How does Chinese flankers fare against our Su-30 MKI ?


Senior Member
Nov 30, 2017
Do we have Derby ER now with MKI or confirmation of integration on LCAs?

No confirmation yet. LCA's integration won't take time, since Derby is already integrated with it, so ER integration and flight testing won't take long.

Spice seems to have completed integration, or in the process of, with MKI. A BVR missile will take much longer than that. Hopefully it's been expedited.


Active member
Dec 26, 2017
No confirmation yet. LCA's integration won't take time, since Derby is already integrated with it, so ER integration and flight testing won't take long.

Spice seems to have completed integration, or in the process of, with MKI. A BVR missile will take much longer than that. Hopefully it's been expedited.

Is there any confirmation that we 'bought' Derby ER in numbers? like SIPRI
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Well-Known member
Jun 19, 2019
You forgot the J-10C, it also has AESA, comes with a long range missile and being introduced in pretty large numbers, at least 40-60 per year. Plus it has a much smaller RCS than our Flanker.

Also, the Chinese claim their AESA radar is superior to the Su-35's Irbis-E. Empty claim or not, we don't know, but the benefit of the doubt can be given to them.

How do you see Chinese AESA and their PL series missile performing against ELTA8222?
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Senior member
Feb 6, 2020
absolutely no source.
These weapons, as the chinese AESA radars, are not combat proven.
I's all marketing.
Yeah the sources are second hand. But they were comparing the j16 with their su35 and were claiming that there missiles and radar were superior to the su 35. That makes me think the reason they ordered the su 35 was that they could reverse engineer the al41 being used on the su 35 rather the no35 Irbis. They even said that the ecm on the j16 was superior to the su35. That makes me think that if we had to upgrade our su 30 it's better to use our own uttam to replace the bars instead of the Irbis. The only thing is all other Russian tech might not be compatible. Also the j10 defeated their flankers in their war exercises so maybe the biggest threat would be the j10c's. I usually take Chinese claims with a bucket load of salt but still you can't be complacent with the Chinese...
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Senior Member
Nov 30, 2017
Is there any confirmation that we 'bought' Derby ER in numbers? like SIPRI

No idea what the status is.
How do you see Chinese AESA and their PL series missile performing against ELTA8222?

There's no way to know. We will need decoys to defeat the missile rather than jamming.

To defeat the radar, it will require a lot of intelligence collection.
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Senior Member
Dec 4, 2017

Thum! Kaun Aata Hai?
News and opinion on India's defense modernization; a veteran's perspective.

Sunday, September 27, 2020
PLAAF vs IAF: Which Air Force Would Prevail?

IAF, PLAAF airbases
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force (PLAAF) is a large, well trained and technologically air force. Arguably, more technologically advanced than the Indian Air Force (IAF)! Importantly, almost all PLAAF platforms and weapon systems are locally developed and manufactured.

The PLAAF's size and technological edge notwithstanding, the well trained, motivated and technologically advanced IAF enjoys a significant advantage over the PLAAF in terms of the number of air bases it can operate from to - support Indian Army (IA) operations, interdict PLA supply lines and undertake counter-air operations against PLAAF bases. In the context of the current face-off along with the Ladakh - Tibet disputed border, if the balloon does go up, would the IAF be able to support Indian troops fighting a grim battle perched on high mountains supplied through a tenuous road infrastructure? What if the conflict spreads all along the LAC? What if the conflict escalates into an all-out war?

In the following paragraphs, I will attempt an objective analysis of PLAAF capabilities to assess the extent of the threat it poses to IA operations. The analysis will dwell on PLAAF platforms, training, and likely tactics to assess the threat faced by the IAF.

PLAAF Overview
In the following paragraphs, we will dwell on PLAAF platforms, training, and likely tactics in the context of a border war between India and China.

The PLA is likely to employ its following frontline fighters to challenge IAF operations. (Inventory holding obtained from Wikipedia is given in parentheses and includes assets deployed by the PLAAF and People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN))

  1. Su-35 Multi-role strike fighter (24)
  2. J-20 Stealth fighter and penetrating sensor (50 of which 25 are likely operationally configured)
  3. J-16 Multi-role strike fighter (128)
  4. Su-30MKK (76)
  5. J-11 Multi-role strike fighter (346)
  6. J-10C Multi-role interceptor (435)
Non-frontline fighters in PLAAF inventory, such as J-7, J-8, and JH-7 are unlikely to play a significant role in a war with India because of the limited number of PLAAF air bases in the theater as well as payload and range limitations of the fighters when operating from high altitude airfields.

