(Air&Cosmos, jul.2023 special issue "Rafale F5")
a paper about Russian IADS, titled:
Outline:
intro
A mobile, redundant and decentralised network
Intro & first part:
Before looking at the many technological breakthroughs offered by the new Rafale, it is worth going back to the reason for the need for it, namely the growing risk associated with IADS. The conflict in Ukraine and the tensions in the China Sea have shown that Western air superiority is being challenged by the return of high-intensity warfare, which is characterised by a massification of equipment, an acceleration of tempo, a narrowing of the technological gap with the adversary and, finally, increasing recourse to connectivity between weapons systems in order to multiply their effects. In this area, Russian and Chinese air defence capabilities have now reached such a level that the A2/AD bubbles that make them up are now structured by a highly complex integrated system (IADS) that coordinates, reinforces and protects them. Only the United States still has the capacity to penetrate these interdiction bubbles. These bubbles have more than just a defensive role, since they make it possible to secure territories obtained through the policy of fait accompli, or to weaken buffer zones such as eastern Poland, the Baltic States and Finland. But they are becoming increasingly dangerous in other parts of the world, as they proliferate under the export strategies of Moscow and Beijing.
While the new S-500 (500 km) represents the fifth generation of these systems, their lethality, together with their ever-improving range, is only part of the reason why they are so dangerous. First of all, these systems are multi-layered in terms of both range and altitude. On the front line are the long-range systems (LRSAM) such as the S-400 parentheses (SA-21 in NATO terminology) or the S-300VM/4 (SA-23) designed to protect critical sites against low-altitude penetration attacks. They are supported at medium range (MRSAM, 75 km) by the Buk (SA-17) and at short range (SRSAM, 15 km) by the Tor M2 (SA-15) or the Pantsir (SA-22), or even by the Igla-S (SA-24) and Verba (SA-25) manpads, which have a range of less than 5 km.
None of these systems is deployed as a multi-mission effector but, on the contrary, as a unit with a precise role that coordinates with the other elements of a vast network known as IADS (1).
Knowing that NATO doctrine places more importance on avoidance to avoid being precisely located, the whole Russian philosophy consists, as in chess, of multiplying situations that will slow down a threat, forcing it to use certain corridors, in order, each time, to refine the data linked to its trajectory and position with the ultimate aim of subjecting it to crossfire. This is why even short-range systems such as the SA-23 Pantsir are capable of tracking a fighter aircraft up to 50,000 feet, and why the sheer number of systems is an attempt to compensate for the technological superiority of Western platforms. /deepl
notes
(1) Russian A2/AD: It is not overrated, just poorly understood, Michael Kaufman, Stratagem, March 2020
(2) Russian Air Defence Command Post, Carlo Kopp, ausairpower.net, April 2012
a paper about Russian IADS, titled:
A2/AD and IADS: a little-known threat
Outline:intro
A mobile, redundant and decentralised network
- - Superiority complex
- - A mobile and decentralised network
- - Counter-furtivity
- - ASAT
- - Interference
Intro & first part:
Before looking at the many technological breakthroughs offered by the new Rafale, it is worth going back to the reason for the need for it, namely the growing risk associated with IADS. The conflict in Ukraine and the tensions in the China Sea have shown that Western air superiority is being challenged by the return of high-intensity warfare, which is characterised by a massification of equipment, an acceleration of tempo, a narrowing of the technological gap with the adversary and, finally, increasing recourse to connectivity between weapons systems in order to multiply their effects. In this area, Russian and Chinese air defence capabilities have now reached such a level that the A2/AD bubbles that make them up are now structured by a highly complex integrated system (IADS) that coordinates, reinforces and protects them. Only the United States still has the capacity to penetrate these interdiction bubbles. These bubbles have more than just a defensive role, since they make it possible to secure territories obtained through the policy of fait accompli, or to weaken buffer zones such as eastern Poland, the Baltic States and Finland. But they are becoming increasingly dangerous in other parts of the world, as they proliferate under the export strategies of Moscow and Beijing.
A mobile, redundant and decentralised network
Superiority complex
For the past sixty years, the Americans have been systematically reassuring us about the threat posed by Russian, Iranian and Chinese ground/air defence systems. And this despite increasingly spectacular setbacks: the destruction of Gary Powers' U2 in 1960, the destruction of 15 B-52 offensive jammers during the Christmas bombing raids over Hanoi in 1972, the loss of 100 Israeli fighters in the first 72 hours of the Yom Kippur War, and that of a Mirage 2000NK2 nuclear deterrent over the town of Palé in Bosnia, at least 1 F-117 'Vega 31' during the Kosovo campaign in 1999 and, finally, the neutralisation of an RQ-170 stealth drone in 2010 and an RQ-4 strategic drone in 2019 over Iranian territory.While the new S-500 (500 km) represents the fifth generation of these systems, their lethality, together with their ever-improving range, is only part of the reason why they are so dangerous. First of all, these systems are multi-layered in terms of both range and altitude. On the front line are the long-range systems (LRSAM) such as the S-400 parentheses (SA-21 in NATO terminology) or the S-300VM/4 (SA-23) designed to protect critical sites against low-altitude penetration attacks. They are supported at medium range (MRSAM, 75 km) by the Buk (SA-17) and at short range (SRSAM, 15 km) by the Tor M2 (SA-15) or the Pantsir (SA-22), or even by the Igla-S (SA-24) and Verba (SA-25) manpads, which have a range of less than 5 km.
None of these systems is deployed as a multi-mission effector but, on the contrary, as a unit with a precise role that coordinates with the other elements of a vast network known as IADS (1).
A mobile, decentralised network
This is structured by a redundant system of relay vehicles, data fusion and command. It is an extremely mobile network, designed to prevent NATO from drawing up strike plans, as it is capable of being diluted in the landscape within five minutes, on average, after a strike. Even within a single battalion, the various platforms (surveillance, tracking, designation, missile launchers, command, maintenance, etc.) are often deployed several kilometres apart so as not to form an easily identifiable pattern. Brigade C2s can be relayed by battalion C2s to avoid creating points of vulnerability (2). For example, the C2 of an S-400 battalion can interact directly with the C2 of a short-range system such as the Pantsir, without passing through the higher echelon. This flexibility means that, in the event of a SEAD (Suppression of Ennemy Air Defence) offensive, the topology of an IADS network can be reconfigured in an infinite number of ways. These different devices can therefore be activated at extremely short notice and pop up like pop-ups against an attacker. All the way down to the level of infantrymen operating SA-25 Verba manpads, who receive the approach vector of a target through their sights even before it is visible from their position.Knowing that NATO doctrine places more importance on avoidance to avoid being precisely located, the whole Russian philosophy consists, as in chess, of multiplying situations that will slow down a threat, forcing it to use certain corridors, in order, each time, to refine the data linked to its trajectory and position with the ultimate aim of subjecting it to crossfire. This is why even short-range systems such as the SA-23 Pantsir are capable of tracking a fighter aircraft up to 50,000 feet, and why the sheer number of systems is an attempt to compensate for the technological superiority of Western platforms. /deepl
notes
(1) Russian A2/AD: It is not overrated, just poorly understood, Michael Kaufman, Stratagem, March 2020
(2) Russian Air Defence Command Post, Carlo Kopp, ausairpower.net, April 2012
Right Mr. BMD?
