will last is uncertain given the history of ups and downs" in ties, said Maleeha Lodhi, Pakistan's former ambassador to Washington.

"It is also an open question whether it will outlast Trump."
 
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