Narendar Singh

Jan 31, 2018
Recently the most imbecile person of politics, cheered veto by China. India has long held a view that it has special place within the South Asian region. With respect to leadership, India has clearly established its preference for external powers to refrain from interfering within South Asia to extensively. Since 1987, it has made it clear that assistance in resolving intra-regional disputes should be directed toward India in lieu of outside powers. This unique position as primary regional security manager was more fully institutionalised in Gujral Doctrine in the 1990s.Aside from such claims to special management responsibilities though, India also views the intrusion of external powers as being an infringement upon its own position within the region. Quoting a senior Indian Foreign Ministry official who discusses India’s role as a protector: ‘India is the center of the region, so the region is India, and it is our job to protect it from outside’. Such a duty has’ been an article of faith for many in the Indian strategic community.
Since, security architecture is an overarching, coherent and comprehensive security structure for a geographically-defined area, which facilitates the resolution of that region’s policy concerns and achieves its security objectives; from the perspective of security architecture, South Asia is a relatively closed and unique strategic unit. It, in a whole, showed the features of asymmetry and fractures in security architecture from three different ‘layers’ or ‘dimensions.
First, in the dimension of power, India enjoys absolute predominance in spite of different dependencies of other state powers on it;
Second, in the dimension of mechanism, the design flaws on SAARC have shadowed double side impacts on both economy and society, which have resulted in the fragmentation of economic integration between the India-eastward camp and the Pakistan-China camp, as well as the huge gap between official social communication or confidence building and unofficial people-topeople contacts.
Third, in the dimension of idea, the bias of land first, sea later and military first, bread later have long and rooted origins, although now it might be the right time to redefine the gravity and priority between land power and sea power. This kind of asymmetric and fractured security architecture cannot adapt to new security situations and demands, nor satisfy the needs of South Asian people for a sustained peace and sustainable development.