Unlike the IAF, the PLA has a bomber force comprising 126 Xian H-6 bombers customized for varying roles such as nuclear weapon delivery, EW (Electronic Warfare), low-level penetration, cruise missile carriage, ballistic missile (Dongfeng-21D) carriage, WZ-8 high-speed UAV carriage, aerial refueling, etc.

The latest H-6 variants feature D-30KP turbofan engines of 12,000 kg thrust replacing the original Chinese turbojets. Other modifications include larger air intakes, a redesigned flight deck with smaller/fewer transparencies, and large dielectric nose radome. Upgraded H-6 have longer range, air-to-air refueling capability, and the capability to deploy weapons such as the ones listed above.

PLAAF force multipliers include aerial refueling tankers (3 IL-78 and 10 HY-6U converted Xian H-6 bombers) and around 50 AEW&CS, AWACS aircraft.

Additionally, the PLAAF deploys around twenty EW aircraft and five Canadian Challenger 850 SIGINT aircraft. The PLAAF also has a large helicopter, transport, and UAV fleet which I will not dwell upon in this article.

PLAAF Training & Tactics
A 2016 Rand report on PLAAF fighter pilot training concluded that the PLAAF has embarked on a major reform of its pilot training program to remedy deep-seated flaws in fighter pilot competency. The report was based on a study of articles published in the PLAAF's official newspaper, Kongjun Bao (Air Force News) on fighter pilot training at operational units over a time frame of five years.

The study established that the PLAAF is training to fight and win battles against near-peer military adversaries, like the United States and is acutely aware of its present shortcomings. The PLAAF has progressed well beyond ground-controlled scripted air combat scenarios to more combat realistic exercises that train for the battlefield, not for the test.

PLAAF conducts multi-day, multi-branch exercises spanning units equipped with surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), and radars. During such "Red force vs Blue force" exercises, adversary forces enjoy autonomy in choosing targets, timings, and tactics. (In PLAAF exercises, Blue force represents the adversary unlike the conventions in the USAF where the Red Force represents the adversary). PLAAF exercises include force multipliers like tankers and AWACS/AEW&CS as well as EW equipment and aircraft.

The PLAAF lacks an analog to the USAF Weapons School (AWS) for developing and disseminating combat skills and tactics across units. As a result, the PLAAF's ability to maintain broad uniformity in tactical practices remains limited. Unit commanders and other senior cadre exercise autonomy in the content and scope of certain training.
The PLAAF has participated in Aviadarts since the second edition of the Russian hosted exercise in 2014. PLAAF pilots who performed well during Aviadarts are honored and counted alongside the finest Chinese pilots as well as Chinese astronauts.

PLAAF Tactics
The PLAAF's fighter combat capability would likely pivot around four fighter jets, namely;
  1. J-20 Stealth Strike & Penetrating Sensor Fighter
  2. Su-35 Multi-role strike fighter
  3. J-16 Multi-role Strike fighter
  4. J-10C Multi-role Interceptor
Considering the large number of AEW&CS/AWACS aircraft available in PLAAF inventory, it is likely they would be facilitating EMCON (Emission Control) by PLAAF fighters to reduce chances of their passive detection by IAF fighters. In other words, operating with an AEW&CS/AWACS platform, PLAAF fighters would not have to switch on their radars and risk revealing their presence.

For air dominance and air superiority missions, PLAAF would use a combination of J-20 and J-16 fighters. The J-16s would sweep the airspace with their powerful Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar while forward deployed and data linked LO (Low observable) J-20s would engage any adversary aircraft breaking EMCON to engage the radiating J-16s. (A fighter aircraft that switches on its radar to engage a target can be passively detected, tracked and engaged by an adversary fighter!) Both the J-20 as well as the J-16 are capable of carrying the PL-15 missile, a Meteor missile analog, with a range of around 150-km.

At the start of hostilities, PLAAF would use J-20 fighters to degrade adversary air defenses. The stealth fighter would be used to take out adversary high-value aerial assets such as AWACS, AEW&CS, and Aerial tankers using PL-15 missiles. Operating as a forward sensor, a J-20 would be able to freely penetrate heavily defended adversary airspace to obtain accurate coordinates of strategic targets such as missile batteries and radar stations. The coordinates would be relayed in real-time over data links to J-16 fighters and J-6H bombers operating outside contested airspace and armed with precision-guided long-range cruise missiles.

After the J-20s have softened adversary air defenses, the PLAAF would rely on J-16 fighters to strike enemy ground forces including mobile radar stations, and the J-10C to provide local air superiority for the striking fighters.

