China Carves Into Bhutan With Outposts, Villages Despite Talks

[Ashwin]

Satellite images of this region, the sharpest to be released so far, suggest that Thimphu may have no option but to accept the fait accompli presented by the Chinese in this area.​

New Delhi: Ongoing border talks between Bhutan and China to formally demarcate their boundary have not prevented Beijing from continuing unsanctioned construction activity in North Bhutan's Jakarlung Valley.

Satellite images of this region, the sharpest to be released so far, suggest that Thimphu may have no option but to accept the fait accompli presented by the Chinese in this area which lies 50 kilometres from Bhutan's Eastern border with Arunachal Pradesh.

"This is a case of China making a claim to an area, based on earlier grazing practices by herders, that is very recent and without precedent - and then unilaterally seizing the territory and settling it with villages, military barracks and outposts,'' according to Professor Robert Barnett, an expert on Tibetan history at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) at the University of London.


''Jakarlung adjoins the Beyul Khenpajong, which is an important cultural and religious area for the Bhutanese. So this case represents China making a very recent, doubtful claim about an area that is of great cultural significance to a far less powerful neighbour, knowing that neighbour has few if any options as to its response.''

The images in this report from Maxar show how China has scaled up its physical presence in the Jakarlung Valley over two years. Images from December 7, last week, show ongoing construction of at least 129 buildings which appear to be residential quarters in one settlement and at least 62 buildings in a second enclave a short distance away. Earlier images from August 2021 of the same area show that none of these buildings had been constructed.

Before and after images indicate the pace of Chinese construction activity in the Jakarlung Valley of North Bhutan. In August 2021, residential quarters had not been constructed. In December, 2023, there are more than 100. (high res: here)
''The sheer scale of this developmental activity emphasises that these villages are not merely isolated outposts but rather integral components forming a comprehensive ecosystem that supports China's territorial ambitions, further contributing to the Sinicization of the Bhutanese landscape,'' says Damien Symon, who has written extensively about the Chinese intrusions in the East and West of Bhutan.

Map location of construction activity identified in this story with other areas of disputed Chinese construction activity on Bhutanese territory highlighted. (With inputs from Damien Symon)
The new images come at a time when Bhutan has stepped up ties with China, in an effort to end Chinese incursions into its territory once and for all. In October this year, Foreign Minister Tandi Dorji travelled to Beijing, a first for Bhutan. That same month, Prime Minister Lotay Tshering told The Hindu, ''We hope to see a line being drawn- this side Bhutan and that side China. We don't have that right now."

Before and after images of Chinese construction activity in the Jakarlung Valley shows a second enclave having been constructed by December 2023. (high res: here)
Significantly, in his interview to The Hindu, Tshering did not reject the possibility of Beijing and Thimphu agreeing to a land swap - where territory in areas including Jakarlung, described in this report, could be exchanged if China were to give up its claim to the Doklam plateau which lies further to the south. In November, Bhutan's King Jigme Khesar Nangyel Wangchuk visited India on an official visit. While details of the ongoing border negotiations were not spelt out in the joint statement which was released, both sides ''held discussions on the entire gamut of bilateral cooperation and regional and global issues of mutual interest.''

In 2017, India and China were involved in a tense two-month-long standoff in Doklam when Indian troops physically prevented the extension of an illegal Chinese road in the area. Mr. Tshering did, however, confirm that ''it will be to Bhutan's interest to make sure both the parties [India and China] are happy with the decisions we make'' in the border talks.

Irrespective of any outcome, ''India may be concerned by the precedent that Jakarlung sets for China's willingness to abrogate treaty obligations when it comes to border disputes,'' says Robert Barnett. ''China signed a formal agreement with Bhutan in 1998 not to alter the status quo in disputed areas. In occupying and settling Jakarlung, it violated that agreement.''

India's immediate concerns over Chinese expansion within Bhutanese territory also extend to the Amu Chu river valley which lies directly adjacent to the Doklam plateau.


Following the Doklam standoff, China has constructed at least three villages along the valley. Any further Chinese extension South would raise alarm bells in New Delhi since that would mean a Chinese presence close to the Siliguri Corridor, the narrow corridor that connects India's Northeast with the rest of the country. The Indian Army has, on several occasions, made it clear to the government that China is approaching a red line that it should never be allowed to cross.

China's use of what India's first Chief of Defence Staff, General Bipin Rawat described as "salami-slicing" of territory has been a standard tactic for all of its territorial expansion plans - from converting shoals in the South China Seas to full-fledged military outposts to pushing across multiple points in Eastern Ladakh.

''In May 2020 in Eastern Ladakh, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) advanced in five areas, but in that case, India strongly reacted after a few days,'' explains Claude Arpi, the renowned Tibetologist.

''In Bhutan's case, the Royal Bhutan Army does not have the capacity to react and push the PLA or Border Defence Force back or even stop the construction of the new villages.''


Of greater concern to New Delhi, which in the past was a net guarantor of security for Bhutan, the ongoing talks could result in a profound geo-strategic realignment in the area. ''Bhutan is slowly shifting towards the strategic orbit of China and there is not much that India can do, except if a new security agreement is signed between Delhi and Thimphu,'' says Arpi.

''It is a difficult situation for Delhi and for the King of Bhutan.''

Pics: China Carves Into Bhutan With Outposts, Villages Despite Talks

Ongoing border talks between Bhutan and China to formally demarcate their boundary have not prevented Beijing from continuing unsanctioned construction activity in North Bhutan's Jakarlung Valley.

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[D68]

Nothing new. Chinese believe in staying one step ahead all the time. Same as building artifical islands in SCS. As long as there are no unforseen results from their perspective, they will continue eeking out an advantage.