The root cause of these manifold failures, in many minds, is the very artificiality of Pakistan itself: a cartographic puzzle piece sandwiched between India and Central Asia that splits apart what the British Empire ruled as one indivisible subcontinent. Pakistan claims to represent the Indian subcontinent’s Muslims, but more Muslims live in India and Bangladesh put together than in Pakistan. In the absence of any geographical reason for its existence, Pakistan, so the assumption goes, can fall back only on Islamic extremism as an organising principle of the state.
Pakistan is, in many ways, the most dangerous nation in the world. Although designated a major non-NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) ally of the United States for security assistance purposes, (A tag which is lately under threat) Pakistan hosts myriad insurgent groups, radical Islamist political parties and a large military establishment well-armed with both nuclear and conventional weaponry. These disparate internal actors with highly divergent objectives illustrate the innate fissures and conflicts that characterise of this outwardly unitary state. As recent events have spectacularly revealed, Pakistan has, wittingly or unwittingly, also provided a hideout for the most wanted terrorist for years. Its populace has been cited as the most anti-American and anti-Indian citizenry in the world. The government’s authority throughout the country is uneven, and militant groups operating inside Pakistan directly threaten the stability of the regime and challenge its monopoly on the use of force. These groups are deeply connected with much of the country’s radical Islamic religious leadership. State failure in Pakistan, triggered by extremism, popular uprising, or economic meltdown would have immensely dangerous repercussions for a host of regional actors and now China.
Pakistan’s willingness to continue baiting India is rooted in structural constraints that are ultimately personified by two simple realities. First, Pakistan remains the “anti-status quo"state in South Asia. This phrase is not meant to convey any normative stance but is merely a description of Pakistan’s circumstances: Islamabad today is not satisfied with the existing territorial order primarily because of its long-standing claims to the former princely kingdom of Jammu and Kashmir, significant portions of which are currently governed by India. Pakistan is not only weaker than India but probably growing weaker in absolute terms as well. This implies that Islamabad simply lacks the resources to secure its claims over Jammu and Kashmir by force. The military solution has in fact been tried on several occasions in the past and has in all instances been unsuccessful.
The second was Nehruvian policies. It may be due historic error or just coincidence due its problems at home. India adopted the ‘socialist system’, which caused a steady relative economic decline (similar as it happened in USSR and China) and a consequent loss of influence in the years after independence. The state-socialist model led India to shun commercial engagement with the outside world especially the West. As a result, India was disconnected from its natural markets and culturally akin areas in the extended nieghbourhood.
Modi based India’s Foreign policy on ‘nuanced, pragmatic realism’. Idealism is all very well, they say, but it cannot trump national interests in dealing with others states. There were four Centres of Power—US, the sole superpower, resurgent Russia, China-Japan in the East and France-Germany in Europe. Modi found the Middle East burning and US taking unilateral actions to limit the capabilities of Iran and North Korea. Hence, the India intensified its economic and diplomatic relations with United States and sought more military and political support. Vis-à-vis China, the India established robust economic relations, but at same time adopt military postures that minimise the risks of destabilising reactions in response. Finally, since material power and capability will define long-term Indian relations with China, Modi recognised the technological and economic challenges before her. He took a leaf from United States policy, ‘Innovative technology and economic strength have been the traditional American assets and sources of its power;’ hence, Modi went in for Make in India and Innovation.
Modi’s solutions will also be influenced by the vagaries of domestic politics. The leadership changes in China has ushered a new generation into power that, appears, to be more internationalist and less nationalist in their strategic behavior. Since independence, India has pursued non-alignment or poly-alignment, and has spurned the use of force as a tool of foreign policy. Non-alignment had become US bashing in India. Modi carried no hang-up of the past. He moved away hence, despite India’s advocacy of a non-polar world, Modi and Indian policymakers nonetheless recognise the benefits of American sponsorship. A pragmatic view is taken on the lasting US status as the sole super-power: US pre-eminence in the global strategic architecture is unlikely to diminish in the foreseeable future. Meaningful broad-based engagement with the United States spanning political, economic and technological interests and commonalties, will impact beneficially on our external security concerns with a resultant albeit less visible impact on our internal security environment.
Both nations agree that it serves neither US nor Indian interests for a powerful, authoritarian China to dominate the Asian landmass or for radical Islamic forces to wage wars that threaten the security of both states. Thus, as the United States perceives strategic advantage from assisting India’s rise to great power status, and India is receiving tangible military and economic benefits from this relationship, for the foreseeable future, India’s continued ascendance will be supported by the global hegemon.
• India’s traditional strategy of non-alignment has shifted towards “polyalignment”.
• As a new regional power, India is increasing its naval, air force and missile capabilities.
• During this period of rapid development, domestic stability is a key challenge for India
The US supports Indian expansion, with the aim of balancing Chinese influence in Asia. The United States faces a complex, dual challenge from Asia’s two rising powers. It would be simplistic, therefore, to address China’s rise by partnering with India, which fails to appreciate that China and India may have their own national self-interests that could clash with those of the United States. Besides, the interaction between China and India against the backdrop of a declining United States is another complicating factor. China-India is displaying several elements of convergence, but also binary features that characterise a zerosum game. This milieu might persuade the United States to pursue a nuanced containment-cooperation policy towards China, but also play the arbiter between India and China. Sino-Indian relations could also resolve into a complex mix with tensions and instabilities co-existing alongside collaboration and cooperation.