J-20 Stealth Fighter Threat
The J-20 is a well-designed stealth aircraft featuring full extent frontal aspect and limited extent side aspect LO shaping. A detailed analysis of the fighter can be perused at IAF vs PLAAF: Assessing the J-20 Threat

The J-20 would be able to penetrate Indian airspace completely undetected on most occasions. On some occasions, it would be possible for the IAF to detect the J-20 using ground-based or airborne radars. However, because of the aircraft's faint radar signature, it would not be possible for the IAF to effectively engage the J-20 using air or ground-launched missiles.

The PLAAF has a limited number of operationally deployed J-20 stealth fighters. They are based in Wuhu, Anhui Province, near the eastern coast. The J-20 is a highly specialized aircraft that likely depends on a lot of support facilities at its home base. It's RAM (Radar Absorbent Material) coating, for example, would frequently need to be tended. It's unlikely that the J-20 will be deployed for extended periods from bases in Tibet.

J-20 operations from high altitude air bases on the Tibetan plateau would be constrained by limited payload due to the rarefied air. As a result, their combat range and/or time over target would be restricted. Also, the physical displacement of PLAAF air bases from the border area would result in a longer time to target. Under the circumstances, it would not be possible for the PLAAF to effectively keep J-20 fighters on patrol along the entire 3,488 km length of the LAC.

Likely J-20 Employment by the PLAAF
The J-20 would likely be employed for specialized roles. For example, shooting down high-value IAF assets such as AWACS & aerial tankers. Considering the limited number of aerial tankers and AEW&CS/AWACS assets in its inventory, the IAF would be greatly disadvantaged by any losses.

The PLAAF could also use its J-20 as a penetrating sensor, leveraging its ability to penetrate Indian airspace undetected. As a penetrating sensor, the J-20 would obtain target coordinates for cruise or ballistic missile attacks by other PLA assets. In case of an uncontrolled escalation, the J-20 could be used to obtain coordinates of mobile strategic missile launchers detected through surveillance satellites.

Xian H-6 Bombers
In total, the Chinese military has 270 H-6 strategic bombers. Most of them are located on the eastern coast of the country.

Since the H-6s carry cruise missiles on board, their deployment in the border zone could provide the PLA with a significant advantage over the Indian army in the event of armed conflict.

The latest H-6 variants are armed with the relatively new CJ-20 cruise missiles featuring half ton warhead and 2,000 kilometers range. Additionally, China has the lighter YJ-63 cruise missiles, which although cover distances ten times less than the CJ-20, can be taken on board in larger quantities.

PLA's Cruise Missile Advantage
The PLA is better armed than the IAF in terms of the range and number of air-launched Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACM) in its inventory.

Air-Launched LACM
The following PLAAF LACMs are worth noting.


KD-63 LACM on an Xian H-6 bomber via Twitter

The H-6 is capable of carrying the 500-km range KD-63 and the 1,500-km range CJ-10 LACMs.

The KD-63 LACM is the latest upgrade of the YJ-63 aka C-603 series cruise missiles that entered service in 2004 - 2005. The KD-63 features a solid nose cone instead of a glass window, suggesting that it uses radar for terminal guidance instead of TV. The missile is powered by the XW-41, turbojet engine, and has a range of 500-km.


CJ-20 missile via Twitter

The CJ-10 LACM, based on the Russian Kh-55 LACM, is a subsonic missile with a 500-kg warhead and a range over 1,500 km. The missile uses a combination of INS/GPS/TCM (Terrain Contour Matching) for navigation and possibly DSMAC (Digital Scene-Mapping Area Correlator) for terminal guidance. The H-6 can reportedly carry four missiles externally.


The HN-3 is a subsonic, turbofan-powered missile weighing approximately 2.5 tons with a range of between 1,200km and 3,000km. The missile uses INS/TERCOM for navigation and TV/IIR for terminal homing.

China's PGM / UAV Advantage
The PLA has numerous types of armed UAV's and weapons developed for use by the UAVs. PLA's armed UAVs include LO UAVs that could penetrate Indian airspace undetected and loiter for hours performing ISR operations and obtaining coordinates for cruise and tactical ballistic missile targets. PLA LO UAVs also have an attack capability.
The IAF doesn't have any armed UAVs.

A full analysis of the PLA's UAV capabilities can be read here. Based on the analysis, we can categorically conclude that the PLA enjoys a very significant advantage when it comes to UAVs

China's Air Defense Capability
The PLA has various types of very short range, short-range, and medium-range tactical air defense systems (ADS) for VA/VP (Vital A/Vital point) defense. The IAF tactical ADS match, and in some cases exceed PLA systems capabilities.

