did I not tell you that even these anti Sterlite protests have been engineered at the behest of US by Churches in India using US money.
did I not tell you that even these anti Sterlite protests have been engineered at the behest of US by Churches in India using US money.
Just check out the religious identity of the people behind this agitation and who supplied money to sustain it? These guys approached everyone from auto rickshaw drivers to lorry drivers to other local communities to join their protest but no one supported them. who funded them and got benefitted with the closure of this plant? Why did these protests start after the plant decided to double the production of copper and who is the largest consumer of copper in India? Does it have anything to do with reducing the capacity of Indian OFB to produce shells and bullets for Indian Armed Forces?sir any evidence to this ?
Just check out the religious identity of the people behind this agitation and who supplied money to sustain it? These guys approached everyone from auto rickshaw drivers to lorry drivers to other local communities to join their protest but no one supported them. who funded them and got benefitted with the closure of this plant? Why did these protests start after the plant decided to double the production of copper and who is the largest consumer of copper in India? Does it have anything to do with reducing the capacity of Indian OFB to produce shells and bullets for Indian Armed Forces?
did I not tell you that even these anti Sterlite protests have been engineered at the behest of US by Churches in India using US money.
India is using counter offer to have the resources from both ends which is display of India's diplomacy.US May Block Sale Of Armed Drones As India Is Buying Arms From Russia
India's acquisition of the state-of-the art Russian S-400 ballistic missile shield could come at the cost of getting access to cutting-edge US military equipment like Predator drones.
In an exclusive interview to NDTV, William Thornberry, the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said, "The acquisition of this technology will limit, I am afraid, the degree with which the United States will feel comfortable in bringing additional technology into whatever country we are talking about."
Mr Thornberry, who oversees the Pentagon, all US Military Services and the US Department of Defence agencies, said the acquisition of the Russian system ''threatens our ability to work interoperably in the future."
Significantly, India's decision to go ahead with a Rs. 40,000 crore-deal with Russia for S-400 batteries could come in the way of India acquiring US-built Predator drones which could have been used in operations against terrorist launch-pads along the Line of Control with Pakistan.
The S400 missile system can hit aircraft over 300 km away and intercept incoming missiles.
Last month, the Trump administration had cleared the export of armed, unmanned drones to close strategic partners such as India. According to Mr Thornberry, "This is one of the areas where the acquisition of the Russian anti-aircraft system will make the acquisition of that technology somewhat more difficult."
The US also wants India to sign the Communications Compatibility and Security Arrangement (COMCASA) and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-Spatial Cooperation (BECA) to take their bilateral strategic partnership + to the next level, with an eye firmly on China’s “aggressive” moves in the Indo-Pacific region.
India maintains a close military relationship with both the United States and Russia but it is Russia which has provided the bulk of India's military weapons systems over several decades. Earlier this year, the United States passed the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) against Russia for allegedly getting involved in the US election process. This means that the United States could technically place sanctions even on close partner nations such as India for acquiring Russian weaponry.
However, Mr Thornberry has pointed out that while the US is disappointed with India's new military acquisition from Russia, sanctions against New Delhi were unlikely at the present stage. Neither will there be an India-specific exemption to CAATSA. "In the legislation that passed the house just last Thursday, there was additional flexibility in the law for nations that have historical ties and thus Russian equipment" said Mr Thornberry who added that "there will be some additional flexibility that will not just be limited to India but there are other countries that fall into that category".
India to ignore US sanctions on Iran, Venezuela: minister
NEW DELHI: India will keep trading with Iran and Venezuela despite the threat of fallout from US sanctions against the two countries, Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj said Monday.
Swaraj, asked at a news conference whether US action against Iran and Venezuela would damage India, said the country would not make foreign policy “under pressure.”
US President Donald Trump this month withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal and ordered the reimposition of sanctions suspended under the 2015 accord.
Washington has also tightened sanctions against Venezuela over the controversial re-election of President Nicolas Maduro.