United States has developed a growing stake in India’s success. It has developed an interest, too, in a confident and reforming India—one that contributes to global growth, promotes market-based economic policies, helps maintain the global commons, and works to assure a mutually favourable balance of power in Asia, especially against the backdrop of a more powerful and assertive China.
United States has developed a growing stake in India’s success. It has developed an interest, too, in a confident and reforming India—one that contributes to global growth, promotes market-based economic policies, helps maintain the global commons, and works to assure a mutually favourable balance of power in Asia, especially against the backdrop of a more powerful and assertive China.
Modi, for his part, clearly seeks a United States that helps to facilitate his economic goals—faster growth, technology acquisition and co-production, and expanded FDI in infrastructure and manufacturing. Previous governments, including but not limited to Modi’s, have also sought American support for India’s rise as a major power and recognition of its growing economic and strategic weight in Asia and around the world.
Modi just changed the game with China, he was candid and forthcoming. Panchsheel was out. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence—are remembered by many in India as being honoured by China in the breach than in the observance in the late 1950s and early 1960s. No mention in joint statement and seems to have been replaced by this:
The leaders agreed that the process of the two countries pursuing their respective national developmental goals and security interests must unfold in a mutually supportive manner with both sides showing mutual respect and sensitivity to each other’s concerns, interests and aspirations. This constructive model of relationship between the two largest developing countries, the biggest emerging economies and two major poles in the global architecture provides a new basis for pursuing state-to-state relations to strengthen the international system.
Modi talked about the relationship being “complex,” as well as about issues that “trouble smooth development of our relations” and held back the relationship. He urged China to think strategically (and long-term) and “reconsider its approach” on various issues. First and foremost: its approach toward the border, but also visas and trans-border rivers, as well as the region (read China’s relations with Pakistan among others). The Indian position is that China continues to illegally occupy 38,000 km² of Indian Territory in Kashmir, besides the 5180 km² ceded by Pakistan to China. On its part, Beijing lays claim to 90,000 km² of territory in Arunachal Pradesh.
China’s approach on economic questions was also put on the table, with Modi stating that, in the long-term, the partnership was not sustainable if Indian industry didn’t get better access to the Chinese market. China’s approach on economic questions was also put on the table, with Modi stating that, in the longterm, the partnership was not sustainable if Indian industry didn’t get better access to the Chinese market.
Modi also made clear that India wants China’s support for a greater role in international institutions. He specifically highlighted that China’s support for a permanent seat for India at the UN Security Council (UNSC) and Indian membership of export control regimes would be helpful to the relationship (interestingly, he explained India’s desire for UNSC permanent membership as stemming from the logic a –part of Asia “seeking a bigger voice in global affairs.”)
Modi did not endorse China’s One Belt, One Road initiatives. Modi noted that both China and India were “trying to strengthen regional connectivity and seeking ‘to connect a fragmented Asia.’” But he distinguished between two types of projects: “There are projects we will pursue individually. There are few such as the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridor that we are doing jointly.”
Modi’s geopolitical attention lies beyond the often mentioned race between India and China for African markets and resources. India sees Africa as a natural partner in the laborious process of reforming the United Nations Security Council. In India, as in parts of Africa, there is a strong feeling (not entirely unjustified) that the current constellation of permanent members of the Security Council— France, Britain, China, Russia and the United States—is outdated. Modi’s foreign policy strategy has aimed to increase assistance to developing countries and vie for linkages with the African continent for increased trade, access to agricultural land, and cooperation on maritime security, in part to buffer China’s influence in the region.
Modi has clearly pursued his “Neighbourhood First” and “Act East policies”, which has prioritised improving relations with India’s neighbours. India has also reached out to its maritime neighbours in the Indian Ocean Rim with proposals of enhancing economic and security co-operation. What underpins this strategy is also the desire to command strategic supremacy over the area.
While China is both a strategic partner and a global competitor, it has been Modi’s policy to engage with China and court investment deals. He has done the same with Japan and Israel. He has also reached out to the Gulf Co-operation countries from which India derives energy security, trade, and employment for Indians who send home their remittances.
Why China votes negative? The failure of CPEC will just erase China make it member of Venuzala Club. India and China are competitors. India has tken over China as afar as diplomacy is concerned remeber vote is 14-1. Pakistan is on a ventilator it is quastion of weeks if not days when it will clloapse under its own weight. Toay UAE backed out. More is in store. Let Azhar remain.
Modi will win a 'War" without firing bullets. Rahul can cry hoarse. But Modi has brought India where China is worried and isolated. Pakistan is a failed state.
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Senior member
Dec 3, 2017
The delusion of India trying to throttle China’s maritime trade
The current phase of the Sino-Indian border conflict which began in May this year may go on for quite some time. India seems to be hunkering down for a long winter.