However, the PLA scores over the IAF in medium-range ADS and IADS (Integrated Air Defense Systems). IADS are complex, multilayered defense systems incorporating a range of ground-based and aerial sensors, as well as multiple surface-to-air missile (SAM) types. Modern IADS like the S-400 feature long-range missiles that restrict freedom of maneuver well outside their land borders. IAF medium-range ADS like MRSAM are likely superior to the PLA's HQ-16(Buk) medium-range ADS, however, the PLA has many more HQ-16 systems deployed.

PLA IADS comprises S-300 and S-400 systems. Additionally, the PLA has HQ-16 (Buk) air medium-range and HQ-9 long-range ADS currently in service.

The Chinese armed forces were the first export customer of the Russian-made S-300PMU2 IADS capable of destroying aircraft, cruise missiles, and theater ballistic missiles in intense clutter and jamming environments. They were also the first export customer of the S-400 system!

The S-300PMU2 can engage aerial targets with a range from 3km to 200km, at altitudes between 10m to 27,000m. The S-300PMU2 also has the ability to detect and destroy anti-ballistic missiles with a range between 5km to 40km and altitudes between 2,000m to 25,000m. The system can engage up to six targets simultaneously, while guiding up to twelve missiles - two missiles per target ensuring target kill. Additionally, highly automated detection and acquisition procedures provide outstanding performance over previous SAM systems.

The S-400 system can engage aerodynamic targets at ranges varying from 3km to 380 km and ballistic targets at ranges varying from 6km to 50 km. It can simultaneously track up to 300 targets, and simultaneously engage 80 targets guiding 160 missiles (two per target) at the same time.

The S-400 comprises four types of interceptor missiles, covering different segments of the airspace protected by the unit.

The HQ-9 is a two-stage, solid-propellant rocket motor powered missile with a max 300 km range capable of engaging aerodynamic and ballistic targets at up to 41km altitude. The missile features INS guidance and active radar homing. The HQ-9 missile system is roughly analogous to the Patriot/S-300

S-400 System Deployment
In September 2020, press reports suggested that the PLA had moved a regiment of S-400 opposite the Chumar sector and is in the process of moving another regiment opposite the Depsang sector.

PLAAF IADS limitations
Luckily for the IAF, terrain shielding will prevent PLA IADS from threatening IAF aircraft flying within Indian airspace. Also, IAF strikes into Tibet could reduce the lethality of PLA IADS by flying low. Considering the 4,500 m average elevation of the Tibet plateau, flying low over it wouldn't pose a significant range or payload penalty on IAF fighters.
Low flying is a stealth technique that the IAF is very comfortable with. IAF strike fighters like the Jaguar, Mirage 2000, and Rafale are honed for low-level flying.

Chinese Fighter Bases
The following is an over view of Chinese fighter bases that would launch fighter operations against the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force.

Chinese Fighter Bases Near Ladakh

The following are the PLAAF fighter bases relevant to the Ladakh sector.

via Twitter

Hotan Airbase
Elev: 4,672 ft
Len: 10,499 ft

This airbase has a standard length runway which would constraint fighter operations by limiting their payload.

The airbase reportedly hosts around 35-40 J-11, J-8, and other fighters, along with a few AEW&C

In September 2020, a report based on satellite imagery revealed that China is constructing a new R/W in Hotan. The existing runway may be constrained by terrain from further lengthening. Building a new longer length runway would allow their fighters to take off with a full load. It's also possible that the new runway would be utilized for fighter-sized drone operations, including GJ-11 Sharp Sword and J-8 drones.

Kashgar Airbase
Elev: 4, 529 ft
Len: 10,499

The airbase reportedly hosts J-11, JH-7, UAVs and H-6K?

Ngari Gunsa Airbase
Elev: 14,022 ft
Len: 14,764 ft

Ngari Gunsa is a dual-use military and civil airport which serves the town of Shiquanhe in the Ngari prefecture.

PLAAF Air Bases Near Arunachal Pradesh
Shigatse Airbase
Elev: 12,408 ft
Len: 16,404 ft

The Shigatse airport has recently been converted into an airbase. Construction of an additional airstrip is in progress on the western side of the main airstrip, likely to be used for UAV operations.

There are nine new aprons and eight new helipads recently constructed on the airbase, one of the satellite images suggests. The support buildings are used for the accommodations of the staff.

Qamdo Bamda Airport
Elevation: 14,436 ft
Length: 14,764 ft

The Bamda airport was upgraded with a longer runway in 2019. After the Doklam stand-off, another airstrip has been added to its eastern side. The additional airstrip would give this airport capability to take off and land aircraft in tandem.

