Forty-nine people are confirmed dead after Friday’s shootings at two mosques in the city in New Zealand’s South Island. Forty-one people died at Al Noor mosque and seven at Linwood mosque. Another victim died later at hospital. The attack, launched during Friday prayers when both mosques were packed, was livestreamed via a camera strapped to the perpetrator. Horrific images of bloodshed and people desperately trying to evade the gunman were copied and shared on social media sites including YouTube.
What is in it for India?
Migration is as old as human civilisation. Population movements have always played a vital role in the structural transformation of societies and economies. However, unlike in the past when migration involved establishment of new habitations in fertile and virgin lands, migration today is characterised by movement of populations to other countries with people and cultures of their own. It therefore raises issues regarding loyalty, identity, development and security.
Bangladeshi migrants to India consist of Muslim migrants and Hindu refugees, both categories having different sets of reasons to migrate. But the overriding consideration in both the cases is ethnic commonalties with Indian Bengalis. Although Bangladeshis have their national identity within the nation-state framework, they identify themselves as Bengalis and share a common ethno-cultural ethos and heritage with Bengalis across the border. However, the basis of a separate nation-state for many Bangladeshis is that they are Muslims and their culture, language and religion is different from that of the Bengali Hindus of West Bengal. The unfolding and enforcement of Bangladeshi nationalism, promoted by the Bangladeshi National Party, had its effects on Bangladeshi migrants to India, in the sense that they carried with them their new-found national identity. It has been difficult, particularly for Bangladeshi Muslims, therefore, to merge into the Indian mainstream.
Problems arise when Nepalese in India try to assert their Nepali identity in exclusive terms vis-à-vis mainstream India. The Gorkha National Liberation Front [GNLF] in Darjeeling illustrates this tendency, even though it claims to protect the interests and rights of Indian Gorkhas only.
For the Indian state, the security implications of large-scale migration from both Bangladesh and Nepal and now from Myanmar are varied but inter-related, given the complex nature of migration and the multiple identities that migrants profess. They cover demographic changes, growth of radicalism, particularly Islamic fundamentalism, regionalism, and, more importantly, involvement and even encroachment of foreign powers on the country’s “sovereign space”. All these threats to territorial integrity, core values or socio-political practices of the Indian state interact, sometimes reinforcing each other.
In general, however, in depth knowledge of national and regional cultural dynamics has not been strong point for Indian strategy, which has tended to rest on sturdy pillars of relative invulnerability and the capacity to mobilise force. In the volatile and uncertain security environment of the years to come, however, the assumption of technological and material advantage may not be safe one, nor will these advantages always suffice to ensure superiority in every possible contingency. The main adversary for India, Peoples Republic of China represents long term rival with considerable assets and great self confidence, derived in part from a highly distinctive and ancient culture.
India confronts a long term struggle to manage the dilemmas of the Muslim World and the associated dynamic of terrorism, that will demand of India sophisticated cultural awareness. Effective engagement in complex contingencies will demand from India and in depth knowledge of real and potential rivals. Strategy is not uniquely the product of culture, and culture itself is not lucid or unambiguous construct. But all strategy unfolds in cultural context, and cannot be fully and properly understood outside it.
One of the most important prerequisites for becoming a major soft power is to have “native ownership” of an ideology that can be used as a means of influence; that is, the ideology should be recognisable as a distinct and unique attribute of that particular country.
Pakistan’s ideology is based on Islamic ‘nationalism’ where it views itself as part of a greater ‘Ummah’, but is certainly not recognised by the members of the ‘Ummah’ as its leader. No one bothered when Pakistan refused to attend OIC Meeting. In other words, Pakistan does not have native ownership over its own ideology, which inevitably leads to Pakistan associating itself with other, more influential members of the ‘Ummah’ like Saudi Arabia and Iran, at the obvious expense of its own subcontinental origins.
India is fortunate to have large Hindu population which has the greatest tolerance. But for how long?
A favoured quote amongst Indians is that by Chinese ambassador and philosopher, Hu Shih: “India conquered and dominated China culturally for 20th centuries without ever having to send a single soldier across her border”; it was Indian Buddhism that helped shape Chinese civilisation. It is this age-old soft power that Modi started to tap into, whilst avoiding the hubris that comes with it. Humility in promoting Indian culture is particularly important in Asia where a lack of it has worked against India’s diplomats in the past.
Nye argued that “it is just as important to set the agenda and structure the situations in world politics as to get others to change in particular cases.” Soft power can help a nation set the agenda and alter the preferences of other nations before they come to the bargaining table. Its main instrument–public diplomacy–aims for milieu goals, the creation of an enabling political environment for a state’s foreign policy. However, as argued by Melissen, “public diplomacy cannot achieve its aims if it is inconsistent with a country’s foreign policy or military actions.” To foreign policy and military actions one must add domestic values, politics, and institutions. In order for soft power to succeed, a country’s message to the world cannot be at odds with the way it conducts itself at home and abroad. Hence comes the need for throwing away of secularism. It is an outdated concept. What is needed is strong action against anyone which strikes the national identity. Modi was right when it hit bases in Pakistan. It has done well to isolate China in world body. Modi has affirmed: “democracy” makes India a valuable partner for the world. Modi has consistently emphasised the importance of Indian democracy. The NDA government under AB Vajpayee then offered support to the US initiative to develop a “community of democracies” at the global level. Modi underscored spiritual linkages between India and Central Asia, marking a contrast with growing extremism around the world, suggesting that “the Islamic heritage of both India and Central Asia is defined by the highest ideals of Islam–knowledge, piety, compassion and welfare.” By emphasising India’s multicultural heritage, Modi undercut prevailing criticisms about his ideological leanings as a Hindu nationalist.