Both countries are key oil suppliers to India and the United States has warned that foreign companies which deal with Iran could themselves be punished.
But Swaraj said New Delhi did not believe in “reactionary” policies and would not be dictated to by other countries.
“We don’t make our foreign policy under pressure from other countries,” she told a news conference.
“We believe in UN sanctions but not in country-specific sanctions.”
Swaraj’s comments came just before a meeting with her Iranian counterpart Mohammad Javad Zarif in New Delhi.
Bilateral trade between India and Iran amounted to $12.9 billion in 2016-17. India imported $10.5 billion worth of goods, mainly crude oil, and exported commodities worth $2.4 billion.
India has other interests in Iran, in particular a commitment to build the port of Chabahar on the Gulf of Oman.
The port is being touted as a way for India to establish trade routes that bypass rival Pakistan.
Media reports have speculated India could revive a rupee-rial payment arrangement with Iran to shield exporters from the heat of US sanctions.
Swaraj also said India would continue trading with Venezuela, but there was no plan to use its local cryptocurrency in oil trade.
As @MilspecAmid trade war, India offers to buy 1,000 planes, more oil from US
Amid the ongoing trade war, India is seeking to buy peace with the US by offering to order nearly 1,000 civilian aircraft over the next 7-8 years and step up oil and gas purchase from the world's largest trader. This was conveyed by commerce minister Suresh Prabhu to his US counterpart during their talks last week.
On Sunday, assistant US trade representative Mark Linscott will begin discussions here with commerce ministry officials as both sides try to find solutions to problems on the trade front. India is trying to convince the US that its reciprocal tariffs are part of a WTO-sanctioned right after the US took the first step with steel and aluminium duties. India is keen to see some resolution before the 2+2 talks + between foreign minister Sushma Swaraj and defence minister Nirmala Sitharaman and their US counterparts - secretary of state Mike Pompeo and defence secretary James Mattis, respectively - in Washington on July 6.
India has calculated that it will be paying about $5 billion a year for aircraft and about $4 billion for purchase of oil and gas from the US. This is apart from defence purchases where India is now looking at buying 12 more naval surveillance aircraft P8i. India is now the largest owner of these aircraft outside the US.
India and the US are working on the next foundational agreement - the communications compatibility and security agreement - which may be inked in the coming months. This comes after the logistics exchange memorandum of agreement was operationalised last year, leaving only the basic exchange and cooperation agreement to be signed between the two countries.
Sitharaman will also make a visit to the US's recently renamed Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii. While the defence and security relationships have improved enormously, some gaps still remain. According to Indian officials, these could get wider if the US were to slap CAATSA (Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act) sanctions on India for buying defence equipment from Russia. That is likely to dominate discussions during the coming dialogue.
Amid trade war, India offers to buy 1,000 planes, more oil from US - Times of India
It is a case of Sama.Dana,Danda,BhedaFriendly fire: The curious case of US sanctions on India
Determined to punish Russia for interfering in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, last August Congress passed the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). The bipartisan legislation requires the president to sanction foreign and domestic entities doing business with Russia’s defense and intelligence sectors.
Congress’s intentions were noble. Russia should pay a price for meddling in America’s democratic process. Unfortunately, the way CAATSA was drafted it threatens to penalize not just Russia, but India and the promising U.S.-India partnership as well. That is, unless lawmakers move quickly to forestall this misguided burst of friendly fire.
CAATSA orders the president to sanction any person who engages in a “significant transaction” (left undefined) with Russia’s defense or intelligence establishment. The president must impose “five or more” sanctions per individual, drawing from a list of potential actions that includes: prohibiting government loans or grants over $10 million, opposing loans from international financial institutions, blocking assets, and revoking visas.
Peculiarly, it appears the bill’s drafters never foresaw that key American partners like India were likely to be ensnared in CAATSA sanctions. Nor did they envision that even the threat of sanctions might pollute the diplomatic atmosphere or threaten some of the goodwill built with the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi over the past four years.