Nyingchi Mainling
Elevation: 9,675 ft
Length: 9,843

Lhasa Gonggar Airport
Elevation: 11,713 ft
Length: 13,123

After the Doklam stand-off, at least two KJ-500 AEW aircraft have been observed permanently deployed here. Satellite images of October 2017 showed 20 J-11s, eight J-10s, eight Mi-171V, and two KJ-500 AEW aircraft at the airport, making it more of a military airbase.

IAF Air Base Location Advantage
The following annotated Google Earth map illustrates the advantage that the IAF enjoys in terms of the number and location of airbases.

China's AWACS Advantage
Data linked with and under control of an AWACS the J-20 would pose a formidable challenge to all IAF fighters including Rafale. With the AWACS providing situational awareness and target tracking information, there would be no need for the J-20 to switch on its powerful AESA radar and risk revealing its position. It's conceivable that the J-20 can relay tracking information obtained from the AWACS to a PL-15 missile that the J-20 has launched till the PL-15 picks up the target on its little AESA active homing terminal tracker.
The following is a brief roundup of PLAAF AWACS platforms.

KJ-2000 via Twitter

The KJ-2000 is based on IL-76. The 14-m diameter non rotating rotodome houses 3 phased array radar antennas.


KJ-200 via Twitter

The KJ-200 is based on Shaanxi Y-8 (An-12 ripoff)


KJ-500 via Twitter

The Shaanxi KJ-500 is based based on the Y-9 airframe

The KJ-500 has a fixed dorsal rotodome containing three radar arrays each containing active electronically scanned array or AESA radars arranged in a triangular configuration to give full 360° coverage. The new radar design supplants the “balance beam” design used on the earlier Shaanxi KJ-200 AEW&C.

In September 2020 an upgraded variant of the KJ-500, equipped with a refueling probe was spotted in images published on the internet.

PLAAF has deployed KJ-500s to Lhasa-Gonggar Airport in Tibet.

A new variant with a claimed fixed next generation radar was spotted in 2013

Cyber Attacks
In a limited conflict or all-out war, China is likely to use its cyber and electronic attack capabilities to the hilt. Retired Chinese general Wang Hongguang, a former deputy commander of China’s Nanjing Military Region, reportedly claimed that China could seize air supremacy over Ladakh and simultaneously capture electronic control systems, destroying India’s command network, air defense network (radar network), and air command network. The PLAAF could target India’s key infrastructures, artillery positions, armored clusters, logistics storage warehouses, oil depots, etc. It would then occupy key strategic heights, dividing and trapping the Indian deployments by cutting off the Depsang Plain and the Siachen Glacier, and finally, occupying National Highway 1 from Srinagar to Leh and thereby cutting off the connection between Ladakh and the outside world.

That's a lot of wishful thinking, but it does give an insight into the PLA's intent to use cyber warfare.

The IAF trains to operate in a dense electronic warfare environment and is aware of Chinese cyberattack capabilities.

The capability gap between the IAF and the PLAAF is significant and must not be overlooked.

In addition to what has been discussed in this article, PLA tactical missiles and weapon systems such as the Type PCL191 MRLS (Guardian-2) with precision strike capability could pose a significant threat to IAF bases and radar units. The mobile PCL 191 modular rocket system can carry eight 370 mm (14½ inch) rockets — each with a range of 350 km (220 miles) — or two 750 mm Fire Dragon 480 tactical ballistic missiles — each capable of flying up to 500 km.

The combination of the S-400 AD system, AWACS, J-20 fighters, and Su-35 / J-16 fighters represents offensive and defensive capabilities that the IAF cannot match.
The IAF does enjoy an edge over the PLAAF in terms of the number of air bases that it can operate from, and their lower elevation.

In a limited conflict, both the IAF and the PLAAF would likely rely on their outstanding pilots and platforms to conduct operations. In which case, the two air forces are likely to be evenly matched. However, if the conflict escalates and lengthens, drawing average squadron pilots into the conflict, the IAF would likely enjoy an advantage on account of better training and motivation.

Overall, in a short or limited scope conflict, the IAF would be in a position to stand up to the PLAAF. But with passage of time or increase in the scope of the conflict, the PLAAF's numbers, technological superiority, better supply chain on account of local manufacture, and greater national power will start to prevail. In any prolonged conflict, the PLAAF is likely to dominate the airspace over the border area and steadily erode the IAF's warfighting capability.