Given the relative symmetries in strength ranged across the Himalayan border, there has long been talk in New Delhi of exploiting strategic alternatives. The most attractive has been the idea that India should use its maritime-geographic advantages and its comparatively greater naval capability in the Indian Ocean to dominate the outcome.

The importance to China of maintaining its maritime trade is widely understood. But many practical difficulties appear when we consider how to interrupt maritime trade. Factors such as time, force and space create difficulties for the interdiction of ships, as well as their protection. These include the complexities of maritime trade in terms of numbers of ships, types of commodities, ownership, flag state, insurance, crewing, multiple destination/embarkation ports for cargoes and more.

Degrading an enemy’s shipping always takes a long time and a lot of resources – the outcomes are not pre-ordained and could have unforeseen consequences.

While these problems can be reasonably dealt with in commerce-protection operations such as recent anti-piracy efforts, they may not be so easy when interdicting a reasonably powerful adversary’s ships during a conflict. Further, in the context of an India-China conflict, Beijing could be expected to protect its sea trade, harm India’s commerce and examine alternatives to overcome any disruptions.

The history of commerce warfare at sea is instructive. Degrading an enemy’s shipping always takes a long time and a lot of resources – the outcomes are not pre-ordained and could have unforeseen consequences. These realities are not unique to maritime trade warfare, and similar issues have been repeatedly encountered in the use of airpower in bombing campaigns. Economic warfare waged through sanctions is similarly bedeviled.

In the Indian public discourse – including noisy TV debates – a persistent refrain is that trade warfare aimed at China’s “jugular” in the Malacca Strait may be the most effective option to relieve pressure along the Himalayan border. The Andaman and Nicobar Island groups are certainly well located (even if the term “jugular” may be an exaggeration when the other Southeast Asian straits are considered). India has maritime surveillance capabilities and also shares “white shipping” information with others.
An Indian Navy ship in the Maldives in May (Ahmed Shurau/AFP via Getty Images)

Some respected Indian naval commentators have pointed out the constraints India faces, and the differences between what is feasible in conflict and what is not, especially when the target country is China.

But there is also often an element of irrational exuberance in making the difficult seem easy. For example, one commentator recently urged the staging of Malabar Exercises and Quad activities in the Malacca Strait to delay and prevent Chinese energy flows, and that India should encourage some ASEAN nations to deny port entry to Chinese merchant ships.

It has also been recently argued that commandeering just one Chinese tanker and taking it to an Indian port would cause a “loss of face” and result in the Chinese Navy deploying to the Indian Ocean where the Indian Navy’s asymmetric advantages could be brought to bear.

All of these come with considerable problems.

Commandeering a ship can be countered by a small armed detachment, and the PLA’s marines are numerous enough to be present on hundreds of ships. The Chinese Navy could also be expected to reduce the disadvantages of asymmetry in ways that their adversaries need to think through carefully: they may not carry knives to a possible gunfight. Making self-comforting assumptions like “loss of face” for adversaries, particularly about the Chinese military, has many pitfalls.

Further, the interdiction of Chinese sea lines of communication anywhere will expose the vulnerabilities of Indian shipping in many reaches of the Indo-Pacific, including in the Western Pacific. Finally, some very strong diplomatic foot-stepping might be necessary to enable the interdiction, commandeering or perhaps sinking even a small number of Chinese ships, not the least because of the very complex nature of global trade.

An alternative to misplaced optimism in quick outcomes of trade warfare (or so-called “counter-value” operations) as the linchpin of maritime strategy in a conflict with China, the Indian Navy may use its own and joint resources on “counter-force” operations. This would mean neutralising much of the deployed Chinese Navy in the Indian Ocean. This is going to be neither easy nor bloodless but successes in counter-force enable counter-value operations to have a slightly higher rate of success. In the near-term, Quad partners could potentially help with intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance requirements across the Indo-Pacific while avoiding getting into the fight. Although not feasible in the near future, a sharp Indian maritime and air expeditionary capability could add to leverage.

The famous US naval strategist Alfred Mahan seemed to have got it right that trade warfare “is doubtless a most important secondary operation of naval war … but regarded as a primary and fundamental measure … it is probably a most dangerous delusion.”


Senior member
Dec 27, 2019

Is this report is genuine or just normal media propaganda? @Saaho @randomradio
Document is authentic :

The name of pdf wa MAJ0820.PDF. Major event publihed in Aug 2020.

Its missing.

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