 

[Ginvincible]

India is really struggling on this front. I know that road progress is considered good but still feels like India is incredibly vulnerable and modernization is still too lethargic.

Feels like the plan is just praying China doesn't decide to massively escalate here before India is prepared.

 

[D68]

India is really struggling on this front. I know that road progress is considered good but still feels like India is incredibly vulnerable and modernization is still too lethargic.

Feels like the plan is just praying China doesn't decide to massively escalate here before India is prepared.

The thinking is they will prioritise Taiwan and SCS and be averse to opening another front against India in the worst case scenario. Who knows how things will pan out. At the moment, government can't justify increasing the defence budget. Against China, we need to modernise forces holistically; from infantry to fighters jets, submarines etc. Piecemeal orders are not enough.

 

[Ashwin]

Looks like we are loosing bhutan slowly.

Doklam shadow over India-Bhutan relations​

TSHERING Topgay was sworn in last month as the Prime Minister of Bhutan, succeeding Lotay Tshering. He had led the People’s Democratic Party to victory in the elections to the national assembly. The Bhutan Tendrel Party, a new entrant led by Pema Chewang, emerged as the main Opposition party. Meanwhile, the United Nations announced that Bhutan was no longer an LDC (least developed country), though economic distress is around the corner, even as India will ‘bridge-finance’ Bhutan’s 12th and 13th Five-Year Plans. Between 2008 and 2013, then PM Jigme Thinley expanded Bhutan’s diplomatic relations by reaching out to several countries, except the P5 nations. Towards the end of his term, Thinley made serious overtures to the Chinese, causing unease in India.

The Global Times sees an Indian hand in opposing Bhutan-China diplomatic relations. The regime change following pro-Chinese overtures was more than a coincidence. When I visited Bhutan after the 2017 Doklam episode, I noticed an undercurrent of anti-India sentiment as some Bhutanese wanted to open up to China.

In an interview with an Indian newspaper in October last year, then PM Lotay Tshering discussed the dramatic progress in the border talks with China between 2020 and 2023. Referring to the three-step roadmap, he emphasised that there were no ‘real differences between Bhutan and China’ and that one more meeting ‘while we are in office will clinch the issue’. He added: “We hope to see the border demarcation materialise.” Asked whether Doklam would be traded for land in the north — Jakarlung and Pasamlung valleys — Lotay confirmed this, adding that neither side had evidence to claim it. This set the cat among the pigeons. Traditionally kept in the loop over Bhutan-China border talks, India appeared to have been left out at that time.

In November last year, King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck visited New Delhi and met PM Narendra Modi. Media reports suggested that bilateral issues were discussed, which the joint statement covered. But there was no mention of the Bhutan-China border talks in the statement. Of course, the two leaders must have covered the issue, but not a whisper came out. Later, in November, Lotay was trounced in the first round of the election, securing less than 15 per cent of the votes. In December, the King announced Bhutan’s biggest connectivity and mega city project, the Gelephu Mindfulness City. Gelephu, which lies on the Bhutan-Assam border, will have an international airport and rail link intended to establish an economic corridor connecting South Asia with South-East Asia through the troubled North East. The King has travelled to all 20 districts in Bhutan, selling the smart city project as a game-changer for national happiness. Gelephu also acted as a diversion from the border talks.

In December last year, Maxar Technologies reported fresh Chinese encroachments of the three ‘well-off society’ villages across the Amu Chu river in Bhutan. This is in addition to a number of dual-use villages constructed in Doklam. In 2017, India had intervened in Doklam as per treaty agreements to prevent China from constructing a road to its perceived but disputed tri-junction at Gympoche. According to the 2012 protocol, the site issue has to be resolved between India’s tri-junction at Batangla and the Chinese at Gympoche, trilaterally between India, China and Bhutan. The Chinese have built a road hugging Amu Chu south towards Jampheri ridge, but to get there, Torsa Nala has to be crossed. The Indian Army is prepared for the worst case scenario — the Doklam plateau lost to Beijing in a Bhutan-China package deal — but will have contingency plans to prevent crossing the red line in Torsa and thwarting Chinese attempts to capture the Jampheri ridge, which overlooks the Siliguri Corridor. Further, the 17 Strike Corps will keep a hawk’s eye over Chumbi Valley to deter China from any misadventure towards Jampheri, pending resolution of the tri-junction matter.

According to Maxar Technologies and independent reports in December last year, the Chinese penetration of Bhutan was significant but not widely known. India is silent about it. China has replaced India as Bhutan’s biggest trading partner and accounts for a quarter of the total trade. The Chinese power corporation is involved in the Chukha and Punatsangchhu hydel projects. The Sino Hydro Corporation, China Gezhouba Group, China Road and Bridge Corporation and other Chinese state-owned companies are working on different projects. The China Railway Engineering Group is exploring railway connections through the Lhasa-Gyantse link. The Chinese Communist Party’s state-owned companies have built the 220-km Friendship Highway, a 290-km lateral road, a 100-km Gelephu-Gointre road and 60-km Wangdue-Trongsa road between 2013 and 2018.

While Chinese companies are mining for gold and copper, fibre optic cables are being laid, expanding the mobile network. Huawei has been involved in 3G and 4G services since 2009. Chinese high-end tourists visited in high numbers (80,000 before the Covid pandemic). The details of financing of these development projects is not known, though the push for establishing diplomatic relations was intensified in 2023, when Topgay said: “Theoretically, how can Bhutan not have bilateral relations with China? The question is when and in what manner.”

If King Khesar Wangchuck has been testing the waters, delinking border talks with those China has with India, he may perhaps also slow down on the Doklam swap.