To remedy the imbalance in the short term, the IAF's best bet would be to procure cruise missiles in large numbers from Russia for its Su-30MKI and MiG-29K fleet, procure ground based EW equipment to neutralize the PLA's advantage in UAV's and PGMS, and step up production of Brahmos-A / upgrade of Su-30MKI for Brahmos-A carriage. Additionally, the IAF needs to augment its Air Defense capability by procuring MRSAM (Barak-8) missile systems directly from Israel.

Vijainder K Thakur at 4:34 PM
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Senior Member
Nov 30, 2017
With the exception of slightly overestimating the J-20, since it's still WIP, it's pretty accurate overall.

Their 4th gen procurements alone will provide them a significant advantage over the IAF for the next 2-3 years. By then they will start introducing at least 2 regiments worth of J-20 every year giving them a significant numbers advantage when it comes to next gen aircraft.

Apart from procuring MRSAMs directly from Israel, the IAF should procure 20-30 of the latest EL/L-8222WB jammers as well, as a replacement for the earlier EL/L-8222 on the MKIs. This would provide a significant boost in capability against Chinese SAMs.

The army also requires ground based EW capabilities to defeat drones.
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Bon Plan

Senior member
Dec 1, 2017
Interesting thread on j-20

This guy is saying the canards on j20 do not reflect radar because of the positioning. Sounds bs but a good thread overall..
An horizontal fin is a .... canard installed in aft !
As a Canard is a .... front horizontal fin !

classical Bull shit from US noob forumers.

If true, the sole real stealth planform is a pure delta (without canard and horizontal fin) => Not a F35, not a F22, not a J20, not a J10, not a EF2000, not a Rafale, not a Gripen.
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May 12, 2021
He is mainland chinese user. He was being pretty racist to Indians (the juvenile type). Most probably using vpn and posting CCP propaganda on twitter.
I’m here to introduce China’s Flanker fighters, J11A, J11B, J15, J16
A week before the Tiananmen Square incident, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Gorbachev visited China. After nearly three decades of confrontation, relations between China and the Soviet Union normalized. Subsequently, China and the Soviet Union signed a contract to introduce su27UK.
The Su-27 uses advanced technologies such as turbofan engines, wing-body fusions and central lift bodies, but many extreme measures are used to reduce weight in the design, which affects the strength of the body to a certain extent. Due to the limitations of the Soviet electronic technology level, the basic Su-27 only uses analog fly-by-wire flight control, and the radar, fire control, and cockpit are equivalent to the level of the United States and Europe in the 1970s.


May 12, 2021
In 1991, China spent about US$1 billion to order the first batch of 24 Su-27s from Russia, of which 18 were single-seater and 6 were two-seater. Subsequently, in 1995, a second batch of 22 was ordered, of which 16 were single-seater and 6 were double-seater.

On December 6, 1996, the Chinese and Russian governments reached an agreement after a long period of negotiation. Russia will provide technology and aircraft parts to assist the Shenyang Aircraft Company to produce up to 200 Su-27SK fighters in China. The total value is 25. Billion U.S. dollars (for example, 6 billion U.S. dollars), the agreement also restricts China from exporting. The agreement stipulates that the Amur Komsomolsk manufacturing plant will first provide a complete set of components, which will be assembled in China and then gradually localized. The model renamed after the introduction of China is called the J-11 aircraft, which is a twin-engine, heavy-duty, long-range and all-weather air superiority fighter.


May 12, 2021
This batch of Chinese self-assembled fighter jets is called J11A, using N001 radar, R27 air-to-air missile, R73 air-to-air missile, useless structural reinforcement, transonic traps still exist, after assembling 80 J11A, the Chinese Air Force finds it difficult to face Taiwan Japan’s F16 and Japan’s F15 decided to abandon the plan to continue to assemble the SU27. China decided to design the J11B by itself. The J11A was upgraded in the later stage. It can launch R77 air-to-air missiles, but it is still at the level of F15A. It is foreseeable that it will be defeated in Thai air combat of,


May 12, 2021
The development of J11B is very difficult. The WS10 engine had early reliability problems, which seriously affected the dispatch rate. After the local structure is replaced with "stiffness and other generations", chattering occurs, which needs to be solved with counterweight. The fire control system continues the design positioning of the Su-27 for pure air combat, and lacks the ability to use precision guided ground attack weapons.


May 12, 2021
The J-11B was delivered to use in June 2007 and formed full combat capabilities in 2013. . Just as Xiao Jun, a brigade commander of the Central Theater Air Force Aviation Corps, who just completed the restructuring of the J-11A to the J-11B in 2015 and took down two "golden helmets" in 2016, said when evaluating the J-11B: "You are old when you are young." This is a pity for modern heavy fighters that frequently require 30-40 years of service life.