India is multicultural.
What is in it for India?
Migration is as old as human civilisation. Population movements have always played a vital role in the structural transformation of societies and economies. However, unlike in the past when migration involved establishment of new habitations in fertile and virgin lands, migration today is characterised by movement of populations to other countries with people and cultures of their own. It therefore raises issues regarding loyalty, identity, development and security.
Bangladeshi migrants to India consist of Muslim migrants and Hindu refugees, both categories having different sets of reasons to migrate. But the overriding consideration in both the cases is ethnic commonalties with Indian Bengalis. Although Bangladeshis have their national identity within the nation-state framework, they identify themselves as Bengalis and share a common ethno-cultural ethos and heritage with Bengalis across the border. However, the basis of a separate nation-state for many Bangladeshis is that they are Muslims and their culture, language and religion is different from that of the Bengali Hindus of West Bengal. The unfolding and enforcement of Bangladeshi nationalism, promoted by the Bangladeshi National Party, had its effects on Bangladeshi migrants to India, in the sense that they carried with them their new-found national identity. It has been difficult, particularly for Bangladeshi Muslims, therefore, to merge into the Indian mainstream.
Problems arise when Nepalese in India try to assert their Nepali identity in exclusive terms vis-à-vis mainstream India. The Gorkha National Liberation Front [GNLF] in Darjeeling illustrates this tendency, even though it claims to protect the interests and rights of Indian Gorkhas only.
For the Indian state, the security implications of large-scale migration from both Bangladesh and Nepal and now from Myanmar are varied but inter-related, given the complex nature of migration and the multiple identities that migrants profess. They cover demographic changes, growth of radicalism, particularly Islamic fundamentalism, regionalism, and, more importantly, involvement and even encroachment of foreign powers on the country’s “sovereign space”. All these threats to territorial integrity, core values or socio-political practices of the Indian state interact, sometimes reinforcing each other.
In general, however, in depth knowledge of national and regional cultural dynamics has not been strong point for Indian strategy, which has tended to rest on sturdy pillars of relative invulnerability and the capacity to mobilise force. In the volatile and uncertain security environment of the years to come, however, the assumption of technological and material advantage may not be safe one, nor will these advantages always suffice to ensure superiority in every possible contingency. The main adversary for India, Peoples Republic of China represents long term rival with considerable assets and great self confidence, derived in part from a highly distinctive and ancient culture.
India confronts a long term struggle to manage the dilemmas of the Muslim World and the associated dynamic of terrorism, that will demand of India sophisticated cultural awareness. Effective engagement in complex contingencies will demand from India and in depth knowledge of real and potential rivals. Strategy is not uniquely the product of culture, and culture itself is not lucid or unambiguous construct. But all strategy unfolds in cultural context, and cannot be fully and properly understood outside it.
One of the most important prerequisites for becoming a major soft power is to have “native ownership” of an ideology that can be used as a means of influence; that is, the ideology should be recognisable as a distinct and unique attribute of that particular country.
Pakistan’s ideology is based on Islamic ‘nationalism’ where it views itself as part of a greater ‘Ummah’, but is certainly not recognised by the members of the ‘Ummah’ as its leader. No one bothered when Pakistan refused to attend OIC Meeting. In other words, Pakistan does not have native ownership over its own ideology, which inevitably leads to Pakistan associating itself with other, more influential members of the ‘Ummah’ like Saudi Arabia and Iran, at the obvious expense of its own subcontinental origins.
India is fortunate to have large Hindu population which has the greatest tolerance. But for how long?
A favoured quote amongst Indians is that by Chinese ambassador and philosopher, Hu Shih: “India conquered and dominated China culturally for 20th centuries without ever having to send a single soldier across her border”; it was Indian Buddhism that helped shape Chinese civilisation. It is this age-old soft power that Modi started to tap into, whilst avoiding the hubris that comes with it. Humility in promoting Indian culture is particularly important in Asia where a lack of it has worked against India’s diplomats in the past.
Nye argued that “it is just as important to set the agenda and structure the situations in world politics as to get others to change in particular cases.” Soft power can help a nation set the agenda and alter the preferences of other nations before they come to the bargaining table. Its main instrument–public diplomacy–aims for milieu goals, the creation of an enabling political environment for a state’s foreign policy. However, as argued by Melissen, “public diplomacy cannot achieve its aims if it is inconsistent with a country’s foreign policy or military actions.” To foreign policy and military actions one must add domestic values, politics, and institutions. In order for soft power to succeed, a country’s message to the world cannot be at odds with the way it conducts itself at home and abroad. Hence comes the need for throwing away of secularism. It is an outdated concept. What is needed is strong action against anyone which strikes the national identity. Modi was right when it hit bases in Pakistan. It has done well to isolate China in world body. Modi has affirmed: “democracy” makes India a valuable partner for the world. Modi has consistently emphasised the importance of Indian democracy. The NDA government under AB Vajpayee then offered support to the US initiative to develop a “community of democracies” at the global level. Modi underscored spiritual linkages between India and Central Asia, marking a contrast with growing extremism around the world, suggesting that “the Islamic heritage of both India and Central Asia is defined by the highest ideals of Islam–knowledge, piety, compassion and welfare.” By emphasising India’s multicultural heritage, Modi undercut prevailing criticisms about his ideological leanings as a Hindu nationalist.
India is multicultural.