Like Vietnam, another Indo-Pacific country the U.S. has been courting, India still relies heavily on Russia for defense hardware. Much of its legacy military platforms are of Soviet origin, requiring costly maintenance and upkeep. New Delhi also continues to pursue new arms deals with Moscow, including a pending multibillion-dollar deal for advanced S-400 air defense systems.
Since the end of the Cold War India has come a long way toward diversifying its defense suppliers, with the U.S. serving as the principal beneficiary. Over the past decade India has purchased roughly $15 billion in U.S. defense equipment. According to the SIPRI database, from 2008 to 2012 Russia provided 79% of India’s arms imports while the U.S. accounted for only 2.7%. Over the next five-year period, Russia’s share plunged to 62%, while America’s share grew over five-fold to 15%.
India should be encouraged to continue weaning itself off Russian hardware. But no credible expert thinks it’s reasonable to demand that India halt defense trade with Russia immediately and indefinitely. None believes India could do so without seriously undermining its national security.
Recognizing this, Defense Secretary James Mattis sought a traditional national security waiver from Congress that would have given the administration some strategic flexibility with India on CAATSA sanctions. The request was denied. As Capitol Hill aides confide, the legislation was written in a manner specifically designed to “tie the hands of the administration” on Russia sanctions. The bar for any waiver or delay was set particularly high.
CAATSA does allow for a presidential waiver, subject to congressional review but the terms are too onerous to be meaningful. Among other things the president must certify “the government of the Russian Federation has made significant efforts to reduce the number and intensity of cyber intrusions conducted by the government.” In other words, likely a non-starter.
CAATSA also contains a renewable six-month delay provision (not subject to congressional review) that the president can exercise if he or she can certify the target of sanctions is “substantially reducing the number of significant transactions” with Russia’s defense and intelligence sectors. However, “substantial reduction” is undefined and a cycle of continuous delays could ensure the subject remains a recurring bilateral irritant.
Finally, the president may terminate sanctions if they notify Congress: (1) the person is no longer engaging in the sanctionable activity or has taken significant verifiable steps toward stopping the activity, and (2) they have received reliable assurances that the person will not knowingly engage in similar activity in the future. India’s geopolitical sensibilities and the reality of its defense profile and requirements make such reassurances unlikely.
Ultimately, these are sub-optimal solutions for a problem that Congress admits it never wanted. For over a decade Washington has been trying to convince Delhi to shed the constraints of its Non-Alignment past—to persuade it that a partnership with America would in no way erode its prized autonomy and independence. For the most part, the U.S. has backed that pledge with action, carving out a panoply of special exemptions for India and demonstrating flexibility when their interests have diverged.
CAATSA risks undermining these long-term efforts at trust-building. Indeed, the very discussion surrounding these sanctions has already provided American skeptics in Delhi ample ammunition, while offering Russia a convenient narrative about America’s capriciousness. The more Delhi fears it can be subjected to U.S. sanctions randomly and haphazardly, the more it will view the U.S. as an unreliable defense partner.
There’s at least one potential legislative remedy in sight. Even as the administration continues to push for a traditional national security waiver, the House version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) contains an amendment that would expand the president’s flexibility to apply (or not apply) CAATSA sanctions. An attempt to insert a different fix in the Senate version of the NDAA failed. Legislators will now have to reconcile the two bills in conference committee. While contemplating the House amendment and additional legislative remedies, Congress should carefully consider the geopolitical stakes and the tremendous investments Washington and Delhi have made in this relationship.
Punishing Russia for its electoral chicanery makes a great deal of sense. CAATSA, by contrast, could end up punishing a key U.S. partner while handing Russia an unexpected victory. At a time Delhi and Moscow have grown increasingly estranged, Russia would like nothing more than to drive a wedge between the two democracies. Congress, the ball is in your court.
Jeff M. Smith is a research fellow at The Heritage Foundation; Bharath Gopalswamy is the Director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council