May 12, 2021
The J-11B adopts a mechanical scanning radar equivalent to that of the J-10 fighter, and its technical level seems a bit low today.Since the Air Force did not require ground attack capabilities, the J-11B’s fire control system did not integrate precision-guided munitions. In the era of the PLA’s later development of precision-guided ground weapons, the J-11B could only launch rockets and unguided bombs. , Looks quite embarrassing
In the era of the development of the J-11B, the Chinese Air Force has put forward the idea of an offensive air force of "both offensive and defensive, and use me in the first battle." Air combat is of course an important part of offense and defense, but it is not the only part.

In the development of the basic Su-27, it was influenced by the respective duties of the Soviet Air Defense Air Force and the Frontline Air Force, and also due to the fact that the U.S. Air Force’s "one pound is not used for air-to-ground" in the development of the F-15 and the Soviet aviation technology level As a result, the basic Su-27 only has a very rudimentary ground attack capability. Basically, it can only use unguided rockets and iron bombs to approach weak opponents who lack advanced air defense capabilities. In actual combat, whether such an adversary is worth attacking with high-cost advanced fighter jets such as the Su-27 is a question.

But this is not a problem for the Soviet air force. A large number of Su-17/22 and Su-24 are more suitable for ground attack. First of all, the air defense air force equipped with Su-27 does not undertake ground attack tasks at all. In the development of the second and third generation Su-27, even for Russia, the technical basis has already deviated, emphasizing the increase in ground attack capabilities.

But the Chinese Air Force was different from the beginning. The Chinese Air Force lacks an effective ground attack platform, especially a combat attack platform with a long range, a large amount of ammunition, and a self-escorting capability. The H-6 has a long range and a large amount of ammunition, but it lacks the ability to self-escort. Qiang-5 has limited self-escort capability, but its range and ammunition capacity are low.

Therefore, in the 1990s shortly after the introduction of the Su-27, the Chinese Air Force used the Su-27 to perform ground attack missions during exercises along the southeast coast. Although it could only launch unguided rockets, it became a topic of ridicule in Taiwan. However, in the specific environment at that time, it was only Su-27 to take off from a relatively safe inland base and have enough space time and ammunition on the other side of the Taiwan Strait, and the Qiang-5 was a bit reluctant to use.


May 12, 2021
Technically, the development era of the J-11B is already an era of digital avionics and multi-tasking of tactical aircraft. The F-15's "a pound is not used for air-to-ground" era background has two aspects: 1. The unsuccessful example of F-111 makes people talk about multi-purpose use, and the special use of air combat helps to reduce the technology in research and development. Risks; 2. Avionics technology limitations make air-to-air and air-to-ground need special systems.

However, the third-generation fighter's high thrust-to-weight ratio and low wing load provide a large amount of residual lift, making air combat fighters naturally suitable for conversion to fighter-bombers with low mobility requirements. On the other hand, the development of electronic technology allows avionics to easily meet the requirements of air-to-air and air-to-ground. In the early days, it was necessary to switch modes from the ground to the ground. Later, it was developed to be able to switch in real time by the pilot in the air. The American F-18 classic was the first to successfully achieve multi-tasking, so the official number of the F-18 is F/A-18, highlighting its dual-purpose characteristics. The F-15, which "a pound is not used for air-to-ground", developed the successful F-15E, although the US Air Force is still ashamed to call it F/A-15E.

However, the development of the J-11B still followed the design concept of the Su-27 basic pure air combat, ignoring China’s actual technical conditions and the reality of changes in the Air Force’s thinking, making the J-11B incorrectly positioned in the design, resulting in uncorrectable shortcomings.
During the development of the J-11B, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force may think that the Su-30MKK fighter jet combined with a large number of purchased and imitated Kh-29 missiles is sufficient to meet the needs of our army for precision strikes. There is no requirement for the J-11B to have strong precision strike capabilities.

In contrast, in addition to localization and partial replacement, the J-11 continues to use the Su-27's simulated flight control and unreinforced airframe. The simplest fly-by-wire flight control just uses electrical signals to transmit the pilot's maneuvering actions. But in signal transmission, automatic realization of a certain linkage and adding stability, this is the meaning of fly-by-wire flight control.

The analog flight control is realized by using an analog circuit with an operational amplifier as the core. The system is relatively simple and has a fast response speed, but the functional complexity is difficult to improve. The circuit has inherent drift and failure rate problems of the analog circuit. It has used old-fashioned electronic tubes or transistor radios. People will experience this. The tuned radio station needs to be fine-tuned with the knob every day, otherwise nothing moves and it may be off the stage. The analog flight control is more difficult to upgrade, just like a tube radio must be connected to a recorder, unless the jack is reserved, it can only be replaced entirely.

The simplest digital flight control is to simply digitize the analog flight control. However, the vitality of digital flight control lies in the integration of advanced functions. It not only automatically analyzes and filters the pilot’s excessive maneuvering actions, but also automatically compensates for changes in weight and center of gravity caused by fuel and ammunition consumption. It can also be cross-linked with the engine and fire control for implementation. Feihuo push integrated control, in the ever-changing battle, free the pilot from complex, cumbersome, and delicate operations, and become a tactician instead of just an operator. The digital architecture also provides a system self-check function, real-time monitoring of the system status, not only prompts when a failure occurs, but can even automatically reorganize, and restore the main functions through part-time jobs in other systems. The digital architecture can even be upgraded through software, just as a smart phone can be upgraded through downloading, or even new features can be added.

The digital architecture is also easy to implement an open structure. Using a PC as an analogy means that you are no longer stuck with specific CPUs, graphics cards, memory, and hard drives. As long as they meet the architectural standards, they can be directly replaced. This is not only the convenience of maintenance and upgrading, but also encourages the introduction of new technologies. In a sense, the IBM PC quickly defeated the Mac, which had already "occupied" the market, thanks to the open architecture. F-22 is the first to use open architecture on fighter aircraft. F-35 represents the highest level of open architecture. To a large extent, it is the main reason why F-35 has become a "soft fighter", making F-35 unlimited in the future. Upgrade potential. This also represents an important direction for the development of fighter jets in the future. "Hard performance" is no longer the only factor that determines combat effectiveness.


May 12, 2021
The J-11B also did not move the infrared photoelectric search and tracking system (IRST) in front of the cockpit to the right side like the J-15, leaving room for the aerial refueling probe to be suitable for patrols in the open sea (such as around Taiwan or Nansha). The J-10A already has the ability to refuel in the air.

The premature decline of the J-11B was caused by its low positioning, and Shen Fei has a hard-to-shirk responsibility.

Of course, not all responsibility lies with Shen Fei, and the Air Force is also responsible. For the Air Force, the old thinking that only cares about the near and not far away must also keep pace with the times. The beginning of the 21st century is an era when China's national defense situation is very severe. It is natural for the Air Force to urgently require new fighters to enter service as soon as possible. However, the Chinese military (not just the Air Force) has entered service with a large number of modern high-performance, high-cost equipment, and still has not jumped out of the old mentality of treating military products as consumables for short-term use. Only by winning the battle can the soldiers be defeated without fighting. Therefore, the issue of war attrition must be considered. But long-term peace depends on the sustainability of military modernization, which requires high-quality, high-durability, and high-upgradability equipment, rather than "use and throw away." This needs to be balanced.
In the development of the J-16, both the military and Shen Fei have made great progress in the guiding ideology, and no longer developed the "short, flat and fast" route of the J-11BS+JH7A avionics.


May 12, 2021
In contrast, the J-16 did not simply combine the J-11BS platform with the JH-7’s fire control and external management, and took the old path of short, flat and fast but too low positioning. The J-11D can be regarded as a single-seat JH-7. -16. This is a huge improvement. Compared with the J-11B, 80% of the body structure of the J-16 has been changed or redesigned, and 90% of the system has been improved or completely new. For the first time, imageless manufacturing technology has been applied.

More importantly, the J-16 has a digital integrated fire control and advanced electronic warfare system centered on the domestic active electronic scanning radar, and it realizes integrated control of flying fire and propulsion around the new generation of digital flight control and the improved "Taihang" engine. Improved flight performance and mission effectiveness. It is said that the overall performance is close to that of F-15K/SG. This is the ultimate mass-produced version of F-15E. The US Air Force’s "Eagle 2040" was also developed on this basis. In other words, in accordance with the expectations of the U.S. Air Force, this standard F-15 fighter will still be the first-line main fighter in 2040.
The rigidity of partial components replaced with composite materials is to maintain similar structural elasticity. The problem is that the rigidity of the partial components themselves only solves the structural elasticity problem at the component level, but the components are to be installed on a larger structure. The weight of the "hang-on" components is reduced, which will inevitably affect the overall structure. And damping. The more highly optimized the basic structure is for weight reduction, the more sensitive it is to such weight changes. It is very unreasonable for Shen Fei to trip over such a low-level mistake, but it is also the inevitable result of seeing the trees but not the woods caused by dogmatic and mechanical "understanding". Shenyang finally saw the woods. The overall structural optimization is an important driving force for the J-16 to no longer be limited to partial reinforcement and weight reduction, but to a comprehensive redesign.